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Summary 
The principal objective of this thesis is to investigate and understand the relationship 
between Ireland and Spain from 1939 to 1955 by researching the cultural, economic 
and political ties that existed between both nations. The research is based on primary 
sources  examined  in  the  diplomatic  archives  of  Dublin  and  Madrid  as  well  as 
original  documents  analysed  through unrestricted  access  to  private  archives.  The 
main body of files investigated centre on the reports of diplomats that reveal the 
nature  of  this  relationship,  which  was  in  the  main  harmonious,  despite  the 
momentous internal and external challenges that confronted both countries during 
that  period.  The  findings  expose  the  perceptions  held  by  the  leading  politicians 
towards this affiliation and why it was considered important to maintain. The results 
also show that ultimately the relationship proved ephemeral because it was based on 
antediluvian and archaic values that were incompatible with the prevailing course of 
history.  By juxtaposing Ireland and Spain between the start of the Second World 
War and the admission of both nations into the United Nations in 1955, a major gap 
in  historical  research  is  explored  that  substantially  assists  the  knowledge of  this 
bilateral relationship. Furthermore, the research lifts a veil on the socio-economic 
and socio-political environments of both countries in a way that contributes to the 
historiographical appraisal of the period. 
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Introduction
Diplomacy is                                 Diplomacy  is  the  art  and  practice  of  conducting  international  negotiations.  The 
investigation  of  the  important  role  played  by  professional  diplomats  has  been 
instrumental  in  furthering  our  knowledge  of  historic  time  periods  and  relations 
between  States.  Historians  have  always  attached  considerable  importance  to 
diplomacy as a recognised branch, and resource, of history. This thesis focuses on 
Irish-Spanish  relations  from  1939-55;  it  therefore  traces  the  nature  of  that 
relationship, considering the links, common values and shared experiences that held 
it together as well as its successes and failures. It also sheds new light on the vision, 
purpose and principles that underpinned their respective foreign policies as well as 
the place they envisaged for their nations in an international context. The essence of 
this story is found in the diplomacy of the period and it is brought to life as a result 
of  exhaustive  research  undertaken  in  the  diplomatic  files  of  both  nations  which 
provide the thesis  with a healthy balance and full  panorama of how that historic 
relationship evolved throughout the period. For the first time the definitive story of 
Irish-Spanish relations during the most critical periods of the twentieth century can 
now  be  told.  Probing  investigations  reveal  the  interesting  parallels  and  joint 
participations between both nations during the Second World War, as the conflict 
ebbed and flowed,  and  during the Cold  War,  as  tensions  in  the post-war  period 
intensified. The thesis is also uniquely identifiable for the personalisation it brings to 
foreign  policy  which  hitherto  has  been  neglected  and  often  omitted  from  the 
historical landscape. The investigative documentation of the invaluable contribution 
made  by  diplomats  from  both  sides,  the  eyes  and  ears  of  Irish  and  Spanish 
policymakers, finally accords them the recognition they deserve as the foot soldiers 
of foreign policy. 
In  1986  the  Government  introduced  legislation  known  as  the  National 
Archives Act which established the National Archives. For the first time the public 
was statutorily entitled to examine the records of several State bodies, and for the 
purposes  of  diplomacy,  the  files  of  the  Department  of  External  (later  Foreign) 
Affairs. This significant development gave rise to an astonishing wealth of political, 
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historical and literature works that has continued to rise steadily in the succeeding 
years. Hitherto, only a handful of notable academics had published material on Irish 
foreign policy. In 1953 Thomas Desmond Williams, Professor of Modern History in 
University  College  Dublin  (UCD),  published  several  articles  on  Irish  neutrality 
during  the  Second  World  War  in  the  Leader.1 In  1969  a  publication  by  David 
Harkness2 chartered  the  turbulent  course  of  Irish  independence  from the  British 
Commonwealth since the establishment of the Irish Free State on 6 December 1922. 
During the 1970s Patrick Keatinge furthered our knowledge of Irish foreign policy 
in two books that focused, amongst other issues, on the policymakers who chartered 
Ireland’s path to inclusion in the international community.3 
As a result of the pioneering work undertaken by these distinguished figures, 
a  new  generation  of  scholars,  some  who  studied  under  Professor  Williams  in 
particular, became interested in researching Irish foreign policy. Without access to 
the diplomatic files of the Department of External Affairs they were forced to study 
abroad in the archives of London, Rome and Washington D.C. Their collective body 
of work produced several essential articles and accounts on Irish diplomacy in the 
twentieth century. Dermot Keogh’s major book on the relationship between the Irish 
Government  and the  Vatican,  its  most  important  overseas  mission,  brought  new 
insight and important evidence that challenged many old ideas and perceptions on 
this relationship.4 Keogh followed up on this success with a substantial account on 
the establishment of External Affairs, its raison d’être and the enthusiastic public 
servants who joined the department hoping to enhance the cause of Ireland abroad.5 
With the opening of the National Archives Keogh was finally able to examine some 
of the most contentious events in Irish foreign policy, most notably, the visit of An 
Taoiseach Éamon de Valera to the German Legation to offer his condolences on the 
death of Adolf Hitler.6 
1 From 1958-73 Williams was joint editor of Irish Historical Studies. 
2 David  Harkness,  The  restless  dominion:  the  Irish  Free  State  and  the  British  Commonwealth  
(London, 1969). 
3 See Patrick Keatinge, The formulation of Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 1973) and A place among the  
nations: issue of Irish foreign policy (Dublin, 1978). 
4 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, the bishops and Irish politics, 1919-39 (New York, 1986). 
5 _____, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988).
6 _____, ‘Éamon de Valera and Hitler: an analysis of international reaction to the visit to the German 
Minister, May 1945’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, iii (1989), pp 69-92. 
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Ronan  Fanning,  another  member  of  that  emerging  “new  generation”  of 
researchers and protégé of Professor Williams as an undergraduate in UCD, wrote a 
highly  critical  overview  of  the  Department  of  Finance.7 His  analysis  of  the 
department, especially its economic policy during the Emergency years,  1939-45, 
helped explain why Irish missions overseas were so severely understaffed and the 
budget allocated to External Affairs was so paltry. Fanning illuminated other issues 
that concerned the Emergency years, most importantly, neutrality. Although arguing 
that neutrality was first and foremost a visible expression of independence, Fanning 
went  on to  detail  the  assistance  that  the Government  provided  the Allied  cause, 
which ran contrary to its declared position of strict neutrality and the public message 
disseminated by the Taoiseach to the people at the time.8 
As a result of this reawakening of the important role diplomacy played in 
both preserving and shaping Ireland’s place in the world, despite tumultuous events 
on the battlefields of Europe,  other gaps in historical  research began to be filled 
related  to  this  period.  Donal  Ó  Drisceoil’s  wide-ranging  monograph  on  Irish 
neutrality and politics during the Emergency focused particular attention on the role 
censorship played in protecting neutrality from internal and external criticism.9 This 
concentration of literature on Ireland during the Second World War continued with 
more  publications  by  Eunan  Ó  Halpin,10 Brian  Girvin  and  Geoffrey  Roberts,11 
addressing such fundamental issues as how “neutral” was Irish neutrality, what was 
the reaction of the belligerent powers Britain and Germany to this policy and how 
was it received by the public at the time.  
Notwithstanding  the  growing  interest  and  plethora  of  work  on  the  role 
diplomacy  played  in  an  Irish  context  during  the  Second  World  War,  other 
contributors felt the need to move away from this central thrust of scholarship and 
focus instead on other international dimensions to Irish foreign policy, such as the 
United Nations. A strong attempt to rebalance this focus came with Joseph Skelly’s 
7 Ronan Fanning, The Irish Department of Finance, 1922-58 (Dublin, 1978). 
8 _____, ‘Irish neutrality – a historical review’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, i (1982), pp 
27-38. 
9 Donal Ó Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 1939-45: neutrality, politics and society (Cork, 1996). 
10 Eunan O’Halpin,  Defending Ireland: the Irish Free State and its  enemies  since 1922  (Oxford, 
1999). 
11 Brian Girvin & Geoffrey Roberts, Ireland and the Second World War (Dublin, 1999). 
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article on Ireland’s isolated place in the post-war period.12 He analysed this isolation, 
seeking to establish not only the degree to which it was self-imposed, but also how 
policymakers in Iveagh House, seat of the Department of External Affairs, viewed 
Ireland’s position in an international context vis-à-vis the gradual deterioration in 
East-West relations. Skelly assembled a follow-up to this article with his work on 
Ireland’s entrance into the U.N. in 1955 and the active, inclusive and participatory 
role  it  enjoyed  in  that  organisation  during  the  premiership  of  Seán  Lemass  as 
Taoiseach and Frank Aiken’s tenure as Minister for External Affairs. 
There  are  a  few  other  important  monographs  which  help  to  illuminate 
various aspects of Irish foreign policy in the post-war period. Bernadette Whelan’s 
work  on  the  application  to  receive  Marshall  Aid  and  the  diplomatic  triangle  of 
negotiations  between  Ireland,  Britain  and  the  United  States  surrounding  the 
European Recovery Programme exposed the divergent  views held by officials  in 
External Affairs on the one hand, and at Cabinet level on the other, in the First Inter-
Party Government.13 Likewise, the role diplomacy played in shaping the country’s 
place at regional level within bodies such as the Council of Europe was examined in 
fine detail in a collaborative work by Eunan O’Halpin and Michael Kennedy.14 This 
gradual  shift  away from the  heavily  weighted  role  diplomacy  played  during  the 
Second World War towards a more comprehensive appraisal of Irish foreign policy, 
was highlighted by an important publication by Michael Kennedy and Joseph Skelly, 
with  contributions  by  several  renowned historians.  From the  origins  of  External 
Affairs in the 1920s to the Christian values that underpinned its policy in the 1930s 
and the  emergence  of  a  more  positive  European outlook in  the  later  1950s,  the 
historiography of Irish foreign policy was now being fully appraised in this work.15 
It was perhaps fitting that those who had spent their years as undergraduate 
students  listening  to  their  lecturers  lament  the  poor  accessibility  of  records 
concerning  Irish foreign policy should decide  to  jointly  contribute  to  a series  of 
12 Joseph Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: a 
new look’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, vii (1996), pp 63-80. 
13 Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57 (Dublin, 2000). 
14 Michael Kennedy & Eunan O’Halpin, Ireland and the Council of Europe: from isolation towards  
integration (Strasbourg, 2000). 
15 _____ & Joseph Skelly, Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000). 
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volumes  entitled  ‘Documents  on  Irish  Foreign  Policy’.  Dermot  Keogh,  Ronan 
Fanning, Eunan O’Halpin, Michael Kennedy and Catriona Crowe, senior archivist at 
the National Archives, co-authored these publications that chartered the historical 
development of Irish foreign policy in each decade of the twentieth century. For the 
first time, the public could easily access the full transcripts of files from External 
Affairs as well as be guided by a useful glossary that explained the hierarchy in the 
department, the background behind each diplomat and the various terminology and 
protocol associated with diplomacy. 
This thesis, as already outlined, charters Irish-Spanish diplomatic relations. 
What  then is  the state  of  play in Spanish diplomatic  history?  There are  obvious 
parallels with the Irish situation. It is only in the last decade or so that an astonishing 
wealth of political, historical and literary work has emerged that has shed new light 
on  Spanish  foreign  policy  and  the  purpose  of  diplomacy  during  the  Francoist 
dictatorship. Precisely because the regime was so paranoid and forbade the objective 
investigation of State records throughout its lifetime, much of the material that was 
published  was  partisan  in  nature,  lacked  a  solid  grounding  in  primary  source 
material  and too often took the form of memoirs from individuals determined to 
present their careers and actions in as benign a light as possible.16 Many of these 
memoirs were written in the post-war period and during a time when Spain was in 
the throes of international  condemnation by the U.N. for support rendered to the 
Axis  side  during  the  Second  World  War.  These  individuals  tried  to  remodel 
themselves as shrewd officials who on the surface had appeared to support the Axis 
side but who were in fact playing them along in order to keep Spain out of the war. 
This thesis exposes the truth behind such lies with evidence acquired from archival 
research in Madrid and Dublin. 
It must also be remembered that the Spanish people, living under a repressive 
tyrant, were only told what the regime wanted them to know. Illiteracy remained a 
blight in Spanish society and with no political opposition to Franco, it was very easy 
to  propagate  Spanish  foreign  policy  during  the  war  as  being  nothing  other  than 
adhering  to  a  strict  neutral  policy.  Again  this  thesis  repeatedly  shows  that  both 
16 See Ramón Serrano Súñer,  Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar  (Madrid, 1947) and J. M. Doussinague, 
España tenía razón, 1939-1945 (Madrid, 1949).  
5
Franco,  his  brother-in-law  and  other  Ministers  frequently  violated  the  Hague 
Convention of 1907 which defined the rights and responsibilities of neutral powers. 
In complete control of the press and publications the regime was able to encourage 
apologist  historians17 to  rewrite  history and portray Spanish  foreign  policy  in  as 
peace-loving a light  as possible  with Franco lauded for being the pragmatic  and 
caring protector of the nation.
The death of the dictator in 1975 did little to rebalance this one-sided and 
false historical narrative for practical as well as political reasons. With the records of 
the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  still  closed  to  objective  investigation,  apologist 
historians  for  the  dictatorship  continued  to  write  lengthy  monographs  that  were 
heavily weighted towards partisan interpretation.18 The emerging Spanish democracy 
was  still  cautious  in  liberalising  universities  and  archives  for  fear  that  it  might 
unleash internal opposition from pro-Francoist supporters in the Spanish Parliament 
and  the  military,  collectively  known  as  the  Bunker.  A  general  consensus  was 
reached that Spain should forget the legacy of the Francoist dictatorship and instead 
concentrate on other more pressing issues. This pact became known as the Pact of 
Forgetting or  el pacto de olvido. Indeed as Julius Ruiz has noted,19 not until 1985 
were historians permitted to begin the exhaustive process of examining records of 
executions committed throughout the country after the Spanish Civil War ended. As 
a result of this it took Ruiz years to finally refute Ricardo de la Cierva’s claim that 
only 10,000 people were executed after the Civil War.20
With the consequent liberalisation of universities and the opening of archives 
there began a reawakening and reassessment of the Francoist dictatorship thanks to 
important contributions by some notable American, English and Spanish historians. 
Since the 1960s American historiography on the Francoist  regime had been well 
17 See El Caballero Audaz (J. M. Carretero),  Gracias a España  (Madrid, 1946), Sancho González, 
Diez años de historia difícil: índice de la neutralidad de España (Madrid, 1959), M. M. Labarra, El 
desafío rojo a España (Madrid, 1968), Agustín del Río Cisneros, España, rumbo a la postguerra: la  
paz  española  de  Franco  (Madrid,  1947)  and  _____,  Política  internacional  de  España:  el  caso  
español en la O.N.U. y el mundo (Madrid, 1946). 
18 See  Ricardo  de  la  Cierva,  Historia  del  franquismo:  orígenes  y  configuración,  1939-1945 
(Barcelona, 1976).  
19 Julius Ruiz, Franco’s justice: repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2005). 
20 Ruiz himself puts the figure at approximately 50,000. Paul Preston, on the other hand, believes the 
true  figure  could  be  as  high  as  180,000.  See  Paul  Preston,  The  Spanish  Civil  War:  reaction,  
revolution and revenge (London, 2006), p. 302.  
6
served  thanks  in  large  part  to  Stanley  Payne,  internationally  recognised  for  his 
publications  that  delved  into  the  institutional  framework  behind  the  Francoist 
regime,21 especially the Falange party, the Spanish Army’s eagerness to intervene in 
domestic  politics,22 as  well  as  the  clash  of  nationalism within  the  Spanish  body 
politic.23 In  more  recent  years  Boris  Liedtke  has  written  accounts  on  American-
Spanish relations in the post-war period and how U.S. policymakers were willing to 
turn a blind eye to the U.N. resolution in favour of a more active engagement with 
the regime, in part as Liedtke argued, because of  realpolitik and heightening Cold 
War tensions.24 
There are several general works on Spain that place the regime in its long-
term historical  context  but  some by several English authors  are  significant.  Paul 
Preston  has  written  several  revelatory  publications  on  the  dictatorship  and  his 
excoriating biography of Franco is  still  recognised as the definitive  work on the 
dictator in any language.25 Preston also investigated some of the most controversial 
diplomatic  demarches  in  Spanish diplomacy,  most  notably,  the Hendaye  meeting 
between Franco and Adolf Hitler on 23 October 1940 which exposed the fallacy 
between many myths concocted by apologists in the post-war period. Denis Smyth 
has written on British diplomacy during the Second World War. He detailed how, 
given Britain’s perilous situation in the war after the fall of France in June 1940, 
London preferred to appease Franco with trade agreements and imports of essential 
goods rather than take a heavy handed approach against him.26 Smyth argued that the 
British  Government  and  Churchill,  in  particular,  favoured  a  pragmatic  policy 
because an aggressively hostile one towards Spain might have forced it to join in the 
war on the Axis side. A wider contextual panorama to Spain has been provided by 
21 S. G. Payne, Falange: a history of Spanish Fascism (California, 1961).
22 ______, Politics and the military in modern Spain (California, 1967). 
23 _____, ‘Nationalism, Regionalism and Micronationalism in Spain’ in Journal of Contemporary 
History, xxvi (1991), pp 479-91. 
24 See  Boris  Liedtke,  Embracing a dictatorship:  US relations  with  Spain,  1945-53  (Basingstoke, 
1998). 
25 Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993). 
26 Denis Smyth,  Diplomacy and strategy of survival: British policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-41  
(Cambridge, 1986).
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Mary  Vincent  who  concentrated  her  analysis  of  the  Francoist  regime  on  its 
perceptions of women and the role of the Catholic Church in society.27
There are several  crucial  books by other historians that have significantly 
aided our understanding of the regime from its flirtation with the Axis camp right 
through to its abandonment of its fascist principles with the jettisoning of autarky in 
favour of a more liberalised economy in the late 1950s. Franco’s relationship with 
Adolf Hitler as well the steady flow of essential goods, most notably wolfram, to 
Germany  during  the  war  has  been  well  documented  by  Christian  Leitz.28 In  a 
splendid  collection  of  articles  which  Leitz  edited  with  David Dunthorn,  a  broad 
spectrum of gaps in the historiography of the period were filled, in particular, the 
regime’s diplomatic relations with other States.29 Although some of the best writing 
of  the  regime  has  been  produced  in  Britain  and  the  United  States  there  exist 
important books in other European languages. However, the final critical element in 
understanding the progression of the historiography of the Francoist dictatorship has 
come about thanks to the work of Spanish authors. 
Javier Tusell  comprehensively dismantled several  longstanding myths  that 
had been concocted around the supposed neutral  policy of the regime during the 
early years of Axis dominance in the Second World War.30 His research detailed the 
furtive provisioning of U-boats in Spanish ports as well as the assistance officials 
rendered to Axis agents operating in the port city of Tangier. Manuel Ros Agudo 
likewise focused scholarly attention on the repeatedly unneutral acts committed by 
Franco  and  his  imperial  aspirations  to  annex  territory  from  France,  Gibraltar, 
Portugal, Morocco and Algeria with the discovery of offensive military plans during 
his  archival  research.31 Ángel  Viñas  has  considerably  furthered  research  in  two 
significant areas – Franco’s relationship with the West and autarky. Viñas, himself 
an  experienced  diplomat,  argued  that  the  1953  agreement  with  America  that 
conceded several  bases  to  the  United  States  was  a  poor  deal  for  Spain  and that 
27 Mary Vincent, Spain 1833-2002: people and State (Oxford, 2007).
28 Christian  Leitz,  Economic  relations  between  Nazi  Germany  and  Franco’s  Spain,  1936-1945  
(Oxford, 1996). 
29 _____, & David Dunthorn, Spain in an international context, 1936-1959 (New York, 1999). 
30 Javier Tusell, Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el Eje y la neutralidad (Madrid, 1995). 
31 M. R. Agudo,  La gran tentación: Franco, el imperio colonial y los planes de intervención en la  
Segunda Guerra Mundial (Barcelona, 2008). 
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Franco underestimated the degree of sovereignty he had surrendered to an external 
power.32 Viñas’s standing on the economic history of the regime has been attested by 
his  work on the  Spanish  economy that  outlined  the ideological  logic  behind  the 
regime’s  adoption  of  autarky  as  its  economic  model.33 Important  work  on  the 
diplomatic side of the historiography has been covered by Florentino Portero, who 
argued that the U.N. resolution recalling the Heads of Mission in the post-war period 
strengthened the regime rather than weakened it and that the re-emergence of Spain 
as a player  on the international  stage was attributable  principally to international 
pressures rather than any shrewd diplomacy on the part of Franco.34
Despite the wide coverage given by Irish and Spanish historians to the role of 
diplomacy in each respective field, no research to date has challenged, or secondary 
source literature examined, Irish-Spanish relations exhaustively from 1939-55 and as 
a result, a large gap in historical research has been left hollow for far too long. For 
the first time, this thesis breaks new ground precisely because it fills this void by 
investigating the role diplomacy played in furthering bilateral  political,  economic 
and cultural relations from the start of the Second World War to joint membership 
by both countries to the U.N. in 1955. Owing to the extensive archival  research 
undertaken in the diplomatic  files  of Dublin and Madrid,  as well  as unrestricted 
access to the Communist Party of Ireland Archive and the Leopold Kerney private 
papers,  a  major  advancement  in  our  knowledge  and  understanding  of  life  and 
attitudes, shared links and experiences, common values and aspirations behind this 
international relationship is achieved that will contribute significantly to mainstream 
perceptions of Irish-Spanish relations as well as challenging some long held beliefs. 
The thesis is divided into two broad time periods – the war years and the 
post-war period. For both countries, neutrality during the Second World War was the 
visible  expression  of  their  diplomacy  and  for  both  it  was  also,  principally,  an 
expression of sovereignty and independence to pursue national interests before any 
32 See Ángel Viñas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda económica y  
recortes de soberanía (Barcelona, 1981).  
33 _____, Guerra, dinero, dictadura: ayuda fascista y autarquía en la España de Franco (Barcelona, 
1984). 
34 See Florentino Portero,  Franco aislado: la cuestión española,  1945-50  (Madrid,  1989) and  La 
política exterior de España en el siglo XX (Madrid, 2003). 
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other  considerations.  It  was  this  policy  that  successfully  kept  both  nations  and 
peoples  out  of  the  war  and  saved  them  from  possible  destruction  and  internal 
collapse.  For  too  long  Irish  historiography  has  focused  attention  on  Anglo-Irish 
relations during the war and has failed to realise that this was but one aspect of a 
wider  policy aimed  at  building  up friends  and allies  abroad.  This  thesis  casts  a 
critical  eye  over  the  role  played  by  policymakers  in  Dublin  and  Madrid  and 
challenges much mainstream literature that has praised the role of both Éamon de 
Valera  and  Francisco  Franco  in  this  regard.  Historians  have  overlooked  the 
important role diplomats in the field played and have instead focused on the senior 
echelons of policymaking.  This thesis confirms the observation made by Michael 
Kennedy  and  Joseph  Skelly  that  ‘Ireland’s  diplomats  became  the  first  line  of 
defence’ in preserving that neutral policy.35 
Both Éamon de Valera,  Minister  for External  Affairs  and Taoiseach,  and 
Joseph Walshe,  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  External  Affairs,  carried  out  an 
instrumental role in directing Ireland’s relations with its neighbouring States. Both 
men  have  been  praised  in  several  monographs  for  their  skilful  handling  of 
contentious issues and events that  impacted on Ireland during the war.36 Yet this 
research  challenges  that  perception  and  instead,  confirms  Dermot  Keogh’s 
observation,  that  Irish  overseas  missions  were  ‘small,  understaffed  and 
underfunded’.37 Indeed,  Keogh argued that  a more  ‘developed diplomatic  service 
could have served the country in wartime much more efficiently.’38 As Chapter 3 
will  show,  Leopold  Kerney,  Ireland’s  Minister  in  Madrid,  carried  out  the  entire 
diplomatic mission singlehandedly for years without any adequate assistance, proper 
funding or holiday time. Despite these restrictions and failings, which were never 
addressed by de Valera or Walshe even after the war, Kerney performed his duties 
admirably and Dublin was constantly informed on the situation in Spain. Although 
the dynamics of power were controlled by those at the top, this research focuses on 
the diplomats on the ground who provided the real genesis of foreign policy and 
35 Michael Kennedy & Joseph Skelly, Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000). 
36 See  Diarmaid  Ferriter,  Judging  Dev  (Dublin,  2007)  and  Aengus  Nolan,  Joseph Walshe:  Irish 
foreign policy, 1922-1946 (Dublin, 2008). 
37 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 114. 
38 Ibid, p. 182. 
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critically  examines  their  relationship  with  their  superiors,  especially  Kerney’s 
relationship with Walshe. 
Unlike de Valera, Franco never held a ministerial portfolio during the war 
and instead preferred  to  delineate  this  task to  other  officials.  During the Second 
World War Spain was served by four Ministers for Foreign Affairs: Colonel Juan 
Beigbeder, Ramón Serrano Súñer, the Count of Jordana and José Félix de Lequerica. 
Despite these appointments all these Ministers were responsible and answerable to 
the dictator who played a central role in the fortunes of Spanish foreign policy. On 
several  occasions,  as  Chapters  3  and  4  will  describe,  Franco  not  only  violated 
Spain’s neutral  policy through repeated breaches but actively pursued a pro-Axis 
orientation, in marked contrast to Ireland’s pro-Allied neutrality. His meeting with 
Hitler  at  Hendaye on 23 October 1940, that  committed Spain to joining the war 
against  the  Allies  at  a  time  of  its  choosing  under  a  secret  protocol,  confirmed 
Kerney’s  repeated  observations  on  the  ground  that  Spanish  foreign  policy  was 
anything but neutral and that the nation, despite Franco’s imperial aspirations, was 
economically too impoverished to actively engage in the war. The Hendaye protocol 
is but one example of several unneutral acts committed by Franco throughout the 
war that is analysed in the thesis and its conclusions confirm both Paul Preston’s 
view that the dictator ‘believed blindly in the victory of the Axis’39 and Christian 
Leitz’s findings that Franco’s support for the Axis ‘did not vanish’ even as the tide 
of war changed irrevocably against the New Order.40 
The solid grounding of the war years in the diplomatic reports by Leopold 
Kerney provided policymakers in Iveagh House with a clear  picture of daily life 
within Spain. Again, these chapters break new ground in the historical narrative of 
Spain  from 1939-45  by  providing  us  with  a  window into  how ordinary  people 
survived after  the traumatic  experience of the Spanish Civil  War.  Kerney relates 
how their lives became ones of abject poverty thanks, in no large part, to the failings 
of the regime to implement a cohesive economic policy and through the large scale 
repression it  orchestrated against  hundreds of thousands of Republican prisoners, 
39 Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the myth of Hendaye 1940’ in Contemporary European History, i 
(1992), p. 6.  See also Preston’s biography, Franco (London, 1993), pp 393-400. 
40 Christian Leitz,  ‘Nazi  Germany and Francoist  Spain,  1936-1945’ in  Sebastian Balfour  & Paul 
Preston (eds), Spain and the great powers in the twentieth century (London, 1999), p. 140. 
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long after the Civil War had ended. The arrival of a Catalan dissident to Ireland, 
another  original  discovery,  is a testament  of their  fears of being captured by the 
regime.  Indeed,  on several  occasions  we see reports  from verifiable  and reliable 
sources that Kerney had in the upper echelons of the dictatorship, which detailed the 
continued  execution  of  opponents  as  far  as  June  1945.  This  new  revelation 
challenges Julius Ruiz’s claims that ‘mass executions had largely come to an end by 
1941’41 and  shows  irrefutably  that  Franco  was  still  committing  mass  executions 
against his own citizens, six years after the Civil War ended. Furthermore, this raises 
serious questions surrounding the attitude of de Valera and Walshe and why they did 
not, even as a token gesture, send a written note condemning this genocide. On a 
broader level, the thesis will evaluate why de Valera chose to maintain relations with 
Spain despite his full knowledge of these crimes and in contravention of Ireland’s 
moral standing internationally as a Catholic and democratic State.
The  diplomatic  reports  by  Kerney’s  counterpart  in  Dublin,  Juan  García 
Ontiveros, form the Spanish element to the war years’ story in Chapter 1. In keeping 
with  diplomatic  practice  at  that  time,  known to  historians  as  ‘first’  Francoism,42 
Madrid dispatched an ardent and committed fascist  to represent the “new” Spain 
under the leadership of Generalísimo Francisco Franco.43 Ontiveros’s primary task 
was to restore and enhance bilateral political relations following on from the Spanish 
Civil War. For the first time we discover how Irish society, in particular influential 
religious, political and legal circles, perceived Franco’s Spain and what support they 
provided Ontiveros to assist him in his mission. Their attitudes towards the regime’s 
opponents  become  noticeably  apparent  especially  in  connection  with  the 
imprisonment  of  Frank  Ryan,  the  commander  of  the  Irish  Brigadista units  that 
fought against the Nationalist forces. Thanks to the discovery of Spanish primary 
41 Julius Ruiz, ‘A Spanish genocide? Reflections on the Francoist repression after the Spanish Civil 
War’ in Contemporary European History, xiv (2005), p. 183. 
42 For a good account of the transition of the regime from ‘first’ to ‘second’ Francoism see Ángel 
Viñas, ‘Franco’s dreams of autarky shattered: foreign policy aspects in the run-up to the 1959 change 
in Spanish economic strategy’ in Christian Leitz & David Dunthorn (eds), Spain in an international  
context, 1936-1959 (New York, 1999), p. 300. 
43 For a good account on how the regime filtered and purified diplomacy from the Spanish Civil War 
onwards see José Luis Neila Hernández, ‘The foreign policy administration of Franco’s Spain: from 
isolation to international realignment 1945-1957’ in Christian Leitz and David Dunthorn (eds), Spain 
in an international context, 1936-1959 (New York, 1999), pp 277-98. 
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source material in Alcalá de Henares and the Communist Party of Ireland Archive, 
new light has been shed on several murky aspects to Ryan’s detention that builds 
significantly on work in this area by Seán Cronin,44 Robert Stradling45 and Fearghal 
McGarry.46 Proof of clerical condemnation of Ryan has been found and confidential 
reports  written  by  lay  members  of  the  church  to  Ontiveros  after  they  had 
successfully  infiltrated  pro-Frank  Ryan  meetings  are  exposed  in  Chapter  2. 
Furthermore, the support the clergy and General Eoin O’Duffy, commander of the 
Irish Brigade that fought with the Nationalists, rendered to the Spanish Minister, as 
well as the threat of assassination that hung over Ontiveros from Irish Republican 
elements,  breaks  new  ground  in  our  understanding  of  the  Ryan  case,  the  most 
controversial event in Irish-Spanish relations in this period. 
A common feature of ‘first’ Francoism was the determination, and paranoia, 
with which the regime tracked down known dissidents abroad. After the capitulation 
of France in June 1940, thousands of exiled Republicans faced the possibility of 
deportation back to Spain if captured by the Gestapo. Mainstream literature on this 
area has focused attention on their desperate flight to Britain, Mexico or the United 
States yet this thesis has unearthed new material on a group never before analysed – 
a dozen prominent Basque exiles who came to Ireland by boat in July 1940. This 
glaring omission in the historical narrative on the fate of exiled Republicans is due, 
primarily, to the fact that Ontiveros’s wartime reports have never been investigated, 
until now. In keeping with his counterparts in other Spanish missions overseas, he 
devoted  a  considerable  amount  of time trying  to get  these Basques sent  back to 
Spain  to  face  lengthy  imprisonment.  Despite  successfully  persuading  the  Irish 
authorities  to  place  them under  surveillance,  both  de  Valera  and Joseph Walshe 
emerge in a positive light for granting them asylum and refusing to bow to persistent 
diplomatic pressure to deport them. 
Chapter 1 will also examine another important duty that senior policymakers 
in the Palacio de Santa Cruz, seat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expected their 
diplomats abroad to fulfil – preventing malicious propaganda abroad from defaming 
44 Seán Cronin, Frank Ryan: the search for the Republic (Dublin, 1980).
45 Robert Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 (Manchester, 1999). 
46 Fearghal McGarry, Irish politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999). 
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the  image  of  the  Francoist  State.  Ireland,  despite  what  Donal  Ó  Drisceoil’s 
monograph  on  censorship  has  shown,47 was  susceptible  to  imported  printed  and 
visual material from abroad, especially emanating from Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain. As the tide of war changed in favour of the Allies following the battle of 
Stalingrad  in  particular,  more  criticism  began  to  be  levelled  at  the  Francoist 
dictatorship for its fascist orientation in publications that were widely circulated in 
Ireland. More worrying was the joint cinematographic production by Life and Time 
that excoriated the regime for its assistance to the Axis and repeated breeches of 
neutrality. If this film was allowed to be shown in Irish cinema screens it could have 
significantly  undermined  the  positive  image  of  Francoism  that  Ontiveros  had 
skilfully fostered amongst the general population, thanks to his partnership with the 
Irish  Independent.  The  degree  to  which  policymakers  in  Iveagh  House  and  the 
censorship  authorities  were  willing  to  ensure  that  the  image  of  a  historic  friend 
would not be sullied was shown by their assurances to the Spanish Minister that it 
would not be shown and that frequent consultation with him would be sought from 
then on to ensure incidents like that would not happen again. That de Valera and 
Walshe acted so swiftly on this pressing issue and,  in marked contrast,  failed to 
adequately  respond  to  several  critical  reports  by  their  man  in  Madrid,  Leopold 
Kerney,  raises  many  questions  surrounding  Dublin’s  priorities  vis-à-vis  Irish-
Spanish relations. 
The Second World War had a substantial impact on Irish and Spanish society 
and the diplomatic reports of both wartime Ministers open a window on its socio-
economic  consequences.  The  war  and their  respective  neutral  policies  served  to 
strengthen the old historic bonds of friendship that had united both countries. This 
common sense of togetherness was attested again in the post-war period when both 
nations  were  prohibited  from  joining  the  U.N.  To  policymakers  in  Madrid  and 
Dublin it seemed that once again the links that united both nations would have to be 
enhanced in order to maintain this bond through uncertain times. Both de Valera and 
Walshe felt that a moral responsibility rested on Ireland’s shoulders to stand beside 
Spain in spite of the U.N. resolution that recalled the world’s Heads of Mission from 
47 See Donal Ó Drisceoil,  Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: neutrality, politics and society  (Cork, 
1996). 
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Madrid. The Spanish diplomatic reports yield new insights into how policymakers in 
Iveagh House viewed Ireland’s place in the U.N. Through the records of private 
meetings between Ontiveros’s successors, the Count of Artaza and the Marques of 
Miraflores,  with Éamon de Valera  and John A. Costello,  much of  the published 
material on Ireland and the U.N. can now be called into question. 
Joseph  Skelly  wrote  that  de  Valera  wanted  Ireland  to  have  an  ‘activist, 
international  role’  in  international  affairs,  and  in  particular,  in  the  U.N.48 The 
diplomatic  files  challenge  this  assertion  and  instead  cast  a  critical  eye  over  de 
Valera’s post-war vision for Ireland. Rather than seek inclusion, he wanted to keep 
the country parochial, insular and backward, caused, in part, from his obsession with 
partition and his inability to jettison political aspirations for economic development. 
In private conversations that he had with Artaza we see (in Chapter 5) his fear that 
joining the U.N. could mean voting against  Spain and interfering  directly  in  the 
domestic affairs of that country, something he had spent his political career fighting 
for – the right of each country to self-determination. Not only de Valera, but John A. 
Costello too failed to project Ireland abroad by refusing to join NATO and in private 
conversations he had with Miraflores, it is evident that he preferred Ireland to be part 
of a continental bloc of neutral Catholic nations in the Cold War rather than join the 
U.N. These revealing insights bring new perspectives on the broader documentary 
landscape  and,  in  fact,  confirm  Gary  Murphy’s  findings  that  events  in  Western 
Europe49 simply  ‘passed  the country by.’50 When Ireland did join  the U.N.  with 
Spain in December 1955 as part of a broader package deal agreed between the major 
powers, it was more concerned with the financial burden U.N. membership would 
impose on the exchequer. It was left to Seán Lemass and Frank Aiken to promote a 
more active role in international affairs in the 1960s. 
The  Spanish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  confronted  with  enormous 
difficulties in the post-war era owing to the regime’s repeated breaches of neutrality 
48 Joseph Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: a 
new look’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, vii (1996), p. 69. 
49 The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) in 1952 and the Western 
European Union (W.E.U.) in 1955.
50 Gary Murphy, ‘“A wider perspective”: Ireland’s view of western Europe in the 1950s’ in Michael 
Kennedy & Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000), p. 250. 
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during  the  war.  Condemned  by  the  victorious  Allied  powers  at  the  Potsdam 
Conference  and debarred from joining the U.N.,  Spain suffered the ignominy of 
seeing almost the entirety of the world’s sovereign States withdraw their Heads of 
Mission from Madrid. Ironically this proved a blessing in disguise for Franco for, as 
Florentino Portero has argued,51 the dictator was able to insulate the nation from 
external  events  and claim that  unlike  previous  kings,  he would not  abandon the 
people in the face of foreign pressure. For Franco, the whole raison d’être of foreign 
policy in the post-war period was to gain admission into the U.N. In order to do this 
a concerted propaganda campaign had to be waged to repudiate all charges of Axis 
collaboration. In tandem with this Spain sought out old and new friends to forge a 
system of alliances that would undermine the credibility of the U.N.’s position and 
the veto exercised by the Soviet Union. Chapter 7 comprehensively charts Spain’s 
course towards rapprochement with the West and inclusion into the U.N. However, 
it  also answers the most  pressing issue for an Irish context – How did Ireland’s 
policymakers  direct  foreign  policy  in  response  to  these  important  events? 
Remarkably,  Dublin  chose,  against  the  tide  of  international  opinion,  not  only  to 
continue its  diplomatic  mission in Madrid but actually to raise the status of that 
mission from a Legation to an Embassy. Furthermore, it backed Spain at every turn 
and defended its  friend at  every regional  conference  that  the regime was denied 
admission  into,  despite  the  negative  impact  this  would  have  on  Ireland’s  own 
relations with other States, most notably, the U.S. and Britain.  
Historical interest in Irish-Spanish relations has focused principally on two 
main areas – the Irish “wild geese” that sought sanctuary in Spain following the 
defeat of Hugh O’Neill  in the Nine Years’ War and their  descendants,52 and, the 
Irish participation in the Spanish Civil War.53 The findings of this thesis reveal the 
necessity  to  rethink  some long held perceptions  of that  historic  friendship.  Most 
publications  on  this  relationship,  and  speeches  by  diplomats  and  politicians 
throughout the ages, identified the shared partition of territory (Ulster and Gibraltar), 
the  common  religious  faith  (Catholicism)  and  the  conservative  nature  of  both 
51 See Florentino Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestión española, 1945-50 (Madrid, 1989). 
52 See Declan Downey & J. C. MacLennan, Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008). 
53 See Fearghal McGarry, Irish politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999). 
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societies as the defining attributes of this close association. However, although both 
sides extolled these ties and similarities, little appreciable and tangible benefits were 
accrued from them and it is during this time period under investigation that a major 
refocus  of  the  bonds  connecting  both  nations  was  undertaken.  For  Spanish 
policymakers it was essential, given the external reality facing the regime, that its 
mission  in  Dublin  be  reoriented  towards  closer  economic  interaction.  The  files 
reveal  the  urgency  with  which  Ontiveros’s  successor,  the  Count  of  Artaza, 
endeavoured to promote trade and economic cooperation as the sine que non of his 
diplomatic  mission.  The  total  failure  of  Ireland’s  self-sufficiency  model  is 
comprehensively exposed for the first time through the prism of Irish-Spanish trade 
statistics in Chapter 7. As External Affairs headed these trade missions it must bear 
responsibility  for  Ireland’s  disastrous  trade  imbalance  with  Spain  throughout  the 
post-war period. These findings dispute Michael Kennedy’s assertion that External 
Affairs revamped itself to ‘take account of the new economic-based interests of Irish 
foreign policy.’ The opposite was the case and Ireland suffered economically as a 
consequence with generation after generation emigrating from the country.
Not only in economics but also in cultural affairs are major failings in Irish 
foreign  policy  revealed  for  the  first  time.  Chapter  7  also  lays  bear  the  dismal 
performance of Leo McCauley, Ireland’s first Ambassador to Spain, to promote any 
form of cultural awareness of Ireland, as will be shown in the Lorca incident. By 
contrast, it was the Spanish again, who valued closer cultural interaction and who 
provided the dynamism in the relationship.  The Marquess of Miraflores, the first 
Spanish  Ambassador  to  Ireland,  achieved  notable  success  during  his  mission  by 
organising cultural expositions, wine fairs and student exchange programmes with 
universities.  The  success  of  the  Elcano  naval  ship  celebrations  in  Dublin  Bay 
elevated his standing within the Diplomatic Corps and earned him wide coverage in 
the  national  newspapers.  As  a  consequence  of  Miraflores’s  work,  a  growing 
knowledge of Spain emerged which led to the establishment of more substantive 
links – the beginning of tourism. This thesis provides original source material that 
traces the origins of tourism between both countries and the far-reaching impact it 
had on the nature of the relationship.
17
Dermot  Keogh  demonstrated in  his  seminal  publication  on  Ireland’s 
relationship with the Vatican, that the image of solidarity that was presented to the 
public  masked  divisions  between  the  secular  and  clerical  hierarchies.54 As  this 
research will show, although External Affairs was always mindful of what line the 
Vatican  took  on  an  issue,  for  Ireland  national  interests  superseded  all  other 
considerations.  In  spite  of  rifts  between  Franco  and  the  Holy  See  over  the 
appointment of senior prelates, Irish foreign policy was never moved by Catholic 
sentiment to analyse its relationship with such a tyrannical regime for had it been, 
Kerney’s  reports  on  mass  executions  should  have  been  acted  on.  A  popular 
misconception in mainstream literature is that the manifest importance of religion to 
both  societies  naturally,  as  a  consequence,  formed  a  taut  and  inseparable  link 
between  both  countries.  The  diplomatic  and  ecclesiastical  files  reveal, 
comprehensively, that religion was a unifying theme but not a unifying constituent 
in the relationship. Diplomats rarely met Archbishops or Cardinals for discussion or 
consultation; they were guided by and answerable only to their political masters. 
Whilst the rest of Europe struggled to rebuild itself from the ruins of a world 
war, Ireland and Spain continued to espouse and pursue cultural and economic self-
sufficiency. Both believed they could insulate their peoples from the forces of what 
came to be known as globalisation and as a consequence were resolved to preserve 
this simple, rustic, frugal and pious culture from outside influence. Economically too 
both nations were going nowhere. Countries that were severely impacted by the war, 
such as Italy and Norway, recovered and rebuilt their economies and raced ahead of 
Ireland  and Spain,  which  maintained  an  antiquated  and failing  economic  policy 
known as autarky. As the years passed and the relentless progress of the Western 
world advanced, one sees two nations still practising and promoting the economic 
model of autarky even though it was not producing substantial economic benefits for 
their own people. Emigration, mass unemployment and poverty became features of 
Irish and Spanish societies and would not be addressed until both nations abandoned 
self-sufficiency in favour of international inclusion and a more liberalised economy.
54 See Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, the bishops and Irish politics, 1919-39 (New York, 1986). 
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The most revealing outcome from the entire period investigated, 1939-55, is 
the  confirmation  that  both  countries  lived  in  an  antediluvian  existence  that  was 
completely out of step with the rest  of Western Europe.  Gary Murphy described 
Ireland’s  outlook in  an international  context  as ‘parochial’,  a view that  confirms 
observations made by Miraflores in his dispatches to Madrid.55 Despite the active 
and dynamic impetus that the Spanish gave to this bilateral relationship, in a wider 
international  context,  Ángel  Viñas  castigated  the  regime’s  incompetent 
administration and adjudged it  to be living,  like Ireland,  in a ‘time-warp’.56 This 
primitivism  characterised  not  only  Irish  and  Spanish  foreign  policy  but  both 
societies and also the relationship. Until now, mainstream literature, especially in an 
Irish  context,  has  defended  its  foreign  policy  as  being  active.  This  thesis 
conclusively demonstrates that it was not until Seán Lemass became Taoiseach in 
1959 and the implementation of the Stabilisation Plan in Spain in the same year that 
both  countries  channelled  their  respective  foreign  policies  on  more  coordinated, 
efficient  and  competent  lines,  thanks  to  inclusion  within  the  international 
community.
55 Gary Murphy, ‘“A wider perspective”: Ireland’s view of Western Europe in the 1950s’ in Michael 
Kennedy & Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000). 
56 Ángel Viñas, ‘Franco’s dreams of autarky shattered: foreign policy aspects in the run-up to the 
1959 change in Spanish economic strategy’ in Christian Leitz & David Dunthorn (eds), Spain in an 
international context, 1939-1959 (New York, 1999), p. 308. 
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Chapter 1
Ontiveros’s Diplomatic Mission to Ireland, May 1939-June 1945
May-  August, 1939  
                    On 1 May 1939 Juan García Ontiveros1 arrived in Ireland to begin what he hoped 
would be a long mission, helping to encourage and further good bilateral relations. 
His prompt dispatch to Dublin, exactly one month after the bloody Spanish Civil 
War had ended, signalled Spain’s intention to renew contact  with friends abroad 
who held similar national and international aspirations. The purpose of Ontiveros’s 
mission in Dublin was multifaceted. On the surface he was Franco’s representative 
to another sovereign authority, empowered to represent and promote the policies and 
views of Nationalist Spain as communicated by his superiors. His most important 
function was to restore, enhance and maintain cordial bilateral political relations. He 
was also charged with initiating contact at all levels with Irish business and official 
circles with an eye to increasing direct trading links. As well as carrying out these 
and  other  normal  duties  of  any  diplomat  abroad,  Ontiveros  was  to  engage  in 
propaganda activities by promoting and disseminating written and visual material 
and host social events to foster a benign and positive image of Nationalist Spain. 
The Legation’s residence for the new Minister2 was on Shrewsbury Road, 
Ballsbridge.  Ontiveros  and his  staff  were inundated  with letters  of goodwill  and 
congratulations  for  the  triumph  of  Franco’s  Cruzada3 against  “Godless 
Communism”. A mass was offered by several Catholic associations which Ontiveros 
described  as  a  ‘commendable  manifestation  of  solidarity  with  our  victory’.4 The 
1 Born in Madrid on 1 Apr. 1883 he joined the Diplomatic Corps in 1911 and served as Vice-Consul – 
Marseilles, 1911; Acting Consul – Mazagan, 1913, 2nd Class Consul – Mazagan, 1915; 1st Consul – 
Tetuán, 1920; Consul – Brussels, 1924; Consul – Rabat, 1924; Consulate General  – Rabat, 1929; 
Consul General – Hamburg, 1936 (N.A.I., Pres. P881). 
2 In diplomacy a nation maintains a presence in a host country that can be categorized as a Consulate, 
Legation or Embassy.  A Consulate is the office or period of office of a Consul. A  Legation is a 
diplomatic mission headed by a Minister. An Embassy is the residence or place of official business of 
an Ambassador. An Embassy is the highest form of official accreditation to a nation and highlights 
the size and prestige of that mission in the host nation. 
3 Cruzada meaning Crusade. A term used by the Nationalist forces to describe the cleansing of the 
country of Marxism. 
4 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 May 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10). 
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national  press  also  welcomed  his  appointment  to  Dublin  with  bold  headlines 
heralding his  arrival  as a symbolic  return of Spain to peace and tranquillity.  No 
newspaper was more fulsome in praising the triumph of the Nationalist cause than 
the Irish Independent. Reports from so-called impartial observers contrasted, barely 
two months on from the cessation of the Civil War, the living standards enjoyed by 
ordinary people under the new regime and its  predecessor,  the Second Republic. 
Franco was restoring the ‘prosperity, perfect organisation, peace and well-being’ of 
the nation.5 Justice, civility and a business-like approach to the present woes were 
the order of the day. Alongside such optimistic accounts of normal life within the 
nation there appeared in the Irish Independent descriptions of recent events in Spain 
which  read  like  an  anatomical  dissection.  The  Republicans  were  depicted  as  a 
cancerous  infection  within  the  body  politic,  spreading  its  ‘tyrannical  Marxist 
domination’  over  the  Spanish  patient  whilst  the  Nationalists  were  seen  as  the 
‘healthy’  organs repelling  and healing  the patient  from within and administering 
combative medicine to ‘foreign sponsors’ who had inflamed the contagion with their 
‘Marxist  gangrene’.6 The  Minister  welcomed  such  laudatory  reporting  from  a 
national newspaper with the second highest  national distribution sales throughout 
Ireland. He identified early on the benefits that could be accrued by placing himself 
at  the disposal  of  the  Irish Independent editorial  board.  He knew that  the paper 
represented ‘healthy opinion’: rightist, Catholic, conservative and middle-class Irish 
public opinion which had ‘sustained with perseverance the cause symbolised by our 
Caudillo’.7 
In  contrast  to  the  positive reports  on Spain by the  Irish Independent,  the 
Minister  vehemently  criticised  other  printing  organs  that  did  not  follow  the 
mainstream  Catholic  line,  especially  the Irish  Times.  In  his  judgement  this 
newspaper’s commentary failed to display enough overt enthusiasm and frontline 
column  exposure  to  either  himself  or  his  nation.  He  believed  the Irish  Times 
represented the viewpoint of ‘adversarial’ opinion that was financed by ‘Jews and 
5 Irish Independent, 3 June 1939. 
6 Ibid., 14 Dec. 1939. 
7 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 June 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10). Caudillo 
meaning warlord. It denoted his supreme leadership over the nation and can be compared to the title 
of Duce adopted by Benito Mussolini in Italy and Führer adopted by Adolf Hitler in Germany. 
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Masons.’8 The newspaper with the widest circulation at this time was the Irish Press, 
which Ontiveros viewed as representing ‘governmental sectors’ and being in reality 
just a mere extension of the Fianna Fáil political propaganda organ.9 He realised that 
each of the three leading daily broadsheets represented a different section of public 
discourse and that the Civil War in Ireland, like in Spain, had bitterly divided society 
across entrenched political  lines. He would foster a close relationship with many 
prominent men who were or had been associated with the Fine Gael party – General 
Eoin O’Duffy, William T. Cosgrave and Richard Mulcahy. 
On 25 May 1939 Ontiveros attended a meeting to address important political 
and  economic  bilateral  relations  with  the  two most  influential  men  behind  Irish 
foreign policy. Éamon de Valera, Taoiseach and Minister for External Affairs,10 was 
a  strong admirer  of Spain,  its  people and its  prestigious  history.  Joseph Walshe, 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, had headed Irish diplomacy since 
1923. As Dermot Keogh has argued, both men envisaged Ireland’s ‘independent 
foreign  policy’  as  primarily  a  representation  of  sovereignty  on  the  international 
stage.11 In  Michael  Kennedy’s  view,  both  men  also  held  a  firm  belief  in 
‘international  Catholicism  and  links  between  Catholic  States’.12 Official  Spanish 
reverence for Catholicism was therefore an attractive inducement  to both men to 
work closely with Ontiveros, especially given his nation’s stoic defence of religious 
values in the recent Spanish Civil War. The Minister’s account of the meeting was 
complimentary.  Walshe  remained  quiet  throughout  the  discussion,  allowing  his 
Minister leeway to dominate the meeting. Ontiveros liked de Valera’s mild and lucid 
manner.  He  was  particularly  interested  when  the  conversation  turned  to  the 
Taoiseach’s surname and Spanish origins and his intention to visit Spain some day 
soon to see many of the religious sites there. The conversation also focused on the 
recent Civil War with Ontiveros surmising de Valera’s view that Ireland had always 
prayed for a Nationalist victory over ‘Red Communism’: ‘the population en masse, 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.
10 De Valera also held the post of Minister for Education briefly from 1939-40. 
11 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 2. 
12 Michael Kennedy, ‘Leopold Kerney and the origin of Irish-Spanish diplomatic relations, 1935-6’ in 
Declan Downey & J. C. MacLennan (eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), 
p. 191.  
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of Ireland, had always desired the triumph of our Caudillo and the good cause,’ he 
reported to Madrid.13 
As the meeting ended, de Valera raised a matter of significant importance 
both to him and External Affairs. Frank Ryan had fought for and commanded the 
Irish Brigadista unit against General Franco’s forces. He was incarcerated in prison 
with little or no information concerning his health or sentence reaching Ireland. Both 
the Ryan family and many influential Republicans were anxious for his welfare. De 
Valera  described  Ryan’s  behaviour  as  irresponsible,  but  explained  that  Ryan 
nevertheless retained his heroic status, among a small body of public opinion, for his 
courageous fight for Ireland’s independence. Ontiveros likened Ryan’s conduct in 
Spain to that of a ‘radical extremist’ and consequently did not give further thought to 
the matter despite the significance that Dublin attached to Ryan’s release as ‘proof 
of friendly’ Spanish intentions.14 The Ryan case would later repeatedly surface in the 
public  arena  and  would  undermine  the  benevolent  image  of  Francoism that  the 
Minister was working assiduously to establish.15 
The formal presentation of credentials took place in St Patrick’s Hall, Dublin 
Castle on 27 July. The Spanish Minister was accompanied by Dr Michael Rynne, 
Legal Advisor in External Affairs, and a cavalry escort for the official  ceremony 
which  had  been  kept  secret  until  the  last  minute,  owing  to  security  fears  of  a 
potential attack by sympathisers of the Spanish Republic. He read out his speech in 
Spanish and stressed his and his nation’s esteem for ‘the great and admirable Irish 
nation’.16 He  emphasised  the  bonds  of  race,  religion,  tradition  and  common 
experiences  that  united  both  States.17 The  speech  was  notable  for  his  recurrent 
obsequious praise for Franco who had ‘redeemed’ Spain through the ‘firm will of 
true  Spaniards’  who  had  given  their  lives  in  ‘an  infinite  number’  for  God  and 
civilisation.18 Indeed, he continued, Europe and contemporary society owed Franco a 
13 Private  meeting between Ontiveros  and Éamon de  Valera,  25 May 1939 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
1056/E10).
14 Ibid.
15 See chapter two. 
16 Irish Times, 28 July 1939. 
17 Ibid. At this time it was a commonly held view that both nations possessed similar characteristics as 
a result of common ancestry caused by the migration northwards of Spanish settlers. Recent research 
has found this theory to be unsubstantiated.  
18 Ibid. 
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great  honour for his  impassioned defence against  Communism. He concluded by 
expressing the principal focus of his mission in Ireland to intensify ‘the very cordial 
and  intimate  relations’  enjoyed  by  both  nations.19 De  Valera  replied  in  Irish 
acknowledging the ties between both nations and he went on to assure Ontiveros of 
‘the closest cooperation’ from his Government to help him fulfil his mission here.20 
With the formal ceremony concluded the entourage exited onto the main court-yard 
of Dublin Castle, where a guard of honour was awaiting inspection. Ontiveros gave 
a right-arm fascist  salute as the new imperial  flag was hoisted high. Ireland had 
formally recognised the representative of fascist Spain. 
The deterioration in the general European situation was a constant theme of 
discussion amongst  diplomatic  officials.  Ireland had  successfully  stymied  British 
attempts to introduce conscription in Northern Ireland earlier in the year but as the 
continent  lurched  towards  a  dark  abyss,  the  mood  in  Dublin  was  remained 
remarkably  buoyant.  On  26  August  1939,  less  then  a  week  before  the  German 
invasion of Poland, Ontiveros called into External Affairs to ascertain what Ireland’s 
position  would  be  vis-à-vis  both  sides  in  the  event  of  war.  The  ‘dominant 
impression’,  Ontiveros  recorded,  was  that  Dublin  believed peace  talks  would be 
quickly initiated between both sides owing to their shared experience of the horrors 
of the Great War, that Britain would be reluctant to ‘involve itself in any conflict’ 
with Germany, and that, in the unlikely event of war, Ireland would adhere to its 
stated ‘neutral position’.21 To a certain degree this conveyed a confidence in German 
military strength and a  comparatively  weak assessment  of  Britain’s  chances  and 
Ontiveros did not share Dublin’s quiet confidence that a sudden détente could avoid 
a war. He cited as an example the continuous arrival of mail boats returning from 
Britain,  full  of  ‘suspicious  agitators’  and  expelled  I.R.A.  suspects  supposedly 
connected with the bombing campaign in Britain.22 In the Minister’s judgement the 
expulsion  of  potential  fifth-columnists  was  a  clear  indication  that  Britain  was 
preparing itself for war. 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 Aug. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10).
22 Ibid. 
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September-December, 1939
The German invasion of Poland on 1 September prompted de Valera to convene an 
emergency session of Dáil Éireann the following day to discuss the implications of 
the crisis for Ireland. The Government passed the Emergency Powers Bill, by which 
it awarded itself with enormous authority over the nation. The democratic and liberal 
nature of the State was to be transformed as the Government  henceforth,  for the 
duration of the war, exerted itself over all facets of national life. Non-intervention 
between the belligerent powers was both an expected response by the Taoiseach to 
the external situation and in keeping with quixotic Irish Republicanism.23 As Ronan 
Fanning  has  argued,  neutrality24 was  principally  the  ‘visible  expression’  of  Irish 
independence.25
Significant  technological  advances  made by belligerent  powers  in  aircraft 
design, payload and strategic reach, as shown in the Spanish Civil War, combined 
with  Ireland’s  vulnerable  geostrategic  position  on  the  trans-Atlantic  trade  route, 
placed the nation in a potentially perilous situation. The calamitous fate engulfing 
Poland was a sharp reminder to the Government to stay out of the war at all cost. 
Ireland was the only member of the Commonwealth of Nations to declare neutrality 
as both an assertion of its national sovereignty and recognition of the unique status it 
enjoyed  within  that  organisation.  Neutrality  was  also  a  formal  protest  at  the 
continued partition of the country and barely seventeen years on from the Irish Civil 
War it was judged prudent not to lead a divided people into an uncertain war on the 
side of the liberal democracies. Neutrality was the main unifying and feasible option 
available  to  the  Taoiseach  and  was  a  policy  endorsed  by  all  the  main  political 
parties.
Ontiveros admired the dexterity,  ‘resolve’ and decisive leadership qualities 
displayed by de Valera in confronting such sudden and momentous events.26 On 3 
23 Article one of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland affirmed the inalienable right of the Irish nation to 
‘determine its relations with other nations’. 
24 The Hague Convention of 1907 defined neutrality, the rights and responsibilities of neutral nations 
in a war.
25 Ronan Fanning, ‘Raison d’état  and the evolution of Irish foreign policy’ in Michael Kennedy & 
Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000), p. 316. 
26 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Sept.1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10). 
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September  he  noted  that  the  previous  week’s  ‘optimistic  mood’  had  changed 
‘radically’ due to the Allied resolve to fight rather than appease Hitler.27 Ireland’s 
ability to survive either destruction or internal collapse, possible outcomes brought 
on  by  the  vicissitudes  of  war,  would  form the  principal  themes  of  his  wartime 
dispatches.  On  the  day  war  was  declared,  Ontiveros  informed  Madrid  about 
Ireland’s  declaration  of  neutrality  and  de  Valera’s  request  for  collective  unity 
without any ‘partisanship’.28 Ontiveros had been in close contact with Dr Eduard 
Hempel, German Minister to Ireland, to ascertain the response of the Third Reich to 
the declaration. Hempel informed him confidentially that so long as the Government 
maintained  a  policy  of  ‘irreproachable’  neutrality,  Germany  would  respect  Irish 
sovereignty.29 Ontiveros’s own assessment outlined many of the potential problems 
the nation would face and some of the recurrent themes he would later continuously 
refer to in his dispatches. In these observations he demonstrated great foresight.  
Politically,  Ontiveros questioned whether neutrality could work, given that 
the nation did ‘not form a homogenous unit’.30 The continued partition of Ireland 
would encourage Republican extremists to take advantage of England’s difficulties 
and  realise  the  ‘eternal  aspiration…and  annex  the  North  of  Ireland  under  a 
Republican  regime,  culminating  in  a  complete  separation  with  the  neighbouring 
island.’31 The Minister and his superiors did recognise the difference between de 
Valera’s Republicanism and that espoused by the I.R.A. They were acutely aware 
that the Taoiseach had long ago renounced reunification through armed conflict and 
had accepted the constitutional  roadmap.  He had maintained social  cohesion and 
economic  development  without  destabilisation  and  had  instigated  a  fruitful 
rapprochement  with  the  Catholic  hierarchy.  For  all  these  reasons  his  brand  of 
Republicanism and his reputation were acceptable to the Spanish. They viewed the 
I.R.A., however, as a Marxist-inspired terrorist  organisation.  If de Valera did not 
effectively lead his  people,  the Minister  believed,  the extremists  could create  an 
insular  conflict  by  winning  the  propaganda  campaign  of  Republicanism  over 
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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neutrality and realise ‘the last aspiration of the masses and a good majority of other 
social  classes  to  separate  completely  from  England  and  achieve  political  and 
territorial  unity.  This  would  come  at  the  cost  of  abandoning,  consequently, 
neutrality’.32 The  Spanish  believed  themselves  experts  in  identifying  political 
extremists.
Another observation, albeit a nebulous one that the Minister noted, was the 
influx of social outcasts who could ignite an ‘internal revolution’.33 In August he 
first recorded this phenomenon and attached considerable importance to it. No doubt 
influenced  by his  own personal  experience  from the  Spanish  Civil  War  and the 
appalling  social  upheaval  it  spawned,  he  feared  Ireland  could  become  the  new 
gateway for Communist infiltration. He identified four social groups as representing 
the  pillars  of  social  chaos:  Communists,  Republican  extremists,  Jews and ‘Free-
Mason elements’.34 All these malcontents, he believed, were flooding into Ireland 
from Great Britain and the continent at an alarming rate. Ontiveros noted the ‘recent 
arrival of relatively numerous extremist Irish elements expelled from Great Britain, 
with many Jews and Judaizers who in the last few months have been disembarking 
in Ireland, originating from the continent.’35 His reference to these groups would 
occur again and again throughout the war years as internal security appeared on the 
brink of collapse. He displayed a particularly vicious prejudice against the Jewish 
community.  It  was  his  view  that  these  elements  should  be  challenged  and 
quarantined  immediately.  He criticised  the  State’s  lax  security  measures  and the 
‘excessive tolerance’ shown to them.36
Ontiveros  identified  in  this  report  the nation’s  almost  complete  economic 
dependence on Britain for its survival, an observation shared by Dermot Ferriter.37 
He deemed it impossible for Ireland to ‘turn its orbit’ away from this stark reality so 
a  friendly  neutral  policy  toward  Britain  was  inevitable.38 He  highlighted  an 
enormous problem for de Valera and his Government should the war continue. As an 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. 
37 See Dermot Ferriter, Judging Dev (Dublin, 2007), p. 256. 
38 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Sept.1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10).
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island, Ireland had to import all its goods by sea, yet the country had no ‘merchant 
fleet’.39 British  ships  carried  all  these  goods  and  the  Government  had  made  no 
procedures in the legislation for the establishment of an indigenous merchant fleet. 
The  Cabinet  privately  did  foresee  this  ‘major  difficulty’  but  deemed  it  ‘very 
expensive’ to establish such a fleet.40 Ontiveros also predicted the beginning of what 
would become a migrant  highway across the Irish Sea as natives left to work in 
British factories or enlisted into the Allied armies. The reverse was also anticipated, 
with many of the Irish diaspora returning home to avoid potential conscription or 
death. Many English social classes he believed would come to Éire to sit out the war 
in idle tranquillity: ‘thousands of immigrants from England and the continent look 
upon  Ireland  as  an  oasis  of  tranquillity  and  security’,  he  declared.41 These 
predominantly socio-economic forecasts were all realised early on by the Minister, 
to his credit, and the Irish Government would encounter many difficulties in trying 
to resolve them later on. 
The report’s concluding sections outlined sectors of society over which the 
Government  was  predicted  to  exert  ‘extraordinary  powers’,  with  special 
consideration  for  the  economy,  defence  forces,  local  volunteer  organisations, 
censorship of the press and means of communication.42 Indeed, as Brian Girvin has 
noted, planning for wartime censorship had been ongoing since 1938, well before 
military  preparations  were  considered.43 The  Minister’s  dispatch  ended  with  an 
example of how the island was gearing up to a new life of restrictions and shortages, 
decrees  and calls  to patriotic  duty:  ‘the streets  remain  without  public  lighting  at 
night, the population has been required to restrict to a minimum lights within the 
house’.44  
On 4  September,  the  Minister  visited  External  Affairs  to  meet  Frederick 
Boland, Assistant Secretary of the Department. Ontiveros was there to transmit the 
English translation of Spain’s declaration of neutrality signed by General Franco and 
39 Ibid.
40 Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 16 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.T., S11393). 
41 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Sept. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10). 
42 Ibid. 
43 See Brian Girvin, The Emergency: neutral Ireland, 1939-45 (London, 2006), p. 84.  
44 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Sept. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1056/E10).  
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Colonel Juan Beigbeder, Minister for Foreign Affairs. It decreed that the ‘strictest 
neutrality’  was  to  be  maintained  by  Spain  during  the  present  ‘state  of  war  that 
unfortunately  exists  between  England,  France  and  Poland  on  the  one  side  and 
Germany on the other’.45 Ireland was happy to see Spain join the neutral club and 
concentrate  all  its  energies  on  internal  reconstruction.  The  Francoist  State  had 
followed the Vatican’s lead by appealing for talks to negotiate a settlement or at the 
very least localise the conflict.  Both men discussed the general war situation and 
Boland agreed that Ireland too desired a localised conflict. 
The most prominent internal threat confronting the legitimate authority of the 
Government  was  the  I.R.A.  To  combat  this  danger  the  State  had  introduced 
legislation known as the Offences Against the State Act on 14 June 1939. The I.R.A. 
had emerged fragmented but still active after the recent bombing campaign on the 
British mainland orchestrated by its Chief of Staff, Seán Russell. It had failed in its 
objective to force Britain into handing back the disputed six counties of Ulster. Now 
divided into two units, a northern and southern command, the I.R.A. planned to use 
the present war to its own advantages,  achieving,  amongst  other things,  its  most 
notable success during the raid on the Phoenix Park magazine fort on 23 December 
1939.46 From September An Garda Síochána began arresting key members of the 
I.R.A.  and  holding  them  without  trial.  Ontiveros  wrote  about  these  detentions 
favouring  a  tough  crack-down  on  known  active  members.  He  rejected  their 
machinations as mere ‘romantic inspirations’ which ignored the practical reality that 
Ireland could not survive without the ‘well-being and security’ of Britain.47 He also 
believed that if they succeeded in undermining de Valera’s neutral policy the nation 
risked antagonising its fellow Commonwealth partners, which had hitherto respected 
Ireland’s neutrality.  The Minister was worried that ‘those elements’ of the I.R.A. 
who had been ‘expelled’ from Britain would orchestrate a terrorist campaign against 
the  Irish  Government  and  the  diplomatic  representatives  of  Germany,  Italy  and 
Spain.48 
45 B.O.E., 4 Sept. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1467/E14).   
46 For a good account of the I.R.A. see T. P. Coogan, The I.R.A. (London, 2000).  
47 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 Sept. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E33).  
48 Ibid. 
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Ontiveros genuinely believed that he was a possible target for assassination 
and  cited  the  delay  in  presenting  his  credentials,  which  took  place  ‘against  the 
pressure  of  those  elements’.49 The  Legation  was  placed  under  twenty-four  hour 
security watch as a team of police guarded his residence. These security precautions 
were also extended, he noted, ‘to the Legations of Italy and Germany’.50 His fears 
concerning the arrival of so many ‘elements of Hebrew origin’ were still prevalent in 
his  reports.51 Around  this  time  Ontiveros  received  a  request  from  one  David 
Nachmann, a German Jew living in Ireland who wanted a travel visa for his wife, 
who was in Germany. He was extremely ‘unhappy and despairing’ because he had 
heard  rumours  ‘that  all  Jews living  in  Germany at  present  will  be  evacuated  to 
Poland.’52 The  Minister  displayed  little  sympathy  for  Nachmann  or  his  family’s 
circumstances and simply passed his request back to Madrid where it would be lost 
in the labyrinth of bureaucracy. 
The  Minister  read  the  daily  newspapers  copiously,  searching  for  further 
evidence of I.R.A. surreptitious activities. By the middle of November he recorded 
large ‘quantities of weapons and munitions’ seized by police and rumours of top-
level army collaboration with the organisation.53 One incident particularly caught his 
attention.  At a  meeting  organised in  the Mansion House to  raise  funds for  poor 
families,  de  Valera  was  invited  to  speak  by the  St  Vincent  de  Paul  Society.  In 
attendance were members of the Diplomatic Corps, who were shocked when several 
women  stood  up  and  launched  into  a  tirade  of  abuse  against  the  Taoiseach  for 
allowing their husbands and relatives to stay on hunger strike for over two months. 
De Valera was forced to sit down whilst police were called to expel the women from 
the premises. Three days later the men were allowed to go to hospital. Ontiveros was 
indignant that ordinary people, especially radical-minded citizens, could be allowed 
to disrupt and sway a Government to agree to their demands. He argued that these 
men had decided to abstain ‘voluntarily without food’ for an indefinite period of 
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. 
52 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ibid.).
53 Ontiveros to _____, 16 Nov. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E33). 
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time and should be shown no clemency.54 In his opinion, the State’s authority was 
paramount to the well-being of prisoners on hunger strike for better conditions.55 
Alarmed by what he discerned as a society teetering on the brink of anarchy, 
Ontiveros arranged to have an after-lunch conversation with Joseph Walshe.56 The 
continuous dissolution of public security was the main item of discussion. Walshe 
commented on the Minister’s observations by saying he suspected that most of the 
armed  robberies  were  of  a  ‘professional’  nature  and  could  not  necessarily  be 
attributed  to  the  I.R.A.57 Both  men  then  discussed  the  possibility  that  foreign 
nationals might be behind the spate of criminality. Walshe suspected members of the 
‘North American underworld’ of being the main instigators of it all and that they had 
entered Ireland because England had deported them before the war broke out.58 To 
hear  the  second most  important  figure  in  Irish diplomacy acknowledge this  was 
music  to  Ontiveros’s  ears  because  it  confirmed  observations  he  had  noted 
concerning  ‘undesirables’  and  ‘Jewish  fugitives  from  Germany’  who  had  been 
infiltrating  into  the  country  at  a  ‘continuous  rate.’59 To  him  it  was  ‘absolutely 
incomprehensible’  that  no  stringent  port  controls  had  been  initiated  and  that 
‘excessive  tolerance’  had  been  shown  to  such  dangerous  elements  with  the 
consequent result that they could operate with ‘complete impunity’.60 Mention was 
made of a former I.R.A. Chief of Staff and distinguished lawyer, Seán MacBride, 
who was challenging the Offences Against the State Act which had resulted in over 
fifty leading activists being detained without trial.61 The one legislative process that 
promised an end to this criminal behaviour was being challenged in the courts, a 
process  which  highlighted,  in  Ontiveros’s  opinion,  the  prevalent  weakness  of 
democracies.  Under  Francoism  the  State  institutions  had  a  right  to  act  without 
judicial restrictions in the ostensible interest of public order and the common good. 
54 Ibid. 
55 For  a good account on aspects of Spain’s military judicial  system see Julius Ruiz,  ‘A Spanish 
genocide?  Reflections  on the Francoist  repression after  the Spanish Civil  War’  in  Contemporary 
European History, xiv (2005), pp 171-91. 
56 Private meeting between Ontiveros and Joseph Walshe at the Spanish Legation, 7 Dec. 1939 (ibid.).
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. 
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For  this  reason  Ontiveros  explicitly  dismissed  certain  fundamental  human  rights 
such as ‘hapeas [sic] corpus so respected and traditional in these countries’.62 
On 21 December Ontiveros informed his superiors that the Supreme Court 
had  struck  down  the  Offences  Against  the  State  Act  as  being  unconstitutional. 
Ireland loved its  ‘liberties  and individual  privileges’  was  the Minister’s  sardonic 
comment.63 Press  coverage  of  the  Phoenix  Park  raid  on  the  State’s  principal 
munitions storage facility deeply disturbed him. On the night of 23 December at 
8.30 p.m. four lorries pulled up outside the fort. Some of the forty or so raiders were 
dressed in military uniform. 1,084,099 rounds of ammunition for Thompson and .
303 rifles were stolen in an operation lasting three hours.64 To a ‘non-Irish observer’, 
he opined, it seemed incredible that one of the guards of the fort was ‘momentarily 
absent from his post’ which greatly facilitated the raiders.65 The raid prompted a 
massive British Army and R.U.C. mobilisation scramble all along the border area to 
prevent acts of terrorism. A few days later Ontiveros recorded that a man had been 
arrested in Rathmines in possession of $7,950 and aluminium powder believed to be 
used in explosive devices. The Taoiseach spoke out in the Dáil against the I.R.A.: 
‘They are usurping authority here and they cannot be permitted to do so.’66 As 1940 
drew close Franco’s representative was genuinely fearful that Ireland was on the 
threshold of an internal revolution. 
January-June, 1940
The New Year started propitiously for Ontiveros as Franco increased the salaries of 
all  State  employees.  Not  so  rosy  was  the  Legation’s  forecast  for  1940  which 
predicted an inauspicious year with further revelations concerning the ‘very deep 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 Dec. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 4006/E7).
64 Irish Independent, 4 Jan. 1940. 
65 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E27).  
66 Irish Independent, 4 Jan. 1940. 
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social decomposition’ prevalent everywhere.67 The frequency of armed attacks and 
‘house robberies’ was increasing as law and order appeared, to him, to be on the 
point of collapse.68 Whilst  the Government  had amended sections of the recently 
rejected  legislation  and  was  now  in  a  position  to  tackle  the  I.R.A.  once  again, 
Ontiveros wrote an extensive report that was heavily underlined by his superiors. 
The mystical propaganda of the extremists was fostering an ‘unhealthy hatred of the 
English’  which  appealed  to  a  people  with  a  ‘complete  insular  composition’,  he 
noted.69 He accurately identified that these ‘idealists’ favoured England’s continental 
enemies and were sowing the seeds of internal revolution with the sole objective of 
annexing  Northern Ireland under a  homogenous  Republican  Government.70 Their 
attacks on the police force mirrored the atrocities committed in ‘Spain’.71 For the 
first time he heard public rumours secret ‘provisioning of submarines to England’s 
enemies’.72
Ontiveros  was  delighted  to  see  the  Irish  Independent publish  a  series  of 
favourable articles on Spain between January and April  1940. As usual the Irish 
Times  was  critical  of  General  Franco  but  Ontiveros  was  accustomed  to  such 
criticism from a newspaper that represented ‘the Protestant and leftist sector and pro-
British elements’.73 It was no mere coincidence that the Irish Independent suddenly 
began a very pro-Franco campaign. The editor of the newspaper, Frank Geary, sent a 
long,  flattering  letter  to  Ontiveros  in  which  he  stressed  the  close  affinity  the 
newspaper  had  always  had  with  Franco.  Geary  wrote  that  the  newspaper  had 
‘unequivocally and whole-heartedly’ given its support to General Franco from the 
first day of the Spanish Civil War.74 He went on to write: ‘we did all that in us lay to 
secure  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the  Irish  people  for  the  Spanish  Nationalist 
cause.’75 Because of its tenacious defence of Francoism the newspaper had made 
67 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E27). 
68 Ontiveros to _____, 10 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 4006/E7).  
69 Ontiveros to _____, 4 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E27). 
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71 Ibid.
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73 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E36). 
74 Letter from Frank Geary to Ontiveros, 30 Jan. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 4006/E7).  
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‘many  enemies’.76 Geary  asked  Ontiveros  for  an  ‘unusual  favour’  requesting  a 
special message from the Caudillo to the Irish people on the anniversary of the end 
of the Spanish Civil War.77 It would come to light on the day of the anniversary just 
how  close  this  working  partnership  between  the  editorial  board  of  the  Irish 
Independent and the Spanish Minister had been.   
Professor E. A. Peers of the University of Liverpool, one of the world’s most 
renowned experts on Spanish affairs, published articles that appeared in the  Irish 
Independent.78 They helped foster a benign but false impression of domestic life in 
Spain.  Franco’s  ‘strong’  and  ‘progressive’  leadership  was  credited  with  major 
advances in socio-economic living standards.79 His popularity rested on the ‘sound 
base of the will of the united Spanish people’.80 These obsequious articles helped in 
depicting  the  benevolent  impression  about  Spain  that  the  Minister  wanted 
disseminated to the Irish people, and if a national newspaper was deliberately aiding 
him in this process so much the better. His daughter, María Louisa Ontiveros, wrote 
an article in the newspaper explaining the salubrious work undertaken by the female 
branch of the Falange, Sección Femenina,81 ‘to raise the social and cultural standard 
of  the  Spanish  woman’.82 She  described  the  Falange’s  religious  devotion  to  St 
Theresa and to historical figures like Queen Isabella of Castile. 
These commentaries were markedly different to what the Irish Times was 
writing.  As  Ireland  had  no  correspondents  abroad  it  was  relying  for  all  its 
information  on  the  internal  situation  in  Spain  from the  Associated  Press,  which 
received its  information from unreliable  sources:  ‘Like the rest  of the world,  we 
know virtually nothing – except  what rumour tells  us – of what is happening in 
Spain.’83 The Minister was not unduly concerned by such comments as he knew the 
Irish Times distribution network did not reach far outside the capital and even at that 
was read by only a narrow section of the population.  He could also rely on the 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 For further reading see E. A. Peers, The Spanish dilemma (London, 1940). 
79 Irish Independent, 22 Jan. 1940. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Its leader was Pilar Primo de Rivera, sister of the Falange founder, José Antonio. 
82 Irish Independent, 2 Feb. 1940. 
83 Irish Times, 5 Feb. 1940. 
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support of  The Standard, a Catholic weekly with enormous popular appeal which 
glorified  the  work  done  by  Franco,  to  whom  ‘Europe  owes  much’  for  his 
commendable actions  in saving ‘Catholic  Spain from political  anarchy’.84 Franco 
had built up a nation in less than a year based on ‘justice and charity’.85 Ontiveros 
was likewise in close contact with its editor. 
In March further pro-Franco articles were printed in the  Irish Independent. 
On 28 March an article appeared entitled ‘Year of Peace in Spain’.86 It claimed that 
religious faith had never been stronger and that Spain was once again exercising ‘her 
age-old  influence  for  civilisation  and spirituality  in  a  world  ruled  by materialist 
opportunism.’87 Franco had restored to the Church all of its subventions from the 
State and Jesuit property that had been misappropriated under the Republicans was 
returned to its owners. Catholicism was also re-established as the recognised faith in 
the nation. On 2 April, to mark the first anniversary of the ending of the Spanish 
Civil War, a mass was offered at the Sacred Heart Church in Donnybrook at ‘the 
request of the Spanish Minister’.88 The ceremony was presided over by the head of 
the Diplomatic Corps and Papal Nuncio, Dr Paschal Robinson. In attendance were 
both the German and Italian Ministers.  Joseph Walshe was in attendance as was 
General  O’Duffy.  The church was packed with all  the leading figures from Irish 
banking, industry, judiciary, the arts and cultural elite as a mark of Irish solidarity 
with  Spain.  A  reception  in  the  Legation  followed  with  euphoric  toasts  for  the 
‘personal good health of the Caudillo saviour of Spain’.89 
The Minister finally revealed that over the last few months he had built up a 
close  friendship  with  Dr  William  Lombard  Murphy,  one  of  the  richest  men  in 
Ireland.90 Murphy was Chairman of Independent Newspapers Ltd and he had done 
84 The Standard, 2 Feb. 1940. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Irish Independent, 28 Mar. 1940. 
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88 Irish Press, 2 Apr. 1940. 
89 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 Apr. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E36). 
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more  than  most  to  continue  the  broadsheet’s  sympathetic  orientation  towards 
Francoist Spain. This influential figure, who ‘is the soul of the campaign to favour’ a 
pro-Franco image in Irish life, should receive some honourable recommendation, he 
argued.91 He ruled out awarding Murphy a medal as this distinction was not common 
amongst Irish society but instead favoured presenting a formal invitation to him to 
come visit Madrid as an ‘official guest’ on a guided tour which ‘could be beneficial 
to us’ as he would see first-hand the glory of Francoism and be relied upon to report 
back favourably.92
On 5 June 1940 the  Irish Independent  wrote  probably its  most  laudatory 
article on Franco. It detailed what it described as the phenomenal irrigation and land 
reclamation  projects  undertaken  to  transform  barren  wasteland  into  highly 
productive  agricultural  farms.  In  addition,  the  regime  had  instigated  an 
environmentally  efficient  ‘scientific  and  systematic  afforestation’  programme 
throughout  the  countryside.93 Under  Franco’s  ‘Charter  of  Liberties’,  the  paper 
claimed,  that  workers  enjoyed  ‘free  treatment  in  spas  and health  resorts,  family 
allowances, workers’ insurance, loans, medical assistance, old-age insurance’.94 Its 
depiction  of  ordinary  life  within  Fascist  Spain  was  of  a  workers’  paradise.  The 
Minister congratulated its ‘eulogistic tone’ and believed any reader should give it the 
‘firm applause, that naturally, it deserves’.95 
In April the Minister wrote a final detailed monthly analysis on the activities 
of the I.R.A. He had begun to study the history of the movement, had acquired an 
extensive knowledge of the organisation and was astonished that the I.R.A. had ‘the 
audacity  to  publicly  declare’  that  when  Germany  defeated  Britain  one  of  the 
conditions  of peace would be the ‘total  separation’  of Northern Ireland from the 
United Kingdom.96 April marked the death of two I.R.A. prisoners who, involved in 
the Phoenix Park raid, had been on hunger strike. De Valera had refused to back 
Society. He died suddenly on 9 Jan. 1943. His enormous inheritance was divided amongst his family.  
See Irish Times, 11 Jan. 1943.  
91 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 Apr. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E36). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Irish Independent, 5 June 1940. 
94 Ibid.
95 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E36). 
96 Ontiveros to _____, 2 Apr. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E30). 
36
down  to  their  demands  this  time  and  Ontiveros  was  pleased  that  the  ‘pair  of 
fanatics’97 had  died  rather  than  have  Government  authority  surrender  to  ‘a 
dictatorship of revolutionaries’.98 On 26 April an explosion rocked through Dublin 
Castle where he had presented his credentials less than a year before. An unarmed 
police force was no deterrent to such fanatics, he reasoned. Yet what bewildered him 
further as a devout Catholic was the public sympathy displayed to those about to be 
executed for committing such appalling acts. In one instance outside the G.P.O. he 
recorded the sight of ‘three thousand people, kneeling and saying the rosary for the 
souls of those executed’.99 During his entire mission here Ontiveros never managed 
to understand the compassion the Irish people had for those in misfortune. 
Politically  the  nation  was  entering  an  uncertain  period.  De  Valera  was 
acutely aware that with the fall of Norway the front would shift to western Europe. 
On 9 May, the day before Hitler launched Operation Yellow – the blitzkrieg invasion 
of France – the Taoiseach called for collective unity and support for the Government 
from all sections of society.  Only a united people could collectively maintain the 
security and economic survival of the nation, he pronounced. If such a patriotic spirit 
was  to  be inculcated  news of  the  type  Ontiveros  received  could not  be allowed 
become public knowledge: 
         
            Éire has decided to construct a navy for vigilance service, and coast guard     
protection…But in the first night that it was anchored in its jurisdictional  
waters, whose security and defence it is intended to guarantee, a comical  
incident occurred when in the dead of night, a canoe manned by two or three 
men, climbed on board, surprised the only guard on deck, and apparently,  
threw him into the water.  After making this demonstration they returned  
quietly to land.100 
Whilst extr                  The Basque Community
97 Tony D’Arcy and Jack McNeela. 
98 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 Apr. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E27).  
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37
Hitler’s annexation of France in June 1940 meant that fascism reigned supreme over 
mainland Europe. Ironically for the Spanish Minister the German conquest was to 
create an unusual problem for him. Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards had fled into 
southern France after Franco came to power. There they had lived in relative safety. 
The arrival of the Nazis changed all this as the Gestapo searched through the French 
countryside trying to find Catalan and Basque Republicans and Separatists. If caught 
they would be deported back across the frontier where they would await a certain 
prison sentence or possible execution. Thousands of refugees fled in panic, hoping to 
charter a boat abroad. One group of about a dozen Basques left St Jean de Luz in a 
rickety  boat  trying  to  reach  the  relative  tranquillity  of  Ireland.  Their  hazardous 
voyage across open, rough seas ended when they arrived in Cork. This now meant 
that they had become Ontiveros’s problem. On 17 July, on the fourth anniversary of 
the military uprising, he started to compile a new file about these asylum seekers 
entitled  ‘Red  Information’.101 Its  unambiguous  title  left  no  doubt  as  to  what 
Ontiveros  thought  of  them.  The  Spanish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Juan 
Beigbeder, sent Ontiveros an urgent telegram when he first heard about this group. 
He wanted detailed information on who they were and an assessment of whether or 
not they constituted a possible threat to the regime.102 
Ontiveros  informed  Beigbeder  that  the  group  consisted  of  an  ex-naval 
commander, a former pilot, engineers, academics and businessmen. Their leader was 
José Camiña, a prominent businessman who was in possession of substantial sums 
of money. The Basque group quickly established themselves in Gibbstown County 
Meath,  in  a  Gaeltacht  district.  They  stayed  in  a  country  estate  and  assimilated 
themselves into the native community.  Ontiveros informed Madrid that the group 
was ‘under police surveillance’.103 The Minister  suspected that  someone or some 
group was protecting these fugitives from Francoist justice. His secret investigations 
revealed  that  an  Irishman  with  fluent  Spanish,  Ambrose  Martin,  was  actively 
101 Ontiveros  to  _____,  17 July 1940 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 987/E32).  Red or  Rojo was the term 
commonly used by Spanish fascists to describe supporters of Socialism or Communism. 
102 Telegram from Juan Beigbeder to Ontiveros, 6 Aug. 1940 (ibid.). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was passing on Ontiveros’s reports to the security authorities to keep them abreast on the activities of 
the Basque group.  
103 Ontiveros to Juan Beigbeder, 17 July 1940 (ibid.). 
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supporting them. Martin had been a commercial agent for the ‘Irish Iberian Trading 
Company’ which imported Spanish fruit products in the 1930s. Ontiveros first heard 
about Martin when, during one of his initial meetings with de Valera in May 1939, a 
member of the Irish delegation passed on Martin’s contact details.  Ontiveros had 
subsequently  met  up with  him to  ascertain  whether  immediate  commercial  links 
could  be  established,  leading  to  a  landmark  Irish-Spanish  treaty.  During  their 
discussions  Martin  said  he was a  ‘good friend’  of  the Irish Minister  in  Madrid, 
Leopold  Kerney,  and  an  official  in  External  Affairs  informed  the  Minister  that 
Kerney  may  have  known  and  helped  some  of  the  Basque  exiles  when  he  was 
resident in St Jean de Luz.104 Well-informed ‘Irish Catholic elements’,  whom the 
Minister  believed  to  be  ‘entirely  honourable’,  warned  him  that  Martin  had 
sympathised with the Second Republic and had done business with ‘Red Spain’.105 
Ontiveros  further  revealed  that  the  editor  of  The  Standard,  had  confidentially 
informed him about Martin. Rumour abounded that ‘he had abandoned his spouse’ 
while on a business trip in France and had ‘married another woman’.106 It was clear 
in his mind that Martin was the principal ‘protector’  of those ‘pseudo-Spaniards’ 
who had helped built up and financed a ‘Basque enclave’ in Ireland.107   
An astonishing  feature  of  the  tiny  Basque  colony was  how quickly  they 
managed  to  raise  their  living  standards  from  asylum  seekers  to  a  comfortable 
bourgeois lifestyle. Since their arrival into the country in July not one of them had 
approached  the  Legation.  Camiña  in  particular  irritated  the  Minister.  He  had 
managed to set up a successful enterprise exporting furs to the British market and 
had close contacts  with a prominent ‘Israelite’  businessman.108 One highly prized 
commodity needed by the British war effort was rabbit fur-collars, for pilots flying 
at high altitude. Camiña set up a factory and began exporting this product in large 
quantities. Ontiveros was incensed and compared Camiña’s character to that  of a 
stereotyped Jew ‘whose typical morality one can only imagine’.109 Ontiveros had 
104 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 Jan. 1941 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2253/E98). Kerney 
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acquired incriminating documents linking Camiña to the ‘National Government of 
the Basque Country’ and the ‘French League of Friends of the Basques’, but the 
authorities  would  not  arrest  or  deport  the  group because  they had  done  nothing 
wrong.110 Camiña was also suspected of being involved in massive misappropriation 
of money. He had been linked to the Basque Government during the Civil War and 
rumour had it that when Camiña fled to France he embezzled large sums of money 
in foreign bank accounts.  Ontiveros had discovered that £60,000 was believed to 
have been lodged by Camiña into Westminster Bank, London.111 
Ontiveros had many supporters and informers, and one named source was 
Art Ó Briain, former Minister to France, who was a frequent visitor to the Legation. 
He hoped that Ó Briain might have learned something about this group of Basques 
during his mission to France in the 1930s. Ó Briain did know something. Camiña 
was rumoured to have expropriated paintings by Darío de Regoyos.112 Not only were 
these paintings priceless but he had taken the artist’s best collection. To the Spanish 
Minister it was clear that influential circles were actively aiding these fugitives from 
justice from their initial escape to France, to their time in St Jean de Luz and their 
eventual arrival in Ireland. Based on the “evidence”, Madrid was quick to respond. 
In  accordance  with  the  Francoist  law  of  13  January  1940,  a  committee  was 
established for the recuperation of the artistic works. Two leading experts, one a 
director of the Museum of Modern Art, were assigned the task of tracking down the 
looted  paintings.  They  arrived  in  southern  France  and  worked  closely  with  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  there,  José  Félix  de  Lequerica,113 and  with  the  German 
authorities. The art works were discovered in one of Camiña’s factories in France. 
Were Camiña to be deported from Ireland back to Spain he would have faced certain 
execution by the Francoist State. In the meantime he continued to enjoy his liberty 
and had purchased a property close to Ontiveros’s residence: ‘[His new home is] in a 
nice area of the city, not far from this Legation and he is preparing to establish here 
110 Ontiveros to Juan Beigbeder, 17 July 1940 (ibid.). 
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113 Lequerica’s wartime dispatches from France are laced with anti-Semitic prejudice. See (A.M.A.E., 
leg. R – 2295/E4).  
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as his centre of activity.’114 Camiña’s close presence to the Legation must have been 
a major irritant to Ontiveros.
The story of this Basque community in Ireland is remarkable. One of them, 
named  Ramón Jiménez  Marañón,  joined  the  R.A.F.  Ángel  Aguirreche  and  Juan 
Antonio  Izaguirre  left  Ireland also  to  fight  for  General  de  Gaulle’s  Free  French 
Forces in the liberation of Europe and North Africa from Fascism.  Don Manuel 
Egileor, ex-Deputy, became a lecturer in T.C.D., whose reputation was dismissed by 
Ontiveros  for its  ‘British ancestry and tendencies’.115 By July 1942 his  sustained 
scheming against the group began to undermine his relationship with important Irish 
circles.  A renegade Basque priest  and ex-canon of Valladolid,  Alberto Onaindia, 
who had written an eyewitness account of the bombing of Guernica, came to Ireland, 
lodged with José Camiña and said daily mass close to the Legation. In spite of the 
fact that he had not undertaken any political or propaganda activities here against the 
Francoist  regime,  Ontiveros  had,  through  the  Department  of  External  Affairs, 
‘communicated  telephone  instructions  to  the  police’  to  have  Onaindia  put  under 
surveillance.116 Rumour surfaced that Onaindia was to give a talk entitled ‘Spain Still 
Alive’.117 The Minister was unable to ascertain when or where the talk was to take 
place but he was assured by the police that if the Basques engaged in any unlawful 
activities  they  would  be  arrested.  It  was  apparent  to  Ontiveros  that  many  Irish 
Catholics admired the religious devotion of the Basques so he had to tread carefully 
in his pursuit of Onaindia. His relationship with both External Affairs and the Irish 
Independent soured  due  to  his  obsession  with  the  Basques.  An  article  that  had 
appeared  in  the  newspaper  about  one  of  the  families  living  in  Gibbstown,  the 
Gallastegui family, angered the Minister for the ‘unjustified condescension’ shown 
to these disparate groups who had renounced their Spanishness.118 Subsequently he 
wrote to Madrid stating that although ‘I am,  in principle,  opposed to starting up 
114 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Oct. 1940 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 987/E32). It  is 
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arguments with the press’, he felt justified in starting one at that time.119 The editor 
was forced to launch an investigation into the matter, culminating in an apologetic 
reply which acknowledged that the views of the Basques were not representative of 
the  newspaper.  Ontiveros  called  on External  Affairs  to  complain  about  how the 
censorship authorities could have allowed such a ‘flagrantly disdainful’ article to be 
published.120 He believed it had sullied Spain’s image and the collective ‘national 
feeling’ of true Spaniards.121 
Ontiveros’s only personal success against the Basques came when two of the 
‘uncompromising dissidents’ approached the Legation to seek travel permits.122 Two 
brothers,  Manuel  and  Telesforo  Echevarría,  wanted  to  travel  to  Spain  owing  to 
Telesforo’s  deteriorating  blindness.  Through  confidential  sources  the  Minister 
learned that they had no intention of going back to Spain but wanted to travel to 
Lisbon and onwards to North America. He also doubted their claims to have ‘broken 
relations’ with Camiña and consequently refused them travel permits.123 Despite this 
one pyrrhic victory most of his endeavours had proven fruitless and Camiña and his 
fellow exiles  lived  happily  in  Ireland for  the  duration  of  the  war,  thanks  to  the 
welcoming native ‘Irish hospitality’.124
June-December, 1940
On 26 June 1940 Malcolm MacDonald, British emissary and Dominions Secretary, 
met  de  Valera  and  presented  him  with  a  one-page  memorandum  agreeing  in 
principle  to  a  united  Ireland.  Now  more  than  ever,  given  as  Denis  Smyth  has 
demonstrated, Britain’s ‘perilous strategic position’,125 it needed Irish assistance for 
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provisions, manpower and, more importantly,  the strategic ports of Lough Swilly, 
Cobh and Berehaven. Without the use of these ports all Royal Navy and merchant 
ships  had to  undertake  a  circuitous  route  up the North Sea and beyond  the  60th 
parallel to avoid the German Kriegsmarine and keep the vital trading link with North 
America  open.  The  Taoiseach  rejected  the  offer  because  it  did  not  guarantee 
territorial  unity  and,  more  importantly,  it  meant  plunging  Ireland  into  a  war  for 
which it had no adequate military or manufacturing industries. Furthermore, it would 
have  politically  undermined  the  cross-party  unity  de  Valera  had  managed  to 
negotiate with Fine Gael and Labour as well as potentially unleashing major social 
unrest  domestically  and  with  Northern  Ireland’s  Unionist  community.126 The 
German conquest of France certainly conditioned Ireland’s foreign policy, but the 
Government’s  resolve  to  maintain  neutrality  prevailed.127 Behind  the  scenes  the 
Cabinet Committee on Emergency Problems had finalised secret plans to transfer 
power to the military authorities should the Government be captured by an invasion 
force.128 Other plans envisaged a County Commissioner for each city should they be 
seized. 
Throughout July Ontiveros recorded the collective psychosis and foreboding 
prevalent within the capital. Air-raid sirens were regularly heard from 10 July due to 
the threat of bombing connected with the air war raging between the R.A.F. and the 
Luftwaffe  over  the  skies  of  Britain.  Government  buildings  and  many  historic 
landmarks were now heavily protected with sand bags and soldiers as a precaution 
against  aerial  bombing.  Bomb  shelters  for  civilians  were  under  construction. 
Phoenix Park was littered with barbed wire to prevent it becoming a possible landing 
strip  for  enemy planes.129 A huge evacuation  plan was carried out  ‘to  decongest 
urban  areas’.130 Children  were  separated  from  their  families  and  sent  to  rural 
communities.  In the Minister’s opinion,  the unspoken public enemy was still  the 
126 On 16 June 1940 Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Labour united together to urge recruitment to the 
Local Security Force. 
127 The Irish Government feared invasion by Germany more than Great Britain at that time.  
128 Minutes of a Cabinet meeting, 16 July 1940 (N.A.I., D.T., S11982). 
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English, ‘owing to the lasting memory of the past’.131 He believed that if partition, 
the greatest irritant in Anglo-Irish relations was removed, Ireland would join in the 
war with Britain. Ontiveros never doubted that the people would resist determinately 
any  invasion  with  the  same  vigour  with  which  the  nation  had  achieved  its 
independence but he concurred with the Taoiseach’s statement that Ireland was ‘at 
this present historic moment, with all probability, in the most threatening position in 
Europe’.132  
It  was unclear to Ontiveros if the threat of invasion in the late autumn of 
1940 had receded or not because there was no independent media in Emergency 
Ireland as a result of censorship.133 Information gleaned from newspapers formed a 
vital  component  of  his  wartime  dispatches  and  more  often  than  not  he  had  to 
evaluate his opinion of the domestic situation based on their reports. One newspaper 
he never admired, owing to its pro-British tendencies, was the Irish Times. However, 
he could not overlook the fact that its coverage of foreign events, in a nation starved 
of reliable information about the war, reported the significant losses sustained by the 
Luftwaffe as a result of the Battle of Britain: ‘There seems to be small doubt that 
Germany’s losses in aircraft have been substantial’.134 On the other hand, Italy had 
just invaded Egypt on 13 September and on 23 September an Allied expeditionary 
force was defeated at Dakar,135 which further signalled to many that the Axis powers 
were  still  in  the  ascendant.  In  August  and  October  bombs  fell  in  Wexford  and 
Wicklow. The Irish nation at that critical time was gripped by fear and uncertainty. 
In  addition,  there  was  always  the  threat  posed  by  the  I.R.A.,  ‘internationalists, 
Communists, Hebrews and Masons’ who had successfully infiltrated into the body 
politic.136 
Since  assuming  the  office  of  Prime  Minister  on  10  May  1940,  Winston 
Churchill  had taken a  prominent  interest  in  Anglo-Irish affairs.  He had been an 
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unrepentant critic of de Valera’s neutral policy since its inception, questioning the 
legal right of a Dominion to proclaim neutrality. He believed that Irish neutrality had 
cost  the  lives  of  thousands  of  Allied  servicemen  and  merchant  sailors.137 
Furthermore,  he held the view that if the maritime link with North America was 
severed  by  the  German  U-boat  menace,  Britain  as  well  as  Ireland  was  all  but 
doomed. He blamed de Valera for many woes, both past and present, in Anglo-Irish 
relations and in a speech to the House of Commons on 5 November 1940 the Prime 
Minister excoriated Irish neutrality: 
The fact that we cannot use the South and West coasts of Ireland to refuel 
our flotillas and aircraft and thus protect the trade by which Ireland as well as 
Great Britain  lives,  is a most  heavy and grievous burden and one which  
should never have been placed on our shoulders.138 
The Taoiseach responded to Churchill’s speech on 6 November in Dáil Éireann. He 
asserted that the partition of Ireland caused by Britain was one of the reasons the 
nation was not fighting alongside its neighbour. He reaffirmed the inalienable right 
of a small nation to choose its own course and not be pressured into any other policy 
by bigger powers:
Certainly, as long as this Government remains in office we shall defend our 
rights in regard to these ports against whoever shall attack them, as we shall 
defend our rights in regard to every other part of our territory.139
He subsequently reinforced neutrality through legislation. On 11 November the 51st 
amendment to the Emergency Powers Act was approved, by which no warship could 
enter an Irish port, save in the case of distress. Ontiveros commended de Valera’s 
‘firm  answer’  to  Churchill  as  an  assertion  of  Ireland’s  self-determination  and 
sovereignty.140 In the Minister’s eyes de Valera had taken the opportunity ‘to attract 
137 For further reading consult Roy Jenkins, Churchill (London, 2001), pp 564-5. 
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the sympathies and spiritual support in general of the Irish people’ to unite the nation 
behind him as its undisputed leader.141 The Minister judged de Valera’s responses to 
Churchill’s speech as amongst his best ‘in the Parliament since the initiation of the 
European tragedy.’142 The Taoiseach had grasped the mood of the nation by standing 
up to a world power and old foe. In addition, Ontiveros believed that Irish neutrality 
had important support across the Atlantic where ‘the great mass of the Irish is very 
compact in the great American Confederation, and includes an enormous number 
who have acquired positions in the [Roosevelt]  administration’.143 Soon after this 
Anglo-Irish  tête-à-tête, Ontiveros called into External Affairs to discuss the recent 
controversy. He also held conversations with the German and Italian Ministers. All 
parties agreed that Churchill’s speech did not signal a malicious intent on the part of 
Great Britain to force Ireland into the war and that de Valera had won the moral high 
ground.     
January-June, 1941
In  1941  the  dominant  topic  of  discussion  in  all  households  was  rationing.  The 
Minister  for  Supplies,  Seán  Lemass,  was  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of 
controlling  and distributing  essential  foodstuffs  to  the  public.  On 4  February de 
Valera  announced on radio that  fuel  would also have to be curtailed  for general 
purposes and that military considerations took precedence at this critical time in the 
nation’s fight for survival. Furthermore, Ireland’s stocks of coal, which it received 
entirely  from Britain,  were  running  dangerously  low and  could  grind  the  whole 
economy to a halt. To cope with the worsening situation an enormous turf extraction 
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campaign was launched to replace coal as the dominant fuel for domestic homes and 
industrial consumption. Phoenix Park became the principal turf depot as mountains 
of turf were stockpiled for distribution to the public during a bitterly cold winter. 
Problems  in  transportation  mounted  as  railways  struggled  to  function  starved  of 
essential fuel supply. The canals were reopened to transport goods into the capital. 
Ontiveros may not have been accustomed to such winters and personally felt  the 
collective harsh reality of restrictions caused by the ‘penury of coal’  in Ireland’s 
‘rigorous  climate’.144 Farmers  complained  that  imported  supplies  of  fertilisers 
essential  to replenish and enrich the soil  for further harvests were declining at  a 
significant rate. De Valera had championed tillage over pastoral farming for years 
yet  had  made  no  provisions  for  wartime  imponderables  let  alone  foreseen  the 
benefits of establishing an indigenous fertiliser plant in the event of war. 
Improvisation and endurance were to be the essential means through which 
Ireland was to survive its isolation. Wheat, the primary component of bread, formed 
the  principal  stable  dietary  supplement  of  the  average  person’s  food  intake  and 
consequently Irish trade links with Spain were shown to be indispensable. Imports of 
mercuric  fungicide  were  obtained  from Spain  to  safeguard  de  Valera’s  agrarian 
policy  in  order  to  combat  the  decimating  impact  of  blackspot  on  wheat.145 
Remittances from Irish workers in the British war economy were of vital importance 
in financing the exorbitant cost accrued by the State as a result of its expenditure on 
defence and military needs during the war, when additional supplies of munitions 
and weaponry were required by the army. 
Ontiveros’s brief as a professional diplomat had been altered as a result of 
the  European  war.  The  raison  d’être of  his  wartime  mission  to  Ireland  was  to 
ascertain,  evaluate  and  inform his  superiors  about  the  socio-political  and  socio-
economic  implication  that  the war was having on the Irish people.  But by early 
January  1941,  the  Minister  began  to  send  a  plethora  of  newspaper  clippings 
concerning Spain. Ever since Franco and Hitler had held their secretive meeting at 
Hendaye on 23 October 1940,146 the Irish Times had begun to devote considerable 
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attention to Spain’s neutral position vis-à-vis the Axis powers. As a result of the pro-
Axis inclinations of both Franco and Serrano Súñer, it seemed inevitable that Spain 
would abandon its neutrality. In return for joining the Axis orbit the regime could 
aspire to an empire in North Africa at the expense of Vichy France and a German-
aided military assault to recapture Gibraltar. It is plausible that Ontiveros genuinely 
feared the consequences of such a momentous step being taken by his own nation, 
beginning  as  a  result  to  send deliberately selected  material  from the  Irish Times 
because its coverage of the war was more accurate and detailed than the other two 
main broadsheets.147 The Minister also began to send reports of enormous Allied and 
Red Cross food aid shipments to Spain, at a time when it was generally known that 
the country was experiencing famine in many regions. 
On 6 January 1941 Ontiveros attended a meeting with An Taoiseach and 
Minister for External Affairs, Éamon de Valera, at Government Buildings.148 He was 
there  ostensibly  as  a  matter  of  courtesy  to  pass  on  his  New  Year  message  of 
goodwill.  What  the Spanish Minister  really  wanted to  discuss  with him was the 
recent  bombing  of  Dublin  and  adjacent  counties.149 De  Valera  confidentially 
informed him that army experts had discovered that the bombs were ‘undeniably of 
German manufacture.’150 What amazed Ontiveros was the total  amount of bombs 
reputed to have fallen in the last few days alone: ‘In total  the number of bombs 
dropped in the last few days is around seventy’.151 De Valera warned the Spanish 
Minister that the Government may have to order a complete black-out of the capital 
as  a  precaution  against  any  loss  of  life.  He  further  informed  him  that  no 
compensation had yet been received from Berlin for other bombs dropped for which 
the  Third  Reich  had  accepted  responsibility,  following  strongly-worded notes  of 
protest from the Irish Minister in Berlin. In addition, Ontiveros was informed by 
confidential  sources  that  if  such  incidences  continued,  the  German  Minister  to 
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Ireland,  Dr  Hempel,  who  was  a  close  friend  of  the  Spanish  Minister,  might  be 
ordered to leave and close his Legation, a decision of such magnitude that it would 
certainly have curried favour with the Allies.
Ontiveros also heard that some of the bombs dropped recently were of such a 
precise  calibration  that  the  German  Luftwaffe had  deliberately  sought  to  kill 
prominent members of the Jewish community in Ireland. It was rumoured that these 
precision bombs had ‘destroyed a synagogue’ and demolished among other homes 
‘one of the rabbis of a temple here.’152 If these rumours were true and if the reports 
from the  Irish Times were accurate, then the next theatre of operations in the war 
would shift to the western Mediterranean, the Minister foresaw. It is plausible that 
Ontiveros had ulterior motives in dispatching such selective reports at this particular 
time. His reports suggest that he may have feared the impact that a full-scale war 
could wreak on a people.  He could see himself  the detrimental  economic effects 
Europe’s total war was having on Ireland and he clearly did not want policy makers 
in Spain to embark on a militaristic course for which the nation and its people were 
ill prepared. 
The Minister’s vigilant watch on the I.R.A. continued unabated. He secured a 
communiqué from the ‘Government of the Republic of Ireland’ signed by Chief of 
Staff Stephen Hayes in which it claimed that ‘the Parliament for two-thirds of the 
country is a body which rules by assassination, internment and martial law.’153 He 
found its propaganda ironic as it was this organisation that was robbing banks and 
ordinary people to fund its illegal activities. He still believed that a certain section of 
society would always support such propaganda in the light of Ireland’s past history 
with England. He also detected increasing public disquiet caused by the rationing of 
bread, tea and fuel. No commodity in Ireland was more desired than tea, with only 
the Irish Times defending tea rationing because of recent losses in shipping sustained 
by Great Britain. To help ameliorate the situation the Government established Irish 
Shipping Ltd to carry imports  into the country and in March 1941 Frank Aiken, 
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, was dispatched to the United 
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States to purchase weapons, food stocks and ships. Aiken successfully purchased 
$50  million  in  arms  and wheat  as  well  as  two new ships  for  the  nascent  State 
shipping line.154 Ontiveros sagaciously judged that Aiken’s short  mission had not 
been an entirely successful one and that a noticeable ‘cooling’ in Irish-American 
relations was discernible.155 
Inside  the  Dáil  the  Government  was  under  increasing  pressure  from the 
Opposition for its handling of the nation’s budgetary deficit. On 4 and 17 June 1940 
de Valera, Seán T. O’Kelly, Minister for Finance, and James McElligott, Secretary 
of the Department of Finance, had been forced to meet with the nation’s prominent 
banking officials  for their advice on restructuring the State’s finances. By March 
1941 O’Kelly had estimated army expenditure to reach £8,383,556, an astonishing 
figure for that time.156 De Valera defended such expenditure on the grounds that a 
neutral country must have the ability to defend its sovereignty by more than just 
words: ‘We are determined that no one of the belligerents shall use the territory of 
the State as a base of attack upon another.’157 
The  capture  of  Axis  agents  in  Wexford  and  in  Cork158 reinforced  the 
Government’s  publicity  campaign  for  volunteers  to  the  Local  Defence  Forces. 
Ontiveros noticed that in the main access routes to the capital rectangular concrete 
emplacements had been constructed and manned to stop all cars for investigation. 
The principal organ of Fianna Fáil propaganda was the Irish Press. Since January it 
had reported a  ‘magnificent’  response to  enlistment,  citing  in  particular  veterans 
from the  War  of  Independence  who answered  the  Taoiseach’s  call  to  stand and 
defend  the  tricolour.159 All  new  recruits  received  ‘intensive  training’  and  their 
intrinsic ‘soldierly quality’ made up for any shortages in rifle equipment.160 This was 
at odds with what the Spanish Minister had witnessed. He recorded previously a visit 
to the pictures and noted the ‘smiles and laughs of derision’ from young men when 
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they saw Government films promoting life in the many volunteer organisations.161 It 
was apparent to him that despite the patriotic propaganda emanating from the Irish 
Press, the youth of Ireland was apathetic and unwilling to sacrifice much for the 
national effort. Even de Valera lamented the low numbers volunteering to defend the 
nation: 
Would to God we had a quarter of a million men, armed and equipped, and 
then the danger would be lessened.162
To boost morale and encourage young recruits to enlist in volunteer construction or 
defence  organisations  the Government  organised an enormous  military parade  to 
pass  by the G.P.O.,  O’Connell  Street,  on 14 April  1941.  Ontiveros  attended the 
parade, which had a profound impact on him. The seminal event marked the 25th 
anniversary of the 1916 Easter Rising. Leading politicians used this historic occasion 
to inspire a new generation of patriots and to remind the belligerent powers that the 
nation was determined to uphold and defend its neutrality.  The enormous parade 
witnessed over 22,000 troops pass by the G.P.O. to salute the Taoiseach. The public 
was particularly attracted to the new uniforms of the recently commissioned Irish 
Marine Service. A fly-over by the Air Corps was also performed. 
The  Minister  thoroughly  enjoyed  the  ‘magnificent  parade’  that  visibly 
displayed  the  public’s  ‘patriotism’  as  it  seemed  to  awaken  the  nation  from  a 
collective feeling of apathy.163 He compared this ‘great display of Celtic race and 
Catholicism’ with Spanish parades.164 For ‘a Spaniard’ it all seemed a little ‘cold’ 
and  lacked  the  whole  paraphernalia  of  flags,  emblems,  symbolism  and  public 
involvement so prominent in Spanish parades.165 He disliked the fact that de Valera 
arrived without ‘an escort’ and criticised his dress apparel believing that such events 
required a statesman to dress more exotically rather than in a mundane black suit.166 
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However,  the  great  display  of  military  prowess  impressed  the  Minister  and 
reinforced his belief that the Irish had the fighting calibre to resist an invasion, albeit 
through  guerrilla-warfare.  On  conclusion  of  this  report  he  coined  the  phrase 
‘inflexible  neutrality’  to  describe  the  Irish  Government’s  wartime  policy.167 He 
concluded that both politically and economically Ireland would survive the war.
                                                                April-July, 1941
On 15 and 16 April 1941 in four bombing raids on Belfast the Luftwaffe killed 1,100 
civilians, destroyed 56,000 homes and made 100,000 people homeless.168 The Irish 
Government  immediately  dispatched  a  convoy of  fire-fighting  rescue  crews  and 
ambulance workers to Belfast to help put out the fires and attend to the wounded. 
Many thousands of refugees were accommodated in the South with food, shelter and 
clothing.  Ontiveros  succinctly  noticed  that  the  Irish  Government  immediately 
claimed that  this  was  not  an act  of  generosity  to  Great  Britain,  but  to  Northern 
Ireland, over which the Irish authorities claimed jurisdiction. Ontiveros admired the 
‘spirit of humanitarian solidarity’ shown to the Northern Ireland Government by de 
Valera in an act of ‘Irish fraternity.’169 However, not long after this humanitarian act 
of kindness, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Lord Craigavon, with the full 
support of the Government of Northern Ireland, pressured the British Prime Minister 
to introduce conscription in the North. Ontiveros noted that partition defined Anglo-
Irish relations and he correctly surmised that conscription in the North would be a 
disaster  for  it  could  cause  ‘civil  conflict’  with  ‘violent’  consequences.170 The 
Taoiseach expressed himself more forcefully on this issue: ‘The Six Counties are a 
part  of  Ireland.  They  have  always  been  a  part  of  Ireland.  Their  inhabitants  are 
Irishmen, and no Act of Parliament can alter this fact, present and historic.’171 The 
following day in the House of Commons,  Winston Churchill  was forced to back 
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down on introducing conscription in the North because ‘it would be more trouble 
than it  is worth to enforce such a policy’.172 He did add, as a parting shot at  de 
Valera, that Britain was grateful to the Northern Ireland Government for its: 
loyal  aid and continued and constant support of our cause…no words of  
praise can be too high.173
Dublin was itself the subject of a major bombing on 31 May 1941 that left twenty-
eight dead, ninety wounded and hundreds of homes damaged or destroyed in the 
North Strand area of  the  capital.  Phoenix  Park,  residence  of  the  Irish President, 
Apostolic  Nuncio  and  the  American  Minister  David  Gray,  was  also  struck. 
Ontiveros condemned the ‘unspeakable act’ as an indiscriminate attack on a civilian 
population.174 He was horrified when he saw the ‘demolished and devastated’ houses 
it  had destroyed.175 He informed his  superiors that  the plane flew at  a ‘very low 
altitude’ and the ‘emblems and markings’ clearly identified it as belonging to the 
Luftwaffe.176 Luckily for Ireland the war was to move eastwards and the threat of 
both invasion and bombing was to diminish considerably from then on. 
 
August-December, 1941
Unfortunately for the Spanish Minister his relationship with the  Irish Independent 
had  soured  after  he  had  ordered  an  investigation  into  an  article  the  newspaper 
printed on one of the Basques living in exile in Ireland. The cooling process in their 
working relationship was highlighted by the Minister when an article appeared that 
described the ‘closing of businesses’ as a result of the State’s autarkic  economic 
policies.177 Furthermore, it detailed how the penitentiary system was overburdened 
with inmates at a time when the country needed every eligible man for the harvest. 
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To ameliorate the situation, the article claimed, prisoners were being released into 
labour battalions for what was effectively slave labour. The rampant ‘vicious spiral 
of  rising  prices  and  clandestine  trading’  had  created  the  biggest  industry  in  the 
country,  Estraperlismo.178 The newspaper printed another article  about Spain that 
described an incident during which Madrid’s citizens had attached a note onto the 
trident of one of the landmark fountains in the city, the god-Neptune. The note read: 
‘Either give me something to eat or take away the fork!’179 The humour was lost on 
Ontiveros  who could not understand why the newspaper  had so suddenly turned 
against him. 
More worrying news followed when a judicial tribunal in Spain charged with 
the repression of ‘Freemasonry and Communism’ passed sentence  in absentia on 
nine  former  leaders  of  the  Republican  Government  and  the  sentences  the  court 
administered were published in the Irish Independent.180 Of those sentenced, two had 
been former Prime Ministers of Spain. Both men, Santiago Casares Quiroga and Dr 
Juan Negrín, were sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment and the loss of all civil 
and political rights. Included in the list of those condemned was a woman of Irish 
origin, Victoria Kent. She had been a former Director of Prisons and had become 
Spain’s first female lawyer and member of Government. Her picture appearing in 
the press incensed Ontiveros because he believed it depicted her as a modern-day 
‘Joan of Arc’.181 In his opinion this woman was of the same ilk as Frank Ryan and he 
decided to complain to External Affairs. He was aware that the public had a long 
historical  compassion for prisoners and front-page articles such as these depicted 
Francoism as inhumanly suppressive. He admitted, not for the first time, that the 
public  compassion  for  such  people came as  a  great  surprise  to  him and he was 
perplexed  by the  ‘completely  hostile  orientation’  that  the  Irish  Independent was 
taking regarding Spain.182 Fortunately for Ontiveros he could always rely on  The 
Standard, which vehemently attacked the ‘laudatory’ coverage of Victoria Kent.183 
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The  onset  of  another  cold  winter  brought  further  privations  for  the  Irish 
people. Gas was reduced to only essential needs and railway lines were reduced to a 
minimum service of operation due to the ‘scarcity  of coal.’184 Luxury items  like 
cocoa,  chocolate and soap were impossible to come by unless one was a regular 
customer of a shop. Basic goods which Ireland had in large quantities such as ‘sugar, 
soap and matches’  were also rationed.185 Candles and paraffin oil  were in scarce 
supply but Ontiveros noted that this did not dampen the religious piety of the people 
at mass. Lard, jam and marmalade were very difficult to buy and in an agricultural 
country the Minister could not understand how items such as eggs were so ‘difficult 
to obtain’.186 The State continued to export a weekly quota of ‘seven thousand heads 
of livestock’ to Great Britain.187 In addition,  many people from Northern Ireland 
came down South to purchase goods, something which Ontiveros was completely 
against. He did not understand how this could be ‘tolerated’ because this influx of 
shoppers ‘had contributed to the general scarcity’ in the South.188  
Despite  the Taoiseach’s  repeated  appeals  to  the youth  to enrol in  various 
voluntary  organisations  Ontiveros  had  noted  for  some  time  that  high  levels  of 
disillusionment, ‘indifference and pessimism’ were increasing generally and a belief 
fostered that the old revolutionary generation no longer appealed to the young.189 
Public  anger  at  the  Government  increased  mainly  due to  rationing  and boredom 
caused by stringent censorship. Rumours circulated that clashes in the Cabinet was 
undermining  the  Government’s  ‘prestige  and  authority’,  he  noted.190 Ontiveros 
frequently visited Government Buildings to listen to Oireachtas debates on proposed 
legislation. Robert Briscoe, a close friend of de Valera and the first Jew elected to 
Dáil Éireann, caught his attention.191 The Minister could not understand how Briscoe 
had become a close associate of de Valera. He could not prove it yet  but he had 
reliable information that Briscoe was a ‘leftist, Semite, Basque-regionalist supporter 
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and Mason’.192 The most appalling site the Minister had to pass by was the Masonic 
Lodge on Molesworth Street. He could not understand how a devout Catholic nation 
could allow such a monstrosity to exist. 
On  7  December  1941  the  American  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbour  was 
suddenly attacked by forces of the Japanese Empire. Four days later Hitler declared 
war on the United States. De Valera spoke for the nation when he described his great 
sadness that many Irish relatives may now die fighting in this war. He believed that 
Ireland  could  only  be  a  ‘friendly  neutral’  towards  its  adopted  homeland.193 He 
reaffirmed strict  neutrality despite the entry of the United States into the war on 
Britain’s side: ‘Our circumstances, our history, the incompleteness of our national 
freedom’ made any other policy impracticable.194 Ontiveros noted that  the nation 
now stood at  the ‘limit  of a cataclysm’  and was more  isolated  than at  any time 
before.195 Could  this  ‘young  and  weak  Irish  State’  survive  the  war’s  inevitable 
escalation?  This question more  than any other,  occupied  his  wartime mission  as 
1942 approached.196
In the early hours of 8 December 1941, de Valera was awoken by knocking 
on his front door home in Blackrock. The British representative to Éire, Sir John 
Maffey, had in his hand an urgent message for the Taoiseach from the British Prime 
Minister. It read: ‘From Mr Churchill to Mr de Valera. Personal. Private and Secret. 
Begins. Now is your chance. Now or never. “A nation once again.” Am very ready 
to meet you at any time. Ends.’197 Churchill knew that with the human and natural 
resources  combined  with  the  limitless  industrial,  technical  and  productive 
capabilities of the United States, the Allies could now begin to turn the tide against 
the Axis powers. At that euphoric time in Britain’s fortunes Churchill extended his 
hand to de Valera to join with the Allies to defend freedom and democracy.  He 
offered the Taoiseach the one political prize he had always wanted – the unification 
of Ireland. But for the second time in the war de Valera rejected unification in favour 
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of  neutrality  and  the  bitter  thorn  of  partition,  which  Ontiveros  had  frequently 
reported on, would remain in place to torment Anglo-Irish relations. 
January-November  , 1942  
The general consensus was that ‘1942 is going to be a very hard year’ but Ireland 
would survive ‘by the skin’ of its  teeth.198  On New Year’s Day 1942 the  Irish 
Independent gave  notice  that  gas  supply  was  to  be  further  rationed.  Domestic 
cooking and heating was now only available from the hours of 7.30 a.m. – 2 p.m. 
and 6 p.m. – 9.30 p.m. In-between these hours gas supply was cut off and officials, 
who became known commonly as Glimmer men, could issue fines if a household 
used  residue  gas  during  restricted  hours.  Shortages  of  rubber  led  to  widespread 
bicycle theft with lucrative profit for the perpetrators. Ontiveros recorded that ‘bread 
rationing’ and an ‘intensified’ restriction of ‘coal for domestic usage’ was causing 
considerable  hardship  during  those winter  days.199 One issue  that  confronted  the 
nation was the dire shortage of wheat. Ireland needed approximately 370,000 tons, 
of which 290,000 were secured domestically. Owing to defence expenditure and the 
high cost of external purchase, a deficit of 80,000 had accrued. The Government 
contemplated cutting livestock exports to Great Britain to alleviate this shortage but 
instead decided to ration wheat. 
On 27 January Ontiveros dispatched an urgent telegram to Madrid which 
detailed the arrival of large contingents of American troops into Northern Ireland. 
He noted that the scale of the disembarkation was ‘enormous’: thousands of well-
equipped  and  well-supplied  troops,  significant  heavy  artillery  and  battlefield 
hardware.200 The arrival of these troops could only mean one thing in the Spanish 
Minister’s mind: the Allies were building up for a cross-Channel invasion of the 
continent. The construction of military facilities and complexes was judged by de 
Valera  to  be  an  insidious  assault  on  Irish  claims  of  sovereignty  over  Northern 
Ireland. Ontiveros took an opportunity to dine with William T. Cosgrave, leader of 
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Fine  Gael,  to  discuss  the  latest  political  developments.  Cosgrave  said  that  de 
Valera’s statements on this issue were creating an atmosphere of apprehension and 
‘nervousness’.201 In  his  opinion  the  Taoiseach’s  intransigence  on  partition  was 
alienating Ireland from the United States. Ontiveros asked Cosgrave if there existed 
the  possibility  of  a  National  Government  to  see  the  nation  through  its  present 
difficulties. Cosgrave believed there was not because he would never serve in any 
Government at any time with de Valera.202 He reiterated that his ‘collaborationist 
support’  for  the  Government  was  done  only  out  of  ‘honour  and  service  for  his 
country’.203 
The conversation moved to other matters, especially recent comments made 
by the Deputy-Leader of Fine Gael James Dillon. Dillon had vociferously argued for 
some time that Ireland should abandon neutrality and fight for Christian civilisation 
against  Hitler,  who had suppressed so many nations  by his  ideological  belief  in 
national and racial superiority. If Ireland stood up to Nazism and Fascism, Dillon 
believed,  the  island  could  become  ‘a  Gibraltar  of  the  Atlantic’.204 The  Spanish 
Minister  concluded  his  report  with  an  assessment  that  the  situation  facing  the 
country was still hazardous: 
The one undeniable thing is that in the political, economic and social spheres, 
the prolongation and intensification or eventual geographic approximation of 
the war to this island, increases its problems and sources of discontent in  
terms which might perhaps, before one might have believed, determine a  
dangerous crisis in its history.205 
Ontiveros’s  unstinting  vigilance  of  suspicious  I.R.A.  ‘criminals’,  ‘Freemasonry’ 
elements  and  ‘Jews  from all  origins  and émigrés  from the  continent’  continued 
unabated  throughout  the  winter  months.206 In  his  opinion  they still  constituted  a 
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potential threat to social stability and were afforded too much ‘hospitality’.207 In June 
came news of the City of Bremen which had been bombed in the Bay of Biscay. All 
Irish  ships  displayed  in  big,  visible  letters  the  word  ‘Éire’  accompanied  by  the 
tricolour  to  distinguish  its  nationality.208 This  did  not  prevent  German  planes 
bombing the ship with the loss of all the wheat it was transporting, a commodity 
desperately needed in Ireland. Luckily the crew were all safely ‘rescued by Spanish 
ships’, much to the delight of Ontiveros.209 More Irish merchant ships would be sunk 
throughout the war, owing in part to de Valera’s refusal to arm them in case this 
impinged on Irish neutrality. 
The  Spanish  Minister’s  earlier  observations  that  young  people  were 
becoming  disillusioned  with  their  political  leader  were  manifested  in  the  local 
elections of August 1942. Fianna Fáil was severely hit as the Labour Party made 
huge inroads into local and municipal County Councils. For Ontiveros, it was the 
clearest indication yet of worker dissatisfaction with low wages and high prices, an 
observation confirmed by Henry Patterson, who has shown how real wages during 
this period ‘dropped by 30 per cent’ despite huge increases in the cost of living.210 
Bizarrely, on the day of such an infrequent expression of public disquiet against the 
Government the streets remained calm. Dublin was in reality a stifled and passive 
city. Its citizens felt increasingly isolated from world affairs. ‘Depressing’ was the 
main word Ontiveros heard people use to describe the state of the nation.211 Despite 
all this, Seán Lemass publicly spoke out on 8 November 1942, the day Allied armies 
landed on the beaches of North Africa, to remind the people that they owed their 
survival to de Valera for his clear vision and leadership against external aggression. 
A nation and all  it  represented was identified in the personification of one man. 
Ireland was becoming de Valera’s Ireland. 
January-December 1943
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On 17 March 1943, St Patrick’s Day, Éamon de Valera broadcast to the nation and 
to the world his enduring vision of where Ireland was heading in its long historical 
process. He spoke about the nation’s strong Catholic faith which was brought to 
these shores by St Patrick. He also extolled the importance of the Irish language, but 
the speech was best remembered for the rural socio-economic system he envisaged: 
‘That  Ireland which we dreamed of would be the home of a people who valued 
material wealth only as the basis of right living, of a people who were satisfied with 
frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit’.212 His imagined 
countryside would be alive with the sounds of healthy athletic youths and ‘comely 
maidens’.213 These imaginary scenes of rustic happiness were at odds with the reality 
that Ontiveros saw. His frequent donations to charities such as the St Vincent de 
Paul Society and the I.R.C.S. are an indication that he was aware of the appalling 
penury and unsanitary conditions many people lived in. His wartime observations 
provide  historians  with  an  insight  into  daily  life  in  neutral  Ireland  that  confirm 
medical evidence gathered by the Chief Medical Officer in the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health.214 
Severe rationing of all basic commodities further exacerbated the mood of 
public  disquiet.  Calls  for more  and greater  sacrifices  for the national  good were 
meeting  with  stronger  opposition  and some citizens  took matters  into  their  own 
hands to improve their standards of living. On 21 April the Minister recorded that 
house robberies were increasing exponentially and so too was the violent nature of 
the crimes. Robbers showed up at doors ‘with pistols in hand’, women out on their 
own at night were particularly at risk from ‘groups of three or more individuals’ who 
targeted  bicycles  whilst  ‘peaceful  middle-class  citizens’  were  often  assaulted  for 
their ‘watches and wallets’.215 Ontiveros heard of shootings ‘not only against police 
officers but against ordinary citizens who died without knowing the cause or identity 
of  the perpetrators.’216 He held an extreme view of  this  lawlessness  and did not 
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attribute  it  to  resistance  against  wartime  rationing  but  to  sectors  he  had  been 
reporting on since his arrival into the country. To him it was a ‘precursor’ to the 
same social decomposition that had ‘violently broken out’ in Spain.217 It reaffirmed 
his belief that the Irish Government had been too lax in its handling of those who 
had arrived ostensibly ‘looking for refuge’ but who were in fact, in his estimation, 
causing these crimes.218 
On 14  August  Ontiveros  compiled  his  most  important  wartime  report  on 
what he perceived to be ‘the progressive intensification of criminality’ in Ireland.219 
He did not know whether it was the result of ‘passivity or incompetence’ on the part 
of the police which was failing to protect ordinary citizens and their property.220 He 
classified two distinct criminal elements in the country: one motivated by political 
and ideological convictions – the I.R.A. – and the other which wanted to sow the 
seeds  of  a  socio-political  revolution  –  Judeo-Masonic,  Communist  and  criminal 
underworld elements. In his opinion the latter group represented a greater threat now 
to neutrality. The memories of ‘the last disastrous Republican era’ in Spain were still 
fresh in Ontiveros’s mind.221 He noted that bicycle and car theft was widespread.222 
So  was  ‘night-time  looting’  of  orchards  and  vegetable  patches.223 Not  even  the 
Diplomatic Corps was immune from being targeted. A wife of one diplomat had her 
‘handbag’, other ‘objects of personal value’ and fruit stolen from the garden whilst 
she answered a phone call.224 On the night of 10 August he described a robbery 
against those from ‘Israelite social and literary circles’.225 Five ‘masked’ and armed 
men  entered  the  building  and  forced  them  to  open  the  safe.226 Incredibly  an 
undercover  detective  saw  the  gang  escape  but  could  not  detain  them  as  ‘the 
policeman was not carrying a firearm!’227  In his opinion an unarmed police force 
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was no deterrent to such dangerous elements and only prompt summary execution 
would deter them from their crimes.  
Propaganda
Ontiveros  had  worked closely  with some of  the  leading  broadsheets  in  order  to 
promote a benevolent image of Francoist Spain. Another means through which he 
succeeded in achieving this was through organised exhibitions, where visitors could 
come to the Legation and view particular works of cultural significance. In 1943 he 
had received several letters from youth organisations, such as the Scouts, requesting 
information  on  the  Falange’s  youth  organisation,228 which  was  modelled  on  the 
Italian  Balilla  and  the  German  Hitlerjugend.  Children  were  indoctrinated  into 
becoming the ideal Fascist being and taught specialised history so as to prepare them 
to re-conquer “Gibraltar Español” and launch Spain’s new empire in North Africa. 
The  motto  of  the  youth  organisation  was  “For  God,  Spain  and  its  National-
Syndicalist Revolution”. The Irish public did not seem to equate Spanish Fascism 
with its German and Italian counterparts, with the consequent result that the Falange 
organs seemed reasonably acceptable to them. Ontiveros wrote to the Falange youth 
and  received  many  things  for  the  exposition:  newspapers,  pamphlets,  uniforms, 
insignias, photographs, books, songs, description of its activities and history. In the 
Minister’s opinion the exposition was a complete success with wide attendance. His 
only regret was that a film for projection could not have been sent in time. 
In  April  1943  Life  and  Time  magazines collaborated  to  produce  a 
documentary  film  entitled  The  March  of  Time:  Inside  Fascist  Spain.  No  other 
cinematographic  production  made  during  the  Second  World  War  criticised  the 
Francoist State so severely as this film, which was shown in cinemas throughout the 
world.  Its  producers  had  been  allowed  unprecedented  access  into  the  regime’s 
schools, prisons, youth organisations and Ministries. The film excoriated every facet 
of Francoism, which was described as a ‘tyranny’ completely at odds with the ideals 
of freedom and democracy for which the Allies were sacrificing so many lives.229 
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The  film  crew  visited  model  prisons  where  many  Republican  prisoners  were 
incarcerated for lengthy detention based on their previous political affiliation which, 
by  Western  standards,  were  ‘no  crimes  at  all’.230 The  documentary  attacked  the 
education  system,  which  indoctrinated  young  people  into  becoming  obedient 
soldiers ready to sacrifice their lives for ‘Franco’s dreams of military grandeur’.231 
On a training ground Falangist boy soldiers were trained to become Spain’s ‘new 
conquistadors’  to  achieve  by  ‘force  of  arms’  Franco’s  imperial  aspirations.232 
Another clip showed a young boy in a classroom pointing at a map of Spain’s lost 
empire in Latin America and North Africa ‘to be re-conquered when Franco has 
achieved his internal and European aims’.233 
The film highlighted the appalling poverty which was widespread throughout 
the country. Frail and emaciated people barely survived on meagre rations of poor 
quality  soup  and  bread  whilst  the  regime  continued  to  spend  extravagantly  on 
military hardware. Thousands of Republican prisoners had been forced to work with 
primitive  equipment  in  irrigation  projects  and  harvest  gathering  to  prevent 
unprecedented starvation. They toiled away in the fields for the camera crew ‘under 
the watchful eye of a Falangist guard’.234 The economic impoverishment of Spain 
was  blamed  entirely  on  the  regime  because  its  advancing  armies  had  destroyed 
wholesale cities, large parts of the nation’s infrastructure and executed thousands of 
young  men  who  were  indispensable  for  economic  recovery:  ‘Franco  and  the 
Falangists ordered the execution of over a million Republican prisoners.’235 Most of 
Spain’s economic woes were exacerbated by the regime’s ‘incorrigible inefficiency’, 
autarkic policies and entrenched bureaucracy which had ‘delayed recovery’.236 
Politically, the regime still viewed its Iberian neighbour Portugal as a mere 
satellite which would eventually be amalgamated into ‘total  political  union’ with 
Fascist  Spain.237 Franco’s  annexation  of  Tangier  had  led  to  widespread  Axis 
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espionage  infiltration  into  the  port  where  agents  and  spies  operated  ‘with 
immunity’.238 The Nazis hoped to use Spanish Morocco to hinder Allied access to 
the  Mediterranean  Sea  in  their  military  operations  for  the  inevitable  invasion  of 
Italy:  ‘The  Nazis  are  building  shore  batteries  equipping  them  with  long-range 
guns.’239 Franco’s foreign policy and assistance to the Axis had alienated the regime 
from the West. He was ‘no friend of democracy’, freedom and human rights.240
As Henry Patterson has shown,  despite  the best  efforts  of the censorship 
authorities, Ireland could not be ‘totally insulated’ from imported material.241  If this 
was  screened  in  Ireland  it  could  do  unforeseeable  but  significant  harm to  Irish 
perceptions of Spain and undermine Ontiveros’s tireless efforts to promote a benign 
image of the regime to the public. Frank Aiken, Minister for the Co-ordination of 
Defensive  Measures,  had  adhered  strictly  to  de  Valera’s  instructions  that  the 
Government  should  control  and  suppress  all  written  and  visual  material  for  the 
duration  of  the  war.  Aiken  had  assembled  a  team  of  four  senior  officials  to 
rigorously enforce censorship: Joseph Connolly, Controller of Censorship, Thomas 
Coyne, Assistant Controller of Censorship, Michael Knightly,  Chief Press Officer 
and  Richard  Hayes,  Film  Censor.  Ontiveros’s  contacts  within  External  Affairs 
proved influential in ensuring, albeit without a ‘formal promise’, that because the 
request was made from a ‘Government of a friendly nation’ the documentary would 
not appear before the public in cinema screens.242 The Spanish Minister followed up 
on this by personally contacting the Film Censor Richard Hayes and both men met 
over dinner on 5 June. Ontiveros passed on his concerns about The March of Time:  
Inside Fascist Spain and was relieved to hear that the documentary film would not 
be permitted for screening in Ireland. He received further assurances that any other 
suspected anti-Spanish films would be brought to his attention by the Film Censor 
prior to any official decision being made.
The next challenge for Ontiveros was to attempt to curtail the flow of anti-
Francoist  printed  material  being  disseminated  throughout  Ireland.  The  continued 
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successful victories of the Allies against Axis forces in 1943 gave rise to renewed 
international criticism of the Francoist State in newspapers. Franco was perceived 
internationally as a Fascist who had on the one hand supported Hitler and Mussolini 
and on the other remained outside of the war for purely pragmatic reasons. His State 
was discredited as a totalitarian dictatorship which was incompatible with the ideals 
of freedom and liberty for which the Allies and resistance movements were fighting. 
British newspapers repeatedly criticised Franco’s regime,  none more so, than the 
weekly editions of the Illustrated London News. On 18 June it published an article 
entitled  ‘“Peacemaker”  Franco’.  In  it  was  claimed  that  the  regime’s  cosmetic 
alterations, which it had undertaken as a result of the change in Axis fortunes, could 
not disguise the fact that the Spanish Parliament, the Cortes, ‘slavishly obeys Spain’s 
Dictator.’243 
The  newspaper  published  pictures  of  political  prisoners  incarcerated  in  a 
prison in Valencia as well as their wives who, after four years, were also in prison, 
their  only  crime  being  that  they  ‘sympathised  with  their  husbands’  political 
beliefs.’244 The article excoriated the legitimacy of the regime which it claimed never 
had the support of more than ‘forty per cent’ of the people.245 Franco had failed to 
bring ‘prosperity’ to the nation but had instead plunged it into social and economic 
anarchy.246 His rule was based on ‘keeping – for more than three years now – nearly 
one million men and women in prisons, concentration camps and slave gangs’.247 
Not only Marxists but ‘very mild liberals’ had suffered loss of civil and political 
rights under him.248 The newspaper opined that Franco’s mediation attempts on the 
international stage were but a modest exercise to help ensure his longevity in office 
when the Allies  defeated  the Axis  powers:  ‘But  it  is  much too late  for  all  such 
efforts. When Britain stood alone three years ago, Franco was not talking of peace, 
nor offering his mediation. He was rather thinking of grabbing Gibraltar.’249  
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For obvious reasons the appearance of the Illustrated London News in Irish 
shops  could  destroy  the  positive  image  of  Spain  Ontiveros  had  industriously 
promoted. Its ‘disrespectful’ tone against ‘our regime and our Government’ was the 
topic of discussion when he called into External Affairs.250 Ontiveros expressed his 
‘surprise’ that this blatant and vilifying propaganda had not been censored before 
and stressed that its sale and diffusion inside Ireland was an unacceptable attack on 
his nation’s reputation.251 The Department emphasised to him that it always worked 
in close collaboration with the censorship authorities but that it was impossible to 
prevent such material circulating in shops. As Ireland was an island, material could 
be  imported  in  passengers’  baggage  from  the  United  States,  Great  Britain  and 
Northern  Ireland.  They  also  cited  similar  cases  of  complaint  when  anti-Irish 
propaganda  had  been  allowed  to  circulate  unrestricted  inside  Spain.  Ontiveros 
responded that he could not comment on such cases because he was unaware of 
them.  In  line  with  the  strict  censorship  that  the  Government  championed,  the 
Department  promised  Ontiveros  that  it  would  work  more  vigorously  with  the 
censorship authorities to ensure that Spain’s reputation would not be sullied again.252
The  Spanish  Minister  left  the  meeting  satisfied  that  he  had  upheld  his 
Government’s integrity and argued his case successfully. As always he could rely on 
sympathetic weekly prints of Catholic orientation to promote and defend Francoist 
Spain. On 16 April he recorded that an article published in The Standard extolled ‘to 
the masses of the Irish population, so fervently Catholic in its immense majority, the 
enormous work and persistent policy’ that had been ‘carried out by the Government 
of the Caudillo Franco’ in lifting Spain from the ruins of the Civil War and adhering 
to strict neutrality.253 Ireland’s isolation on the periphery of Europe combined with 
the nation’s insular composition and religious devotion shielded the people from the 
stark realities of Francoist Spain and aided Ontiveros’s mission. 
Although the Government continued to espouse a policy of strict neutrality, 
covertly,  as  Dermot  Ferriter  has  described,  de  Valera’s  ‘pragmatism’  slowly 
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gravitated  it  towards  a  pro-Allied  orientation.254 All  Allied  aircraft  which  crash-
landed in Éire were deemed to be on training flights and their crews were quickly 
transported  back  across  the  border.  All  German aircraft  and crews,  on the other 
hand, were detained under military custody for the duration of the war as it  was 
judged that they had been on operational flights. Furthermore, the Government had 
conceded Allied planes  flight  passage over  the Donegal  corridor,  which reduced 
their  flying times over the Atlantic Ocean.  The sighting of U-boats off the West 
coast was transmitted on open airwaves which caused the wolf-packs to hunt deeper 
in the Atlantic. Irish military intelligence, known as G2, passed on any information 
of suspected I.R.A. or Abwehr agents operating inside the country to MI6.255 On the 
nights of the 16 and 19 December 1943 two Abwehr agents parachuted into Ireland 
from German aircraft. The Taoiseach used the opportunity of their arrest to resolve 
the thorny issue of a secret radio transmitter  in the German Legation.256 External 
events were conditioning Irish neutrality.
A Watchful Vigilance
The collapse of Italian Fascism reverberated like a thunderclap around the world as 
international observers and commentators could now see the overwhelming strength 
of the Allied powers. In November 1943 the Red Army successfully liberated Kiev 
and  its  hinterland.  British  and  American  aircraft  bombed  German  cities  and 
industrial nerve centres day and night in order to destroy the Reich’s ability to wage 
war  and  to  stretch  its  resources  so  as  to  facilitate  the  successful  cross-Channel 
invasion of France, known as Operation  Overlord. But as these momentous events 
were unfolding Ireland remained steadfast in its resolve to stay out of the war and as 
a consequence was left to linger isolated and alone on the periphery of European 
affairs.  External  events  and  how they  might  impact  on  Ireland  did  not  seem to 
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concern Franco’s representative  either.  That  winter  the Spanish Minister  devoted 
much  of  his  time  to  monitoring  the  shadowy  activities  of  former  Brigadista 
combatants and Communist activists.
Why? Ontiveros knew that so long as the war lasted, the probabilities of him 
and his family ever returning back to Spain either for a holiday or to be reassigned 
were miniscule. He was aware, as were his superiors, that direct air and sea links 
between both nations were for all practical purposes severed. When this is borne in 
mind one can see that policy makers in Madrid had no way of knowing what was 
happening  in  Ireland  except  through  its  diplomatic  station  there.  Why  then  did 
Ontiveros  decide  to  devote  so much of  his  time that  winter  to  monitoring  these 
opponents? Why draw Madrid’s attention over this controversial issue? Would he 
not have been wiser to continue commenting on more generic topics? One could 
argue  that  he  was  paid  to  undertake  just  such  work  and  because  Ireland  was 
perceived as a reasonably comfortable posting maybe he wanted to inject an exciting 
interest in his reports. Or was he like most of the regime – a diehard fascist? When 
the Spanish Civil War had begun he was one of the first diplomats to openly side 
with General Franco. He paid dearly for that decision when, in October 1938, his 
eldest son was killed by Republicans. It was only through immersing himself and his 
family into Francoism that he had found the strength to get over that grief.257 He was 
therefore  honour-bound  both  to  his  dead  son  and  to  the  State  to  keep  a  close 
watchful vigilance on these dangerous elements. 
Ontiveros wrote a report on the International Brigade which was read with 
interest  by the  Director  General  of  Foreign  Policy,  José María  Doussinague.  He 
wrote to Ontiveros informing him that the Minister ‘has read with interest’ the report 
on  the  reorganisation  of  the  International  Brigade  in  Ireland.258 After  Jordana, 
Doussinague was the most senior and influential official in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. He had quickly re-orientated his pro-Axis sympathies to support the strict 
neutral  policy  General  Jordana  was  endeavouring  to  implement.  Doussinague 
encouraged  Ontiveros  to  maintain  his  watchful  vigilance  on  these  implacable 
enemies  of  true  Spain  by monitoring  ‘the  results  of  their  meetings’  or  anything 
257 His daughter Pilar was high up in the female branch of the Falange – Sección Femenina. 
258 José María Doussinague to Ontiveros, 14 Dec. 1943 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2224/E3). 
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which  might  appear  about  them  in  the  press.259 Ontiveros  described  these  ex-
Brigadista  combatants as dangerous elements of ‘extreme leftist persuasion.’260 He 
identified  a  Mr  J.  Wilson  as  the  principal  agitator  for  a  permanent  all-Ireland 
International  Brigade  organisation,  to  be  linked  with  the  ‘British  International 
Brigade Association’ to form a ‘broad anti-fascist movement’.261 Furthermore, the 
Minister had obtained copies of a newspaper linked to this group that emanated from 
Northern Ireland, entitled  Unity, which espoused Communist doctrines. Unless the 
internal security agencies of the Irish State confronted these dissident extremists, the 
Spanish  Minister  feared  that  they  could  pose  a  threat  to  both  Irish  and Spanish 
domestic security. He was aware of a further meeting scheduled for the 2 December 
at which members of ‘the Labour movement, Trade Unions and other progressive 
circles in this country’ would be present.262 Ontiveros confronted External Affairs 
with his findings and after  arguing his case strenuously,  received assurances that 
because this group was ‘so adverse to the regime established in a friendly nation’ the 
authorities would monitor it surreptitiously.263 
The Minister constantly observed the activities of the Labour Party but he 
always  judged  the  party  and  its  members  to  be  more  religious  and  nationalist-
inclined than Communist. On 24 April 1944 he filed a report on a meeting of the 
party which, coming so soon after the extraordinary successes it had enjoyed in the 
previous  year’s  general  election,  was  to  have  momentous  consequences  for  its 
future. At this meeting the Minister noted that certain members of the Labour Party 
had identified suspected Communists within its ranks and had insisted on a motion 
being tabled that rejected ‘equally the policies  of Communism and Fascism’ and 
reaffirmed the party’s ‘Republican and Democratic’ nature.264 The motion could not 
prevent a split occurring and several renegades formed the National Labour Party. In 
Ontiveros’s opinion these people were misguided in their suspicions of Communist 
infiltration  in  the  Labour  Party.  He  believed  through  his  own observations  that 
259 Ibid.
260 Ontiveros to José María Doussinague, 4 Nov. 1943 (ibid.). 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Apr. 1944 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1180/E3). 
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Communists preferred to infiltrate into smaller and less prominent groupings. His 
suspicions  led  him  to  focus  on  a  group  calling  itself  ‘Vanguard’.  Ontiveros’s 
contacts with the Catholic weekly,  The Standard, had brought to his attention the 
emergence of this Communist party. His informer was its editor, Peadar O’Curry, 
who told  Ontiveros  that  ‘Vanguard’  had  been  set  up because  its  members  were 
unhappy with current ‘labourite policies’.265 The Minister informed his superiors that 
this new party advocated the ‘abolition of private property’, the ‘ownership by the 
workers and labourers of the means of production’ and the assimilation of Ireland 
into a ‘Federation of Socialist Republics’ once the war in Europe had ended.266 
The  Minister  identified  Peadar  Cowan267 as  the  principal  spokesperson 
behind ‘Vanguard’ and he was aware, through his contacts, that the party had held 
an important meeting in the Engineers’ Hall but, because admittance was strictly ‘by 
invitation’, it was difficult for the Minister or any of his informants to gain access to 
the meeting.268 Nonetheless, he discovered that only fifty people had turned up to 
listen to the party debate its points. The party championed Socialism as the means 
through which Europe would rise from its present nadir and it prophesised that a 
future federation of Socialist States would spread throughout the continent including 
both ‘Portugal and Spain’, which would ‘occupy their respective places once their 
present  regimes  have  been  overthrown.’269 For  the  Minister  these  ‘extremist’ 
political  viewpoints  were  reminiscent  to  those  propagated  during  the  Second 
Republic.270 Ontiveros  hoped  that  Ireland’s  conservatism and Catholicism  would 
render  any leftist  political  agitation  futile,  especially  given the authority  that  the 
Catholic hierarchy exercised across all facets of national life. In his estimation the 
public had no attachment  to Communism or any of its  principles and he blamed 
265 Ontiveros to _____, 30 Sept. 1944 (ibid.). 
266 Ibid. 
267 Captain  Peadar  Cowan:  a  supporter  of  General  O’Duffy  and  the  Blueshirt  movement  he 
subsequently joined the Labour Party and stood as a Labour candidate in the 1938, 1943 and 1944 
general  elections  but  was  unsuccessful.  In  the  1948  general  election  he  stood  as  the  Clann  na 
Poblachta candidate for the Dublin North-East  constituency and was elected to the 13th  Dáil.  See 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/members (11 Jan. 2010). 
268 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 Sept. 1944 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1180/E3). 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 Oct. 1944 (ibid.). 
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Belfast as the centre through which all extremist publications seemed to emanate 
from. 
Unlike several other radical groups and elements that the Minister frequently 
reported on, his assertion that ‘Vanguard’ was a Communist-inspired political party 
that  advocated  radical  socio-economic  and socio-political  change in  Ireland,  was 
entirely credible. Through his close contacts with religious elements and members of 
the Fine Gael Party it is plausible that his reports on this party, dated 30 September 
and 1 October, were passed on to members of the Opposition in the hope that the 
Government  would  crack  down  on  these  subversive  elements.  On  18  October 
Captain Patrick Giles271 asked the Minister  for Justice,  Gerald Boland,  in  almost 
identical language to that written by Ontiveros in his earlier reports, if he was able to 
state Communism’s  position  in  Ireland.272 Giles  specifically  cited  ‘the  recent 
launching in Dublin of an organisation called the “Vanguard”’ and he requested the 
Minister  to  ‘take  steps  to  suppress  the  organisation.’273 Boland  responded  that 
‘Vanguard’ was not a threat to public safety and as a consequence he would not ask 
the ‘Government to make a Suppression Order under Section 19 of the Offences 
Against  the  State  Act’.274 Although  the  authorities  monitored  these  groups 
continuously the lengths to which Ontiveros went to keep a watchful vigilance on 
the disparate groups highlights the paranoia that bedeviled him as a consequence of 
both political and personal events that occurred during his life.  
In Pursuit of Justice
In the spring of 1944 one of the longest sagas in Ontiveros’s mission began when the 
British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare, wrote to General Jordana that an 
official assigned to a trade mission to Ireland must be forbidden to travel. Hoare had 
reliable information that the official in question, José Hernández Durán, had been 
intricately  involved  in  a  previous  ‘commission  that  had  bought  livestock  from 
Portugal’  which was subsequently transported to Italy to aid a belligerent  of His 
271 Fine Gael T.D. for Meath-Westmeath. He was re-elected to the Dáil consecutively from 1937-61.   
272 Dáil Éireann Debates, 95, 18 Oct. 1944.  
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid. 
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Majesty’s Government.275 It was clear that Durán had significant contact with Axis 
officials and as the Spanish commission was obliged to travel to Britain first before 
going  to  Ireland  he  would  be  arrested  immediately  by  the  British  authorities.276 
General Carlos Asensio Cabanillas, Minister for the Army, was reluctant to accede 
to this demand. He was also worried that because the Allied stranglehold over the 
sea lanes of Europe was total it might not be possible for the commission to travel to 
and thence depart from Ireland especially if rumours concerning a potential cross-
Channel invasion of France were realised. Despite this the commission set sail. 
The purpose of the mission was to purchase horses for the Spanish Army. 
The horses were to be transported aboard a vessel chartered from the Saorstát and 
Continental Steamship Company277 but on 17 April 1944 the company issued court 
proceedings  against  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  commission  to  buy the  horses, 
Colonel de las Morenas.278 The company stated that on 9 March Morenas had agreed 
to reserve space on the S.S.  Assaroe for ‘52 horses at the rate of £50 each to be 
carried by the plaintiff’s  vessel.’279 The freight  was due to sail  on 24 March for 
Lisbon and a stipulation in the contract placed responsibility on Morenas to ensure 
that if the horses were not ready to be shipped on time then he ‘would be responsible 
for deadfreight.’280 
When the ship did sail on the 24th without the horses, owing to a failure on 
the part of the Spanish authorities to obtain a navicert in time, the company sued for 
£2,600 in damages. Morenas requested the High Court to set the proceedings aside 
on the grounds that the matter was ‘outside and without the jurisdiction of the Court 
as they implead the Government of Spain,  a Sovereign State’.281 The High Court 
judge, Mr Justice Haugh, dismissed Morenas’s defence that ‘a foreign Sovereign 
275 Sir Samuel Hoare to General Jordana, 4 Jan. 1944 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2166/E119). 
276 Due to the navicert system in operation concerning all commercial activity on the high seas, all 
ships destined for Ireland had to dock in a British port first for inspection.
277 During the war this company’s  ships were frequently damaged or sunk by belligerent  powers 
despite flying the Irish flag. On 15 May 1941 S.S. Assaroe was damaged off the coast of Howth and 
four days later another of its ships, the  City of Waterford, was damaged by German aircraft in the 
Bristol Channel. Another ship, the City of Bremen, was lost due to a German aerial attack on 2 June 
1942 in the Bay of Biscay. See Dáil Éireann Debates, 103, 23 Oct. 1946. 
278 Supreme Court  of  Justice:  Judgement  of  The  Honourable  Mr Justice O’Byrne,  18 Dec.  1944 
(A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2166/E119). 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
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State may claim immunity from the jurisdiction of these Courts’.282 Throughout 1944 
Colonel Morenas and the other officials of the commission had had to stay in the 
Spanish Legation until this contentious issue was resolved. Ontiveros had hoped that 
the High Court would set aside the case as he thought that the court would see that 
Morenas was acting on behalf of his Government. When this was dismissed by the 
court it was the Spanish Minister who pressed for an appeal to be lodged with the 
Supreme Court. 
Whilst  all this was unfolding in Ireland, the Spanish High Command was 
clearly  not  interested  in  lodging  any appeals  and  wrote  to  the  new Minister  for 
Foreign Affairs, José Félix de Lequerica, dismissing the entire court proceedings in 
favour  of  dispatching  several  boats  to  pick  up  the  horses  and  the  officials.283 
Lequerica wrote to Hoare seeking his assistance in the matter but was informed that 
‘no neutral  ships are permitted to travel on the route between Spain and Éire.’284 
Despite assembling an impressive legal team to argue its case before the Supreme 
Court and Mr Justice O’Byrne,285 the judge upheld the original High Court ruling. 
These lengthy and costly legal proceedings were aggravated further by a meeting 
Ontiveros  had  with  External  Affairs  during  which  he  was  told  that  due  to  the 
‘independence of the judicial system’ the Department could not help him.286 
Press coverage also attracted unnecessary public and media attention to the 
case.287 Owing to the war and the unfortunate circumstance that only a specialised 
vessel could carry such livestock, Morenas and his team were to remain in Ireland 
for  most  of  1945 also.  The  whole  controversy  left  a  sour  taste  for  the  Spanish 
authorities who were determined that once normal trade resumed all goods carried 
between  both  nations  would  be  transported  on  Spanish  ships.  For  the  first  time 
External  Affairs  had  been  unable  to  assist  the  Minister  despite  his  formal 
protestations. It was rather ironic that the Department had agreed to quell actively 
the  right  of  opponents  of  the  regime  to  protest  against  the  presentation  of 
282 Ibid. Mr Justice Haugh made his ruling in the High Court on 16 Aug. 1944. 
283 Spanish High Command to José Félix de Lequerica, 2 Dec. 1944 (ibid.). 
284 Sir Samuel Hoare to _____, 29 Dec. 1944 (ibid.). 
285 Counsel for the Spanish included two subsequent Taoisigh – John A. Costello and Liam Cosgrave. 
286 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 Dec. 1944 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2166/E119). 
287 See the Irish Independent and the Irish Press, 19 Dec. 1944. 
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Ontiveros’s credentials, had interfered to stop demonstrators organising a march for 
the release of Frank Ryan,288 had passed on confidential information linking Leopold 
Kerney to Ambrose Martin, had acceded to the Minister’s requests to put Basque 
refugees and suspected Communist  activists  under surveillance and had censored 
anti-Francoist films and printed material from general viewing but decided to draw 
the line on this issue. It is also ironic, though Ontiveros may not have seen it so at 
the time, that he had participated in a case that was to prove a landmark ruling in 
international trade law. 
Whilst  he  had  been  fighting  this  legal  case,  on  30  November  one  of 
Ontiveros’s  and  Spain’s  closest  supporters  in  Ireland  died  in  Pembroke  Nursing 
Home. General Eoin O’Duffy had been a frequent visitor at official receptions at the 
Legation. An unrepentant supporter of General Franco and Fascism, he had always 
assisted the Minister with his mission to promote a positive and benign image of the 
regime. However, during the war years O’Duffy lost much of his former charisma 
and his decline into political  obscurity was not helped by ailing health problems 
brought  on  by  alcoholism.  Ontiveros  naturally  attended  the  funeral  which  was 
followed  by  a  procession  to  Glasnevin  cemetery.289 The  streets  were  lined  with 
thousands  of  people  and  his  coffin  was  draped  with  the  tricolour.  Most  of  the 
Government was in attendance including the Taoiseach as a mark of honour to the 
first Commissioner of An Garda Síochána. Ontiveros also recorded the presence of 
‘numerous ex-combatants’ from the Irish Brigade which O’Duffy had commanded 
in the Spanish Civil War.290 Only Ontiveros and the German Minister, Dr Eduard 
Hempel, were present from the Diplomatic Corps. The Spanish Minister placed a 
wreath with ribbons in the national colours for the Irishman who had fought for the 
true Spain and the “Crusade of Liberation” Ontiveros represented.291 But despite all 
the assistance O’Duffy had rendered the regime, his life and death hardly accounts 
for  a  single  page  in  the  Minister’s  report.  For  a  regime  that  prided  itself  on 
honouring its heroic dead it quickly forgot about its Irish general.
288 See chapter three. 
289 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 Dec. 1944 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1180/E3). 
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291 Ibid. 
74
January-May, 1945
Throughout  January  and  February  1945  the  collapse  of  Hitler’s  thousand-year 
empire in Europe was all too apparent. On 1 January the Wehrmacht withdrew from 
the Ardennes  region,  having failed  to capture  the Allied port  of  Antwerp in  the 
Battle of the Bulge. With the Third Reich under massive air and land attack on both 
sides it was a question of when, not if, Germany would surrender unconditionally to 
the  Allies.  For  both  Ontiveros  and  Ireland  the  momentous  month  of  May 
overshadowed all previous polemical incidences during the war. On 2 May Éamon 
de Valera paid a courtesy visit to Dr Eduard Hempel to offer on behalf of the Irish 
people  his  nation’s  condolences  on  the  death  of  Adolf  Hitler.292 The  Taoiseach 
defended his  actions by appealing to diplomatic  protocol.  Yet over three months 
earlier, on 26 January, Soviet forces had liberated Auschwitz concentration camp in 
Poland, revealing to the world the true horror of Hitler’s racial genocide in the East. 
On 21 April Ya had already informed the Spanish public about the appalling crimes 
committed  by  the  Nazis  at  Buchenwald.293 When  Ontiveros  had  defined  Irish 
neutrality as inflexible earlier on in the war no one could have imagined how far de 
Valera  was  prepared  to  go  to  uphold  this  inflexibility  as  an  expression  of 
sovereignty. 
In the eyes of the Allied powers this open display of sympathy was perceived 
as an egregious wrong. May was to mark the nadir and apogee of de Valera’s policy 
in  pursuance  of  strict  neutrality.  Having  weathered  the  storm  of  international 
criticism over the condolences incident, he was then subject to a bitter rebuke from 
292 See Dermot Keogh, ‘De Valera, Hitler and the visit of condolence, May 1945’ in History Ireland, 
v (1997), pp 58-61. 
293 Ya, 21 Apr. 1945.   
75
the  British  Prime  Minister.  On 13  May Winston  Churchill  delivered  his  victory 
speech to a triumphant British nation. He praised the bravery and heroism the nation 
had demonstrated in defeating Nazi Germany. But the Prime Minister reserved his 
most  virulent  criticism for  de  Valera  and Irish  neutrality  when  he  declared  that 
Britain had ‘never laid a violent hand upon them, though at times it would have been 
quite easy and quite natural and we left the de Valera Government to frolic with the 
German and later with the Japanese representatives, to their heart’s content.’294 On 
16 May the Irish people and the international community waited with baited breath 
to  listen  to  the  Taoiseach’s  response:  Would  he  formally  regret  expressing 
condolence on the death of Adolf Hitler? Would he accept a degree of responsibility 
for  the  consequences  that  neutrality  had  imposed  on  the  Allies?  De  Valera’s 
response on Raidió Éireann did not disappoint: 
Mr Churchill is proud of Britain’s stand alone, after France had fallen and 
before America entered the war. Could he not find in his heart the generosity 
to acknowledge that there is a small nation that stood alone, not for one year 
or two, but for several hundred years against aggression.295
De Valera’s determined rebuke to Churchill represented the pinnacle of his defence 
of neutrality. Internationally it was well-received. On 19 May A.B.C. noted that ‘De 
Valera has demonstrated [to Churchill] in another speech that shows he is no slouch. 
Everybody recognises his answer as a very formidable one.’296 The end of the war 
brought  about  the  end  of  neutrality  and  for  the  nation  the  official  end  of  the 
Emergency could probably be dated to 29 June 1945. On this day both Church and 
State stood side by side before the public to commemorate Ireland’s survival and to 
thank Providence for Its benevolent watch over Its most Catholic servants: ‘a Day of 
National  Thanksgiving  to  Almighty  God for  having  spared  our  people  from the 
horrors of war.’297 For Ontiveros too the occasion marked the end of his wartime 
mission. Within a month he was recalled back to Madrid. He departed quietly from 
294 http://www.rte.ie/radio/judgingdev (20 Jan. 2010).   
295 Raidió Éireann, Speech delivered by Éamon de Valera to the Irish people, 16 May 1945.    
296 A.B.C., 19 May 1945. 
297 Mass to commemorate the end of the European war, 29 June 1945 (N.A.I., D.T., S13675). 
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the diplomatic scene and would go on to serve his nation in Argentina and Denmark. 
His mission was highly successful. He had re-established close political relations, 
had fostered a positive image of Francoism among the public and was ‘well liked’ 
by  External  Affairs.298 Although  his  views  on  certain  issues  could  certainly  be 
described as polemical, Ireland and its people had left a lifelong indelible impression 
on him. This was best displayed many years later when on 20 March 1951 a reporter 
for  the Irish  Times recorded  his  travels  through  Denmark.  His  last  night  in 
Copenhagen was spent with the Ontiveros family:
I had spent my last evening in Copenhagen at the Spanish Legation with the 
Ontiveros family. The present Spain’s first Minister in Ireland had gone from 
Dublin to Buenos Aires and subsequently spent three years in Madrid as  
Professor at  the Diplomatic  Academy.  He now represents  his  country in  
Copenhagen, where his beautiful daughters are as popular as they were in  
Dublin. I had no chance to talk of Spain, or of Denmark for that matter, plied 
as I was with questions about Ireland  and mutual  Irish  friends  –  from the  
state of Mr de Valera’s health to the latest novel by Benedict Kiely.299 
298 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 117. 
299 Irish Times, 20 Mar. 1951. 
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Chapter 2
The Frank Ryan Case
Juan García Ontiveros and the Ryan Case in Ireland
Both the  Irish participation in the Spanish Civil War1 and the life of Frank Ryan 
have been well documented to date.2 A re-examination of the Frank Ryan case, the 
most  controversial  episode  in  Irish-Spanish  relations  during  the  period  under 
consideration,  is  now  necessary  in  light  of  discoveries  made  after  exhaustive 
investigations  of  the  Spanish  diplomatic  files,  which  have  unearthed  new  and 
original  material  that  reappraises the case.  Until  now most  publications  on Ryan 
have been too unbalanced with attention focused almost entirely on Ryan using just 
Irish sources. As a consequence, Ryan’s imprisonment in Spain has been largely a 
one-sided affair and there has been no in-depth examination of the Spanish files. 
This chapter focuses attention away from Ryan and breaks new ground by charting 
the full diplomatic panorama behind the case which helps to reveal the exhaustive 
diplomatic  efforts  made  on  the  Irish  side  to  secure  his  release  and  the  secret 
manoeuvres on the Spanish diplomatic side to hinder his liberation. New material 
has been found that comprehensively proves clerical condemnation of Ryan as well 
as efforts made by lay members of the church to present Ryan and his supporters in 
as malign a light as possible to the Spanish Minister  in Dublin.  Furthermore,  an 
analysis  is  undertaken  that  explains  how  Franco,  his  brother-in-law  and  senior 
officials in the regime perceived Ryan. The disclosing of Dr. Nájera’s interrogation 
of this prominent prisoner also helps to further our understanding of why Franco 
refused to release him despite the cordial relations that existed between Ireland and 
Spain. 
1 For accounts on the Irish participation in the Spanish Civil War see Fearghal McGarry, Irish politics  
and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999), Michael O’Riordan, Connolly Column (Dublin, 1979) and 
Robert Stradling, The Irish and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39 (Manchester, 1999). 
2 See Seán Cronin,  Frank Ryan: the search for the Republic  (Dublin,  1980),  Fearghal  McGarry, 
Frank Ryan  (Dublin, 2010) and Enda Staunton, ‘Frank Ryan and collaboration: a reassessment’ in 
History Ireland, v (1997), pp 49-51. 
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Frank Ryan had fought against General Franco’s forces on the battlefield, in 
the press and on the streets.3 He had defied the Catholic hierarchy, in particular the 
Primate of All-Ireland Cardinal MacRory, who had publicly championed the cause 
of Franco by calling on Catholic Ireland to unite and organise a fighting brigade, 
subsequently known to history as the Irish Brigade, led by General O’Duffy. Ryan 
wrote to MacRory denying his assertion that religion was at stake: this was a war 
about democracy: ‘Our stand in 1922-23 is already vindicated: history will vindicate 
our stand on the Spanish question today.’4 On the streets he called on the workers of 
Ireland  to  unite  and  fight  in  defence  of  the  same  rights  Spanish  workers  were 
defending – freedom, equality and fraternity. It was not enough to say you supported 
them morally;  he called on Irish workers to join with their  Spanish counterparts. 
Knowing all  this, the Francoist State was not surprisingly ill-disposed to set him 
free. 
It was generally believed both in Ireland and inside Iveagh House, seat of the 
Department  of  External  Affairs,  that  Franco  would  logically  release  Ryan  in 
exchange for other foreign prisoners. Joseph Walshe himself had publicly stated his 
confidence in some form of prisoner ‘exchange’.5 When this  did not materialise, 
even after the Civil War had ended, it spawned the establishment of several release 
committees. The members of these committees on the whole were of Republican and 
left-wing  persuasion  and  they  channelled  all  their  propaganda  and  financial 
resources towards pressuring both the Irish Government and the Spanish Minister to 
Ireland, Juan García Ontiveros, to intercede on Ryan’s behalf. Kerney was opposed 
to their involvement and influence as he believed they could only prejudice the case, 
because  their  agitation  would  only  reinforce  the  regime’s  conviction  of  Ryan’s 
culpability. In his estimation, they were naïve to think that their distinction between 
Irish  Republicanism and Spanish  Republicanism would  also  be  distinguished by 
Franco and his military cohorts: ‘deep green in one country, deep red in the other.’6 
The inference was clear – Spain was no longer a democracy, public opinion counted 
for  nothing  and  the  Francoist  State  believed  its  justice  was  unquestionable.  For 
3 At the time of Ryan’s capture he held the rank of Major. 
4 Irish Press, 23 Sept. 1936. 
5 Statement by Joseph Walshe, 19 Jan. 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11731).
6 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 23 Dec. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/3). 
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Kerney the only beneficial  assistance these committees could render was to send 
substantial quantities of clothes, foodstuffs and money through the diplomatic bag. 
This was not easy,  given general  economic conditions at the time, but at  least  it 
would keep  Ryan  alive  and lessen  the financial  burden on his  family.  Although 
Dublin  followed  Kerney’s  recommendation  in  using  Ontiveros  as  a  channel  to 
influence  Madrid,  they  failed  to  follow  his  recommendations  on  the  release 
committees  more  stringently.  The  result  was  that  Ontiveros  could  see  a  clear 
duplicity  in  Dublin’s  position  and  a  far  too  cosy  relationship  between  these 
committees and the Irish Government. 
The Irish Government attached the highest importance to the Ryan case and 
at  a  meeting  held  on  25  May  1939  An  Taoiseach  Éamon  de  Valera,  and  the 
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Joseph Walshe, officially informed 
Ontiveros that the Government viewed the continued detention of Ryan as a major 
obstacle  in  fostering  closer  bilateral  relations.  After  ‘Frank  Ryan  Release 
Committees’ had been established in Ireland, Great Britain and the United States, de 
Valera had come under increasing pressure at home and abroad from Republican 
sympathisers  and  old  I.R.A.  comrades  to  intercede  personally  in  the  matter.  As 
Dermot Keogh has noted, de Valera had a ‘personal interest’ in the case because he 
was the last surviving Commander from the Easter Rising and the pivotal figure in 
Ireland’s fight for independence, and, therefore, could not be seen to be idle whilst a 
former and prominent comrade-in-arms languished in a Francoist gaol.7 The meeting 
also served to impart to Franco’s representative that in all matters relating to Frank 
Ryan,  Leopold  Kerney  was  acting  with  the  full  cooperation  and  support  of  his 
Government. However, Ontiveros did not see the case in the same light. 
 He had been made aware of Ryan’s imprisonment before this meeting in 
spite  of  only  arriving  in  Ireland  on  1  May  1939  because  he  had  received 
correspondence  from the  ‘Frank  Ryan  Release  Committee’.  On  the  13  May  he 
received one such letter signed by well-known Republican activists but, rather than 
entertain their entreaties, he decided not to act on them. This seemed to have worked 
until he answered a call at the door of the Legation and was genuinely shocked that a 
7 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 94. 
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contingent of that ‘extreme’ organisation had the temerity to request a meeting with 
him.8 He felt  personally threatened by their  presence and feared for his security. 
Ryan’s  sister  Eilís  was  there,  along  with  Hanna  Sheehy-Skeffington,  whom 
Ontiveros believed to be a member of the ‘Communist Party’.9 The Minister refused 
to help them or impart  any information to Eilís on the welfare and health of her 
brother and was more preoccupied with getting them away from himself  and the 
Legation. 
By late May the controversy was circulating widely in the newspapers and 
forces on the left mobilised public opinion in support of its cause through its printing 
press. On 27 May the Irish Workers’ Weekly called on the Irish Government to break 
diplomatic relations with that ‘murderous tyranny’ which had come to power solely 
by usurpation and assassination.10 Right-wing supporters of the regime challenged 
this  viewpoint  in  the  Irish  Independent by  insisting  that  ‘General  Franco’s 
generosity with the prisoners is entirely in accord with his upright character and his 
deeply [held] religious views.’11 On 12 June Ontiveros sought a meeting with the 
Department of External Affairs owing to his seething anger toward the orchestrated 
propaganda campaign being launched against his Government in the press and by 
Republican activists.12 The Department listened to his complaints and managed to 
persuade the organisers of a demonstration for Ryan to postpone the event.13 Joseph 
Walshe personally informed Ontiveros on the 13th that he had seen slogans on the 
streets  of  Dublin:  ‘Release  Frank  Ryan  or  Else’.14 The  Minister  again  feared  a 
violent assault or assassination attempt might be made against him. 
Nevertheless, he continued his daily routine and on 14 June despite receiving 
another ‘petition in favour of the Irishman Frank Ryan’ he chose instead to attend 
8 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 June 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11731). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Irish Workers’ Weekly, 27 May 1939. 
11 Irish Independent, 3 June 1939. 
12 Private  meeting between Ontiveros  and  the  Assistant  Secretary of  the  Department  of  External 
Affairs, Frederick Boland, 12 June 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11731). 
13 Over 5,000 leaflets had been distributed in the Dublin area and notes in the C.P.I.A. record ‘the 
greatest  reluctance’ with which the committee had agreed to postpone the rally after  Walshe had 
phoned them. 
14 Private  conversation  between  Ontiveros  and  Joseph  Walshe,  13  June  1939  (A.G.A.  (10) 
3954/11731). 
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the premier of a Nationalist film which he had arranged to be shown in Dublin.15 The 
film was entitled ‘Spain in Arms’ and was shown at St Stephen’s Green cinema, 
which he described as ‘the only one [cinema] in this capital whose business is not 
controlled by Israelite  interests’.16 The Lord Mayor of Dublin,  Alfred Byrne,  the 
Italian Minister, Vincenzo Berardis and the German Minister, Dr Eduard Hempel, 
attended the viewing. General Eoin O’Duffy, Commander of the Irish Brigade in the 
Spanish  Civil  War,  also  accompanied  Ontiveros  that  day  to  the  cinema.  Since 
coming to Ireland the Minister had surrounded himself with men of far right political 
persuasions.  It  was  manifestly  clear  to him that  the views of  O’Duffy regarding 
Frank Ryan were far more representative of public opinion than those expressed by 
Ryan’s supporters. The Minister’s other supporters included the Catholic Church. He 
noted to Madrid that ‘religious elements’ dominated the film attendance and he was 
pleased  when  the  Irish  priests  cheered  and  ‘manifested  their  admiration  with 
applause’ when General Franco appeared on screen.17 
At this time the vast majority of visa applications from Irish citizens desiring 
to go to Spain were being made by priests and nuns who wanted to help the Spanish 
Church rebuild itself after the Civil War. Their public support for General Franco 
and private conversations he would have had with them would have had a major 
influence  on Ontiveros  and helped  form his  perceptions  of  Ryan  and those who 
supported him. On several occasions Leopold Kerney had been informed by officials 
in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they had received countless letters of 
condemnation  from Irish  priests.  None  of  these  letters  survive  in  the  Ministry’s 
archive today or the Francisco Franco private archive, yet definite written proof of 
clerical condemnation of Ryan has been found. Ontiveros received one such letter 
from a Fr James A. Cleary, who described Ryan as a ‘Communist’.18 The priest was 
angry that articles in the Irish press which indicted Ryan for his involvement in the 
International Brigade did not include his alleged involvement in atrocities: ‘Perhaps 
we have not heard the whole truth. If so, it is a pity.’19 
15 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11730).  
16 Ontiveros to _____, 14 June 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11731). 
17 Ibid.  
18 Letter from Fr James A. Cleary to Ontiveros, 28 Jan. 1940 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11732).  
19 Ibid. 
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Every demonstration that was organised by Ryan’s supporters was infiltrated 
by  right-wing  elements  especially  lay  members  of  the  Catholic  Church,  who 
disguised themselves as concerned advocates of justice. Ontiveros did not encourage 
them to do this, yet he did not discourage them either. On 2 July 1939 the Minister 
was informed confidentially about a demonstration of ‘some 400 people’ who had 
marched through O’Connell Street carrying banners demanding Ryan’s liberation.20 
He was also informed about the organisers of the march, most notably, James Larkin 
– the champion of the Dublin working class.21 These anonymous informants were 
deemed by him to represent  ‘various people from the rightist  camp and sensible 
elements of the country’.22 One ‘unknown correspondent’ who attended such a rally 
wrote to him: ‘Your Excellency will see that the speakers, all Communists, conceal 
the fact that he was condemned for murder, wholesale murder of prisoners.’23 When 
fifty  Dáil  Deputies  signed  a  petition  in  favour  of  Ryan’s  release  on  13  July, 
Ontiveros could contend that they were unaware of the scale of his crimes.24 The 
Spanish Minister was determined to hold firm and offer no assistance in the Ryan 
case as the Minister’s supporters, which he believed represented authentic public 
opinion,  were  expressing  their  attitude  just  as  loudly:  ‘I  hope  the  Spanish 
Government will show firmness and not release him.’25 
On  27  July  Ontiveros  finally  presented  his  credentials  as  Franco’s 
representative to Ireland. The significant delay was directly linked to the Ryan case 
and Dublin’s fears over security. From the Legation’s residence in Shrewsbury Road 
up to Dublin Castle the Minister reported how the streets were lined with soldiers 
and  policemen  to  protect  him  against  possible  attack  or  assassination:  ‘an 
extraordinary vigilance in operation and an uninterrupted barrier of police agents’.26 
He smiled when he saw some members of the public who ‘saluted in the Spanish 
[Fascist] style with a raised arm’.27 The fact that the whole ceremony had to be kept 
20 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 July 1939 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11730). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 1939 (ibid.). 
23 Letter from unknown correspondent to Ontiveros, 15 July 1939 (ibid.).  
24 Ibid. 
25 Undated letter from anonymous correspondent to Ontiveros (ibid.).  
26 Ontiveros to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 July 1939 (ibid.). 
27 Ibid. 
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secret from the press highlighted for him the extremist nature of Ryan’s supporters 
and when he heard the Royal Spanish March for the first time and the Francoist flag 
rose over the court-yard, he believed the cause he served had triumphed once again, 
this time against dissident Republican opinion in Ireland. Dublin’s acceptance of his 
credentials  seemed to indicate  that  their  efforts  to secure Ryan’s  release through 
Ontiveros  were  all  but  scuppered.  De  Valera  and  Walshe  had  sought  to  use 
Ontiveros as a useful conduit to placate Ryan’s supporters, yet the Spanish Minister 
had demonstrated his clear unwillingness to acquiesce in Dublin’s plan.  
Leopold Kerney and the Ryan Case in Spain
In late May 1939  Leopold Kerney,  Ireland’s Minister to Spain, met the Count of 
Casas Rojas, Director General of Foreign Policy, on two occasions, to inquire about 
Ryan. These meetings were of an amicable nature and Kerney remarked that Rojas 
was more pleasant and understanding in relation to this case than the Sub-Secretary 
of the Ministry, Domingo de las Bárcenas, who had been a major obstacle in the 
Irish Minister’s efforts to have a meeting arranged to raise the case with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, General Jordana. Lack of access to influential men in the regime 
was a major problem for the Irish Minister because in a totalitarian State real power 
and decisions resided at the top. The top of the hierarchical structure rested upon a 
dense  bureaucracy  characteristic  of  Spanish  public  life,  which  naturally  caused 
systematic  and long delays  that frustrated efforts to glean important  information. 
Kerney wanted to know if Franco ‘was aware of our appeal’  for if  so he would 
surely respond ‘favourably’.28 Rojas said Franco’s legal advisor, Lorenzo Martínez 
Fuset, would be aware of the case but it was a difficult one and Ryan’s perceived 
Communism was the greatest  hindrance to his liberation.  Crucially,  Rojas would 
inform Kerney that the death sentence passed on the prisoner had been commuted to 
thirty years’ imprisonment and also that the prisoner’s health was good, despite his 
chronic  heart  condition.  He could  not  see any reason why a  member  of  Ryan’s 
family could not visit him sometime soon. Kerney left the second meeting with a 
28 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 24 May 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/1). 
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high degree of optimism as Rojas had revealed where the main opposition to Ryan’s 
liberation seemed to lie – with the military authorities. 
Kerney’s  principal  channel  to  gain  access  to  and thence  influence  senior 
military figures in the regime lay with an Irish émigré named Walter Meade. Captain 
Meade had been General O’Duffy’s interpreter and driver during the Civil War and 
he willingly offered his assistance to Kerney. Meade had high-level contacts in the 
senior echelons of the army, which included the Chief of Staff and most of Franco’s 
top commanders – Solchaga, Alonso Vega and Yagüe. The general in charge of the 
6th region,  where  Burgos  Central  Prison  was  located  and  where  Ryan  was 
incarcerated, was one López Pinto and Kerney hoped Meade could use his contacts 
to persuade General Pinto to allow visiting rights for him to see Ryan. It must be 
borne in mind that the Irish Minister was operating virtually alone as the Legation 
had  no  full-time  assistant,  First  Secretary  or  anything  approaching  adequate 
financing. Every penny had to be accounted for and Kerney often incurred expenses 
for which he claimed no allowances  on Ryan’s behalf.  Furthermore,  it  had been 
decided months before not to seek any support from Great Britain in relation to the 
case. Britain’s was a much more sizeable Embassy with considerable human and 
financial resources. This was done primarily for prestige purposes as both the Irish 
Government and Kerney felt an appeal to the British could undermine the reputation 
of Ireland’s diplomatic service.
On 16 June 1939, two days before a major rally took place in London’s Hyde 
Park organised on Ryan’s  behalf,29 Kerney visited Burgos  Central  Prison having 
gained General Pinto’s authorisation through Meade. He was greeted warmly by its 
Director, Antonio Crejo, who outlined the daily routine of the prison.30 From 6.30 
a.m.  to  9  p.m.  prisoners  assembled  and stayed  in  an  open court-yard  were they 
mingled and ate. Most were housed in dormitories which accommodated anything 
from 100-300 people. The Director permitted Kerney to talk to Ryan for an hour in 
the Warder’s Office. The conversation was brief and Ryan said on the whole he was 
treated well but did suffer from a recurring heart condition. He asked Kerney not to 
29 The Spanish Ambassador in London, the Duke of Alba was, like Ontiveros, under severe pressure 
from Republican sympathisers  to intercede  in the Ryan case and speed up his early release.  See 
(C.P.I.A., Frank Ryan, no. 16). 
30 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 17 June 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/2). 
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permit his sister to visit him and he inquired if the Irish people had forgotten about 
him. None of the prisoners were allowed to receive food so Kerney gave him money, 
cigarettes and clothing.  Apparently Ryan remembered meeting Kerney previously 
through a joint acquaintance – the Mulcahy family from Sligo. The Minister could 
not recall this meeting and was not to know then how significant a role the Mulcahy 
family were to play in his career and the Ryan case.31 
The next day Kerney composed a letter for Frederick Boland in which he 
demonstrated  just  how attached  and  determined  he  now was  to  free  Ryan.  The 
Minister was perplexed that Ryan’s enemies in Ireland could be so vindictive as to 
want him ‘to die’ in such appalling conditions.32 He had no doubt that Ryan was a 
good man, perhaps misguided, who did not deserve the vilification of being framed 
as a Communist  which was reaching Spanish ears from his enemies back home. 
However, it  was not just in Ireland that Ryan had enemies.  Kerney was to learn 
confidentially from a conversation he had a month later with the  New York Times 
correspondent  in  Spain,  William  Carney,  who  was  known for  his  pro-Francoist 
sympathies, that the British representative to Franco, Sir Robert Hodgson, had done 
his best to see that Ryan would never be set free. Hodgson blamed Ryan for the 
death  of  his  relative,  Vice-Admiral  Henry  Boyle  Somerville,  who  had  been 
assassinated by the I.R.A. on 24 March 1936 for allegedly recruiting men in Ireland 
to join the Royal  Navy.  Hodgson had passed on all  this  information,  completely 
unfounded, to the Spanish authorities. This revelation helped Kerney see just how 
extensive the opposition to Ryan’s release was and also it reinforced his conviction 
that any help offered by the British was not to be trusted but instead: ‘I shall most 
certainly decline to accept it, whilst clothing my refusal in as courteous a garb as 
possible.’33
Another  contact  Kerney  utilised  in  the  case  was  the  Duchess  of  Tetuán, 
Blanca O’Donnell. Like Meade, she was of Irish descent and knew many prominent 
figures in the regime. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Juan Beigbeder, repeatedly 
31 Kerney knew Elizabeth Mulcahy from his time as Commercial Attaché in the Paris Legation during 
the 1930s. Elizabeth’s husband, Helmut Clissmann, worked for the German Abwehr and would play a 
significant role in Ryan’s “escape” from prison. 
32 Letter from Kerney to Frederick Boland, 17 June 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/2). 
33 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 5 July 1939 (ibid.). 
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expressed his sympathies for Ireland and his desire for closer cultural and economic 
cooperation.  Beigbeder  had  recently  appointed  the  Duchess  to  a  senior  position 
amongst his staff, which Kerney warmly welcomed. He asked the Duchess to see 
Ryan, which she did, and was so moved by Ryan’s plight that she promised to see 
Franco  and  impress  on  him  the  necessity  of  early  release.  Kerney  tried  to  use 
Beigbeder’s pro-Irish sympathies at every opportunity by reminding him that Ireland 
had been one of the first nations to recognise the regime and that a Catholic nation 
which valued spirituality above materialism, like Spain, should view clemency in the 
Ryan case as a major display of bilateral friendship. However, Beigbeder informed 
Kerney that every time he raised the matter with the  Caudillo he was confronted 
with a resolute obstinacy on Franco’s part. It was increasingly discernable that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had little or no influence over domestic affairs in Spain 
and that the military were the real custodians of power. 
In order to see Franco, Beigbeder had to arrange an appointment in advance 
and if the dictator did not agree to a recommendation of his then no authorisation 
was given. The only Ministers who commanded real influence over Franco were the 
Ministers of the three branches of the armed forces and the Minister for the Interior. 
Franco had to listen and placate these men since his power rested solely on their 
support and his position was still  fragile as Spanish society was bitterly divided. 
Without  the  military  and police  forces  he  could  not  govern  and if  he  lost  their 
support a coup d’état would force him and the Falange out of office in a matter of 
hours.  The  Caudillo had  a  close  inner  circle  of  confidants  who  advised  him in 
relation to many prisoners awaiting judgement. His legal advisor and close friend 
Lorenzo  Martínez  Fuset,  who  Kerney  knew,  was  bitterly  opposed  to  Ryan’s 
liberation as his ‘mind was poisoned against him by Gunning and others’.34 Thomas 
Gunning had been General  O’Duffy’s aide-de-camp and had spread rumours that 
Ryan had commanded firing squads. Together with Hodgson’s condemnations, men 
like Fuset were undermining Kerney’s efforts to untangle the veil of lies that had 
been concocted against Ryan.
34 Kerney to _____, 14 Sept. 1939 (ibid.). 
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In addition to Beigbeder’s Ministry holding little if any significant influence 
at Cabinet level, he had enemies within the regime. Franco’s closest advisor was his 
brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Súñer who was both ambitious and conniving and 
wanted Beigbeder’s post for himself. Súñer held the post of Minister for the Interior, 
commanded  a  senior  position  in  the  Falange  – the only party  permitted  to  exist 
openly – and had been the architect behind the political structure of the new State. 
Franco  relied  wholeheartedly  on  his  brother-in-law  and  trusted  his  judgement 
implicitly. Súñer had been captured by the Republican authorities during the Civil 
War and two of his brothers had been assassinated.  He therefore held a visceral 
hatred of anyone who admitted to, or was simply accused of, being a Communist. 
The only way to assuage such viewpoints was to stress some evidence of religious 
conviction; Kerney accordingly submitted a memorandum to Franco which stated 
that  two  of  Ryan’s  sisters  were  nuns  and  he  was  known with  fondness  by  the 
Archbishop  of  Dublin,  Dr  Edward  Byrne.  Given  the  array  of  real  enemies  and 
fabricated stories about Ryan which circulated in Spain, Ireland, and Great Britain it 
was proving increasingly difficult for Kerney to isolate and convince the one man 
that  mattered,  the  one  he  called  the  ‘nigger  in  the  woodpile’,  who  was  Franco 
himself.35 
Every month Kerney visited Ryan and his visits had resulted in the prisoner 
being  made  exempt  from  labour,  granted  more  access  to  a  doctor  and  better 
accommodation. Parcels and cards were permitted by December and Ryan’s mood 
was considerably  upbeat.  Outwardly Kerney displayed  a  mood  of  optimism and 
confided  that  things  were  progressing  in  the  right  direction,  albeit  with  habitual 
delays customary in the bureaucratic system accentuated by the transfer from Burgos 
to  Madrid  of  the  entire  civil  and  military  administration.  Inwardly  he  thought 
differently. On 20 November Beigbeder informed him that at another meeting with 
Franco the  Caudillo simply shook his head and refused to listen to his entreaties 
when he took out his file on Ryan. Kerney responded that surely Franco could see 
the  political  importance  of  the  case  for  both  nations.  The  Taoiseach’s  ‘anxious’ 
desire  to  promote  closer  ties  with  the  regime  was  directly  conditioned  by  its 
35 Kerney to _____, 17 Oct. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/3). 
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treatment of its last Irish prisoner and de Valera was prepared to replace the Spanish 
as Ryan’s gaolers if need be.36 Despite over 80,000 judgements pending, 400 foreign 
prisoners  and  a  bulging  prison  population,  Franco  ignored  official  Irish  pleas 
because of his personal concerns about the ‘dangerous’ nature of this prisoner.37 The 
dictator was a man obsessed with his own personal security who lived in fortified 
palaces far removed from the public. When he did have to travel it was in his six-
wheeled armoured car. How much Franco thought Ryan was a danger and threat to 
him is difficult to ascertain but it is plausible that he felt Ryan posed a threat; after 
all he had organised and transported a contingent of troops who fought outstandingly 
well against him. 
The truth of Franco’s paranoia with Ryan resides with the judgement of a 
senior  medical  official  of the regime.  During Kerney’s  monthly visits  to Burgos 
Central  Prison,  Ryan had imparted  more  information  surrounding his  trial,  those 
involved in it and the evidence against him. On one occasion he told Kerney he had 
been interrogated by a doctor. The Irish Minister noted this detail to Dublin but he 
was clearly unaware of the significance of this man. His name was Antonio Vallejo-
Nájera, head of the Psychiatric Services of the Nationalist Army who had set up a 
Laboratory of Psychological  Investigations  to  scientifically  verify  the sub-human 
nature  of  Franco’s  opponents,  for  which  he  was  promoted  to  colonel  and 
subsequently  appointed  Professor  of  Psychiatry  at  the  University  of  Madrid.38 
During a two-month period he visited Ryan on seven separate occasions. Nájera had 
managed to gain Franco’s approval to undertake experiments on prisoners in order to 
verify what he deemed a ground-breaking study into genetics. Given the fact that 
Franco viewed himself as the ideal being who encapsulated the true ideals of Spain 
and its people, anyone who was opposed to him must surely have a genetic defect. 
There was no other logical conclusion. He commissioned Nájera to investigate, find 
and  prove  his  theory  of  a  so-called  ‘Red’  gene.  As  genes  represent  the  unit  of 
heredity capable of mutation and replication,  its discovery could prevent a father 
who possessed the ‘Red’ gene passing his hereditary Communistic tendencies to his 
36 Kerney to _____, 21 Nov. 1939 (ibid.). 
37 Ibid. 
38 For a good account of Dr. Nágera see Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War: reaction, revolution  
and revenge (London, 2006), p. 310. 
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son and thus save Spain another crusade. Nájera wrote a fifteen-page document of 
his assessment of Ryan and he told the Irishman that he had the illusive ‘Red’ gene, 
was  a  born  revolutionary  and should  have  been  shot  on  capture.  This  report  in 
conjunction with all the other oral rumours about Ryan commanding firing squads 
and being a Communist,  decidedly swayed Franco and accounts for his obstinate 
refusal to set him free.39
Without  any  hope  of  influencing  Franco  by  reasoned  argument  Kerney 
advanced the suggestion to Dublin that economic pressure might be brought to bear 
on Spain. Both the United States and Great Britain were using this method to secure 
the release of their citizens and Spain was most desirous to secure a trade agreement 
with Ireland, given the dire state of its economy. However, Dublin was not disposed 
to such a dramatic démarche so Kerney tried another line of inquiry. He had a senior 
contact  in  the  Falange  named  Barón  de  Senaller,  who  had  been  with  General 
O’Duffy and knew Irish-Spanish relations better than most. Senaller was Secretary 
to the Falangist Minister Without Portfolio, Pedro Gamero del Castillo. Castillo for 
some time had wanted to extend the power and scope of the Falange outside of 
Spain and to infiltrate them into the diplomatic service by becoming a compulsory 
contingent  to  every  Embassy  or  Legation  abroad.  That  way,  the  Falange  could 
disseminate  its  message  and  policies  more  efficiently  to  the  world  as  well  as 
recruiting new members to its organisation in every host country. Kerney presented 
himself as being malleable to these ideas and suggestions in order to obtain a copy 
of the sentence passed by the military tribunal against Ryan, which he duly received. 
The  document  stated  that  Ryan  was  charged  with  armed  insurrection  and 
propaganda work abroad whilst on convalescence.40 
Although his sentence had been reduced to thirty-years,  Kerney could see 
that unless Ryan’s conditions improved his chances of surviving the winter were 
slim. The prison was originally intended to house only a few hundred inmates but 
5,080 prisoners were confined within its walls, with more expected. That winter was 
39 On psychiatry in the post-Civil War years see Michael Richards, A time of silence: Civil War and  
the culture of repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945 (Cambridge, 1998).
40 Ryan  had  been  injured  whilst  fighting  and  had  returned  to  Ireland  briefly  for  recuperation. 
Newspapers reported Ryan encouraging citizens to ‘join forces in a common fight against the agents 
of Fascist Imperialism’. This was used against him at his trial. See Irish Press, 1 May 1937.
91
a harsh one and the release committees’ funds were being used in France to purchase 
food and clothing,  as neither  was to  be found in adequate  supply in Spain.  Mrs 
Kerney knitted socks for Ryan and the Irish Minister regularly purchased insecticide 
powder  as  many  of  the  inmates  were  tubercular  and  diseased.  The  surrounding 
environs of the prison were hellish. Hundreds of women waited outside for news of 
their  husbands and semi-starvation was recorded by Kerney throughout  the area. 
Ryan was tough but the meagre dietary intake of bread and watered soup would 
inevitably have physical and psychological consequences coupled with all his other 
privations.  The  Minister  began  to  be  accompanied  by  an  Irish  priest  named  Fr 
Mulrean, chaplain at the British Institute in Madrid, on his monthly visits to Ryan 
partly in the hope of offering some spiritual relief to the prisoner. Ryan confided in 
the priest that all prisoners who were officers were being shot. All the prisoners were 
forced to attend mass at which a portrait of Franco was hung above the altar. At the 
end of mass prisoners were made raise their right arm in salute and listen to the 
National Anthem. 
Ryan was grateful for Kerney’s indefatigable efforts on his behalf, which had 
resulted  in a  significant  amelioration  in  his  conditions  – but  the longer  the case 
dragged  on  the  more  tenuous  his  existence  became,  given  the  appalling  socio-
economic  state  of  the  country.  That  winter,  Ryan’s  rheumatism  afflicted  him 
repeatedly  and  so  also  did  the  sight  of  ‘unreprieved  prisoners’  who,  Kerney 
informed Dublin, were ‘being shot at the rate of from 10 to 20 a week’.41 During one 
visit  Kerney  and  Fr  Mulrean  stood  in  the  prison,  as  bitter  winter  winds  swept 
through the open court-yard,  and watched boys,  barely men,  ‘many less than 20 
years of age, I should say, walking in groups, many miserably clad and apparently 
underfed’.42 This was not the scene Ryan’s detractors in Ireland saw, nor wanted to 
see.  As  Kerney  had  stated  before  to  Dublin,  the  Francoist  judicial  system  was 
unquestionable; it was also unquestionably harsh. 
The  initial  months  of  1940 had brought  further  unease  with  more  letters 
arriving into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemning Ryan and no visible sign 
of a general amnesty on the horizon to alleviate the State from the enormous costs of 
41 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 5 Dec. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/3). 
42 Kerney to _____, 2 Feb. 1940 (ibid.). 
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incarcerating its opponents. Joseph Walshe still hoped that Ryan would be released 
as part of a large group, maybe a group of British prisoners, because he was not 
indicted under any criminal charge. Kerney still favoured treating Ryan as a separate 
individual  case  which  was  what  the  prisoner  wanted  and  what  his  sustained 
diplomatic efforts merited. Whilst the Director General of Foreign Policy, the Count 
of Casas Rojas and the Duchess of Tetuán expressed their  despondency,  Captain 
Meade had made more inroads in relation to the military authorities that fortified 
Kerney’s spirits. On 5 February 1940 Kerney and Meade met General Pinto, who 
stated that he wanted a revision of sentences and was prepared to raise the Ryan case 
with the Ministry of War. The military had more pressing concerns on its hands than 
acting as camp guards, especially with the world focused on Spanish foreign policy 
and the nation’s possible military alignment with the Axis powers. Coupled with 
this,  the  economic  realities  of  the  time  forced  the  regime  to  begin  releasing 
prisoners. 
On 26 February the  Irish Independent  announced to  the  Irish public  that 
General Franco had released American prisoners.43 This was a major precedent and 
was followed two months later by an announcement on 24 April from Richard (Rab) 
Butler, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, in the House of Commons, that all 
British  prisoners  had  been  released.  Kerney  had  known  for  some  time  through 
contacts in the British Embassy that the economic pressure they were applying on 
the Franco regime would force them to move in relation to the matter of prisoners. 
One former detainee, Tom Jones, told reporters that security organs of the State were 
still processing hundreds of people each month in an endless cycle of arrests and 
imprisonments. Jones recalled his time in prison to Joseph Walshe and worked with 
the release committees to campaign on Ryan’s behalf and keep the controversy alive 
in the public arena.
In May Kerney secured a meeting with the Secretary of the Minister for War, 
General  de la Fuente,  to outline the Irish Government’s  position and to possibly 
overcome  the  ‘occult  forces’  that  were  trying  to  undermine  all  his  diplomatic 
endeavours.44 The meeting proved satisfactory and when Kerney met Ryan for their 
43 Irish Independent, 26 Feb. 1940. 
44 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 May 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/3). 
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monthly meeting he could confide to him and Dublin that the possibility of release 
was now likely ‘within the next 2 or 3 weeks’.45 Ryan had been moved to more 
comfortable accommodation with just a handful of inmates sharing the same room. 
The Irish Minister was also supplying him with cod liver oil and vitamins now to 
combat the effects of a poor diet and nutritional deficiency. His better conditions and 
optimistic mood seemed to symbolise hope. However, this hope was dashed when 
Kerney learned confidentially  that  ‘Franco himself’  had some ‘considerable  time 
ago’ ordered that in the ‘particular case of Frank Ryan’ nothing was to be done in 
regard to his liberation ‘without his personal consent’.46 Both the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of War had proven incapable of moving the Caudillo and 
the inevitable question remained: Why? On 6 June William Norton, leader of the 
Labour Party,  asked the Taoiseach in a debate in Dáil Éireann if it  was true that 
Ryan was now Franco’s last foreign prisoner.47 It  was indeed true and de Valera 
knew it was a bitter disappointment to the credibility of Ireland’s diplomatic service, 
which he headed. 
On 6 July Kerney sensationally reported that the Chief of Police, José Finat 
(the Count of Mayalde), had been ordered by Franco to hasten the release of Ryan as 
a conciliatory gesture but within a week the order had been revoked and Ryan was 
instead to be allowed to “escape” from prison.48 Several circumstances had begun to 
come together to determine the final phase of Ryan’s captivity in Spain. With every 
avenue  of  inquiry  blocked,  Kerney  was  offered  a  propitious  life-line  by  the 
Legation’s part-time lawyer, Jaime de Champourcin. Champourcin had worked in 
Spanish intelligence during the Civil War and knew many of the senior members of 
the German Gestapo in Madrid. He offered his assistance to Kerney and once the 
Irish Minister fell ‘in with this suggestion’, Champourcin contacted these agents of 
the  Gestapo.49 The  Spanish  security  organs  worked  closely  with  its  German 
counterparts and Finat had a strong working relationship with Heinrich Himmler, 
head of the Gestapo,  which was helping to improve the efficiency and operating 
45 Ibid. 
46 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 23 May 1940 (ibid.). 
47 Dáil Éireann Debates, 80, 6 June 1940.  
48 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 26 Aug. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/4). 
49 Ibid. 
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potency of Franco’s security forces. Given the assistance and close collaboration the 
regime was already surreptitiously providing to the Nazis, it is not implausible that 
both Finat and his superior, Serrano Súñer, thought that something might be gained 
by offering assistance  to the Germans  in regard to  the Ryan case.  The Germans 
certainly thought so and immediately arranged to see Franco.
It  is important  to note that  during Kerney’s  entire  campaign on behalf  of 
Ryan, with the exception of the day he presented his credentials,50 Kerney had been 
unable to obtain a personal meeting with Franco. The Germans, however, could do 
so at any time and on 1 July one of their agents met Franco, who approved Ryan’s 
release.  On 5 and 12 July Champourcin,  anonymously referred to  as ‘Mr B’ by 
Kerney in his dispatches, saw Finat, who initially said he was to hasten the pardon 
but subsequently told Champourcin that Franco would not sign a pardon but would, 
as was already noted, authorise an “escape”. Ryan’s fate was now in the hands of 
Spanish and German secret police and Kerney acknowledged that there had been ‘no 
communication, direct or indirect, between me and the Gestapo’.51 He visited Ryan 
for the last time on 12 July to advise him on what was transpiring. He had done 
everything within his  limited resources and solemnly wrote  that  without German 
intervention Ryan would never be set free so long as Franco’s ‘own life or that of the 
regime itself’ existed.52
On 24 July Champourcin informed Kerney that all had been arranged with 
the Germans and Ryan was aware of what was happening. At 2 a.m. the following 
morning Champourcin was near the prison to see two cars pick up Ryan. In one was 
Finat’s  secretary with a  German and in  the other  two of  Serrano Súñer’s  armed 
personal bodyguard. Ryan was placed in the latter car and Champourcin raced ahead 
to  be  at  the  International  Bridge  between  Spain  and  France  at  Irún  an  hour  in 
advance. He watched as Ryan passed uninhibited into what was now Vichy France. 
Kerney was unaware that Elizabeth Mulcahy’s husband Helmut, who worked for the 
Abwehr, had been one of those interested in securing Ryan’s transfer to Germany. 
He could be useful if an opportune moment arrived in the war against Great Britain, 
50 10 Apr. 1939. 
51 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 26 Aug. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., A20/4). 
52 Ibid. 
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which was then raging in the skies over the English Channel. All in all it was a ‘very 
unusual procedure’ Franco had authorised in order to be rid of a man he deemed to 
be highly dangerous.53 Ireland had nothing to be thankful for as Kerney admitted to 
Dublin it was anything but a ‘friendly gesture towards Ireland.’54 
The Ryan case was the most contentious issue in Irish-Spanish relations and 
its outcome was a disappointment to concerted Irish diplomatic efforts on his behalf. 
It marks a disappointing episode in bilateral relations yet it is also confirms Dermot 
Keogh’s findings that Irish missions overseas ‘performed very well’ and patriotically 
on behalf of fellow citizens despite completely inadequate resources.55 As long as 
Ryan had remained on Spanish soil, it was Kerney’s mission to see that every effort 
was  done  to  assist  in  his  welfare  and  care.  Whilst  Champourcin  watched  the 
motorcade slip into occupied France and German jurisdiction, Kerney stood beside 
his  car  at  a  safe  distance,  satisfied  that  Ryan  had  indeed  safely  left  Franco’s 
archipelago for good.56 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid.
55 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 114. 
56 L.K.P.A.  
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Chapter 3
Kerney’s Diplomatic Mission to Spain, January 1939-August 1942
Turning of the   Tide 
On 30 January  1939 the  Irish  Minister  to  Spain,  Leopold  Kerney,  informed  his 
superiors in the Department of External Affairs that the total collapse of the Spanish 
Republic was now just a matter of time and he suggested that Ireland should review 
its official position vis-à-vis Franco.1 The event that decidedly swayed international 
opinion that Generalísimo Francisco Franco would win the Spanish Civil War was 
the capture of Barcelona, the second largest city in Spain, on 26 January. In addition 
to controlling the most important industrial regions of the country, Franco enjoyed 
overwhelming  superiority  in  men,  food  and  munitions.  It  would  be  just  a  few 
months, Kerney estimated, before he would be ‘master of Madrid.’2 A memorandum 
was prepared by Joseph Walshe for Éamon de Valera arguing that they should act 
promptly  on  Kerney’s  recommendation.  De  Valera  agreed  and  on  11  February 
Ireland recognised Franco’s as the de facto Government of the nation.3 
Franco’s military successes had been eagerly monitored and warmly received 
by the vast majority of Irish people because they viewed his cause as a just one that 
defended Catholicism from ungodly Communist hordes who had reaped a terrible 
and destructive whirlwind on Spain. That was their perception of the conflict. It was 
a contest of good versus evil, morality versus immorality, religion versus atheism, 
order  versus  anarchy,  tradition  versus  revolution.  The  ordinary  people  always 
followed the guidance of their spiritual leaders and those leaders told them Franco 
had saved Spain. A microcosm of how Irish society perceived both warring factions 
in the Civil War can be seen in extracts from the Irish Independent. One writer, E. 
1 Kerney to the Department  of  External  Affairs,  30 Jan.  1939 (N.A.I.,  D.F.A.,  227/4).  The Irish 
Government had authorised the establishment of a Legation in Spain on 28 June 1935 and Kerney 
was  appointed  to  the  post  as  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipotentiary  (N.A.I.,  D.T., 
S7911A). 
2 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 30 Jan. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 227/4). 
3 _____, to General Jordana, 11 Feb. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1050/E4). 
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M. A. Kinahan, described the Republican Government as ‘murderous scum’4 whilst 
Fr Ambrose Coleman worried that societies like ‘The Friends of [Red] Spain’ were 
sending munitions concealed as food aid to the Republican forces. The minority in 
the community who defended the Republic were labelled extremists and radicals. In 
a  war  marked  by  its  ideological  dimensions  Catholic  Ireland  stood  shoulder  to 
shoulder  with  its  Spanish  Catholic  brethren  and consequently  with  its  emerging 
leader on the international stage. In general, this viewpoint was shared at all levels of 
society  and across  all  sections  of  the  professions,  succinctly  shown below by a 
resolution passed by Mayo County Council: 
we regard this brilliant achievement [the fall of Barcelona] as a triumph for 
Catholicity over the godless forces of paganism, and the forerunner of the  
early establishment of a Government in Spain based on Catholic principles.5 
April  -December, 1939  
When the Civil War officially ended on 1 April 1939, it was the Irish Government’s 
hope and aspiration that the new regime would work to restore stability and dedicate 
itself  to  internal  reconstruction  and reconciliation.  It  was  also  the  Government’s 
view that  foreign  involvement  had exacerbated  the  conflict  by turning  it  from a 
rebellion into a protracted war which had needlessly prolonged the bitterness of the 
struggle.  Both  de  Valera  and  Walshe,  symbolic  embodiments  of  ‘Catholic 
nationalism’ in the words of Fearghal McGarry,6 hoped that the guiding Catholic 
principles that underpinned the new regime would also ensure a rapid normalisation 
in everyday life. Leopold Kerney, Dublin’s eyes and ears in Spain, reported on all 
aspects of the internal situation in the country. His observations and reports would 
shatter  any  illusions  about  the  supposed  moral  and  Christian  benevolence  of 
Franco’s Government. Yet despite this Dublin would remain resolutely steadfast in 
4 Irish Independent, 14 Jan. 1939. 
5 Ibid., 31 Jan. 1939. 
6 Fearghal  McGarry,  ‘Ireland and the Spanish Civil War’ in Declan Downey & J. C. MacLennan 
(eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), p. 213. 
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its determination to adopt a non-interference policy – a policy also pursued by the 
Vatican. 
Franco’s finest hour  in 1939 came with the first victory parade held on 19 
May through the main street of the capital. On that day he stood triumphant. The 
imperial  ambitions of the regime were visibly displayed to the world’s media.  A 
victory arch had been constructed as a backdrop to the main podium. It was draped 
in the new imperial flag and stencilled into the columns of the arch were the words 
‘Franco, Franco, Franco’ and ‘Victory’. In front of where the  Caudillo stood was 
another  symbol  of  empire,  an  escort  of  Moorish  soldiers  who,  like  later-day 
praetorian guards, were lined in a row to protect  him from harm. He saluted his 
armies whilst a squadron of German bombers flew in formation over the parade. 
General Varela pinned Spain’s highest military decoration, the  Cruz Laureada de 
San Fernando, on Franco’s tunic. Dressed in a concoction of clothes symbolising 
each contingent of the Nationalist  movement,  the  Caudillo was applauded on the 
main podium by his military and political cohorts. The full irredentist machinations 
of the regime were clear. Spain’s decision to leave the League of Nations on 8 May 
had  further  signalled  to  the  outside  world  the  close  association  the  regime  was 
forging  with  the  New  Order  in  Europe.  Madrid  was  now  the  epicentre  of  a 
militarised society that had been formed for, and geared towards, war.  
For Kerney, who was present on one of the podiums overlooking the parade, 
the event merely served to highlight and reinforce the regime’s triumph over the 
vanquished.  Although  the  populace  was  tired  of  war,  Kerney  believed  that  the 
regime aspired to restore the nation to greatness first before embarking on economic 
recovery: ‘The present rulers of Spain are ambitious and their main ambition is to 
raise Spain to the level of a first-rate Power, as she was 300 years ago.’7 For him it 
was plain that no policy of reconciliation was being considered. Neither in Ireland 
did there seem any concern for the welfare of the defeated. What mattered most was 
to restore and foster bilateral relations with the regime and to do everything possible 
to avoid any unnecessary incidents which might undermine this objective. Before the 
victory  parade  had  commenced,  Walshe  had  managed  to  pass  onto  Kerney  a 
7 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 6 July 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
99
telegram from the Catholic Boy Scouts of Ireland to be personally handed to Franco. 
He  duly  received  it.  It  read  that  the  organisation  would  like  to  bestow  its: 
‘congratulations on his glorious victory in Spain.’8 
One of the dominant themes that Kerney frequently reported on was the dire 
socio-economic state of the country. Daily life was hard. The availability of food, 
especially bread, was extremely small at that time, and the capital’s reserves of food 
stocks  were deteriorating  rapidly.  A black  market,  known as  Estraperlo,  was  in 
operation with very high food prices, which made goods available only to those who 
could afford to pay. Madrid was a city plagued by malnutrition and disease, Kerney 
informed  Dublin.  The  scarcity  of  available  food  caused  dietary  restrictions  and 
increased cases of nutritional depletion amongst the population with morphological, 
biochemical and physiological changes in the bodies’ composition becoming more 
apparent. Fatigue and low body fat were the visible effects of malnutrition. But the 
peoples’ plight was exacerbated by the presence of ‘plegara [sic]’,9 a disease Kerney 
reported  as  being  rife  throughout  the  city.  With  the  country also  suffering from 
scarcities in electrical and fuel supplies, medical inspections and treatments for those 
suffering from malnutrition and pellagra were significantly restricted. 
It would have seemed obvious to an impartial observer that Spain needed a 
massive foreign loan to help reconstruct the nation, returning it to some semblance 
of normality. In addition, a general amnesty to all prisoners and a public declaration 
of reconciliation to those in exile would have greatly assisted economic recovery by 
freeing  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  to  help  collect  the  harvest  and  thereby 
guarantee food supplies to the major cities. Yet Franco did none of this. Together 
with his Minister for Industry and Commerce,  Juan Antonio Suanzes, the regime 
pursued a policy known as autarky.10 Ireland aspired to a similar autarkic or self-
sufficiency  model  but  it  was  never  undertaken  on  such  appalling  comparative 
8 Telegram from the  Catholic  Boy Scouts  of  Ireland  for  General  Franco,  14 Apr.  1939 (N.A.I., 
D.F.A., 235/24).  
9 Note  from  Kerney  to  the  Department  of  External  Affairs  (N.A.I.,  D.F.A.,  219/2).  For  a  good 
medical account on pellagra see James Deeny,  To cure and to care: memoirs of a Chief Medical  
Officer (Dublin, 1989), p. 46. 
10 For a good account on Spanish autarky see Ángel Viñas, Guerra, dinero, dictadura: ayuda fascista  
y autarquía en la España de Franco (Barcelona, 1984). 
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conditions.11 Franco’s alignment  with Hitler  and Mussolini  led him to model  the 
economy on autarky.  Yet  Spain  was not  Germany and lacked the  technical  and 
industrial  capability  of  driving  itself  out  of  poverty.  Franco  refused  to  pardon 
prisoners and instead ordered his vast  security organs to continue arresting those 
believed  to  be enemies  of  the  State,  thus  further  undermining  any possibility  of 
economic  recovery.  More sinister  news reached Kerney’s  attention  of  ‘unofficial 
arrests  in  Madrid  and of  corpses  being  found daily  in  the  vicinity  of  a  Madrid 
cemetery.’12 He summed up how appalling the socio-economic situation of Spain 
was: 
There are  no signs of increased production.  With hundreds of thousands  
killed, hundreds  of  thousands  in  exile  and  hundreds  of  thousands  in  
concentration camps, Spain is deprived of a very large proportion of skilled 
and unskilled workers.13 
Because Spain was now a totalitarian State the people could not raise their voices in 
protest against the imperial machinations of the regime or the grinding misery of 
their  existence.  Franco  decided  the  fate  of  the  nation  and  Kerney  foresaw him 
adopting a policy of ‘benevolent neutrality’ towards Germany and Italy in the case 
of war between Britain and France in the hope of winning an empire in North Africa 
and of driving the British out of Gibraltar and back into the sea.14 The single-State 
party,  known as  the  Falange,  continually  rallied  its  membership  and propaganda 
machine towards the re-conquest of Gibraltar. On the eve of the Second World War, 
Kerney  met  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Juan  Beigbeder,  to  discuss  closer 
economic and cultural cooperation between Ireland and Spain, the Frank Ryan case 
and  the  likely  position  Spain  would  adopt  if  war  should  break  out  in  Europe. 
Beigbeder expressed the view that Ireland was like Spain and Portugal in that  it 
commanded enormous respect worldwide for its religious devotion and he believed 
that the three nations, united under the Vatican’s guidance, could play a major role 
11 A policy instigated by Fianna Fáil in the early 1930s. 
12 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 July 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 6 July 1939 (ibid.). 
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in international affairs, ‘having spiritual values on which the salvation of the world 
might very well depend.’15 
On 4 September 1939 Franco declared the strictest neutrality in the conflict 
which  was  what  the  nation  needed;  time  for  reconstruction  and  rebuilding.  The 
Spanish people, Ireland and the international community as a whole welcomed this 
announcement  as  an  indication  of  his  intention  to  stay  out  of  the  conflict  and 
concentrate  all  his  attention  on  internal  matters.  The  Allies  welcomed  Franco’s 
declaration as the last thing they needed was to commit to fighting in another theatre 
of  operations  at  a  time  when  they  were  already  struggling  to  aid  Poland.  Nazi 
Germany hoped that the regime would continue its close friendship and association 
with the fascist New Order. The news reached the people through the newspapers 
which, were completely censored under the direct control of Ramón Serrano Súñer,16 
Minister for the Interior, and his Falangist mandarins in the Department of Press and 
Propaganda,  Dionisio  Ridruejo  and Antonio  Tovar.  Kerney was  unimpressed  by 
Franco’s ‘useless appeal’ for peace talks as up until now the regime’s censored press 
and radio agency, Radio Nacional, had shown little pacifist inclination and nothing 
but ‘contempt for democratic countries’,17 an observation that verifies Paul Preston’s 
findings on the ‘German influence over the press’.18 The Irish Minister believed the 
real purpose of the press campaign was to afford Spain the opportunity of playing 
the part of honest broker on the international stage and thus restore its credibility ‘as 
a first-class Power,’ in particular a Mediterranean power, in the eyes of the world 
and especially the fascist States.19 A full examination of that day’s publication of La 
Voz de España  reveals  the biased nature of  the regime’s  affinities.  In  the entire 
western region it reported that the only operation Britain was able to mount was a 
minor bombing raid ‘on the military ports of Wilhelsshaven [sic] and Dunshaven 
[sic]’ which was successfully repulsed.20 In Poland the German Blitzkrieg campaign 
15 Private meeting between Kerney and Juan Beigbeder, 31 Aug. 1939 (ibid.). 
16 The public privately used the term cuñadísimo to denote Súñer.  Cuñado is the Spanish word for 
brother-in-law. 
17 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 4 Sept. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2).
18 Paul Preston, ‘Franco’s foreign policy,  1939-1953’ in Christian Leitz  & David Dunthorn (eds), 
Spain in an international context, 1936-1959 (New York, 1999), p. 4. 
19 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 4 Sept. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2).
20 La Voz de España, 5 Sept. 1939.  
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was described as sweeping all before it.  In one engagement alone the Polish Air 
Force lost seven planes to none for Germany. As with all the main newspapers in 
Spain  it  relied  entirely  on  the  German  and  Italian  news  agencies  for  this 
information.21 Of the six dailies published in Madrid,22 two were ‘said to be paid by 
Germany’, Kerney heard.23 
This one-sided bias towards Germany at the expense of Britain was the norm 
and in breach of the codes of neutrality as outlined by the Hague Convention of 
1907. It is interesting to compare the censorship practices operated in Ireland and 
Spain once the Second World War had commenced.24 Both had planned for such a 
procedure  for  some time  yet  Ireland  was  to  remain  steadfastly  neutral  in  all  its 
reportage.25 No detailed numbers of enemy losses on either side were given and de 
Valera practised such an efficient form of censorship over the press, radio,  mail, 
telegraphic service and cinematography that Ireland would practice a more vigorous 
censorship policy than Britain. Although the Spanish press, propaganda and radio 
services  were all  under  State  control,  it  was the Falange  which disseminated  all 
information  to  the  public.  Nothing  could  be  printed  without  Serrano  Súñer’s 
approval or without the habitual references to the greatness of Franco and what he 
was doing for the people.26 Any newspaper that refused to accept the State’s right to 
appoint managers to the newspaper was forcibly closed and its owners put under 
surveillance. This was the case with El Debate and its owner, Francisco Herrera. 
Falangist control over the means of communication and information would, 
as  Kerney  highlighted,  afford  Germany  a  favourable  impression  in  Spain  that 
portrayed  the  Third  Reich  as  a  technical  and  industrial  powerhouse,  a  major 
‘misconception’  as  recent  research  has  demonstrated.27 Although  Portuguese 
newspapers,  more  Anglophile  in  content  than  their  Spanish  counterparts  were 
21 The D.N.B. and Stefani were the official news agencies of Germany and Italy. The Spanish news 
agency, E.F.E., filtered all its reports from them to the Spanish press. 
22 A.B.C., Arriba, Informaciones, Madrid, El Alcázar and Ya.  
23 Kerney referred to Informaciones and Madrid. 
24 For a good account on Irish censorship see Donal Ó Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: 
neutrality, politics and society (Cork, 1996).
25 1938 in the case of Ireland. 
26 On 4 Sept. 1939, the day Spain declared its neutrality, Hoja Oficial del Lunes carried an article on 
Franco describing him as a ‘Great Soldier’ whose voice was the ‘authentic voice of Spain’. 
27 Leonard Carvana & Hugh Rockoff, ‘A wolfram in sheep’s clothing: economic warfare in Spain, 
1940-1944’ in Journal of Economic History, lxiii (2003), p. 102.
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accessible,  in  the  main  the  principal  Madrid  dailies  continued  to  exhort  Hitler’s 
greatness and Franco’s endeavours to shape his nation along a similar path. No other 
newspaper was more zealous in the righteous cause of Nazi Germany than Arriba. 
Kerney described this newspaper as virulently fascist, pro-Nazi in content and ‘the 
official organ of Falange (i.e. Serrano Súñer)’.28 It was ‘directly inspired by [the] 
latter’.29 By  contrast  the  Irish  Press,  the  official  newspaper  of  Fianna  Fáil  and 
consequently the Government, never displayed any sentimental inclination towards 
Germany  and  its  quest  for  living  space  nor  towards  Britain  and  its  cause.  It  is 
probably the most accurate example of how divergent and diametrically polarised 
the  State  censorship  bodies  in  operation  in  Spain  and  Ireland  were.  The  latter 
behaved impartially and correctly, while the former acted prejudicially to the codes 
of strict neutrality that it had ostensibly defined as its official position in the war. 
On 21 October Kerney passed on a list of newspaper cuttings from Ya and 
Arriba which detailed the arrest of forty-two people that day. Some were arrested 
and fined for illegal black market activity in a bid to convince the public that the 
State was successfully clamping down on corruption. Other detainees listed included 
a  German  Jew  whose  extradition  back  to  Germany  had  been  requested  by  the 
Gestapo, which cooperated extensively with its Spanish counterpart under a secret 
agreement  signed on  25  November  1937.30 The  rest  had  been  arrested  for  ‘“red 
activity”’, ‘assassination’, being members of the ‘communist branch’ and for having 
signed ‘death sentences’.31 All these people were subject to the retrospective Law of 
Political Responsibilities which had come into being on 9 February 1939. Enríque 
Súñer,  Professor  of  Medicine  at  Madrid  University,  was  the  President  of  the 
National Tribunal for Political Responsibilities.32 The Vice-President was General 
Kirkpatrick, a prominent member of the regime who had close links to Kerney in the 
promotion of closer bilateral relations. All over the country people were tried under 
a vast network of regional tribunals and investigative magistrates. Anyone with any 
28 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
29 Ibid. 
30 See  R.  H.  Whealey,  Hitler  and  Spain:  the  Nazi  role  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  1936-1939 
(Lexington, 1989), p. 67.
31 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 1 Oct. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2).  
32 For a good account of the National Tribunal for Political Responsibilities see Julius Ruiz, Franco’s  
justice: repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2005). 
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connection  to  the  Spanish  Republic  was  liable  to  a  heavy  fine,  arrest,  lengthy 
imprisonment or execution. 
It  seems astonishing that  such accounts  were being openly printed in  the 
newspapers as a reminder to the population of who now ruled the nation, but what 
was  even  more  significant  was  the  attitude  of  the  military  authorities  and  the 
Catholic Church. The military was intricately involved in the regime’s crimes from 
the  detention  of  a  suspect  to  her  or  his  trial  and  imprisonment  or  execution.  It 
justified its involvement in the ongoing killings by stressing its role as saviour and 
protector of the nation. The Catholic Church, whose leaders, like Kerney, read these 
daily lists of arrests, declined to condemn what was going on because it feared a 
return of Republicanism. In an interview to the press the Primate of Spain, Cardinal 
Gomá, preferred to keep alive the flames of hatred by highlighting the ‘methodical 
destruction’ of churches done ‘by the Reds’.33 Franco, the military and the Catholic 
hierarchy stood as one. There was to be no general amnesty and no reconciliation 
towards the vanquished. 
Kerney could rely on other sources of information to ascertain and verify the 
scale of the arrests and persecutions being undertaken by the security organs of the 
State. The enormity of the repression that Kerney documented at this time confirms 
Julius Ruiz’s findings on the ‘chaotic, decentralised nature of military justice’ with 
thousands of arrests and thousands more in overcrowded prisons.34 In the Diplomatic 
Corps Kerney had contacts within the British Embassy,  most notably the military 
attaché,  who was Irish.35 In a conversation with the Belgian Ambassador he was 
informed that 400 people, including priests, had been arrested at a church for alleged 
separatist sympathies.36 All of them were Basques and were put in a concentration 
camp. The Government’s systematic campaign to suppress the independent nature of 
the Basque people, its attempts to eliminate Basque as a spoken language and to 
prohibit all outward displays of Basque culture and autonomy continued relentlessly. 
So long as enemies of “true” Spain continued to exist, the regime would not stop the 
33 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
34 Julius Ruiz, ‘A Spanish genocide? Reflections on the Francoist repression after the Spanish Civil 
War’ in Contemporary European History, xiv (2005), p. 186.  
35 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2).
36 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 9 Oct. 1939 (ibid.). 
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persecutions. In Catalonia too the Civil Governor of Barcelona, Wenceslao González 
Oliveros, a Professor of Law at the University of Salamanca, had been appointed to 
oversee the suppression of the province and its complete assimilation into a unified 
Spain.  All  semblance  of  Catalan  culture,  language,  literature  and  any  traces  of 
separatism were crushed. 
Although Dublin knew that these repressive policies were being officially 
instigated at the most senior level of the regime, in particular  by Súñer,  it  never 
lodged any formal protest with Madrid. On the contrary, External Affairs showed 
little  sympathy  with  the  plight  of  the  Basque  people  or  with  Catalonia.  When 
Professor  Riba  of  the  University  of  Barcelona  presented  a  speech  in  T.C.D.  on 
Catalan literature, Frederick Boland, Assistant Secretary of the Department, ordered 
undercover detectives to attend the speech in case it had to be suppressed.37 Garda 
M. Gregan of “C” branch and Garda J. Conlon of “A” branch compiled a report for 
Boland.  They  recorded  that  when  Professor  Riba  began  to  stress  Catalonia’s 
independent culture and its ambitions to regain ‘political and economic equilibrium 
and integrity’  he was quickly forced to skip over large sections of the speech by 
Professor Brown of T.C.D. who, as Chairman of the debate, did not want politics to 
be discussed openly.38 Boland, the Irish Government, and the academic community 
turned a blind eye to what the Francoist State was doing to the Basques and Catalans 
– the systematic eradication of a people’s identity. 
In 1939 Franco signed important agreements with Germany that were to have 
detrimental consequences for his own people when the Second World War began. 
On 14 April Franco sent telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini upon joining the Anti-
Comintern  Pact.39 The  full  implications  of  this  commitment  would  not  become 
apparent until Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Spain 
signed a Treaty of Friendship with Germany on 31 March 1939 which stipulated that 
in the event of warlike involvements with a third power both nations agreed to avoid 
anything that could redound to the advantage of the enemy. When war broke out the 
German Navy was a long way short of achieving anything approaching parity with 
37 Speech delivered by Professor Riba at T.C.D., 5 May 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 238/100). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Telegrams from Franco to Hitler and Mussolini, 14 Apr. 1939 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1051/E20). 
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the Royal Navy and Hitler had to somehow attain a steady supply of materials for 
the economy principally from land-based countries. This put the Francoist regime in 
a  serious predicament.  On the one hand the economy desperately needed money 
from the Sterling area to help acquire cash from exports that could be used to rebuild 
the nation. But large trade with Britain would breach the terms of the treaty with 
Germany. Furthermore, whilst the British could pay for goods they received from 
Spain in cash, Hitler wanted Spain to pay off its crippling war debt to Germany, 
approximately 400 million Reichsmarks, in goods, or else concede mining rights to 
German industrialists.  Kerney reported to Dublin that Franco opted to honour his 
commitment  to  Hitler  and  on  5  September  the  Irish  Minister  first  recorded  his 
knowledge of sizeable exports of iron-ore and other raw materials being used to pay 
off Spain’s debt.40 These goods were all essential to the German war economy.41  
Milk was added to the growing lists of rationed goods. Kerney was told that 
‘the ration quantity is half a pint per head per week.’42 The Minister compared the 
cost of goods with Ireland and found that everything in Spain was dearer with some 
items such as potatoes, chicken and veal being double the price. In addition, wages 
lagged far behind inflation which significantly eroded people’s purchasing power. 
The agricultural state of the country was appalling. Dried vegetables and rice were 
120,000 tons below normal production levels and sugar was 180,000 tons below the 
norm. Cereal and vegetable production were also down because of the destruction 
the conflict had wrought on the countryside. Wheat, the main component of bread, 
which normally required ‘400,000 truck-loads’ for the domestic  market,  was ‘far 
below this figure,’ he reported.43 Rolling stock to transport food around the country 
was also down by forty per cent. It is no surprise that malnutrition and pellagra were 
so prevalent in Madrid and elsewhere, given the dire food shortage. Spain was now 
edging towards famine and the onset of a bitterly cold winter caused further misery 
and hardship. The rising tide of anger at the state of the nation was becoming more 
40 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 5 Sept. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
41 For  a  good  account  on  Spain’s  trade  with  Germany  see  Christian  Leitz,  Economic  relations  
between Nazi Germany and Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945 (Oxford, 1996).
42 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 31 Oct. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
43 Kerney to _____, 2 Nov. 1939 (ibid.). 
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palpable: ‘The people are suffering from hunger and hardship. In all classes there is 
growing discontent.’44 
The main focus of public anger was centred on Serrano Súñer. Kerney said 
that  the  ‘mistrust’  of  Súñer  was  ‘very  widespread.’45 He  and  the  Falange  were 
perceived as corrupt, incompetent, ambitious and delusional. His aspirations for an 
empire in North Africa at a time when the State was not even capable of feeding its 
own people  were  leading  the  Irish  Minister  to  believe  that  ‘sooner  or  later’  an 
‘upheaval’  from  above  would  topple  Súñer  from  his  position  of  power  and 
influence.46 The people refused to believe his assertions that long queues for bread 
were being caused by hoarders, alarmists, Reds, Freemasons and other enemies of 
the State whose identity he always defined rather vaguely in the press.47 The virulent 
hatred of Súñer was shared by leading generals in the upper echelons of the regime. 
They  despised  him  personally  because  he  was  perceived  as  ambitious  and 
unpredictable. They believed he owed all his power to the fortunate circumstance 
that he was Franco’s brother-in-law. Most importantly,  they feared that his close 
relationship with Franco could prove influential if he could persuade the Caudillo to 
forge ahead with an empire.  The generals  knew better  than him about  the gross 
deficiencies existing in the armed forces.
Súñer’s poor image was also attributed to a public perception that he and his 
Falangist cohorts were hiding the full scale of the nation’s plight from Franco and 
that if the Caudillo could only see for himself the full extent of the crisis he would 
remove these incompetent officials. However, free public expression and assembly 
were prohibited and Franco’s exalted lifestyle, which was largely hidden from the 
public, began to affect his perception of the state of the nation.48 He came to believe 
the  State’s  propaganda  machine  that  he  was  a  genius  and  so  allowed  a  cult  of 
personality  to  be  erected  around  him.  His  portrait  hung  in  every  classroom, 
courtroom and official office. His birth place of Ferrol in Galicia was renamed El 
Ferrol del Caudillo, as was Madrid’s main street, from La Castellana to Avenida del 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid. 
48 See Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993). 
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Generalísimo. Stamps and coins bore his image. Franco genuinely believed that the 
people as a whole loved him and public displays of that enthusiasm were perceived 
by him to be sincere and spontaneous. 
Kerney commented on one such demonstration, which had been organised by 
the Falange Youth wing,  Frente de Juventud.  The whole purpose of the exercise 
seemed to be to exalt the leader: ‘the constant repetition of whose name was the 
distinctive feature of the ritual’.49 As usual Franco’s attire was immaculate and his 
delivery  was  flawless,  ‘fluent  and  unhesitating’,  Kerney  noted.50 It  was  these 
rapturous  demonstrations  of affection  that  were used by the regime as miniature 
plebiscites  to  legitimise  its  existence.  Franco  did  not  know  that  the  whole 
demonstration had been organised by the Falange by bringing these children, 13,000 
boys  and 2,000 girls,  by lorry into the city.  The ceremony was a gymnastic and 
militaristic display of bodily prowess, discipline and the obedience of the multitude 
to its leader. The children did not know that their acclaimed leader was living an 
extravagant lifestyle completely at odds with their standards of living and that he 
was receiving a separate salary from each position he held: Head of State, Head of 
Government  and Generalísimo  of  the  armed  forces.  Neither  did  they  know that 
nearly seven months on from the end of the Civil War the killing machine was still 
working at full speed. 
Kerney  informed  Dublin  that  people  were  not  only  being  ‘arrested  and 
imprisoned  daily’  but  that  mass  executions  of  genocidal  proportions  were  being 
carried  out.51 One of  his  reliable  sources of information  came from an unnamed 
doctor who voiced his shock and disgust privately to Kerney about the scale of the 
crimes being committed. The doctor was ordered to be present at one execution in 
Alcázar  de  San  Juan  to  certify  death  and  he  described  his  complete  revulsion 
towards a priest who argued to him that there was a rational and sound basis for the 
killings – purification of the race.52 The doctor’s information was entirely reliable 
and Kerney declared: ‘I have just got very direct proof of the shooting of a batch of 
49 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 30 Oct. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 2 Nov. 1939 (ibid.).  
52 Ibid.  
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50  prisoners,  ten  at  a  time’.53 He  himself  regularly  heard  nightly  executions 
throughout  the capital:  ‘I  have often heard in  the  middle  of  the night  (generally 
between 3 and 4 a.m.) shots fired in the vicinity’.54 
But no voice of protest was raised in Dublin and it seemed that during this 
entire  period the Irish Government  was more  concerned with the  legislative  and 
implementation  process  behind  Spain’s  censorship  vis-à-vis  its  neutrality  policy. 
Neither de Valera nor Walshe called in the Spanish Minister in Dublin to account 
for, verify or deny Kerney’s reports. No record has been found of them consulting 
Dr  Michael  Rynne,  the  Legal  Advisor  of  the  Department,  to  ascertain  what 
procedures could be followed to convey one nation’s repugnance at what another 
nation was doing against its own citizens. At the most minimal level, no record of 
any note recording Ireland’s disapproval was ever compiled and sent to Kerney to be 
handed into Madrid’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a token gesture and written 
record condemning the Francoist State’s crimes. 
On 7 November the Irish Minister took a rare trip outside of Madrid to travel 
to San Rafael, located forty miles from the capital. San Rafael was the birthplace of 
the  Legation’s  chauffeur,  Eugenio  Goya  Requena,  who had assured  Kerney that 
although most food was difficult to come by in Madrid, especially bread, meat and 
eggs, the outlying regions had an abundant supply of food. When they got there they 
discovered that there was ‘no meat, no coffee, no sugar, no work and no money’.55 
The driver was ‘perplexed’ that the town had become so impoverished and when 
they called on his mother she ‘broke into tears’ relating the hardship of the people.56 
The countryside was as squalid and pauperised as the main cities and the plight of 
the people was exacerbated by the State’s requirements that any transportation of 
food  from  one  region  to  another  necessitated  a  permit.  This  inevitably  led  to 
widespread corruption by State officials  who could either  seize some produce or 
withhold authorisation unless they received a bribe. The Falange further alienated 
the rural population by trying to enforce sobriety into their lives and suppress ‘the 
53 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 2 Nov. 1939 (ibid.). 
54 Kerney to _____, 9 Nov. 1939 (ibid.). 
55 Kerney to _____, 7 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
56 Ibid. 
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holdings of all festive commemorations, banquets, meetings’ without prior consent.57 
Súñer was trying to infiltrate the party into every facet of public life and his position 
as  President  of  the  Falange’s  Executive  Committee,  which  ran  the  political, 
economic and syndical life of the nation, further inflamed the public’s hatred of him 
and corroborates Denis Smyth’s analysis of Súñer as ‘the most dangerous Spanish 
war-monger’.58 It was clear to the ordinary worker and labourer that so long as this 
man held such power and aligned Spain with the Axis, their lives would remain ones 
of abject misery. 
As December approached and with it one of the coldest  winters in living 
memory,  there appeared no visible sign of any waning in Franco’s confidence in 
Súñer and so his star continued to be in the ascent. Kerney noted that anyone who 
tried to oust Súñer or fell foul of his wrath was quickly dismissed by the Caudillo. 
He provided Dublin with past examples to illustrate this. The former Minister for 
Education,  Pedro Sainz Rodríguez,  had been dismissed from office and sent into 
exile allegedly for his pro-Monarchist tendencies but more likely it was purported on 
the direct advice of Súñer. Franco’s own brother, Nicolás, had been removed as his 
right-hand man and banished ‘as Ambassador to Portugal’ by Súñer, who knew that 
close  and  constant  access  to  the  Caudillo meant  power  retention,  influence  and 
continuity in office.59 General Queipo de Llano, a prominent commander, was under 
constant  surveillance  after  he  spoke  disparagingly  about  Súñer  and  subsequent 
doubts about his loyalty to the regime surfaced. Kerney prophesised that Beigbeder 
would be the next to go as he was reliably informed that Súñer had ambitions of 
replacing him as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He believed Beigbeder would follow 
the same path as the others ‘who went down before him’ because Súñer would use 
any  means  to  be  rid  of  a  potential  rival.60 Beigbeder  enjoyed  Franco’s  support 
because both men were Africanistas whose careers had been shaped by their combat 
service in Spanish Morocco but the Irish Minister was aware of Beigbeder’s extra-
marital affairs. Like everyone in the upper echelons of the regime, Franco was a 
57 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 9 Nov. 1939 (ibid.). 
58 Denis Smyth,  Diplomacy and strategy of survival: British policy and Franco’s Spain, 1940-41  
(Cambridge, 1986), p. 76. 
59 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 15 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
60 Ibid.
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devout Catholic and any private infidelities involving sexual relations with another 
partner  outside  of  marriage  were  handled  in  a  caustic  manner.  Kerney believed 
Súñer would use this as evidence against Beigbeder when the opportune moment 
presented itself. 
On 14 November Ya carried an article of a speech delivered by the Minister 
for Agriculture, Joaquín Benjumea, the previous day in Seville.61 Benjumea was the 
first member of the Cabinet to outline a ten-year plan for economic development to 
drag Spain out of its present morass. He wanted the State to act as the prime mover 
in industrialisation, but unlike his Falangist colleagues he was not averse to allowing 
foreign direct investment into the economy. The speech was dismissed by Kerney as 
an unrealistic expectation. He had a high-level contact ‘close to one of the Cabinet 
Ministers’  who  provided  him  with  confidential  information.62 Kerney’s  reports 
validate  Paul  Preston’s  examination  of  Spain’s  economic  problems.63 Firstly,  the 
State had begun the ‘export of oranges from Valencia’ and bananas from the Canary 
Islands abroad at a time when famine,  malnutrition and disease were widespread 
throughout the country.64 Everywhere, he was informed, people were suffering. In 
Bilbao,  a  coastal  city  with  access  to  fish  as  a  source  of  food,  the  people  were 
suffering  from  severe  ‘hunger’.65 In  Asturias  also  the  people  were  living  at 
subsistence level because the male population, which traditionally had worked in the 
mines,  was  all  ‘interned.’66 Within  the  Cabinet  Kerney’s  source  remarked  that 
dissent and anger was growing because of the paralysis prevailing across all sections 
of  the  economy and society.  The generals  were demanding ‘a  restoration  of  the 
Monarchy’.67 For the ordinary people and leading aristocrats in the regime the exiled 
king, Alfonso XIII, was perceived to be the one symbol of hope who could act as a 
lightning rod to help restore unity. 
But  Franco’s  grip  on  the  reigns  of  power  was  still  firm.  He delivered  a 
speech to the Madrid branch of the Falange where he harangued his loyal supporters 
61 Ya, 14 Nov. 1939. 
62 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 17 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
63 See Paul Preston, Franco (London, 2003), p. 344. 
64 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 17 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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by inflaming a spirit of revolutionary zeal in them: ‘We see before us the enemies: 
the liberal bourgeois, the marxist and masonic party’.68 Franco attempted to utilise 
this fervour for the implementation of a completely fascist State, implementing its 
national-syndical  revolution whilst silencing those who advocated a return of the 
Monarchy.  He cunningly exhumed the body of the founder of the Falange Party, 
José Antonio Primo de Rivera, and in a torch light procession placed his body in the 
Escorial  –  the  historical  burial  place  of  Spain’s  kings.  No  greater  symbol  of 
complete  power could better  illustrate  his determination to remain in office.  The 
whole  quasi-religious  ceremony  portrayed  Franco  as  the  historical  heir  to  José 
Antonio and the kings. He imbued them with a sense of righteousness in their cause 
and in the path he wanted Spain to go down. That this metaphorical path had to be 
first  cleared  of  obstacles  such  as  enemies  of  the  State  was  inevitable.  The  end 
justified the means. 
The  small Irish colony in Madrid did its best for the poor that winter. The 
Loreto Sisters had a convent in the city and were frequently in contact with Kerney 
concerning their  work.  But  their  charitable  work was handicapped by the severe 
‘hardship’ they were experiencing.69 Coal was impossible to come by, which left the 
building  ‘unheated’.70 These  were  not  ideal  conditions  to  be  carrying  out 
humanitarian work, especially when the temperature was ‘below freezing-point’.71 
Their supplies of provisions were also running low. Even Kerney had just enough 
coal to keep his family warm for the winter. The Legation car was nearly stolen by a 
group of soldiers and break-ins were occurring in many wealthy households as the 
severe socio-economic plight forced people to resort to extreme measures to survive. 
To restore order a German Consul official informed Kerney that the Falange was in 
contact with the Gestapo to carry out surveillance on any criminal activity ‘based on 
Nazi  methods’.72 Every  communal  apartment  block  had  a  spy  who  monitored 
everyone and reported back their findings on their activities.
68 Ya, 21 Nov. 1939. 
69 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 27 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
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Kerney was woken nearly every night by the sound of gunfire throughout the 
capital: ‘I heard three volleys at short intervals, one for each batch I suppose.’73 The 
Irish public was completely unaware of what was really happening in Spain. Ireland 
had  no foreign  correspondent  on the  continent  and  de  Valera’s  strict  censorship 
policy meant that nobody could learn about the terrible scale of the crimes. It is clear 
that Kerney privately abhorred the regime. Yet he was in the minority from an Irish 
perspective. Religion was the main unifying link between Ireland and Spain and the 
Catholic Church spoke for both peoples on all moral grounds. If one accepts this 
premise then the views of Fr Mulrean are indicative of right-wing, Catholic Ireland’s 
viewpoint on Francoist Spain. He worked in Madrid, had survived the Civil War and 
witnessed  the  early  months  of  Franco’s  repression.  He imparted  his  opinions  to 
Kerney concerning  the  state  of  Spain.  One  could  be  forgiven  for  confusing  his 
Christian outlook with a Falangist one: ‘masonic influences were more predominant 
than ever before’, he declared.74 
On New Year’s Eve Franco delivered a radio broadcast  to the nation  that 
articulated his vision of where Spain was heading. He spoke to the ‘Spanish’ people 
but not to all  Spaniards because there were still  many anti-Spanish elements that 
were infiltrating themselves into society and public life, thereby disguising their real 
character, he alleged.75 These enemies had to be unmasked and with the full support 
of true Spaniards they would be: ‘the success of our resurrection rests on an army, a 
navy and an air  force endorsing our geographical  situation and guaranteeing our 
liberties  and  our  right’.76 Franco did  admit  that  there  were  many failings  in  the 
economy  but  he  had  confidence  in  the  people’s  ability  to  suffer  through  the 
privations. Spain’s problems were infinitely less than Russia’s, he argued. Kerney 
summarised the speech as a pro-fascist one aimed at pleasing the New Order and its 
tone intricately identified the regime with its ‘German friends’ and ‘beloved Italy’.77 
He highlighted Franco’s attack on the ‘worthless and wicked democratic,  liberal, 
masonic and Jewish enemies’ of Europe which would have been well-received in 
73 Kerney to _____, 27 Nov. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
74 Private conversation between Kerney and Fr Mulrean, 19 Dec. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2). 
75 Speech delivered by General Franco to the Spanish people, 31 Dec. 1939 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
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Nazi  Germany,  a  nation  that  likewise  seethed  with  prejudice  against  these 
elements.78  
January-September, 1940
Throughout the  spring of 1940 the world watched with eager anticipation to see 
where the next major combat engagement would be between the Allies and Nazi 
Germany.  Most believed that Hitler would soon go on the offensive to break the 
‘Phoney War’ stalemate between the opposing powers.  In Spain,  meanwhile,  the 
Diplomatic Corps used occasions such as the annual New Year banquet to monitor 
and observe any signs indicating Franco’s preference for one belligerent over the 
other. On 6 January they watched senior officials and civil servants of the State file 
past the Caudillo who acknowledged their presence by extending his right arm in a 
fascist salute. It was clear to the Irish Minister that the upper echelons of the regime 
were  exceedingly  confident  in  Germany’s  military  superiority  over  the  Allies 
because both the German and Italian  Ambassadors  were given preference  in the 
seating arrangements at the banquet by being seated closer to Franco. This afforded 
them the  privilege  of  direct  access  to  him to  engage  in  lengthy  conversation,  a 
courtesy not extended to their British and French diplomatic counterparts. Kerney 
reported that he had a brief  conversation with Súñer at  the banquet  and that the 
Minister for the Interior had extended an invitation to him for a further discussion at 
a later stage. Kerney noted that Súñer’s seating position at Franco’s right-hand side 
signalled the latter’s continued confidence in him as well as the regime’s orientation 
towards the New Order in Europe.  
Kerney produced further evidence to illustrate Spain’s close relationship with 
the Axis. He was given to understand that ‘there are 4 Germans in charge of the 
censorship of letters leaving or entering Spain.’79 Although he had formed the view 
that Beigbeder was distinctly pro-Allied in sentiment and if removed from office by 
Súñer it could open the way to Spain’s active participation in the war, he noted that 
the  German  Ambassador,  Eberhard  von  Stohrer,  had  bestowed  on  Beigbeder  a 
78 Ibid. 
79 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 15 Jan. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
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Führer decoration.80 The Irish Minister was not to know at the time that one of the 
reasons why Beigbeder had been awarded such a decoration was that both he and his 
Under-Secretary,  Juan Peche, were secretly handing over reports from diplomatic 
representatives  abroad  to  Stohrer.81 The  reports  by  the  Spanish  Ambassador  in 
London, the Duke of Alba, were the most sought after material by the Germans. In 
addition,  the regime had been constructing fortifications and military installations 
along the Franco-Spanish frontier for many months. These emplacements were not 
designed  to  defend  neutrality  but  rather  to  antagonise  France.  Franco-Spanish 
relations  were extremely acrimonious  because of French support  for the Spanish 
Republic  during the Civil  War,  the  safe  harbouring  of  thousands of  exiles,  who 
many  perceived  as  enemies  of  the  State,  in  southern  France  and  controversies 
between both Governments over money. Franco and his generals approved regular 
army manoeuvres in Spanish Morocco as a projection of both military power and 
their  political  determination  to  carve  out  an  African  empire  in  North  Africa  at 
France’s expense. These sizeable military manoeuvres significantly helped Hitler by 
diverting large numbers of French military and aviation divisions from the mainland 
to Morocco prior to the German invasion of France in May 1940.82 
No one’s survival was more commented on within the Diplomatic Corps than 
that of the man most identified with holding the real levers of power: Serrano Súñer. 
The higher up Súñer rose in the regime the more identified Franco became with him. 
The public perception, which was never allowed to be openly expressed, was that 
Franco relied heavily on Súñer for advice. Kerney believed that if one of them were 
to  fall  from power the other  would most  likely  fall  as  well.  It  was  increasingly 
difficult for Franco to become disassociated from the repression being orchestrated 
by  his  brother-in-law.  On  5  February  Kerney  reported  that  a  female  servant 
employed by the Norwegian Minister had been arrested in the dead of night in the 
Norwegian Legation.  Such a  violation  of  Norwegian sovereignty could not  have 
80 He also bestowed similar awards on twenty-one generals, ten admirals and vice-admirals of the 
regime. 
81 See Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945, series d,  viii, the war years, September 4,  
1939-March 18, 1940 (London, 1954), pp.324-5, 19 Oct. 1939.  
82 For a good account of Franco’s imperial aspirations in North Africa see Gustau Negrín & Alfred 
Bosch, El imperio que nunca existió (Barcelona, 2001). 
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been authorised without Franco’s prior consent. The Diplomatic Corps viewed such 
a  flagrant  infringement  and  violation  of  internationally  respected  protocol  with 
extreme misgiving. That same day Kerney estimated that the numbers reported daily 
in the press for alleged crimes against the State varied ‘from 10 to about 40; the true 
figure would seem to be higher.’83 These statistics did not include those who were 
already detained, who numbered in the thousands. 
Many of  the  State’s  violations  of  basic  rights  were  enshrined  in  law  by 
Franco’s signature. One such law was the ‘Law of Land Colonisation and Agrarian 
Reform’,  which  he  signed  on  25  January.  This  law  supported  a  basic  tenet  of 
Falangism – the right of the State to expropriate land for the better good. Ostensibly 
the law was designed to allow State authorities to acquire and cultivate unproductive 
land with the aim of using it for agrarian production. The reality was rather different, 
as the arbitrary application of the law meant that  many people who owned land, 
whether  of  sizeable  acreage  or  not,  could  be  liable  to  have  their  property 
expropriated without any legal recourse to a court. The land was then handed over to 
those who had proven their martial  honour in the service of Francoist Spain: ‘ex 
soldiers [sic]’ and ‘widows and children of ex-soldiers who died for Spain or who 
were victims of the red persecutions’.84 What happened to the widows and orphans 
who suffered as a direct result of this seizure of their property was not a concern to 
Franco or his lawmakers. This was their just atonement for having supported Red 
Spain. 
On 25 March Kerney recalled that from 10.30 till 11.30 p.m. ‘I listened to 
almost continuous shooting which began not far from the Legation’.85 This was yet 
another report which clearly highlighted the chaotic state of the nation. However, 
what makes this period unique in the Minister’s reportage on events is that he used a 
visual  source  for  the  first  time.  Visual  imagery  can  be  an  emotive  medium  to 
transmit the reality of a situation better than words or a written account and inside 
the confidential file for this period is a photograph that Kerney had acquired from 
Ocaña prison. The man in the centre of the photograph was Julián Besteiro, a former 
83 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 5 Feb. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 25 Mar. 1940 (ibid.).  
117
Professor of Law and veteran Socialist leader of the P.S.O.E. party.86 He had played 
a prominent role in the surrender of Madrid, which had limited Franco’s vengeance 
upon the defeated and prevented any more unnecessary bloodshed. Upon arrest he 
was quickly sentenced to life imprisonment and the photograph clearly shows the 
impact that prison life had on his health. Tired, gaunt and withdrawn, the photograph 
conveys  Besteiro’s  impending  death.  Another  aspect  of  the  photograph  that  is 
striking is the impact of its colour. Besteiro is dressed in a greyish suit whilst all 
around him are men dressed in black. These men, over forty of them, young and old, 
are ‘mostly Basque’ priests who are still dressed in their cassocks.87 The inevitable 
questions that arise for the viewer are: Why were these men of the cloth in prison? 
Why did the Spanish hierarchy not demand their immediate release nearly a year on 
from the end of the Civil War? What did the most senior officials in External Affairs 
make of the arrest of priests? What would Catholic Ireland have thought if it had 
been  shown  this  photograph?  It  seemed  that  this  photograph  illustrates  the 
pragmatism that de Valera and Walshe exercised over Irish foreign policy in relation 
to Spain – some things were better left unanswered. 
An indication of Dublin’s attitude towards the Basques was displayed by a 
request Walshe made to Kerney.88 The Secretary said that de Valera wanted Kerney 
to  concentrate  more  of his  time on raising the issue of  partition  with influential 
Spaniards by emphasising Ireland’s just grievance against such a flagrant violation 
of its territorial integrity. The whole project was intended to stimulate ‘sympathy in 
Spain for the unity of Ireland’, Walshe contended.89 De Valera’s specific instruction 
was that all diplomats accredited to neutral States should use their connections with 
the editors and owners of newspapers to get articles published on partition. Spain 
was an obviously important post given both nations’ shared experience with Britain. 
Walshe suggested – ‘Could you yourself not write occasional paragraphs or columns 
on  the  unity  issue,  taking  care  to  make  them as  international  and  as  unlike  the 
86 P.S.O.E. Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles had formed part of the Republican Government. 
The party was banned until Franco’s death. 
87 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 11 Mar. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
88 Joseph Walshe to Kerney, 12 Apr. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 5/4). 
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Basque parallel  as  possible?’90 Dublin  clearly  did not  want  to  irk  the regime by 
mentioning  the historical  legacy of the Basque people,  which ran contrary to  its 
efforts to impose unity by force. Kerney summed up the whole project in a marginal 
note he wrote: ‘Does he take me for a fool?’91 
 Of more significance for the Irish Minister’s time was the continued socio-
economic decline of the country. He noted that trade negotiations between Britain 
and  Spain  were  still  ongoing,  seventeen  weeks  after  they  had  commenced.  The 
nation simply could not wait for such delays as there was ‘starvation in many parts 
of  Spain’,  he  recorded.92 He  believed  that  Franco’s  ‘foreign  policy,  which  is 
essentially totalitarian and anti-democratic’ and his constant public acclamation of 
Germany, was not conducive to promoting good Anglo-Spanish relations,93 a view 
that  backs  up  Denis  Smyth’s  remark  that  the  dictator  engaged  in  ‘maladroit 
diplomacy’.94 Britain and the Commonwealth could supply Spain with wheat at a 
time when Kerney reported that ‘there is a shortage of bread and other foodstuffs’ 
everywhere.95 The country had limited fuel stocks as well, which was exacerbated by 
the ‘lack of transport facilities’  in the distribution of essential  foodstuffs.96 Súñer 
publicly acknowledged that the nation also had insufficient stocks of fertiliser with 
which  to  increase  productivity.  In  his  memoirs  Súñer  stated  that  he  had  always 
championed  ‘credit  and  acquired  foreign  commerce’  to  help  ameliorate  the 
economic plight of the people,97 yet  at that time, speaking to a mass gathering in 
Valencia  before  the  Syndical  Federation  of  Farmers  and  Rice  Growers,98 he 
nonchalantly  declared  that  the  people  ‘will  all  have  to  suffer’  but  that  the 
Government would not import bread ‘that would not be from our nation’.99 He still 
maintained  that  an  ordered  and  equitable  distribution  of  food  together  with  a 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Note from Kerney to the Department of External Affairs (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
93 Kerney to _____, 20 Mar. 1940 (ibid.).
94 Denis  Smyth,  ‘Franco  and the Allies  in the Second World War’  in  Sebastian Balfour  & Paul 
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95 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 20 Mar. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A). 
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97 R. S. Súñer, Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar (Madrid, 1947), p. 88.  
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clamping down on the black market would maintain the nation’s well-being, albeit at 
a subsistence level.100 
Throughout  April  Kerney  concentrated  on  military  matters  as  Hitler’s 
successful  invasion  of  Denmark  and  Norway  on  9  April  1940  highlighted 
Germany’s  ability  to  project  power  over  sea.  Rumour  abounded  in  Madrid  that 
Mussolini  would soon join in the war to reap some of the spoils before the war 
ended. Many contended that if Mussolini joined Hitler’s war then surely so would 
Franco. Kerney did not agree with this viewpoint: ‘to go to war before the balance 
weighs more heavily in favour of the axis [sic] Powers would be suicidal’.101 This 
was a remarkable judgement given the scant availability of reliable information at 
the time and it demonstrates his skilful ability to make sound judgements time and 
again. In relation to Portugal, Súñer would later say that the regime always respected 
‘the  unquestionable  independence  of  Portugal’102 yet  with  Germany  rampant 
throughout  Europe  and Italy  also  clamouring  for  territorial  acquisition,  the  Irish 
Minister was aware, through a confidential informant in the military, that Franco’s 
eyes were turning towards Portugal as an easy prize: ‘I hear that there are 3 army 
corps [about 90,000] men stationed near the Portuguese frontier’,103 a fact verified in 
recent scholarly investigations.104 Like most of the Diplomatic Corps, he was well 
aware that Portugal’s close association with Britain contrasted sharply with Spain’s 
preference for the Axis: ‘the Portuguese press reflects a very pro-ally neutrality, just 
as the Spanish press is decidedly pro-German and pro-Italian in tone’.105
It was not just in Portugal that the regime looked to as areas for possible 
territorial expansion should it enter the war. In Gibraltar Franco dreamed of being 
immortalised as the man who would lead the successful  assault  on the Rock. In 
southern  France  the  regime  planned  a  military  offensive  to  annex  Andorra, 
Perpignan, Béziers, Montpellier, Nimes, Marseilles and Toulon. In all, five offensive 
military plans were drawn up by the Spanish High Command. In Oran and French 
100 Ibid. 
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Morocco too the  Caudillo  believed he could carve out an empire.  The period of 
Hitler’s supreme ascendancy in the war was approaching and with it the beginning 
of Franco’s enticement into the war.  
On  10 May  1940  Operation  Yellow was  implemented  –  the  invasion  of 
France. The full might of Germany’s military and industrial complex brought victory 
to  Hitler  in  a  matter  of  weeks.  The  swiftness  and  complete  superiority  of  the 
Wehrmacht over the Allies reinforced many peoples’ convictions that the map of 
Europe was changing irrevocably. The Spanish Ambassador to France, José Félix de 
Lequerica, had done everything in his power to assist the Germans by persuading 
senior officials in the French Government to implement peace negotiations. He was 
also aware that his lengthy and detailed reports on the collapse of morale behind the 
front  were  being  monitored  by  Franco  and  then  handed  to  the  Germans  by 
Beigbeder. In Ireland, de Valera had spoken to the nation at the onset of the invasion 
to  warn the people that  Ireland could consider  itself  within  the  war’s  theatre  of 
operations and that the most critical time in the life of the nation was approaching. 
He even rejected the British offer to accept the principle of a united Ireland in favour 
of  upholding  neutrality.  By  contrast,  Franco  used  the  occasion  of  France’s 
impending collapse to abandon neutrality and order the first, and only, successful 
Spanish territorial annexation of the war. 
On 12 June Franco declared Spain’s official position in the war to be that of 
non-belligerency.106 The  ostensible  reason  for  abandoning  neutrality  was  the 
extension of the war to the Mediterranean. This significant volte-face was in reality 
pre-belligerency  and  one  step  short  of  outright  participation  in  the  war.  Franco 
would not  have declared  non-belligerency unless  he  was absolutely confident  in 
Germany’s ability to defeat the Allies. After the war Francoist apologists in their 
rewriting  of  history would argue that  because  Spain shared a  border  with Nazi-
occupied  France,  this  necessitated  Franco  abandoning  neutrality  to  mitigate  the 
likelihood of invasion.  But  a close examination  of the neutral  camp at  that  time 
shows his actions to be completely unilateral and not in keeping with the conduct of 
other neutral States. Switzerland, for example, shared a border with Nazi-occupied 
106 On 10 June Mussolini declared war on Britain and France. 
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France, Germany, and Italy. It could have been invaded from three different points. 
It  remained neutral.  Ireland also maintained  its  commitment  to  the neutral  camp 
despite the proximity of the war, especially now that the island was in close range 
from aerial  attack  by the  Luftwaffe.  At  the  time  of  Franco’s  declaration  Kerney 
stated that ‘Spain is definitely committed to the “new order”, championed by Japan, 
Germany  and  Italy’.107 The  general  viewpoint  throughout  the  country  was  that 
Germany was going to win the war and Franco was ready to join the Axis alliance. 
This perception is supported by Christian Leitz who argued that Franco took Tangier 
solely on his ‘own initiative’ believing the Axis would win the war.108
On 14 June, the day German troops marched into Paris, Franco authorised 
Colonel Yuste and his contingent of Moroccan troops to march into the international 
zone of Tangier. Spain was now in control of a strategically vital access route to the 
Mediterranean.  The  Royal  Navy  and  Merchant  Marine  had  to  ship  most  of  the 
supplies  of war materiel  destined for the 8th Army in Egypt  and the resupply of 
Gibraltar and Malta through the narrow Straits. At its narrowest point the shortest 
distance between the tip of Spain and North Africa is less than fifteen kilometres and 
any long-distance guns could sink vessels passing through the Straits. That Franco 
authorised such a controversial decision placed his nation in a perilous position if 
Britain  were  to  blockade  Spain  in  retaliation.  On that  same  day Súñer  used  the 
inauguration  of  an  exposition  on  national  reconstruction  to  declare  that  ‘the 
deplorable economic situation’ of the country was less important now than the re-
launching of Spain as a Mediterranean power.109 He informed those present that as 
he  spoke  the  army  was  marching  into  the  ‘international  zone  of  Tangier’  to 
‘maintain  order’  but  also  to  ensure  its  long  term  ‘incorporation  into  Spanish 
geography.’110 The regime’s imperial ambitions clearly overrode reconstruction and 
there was nothing the ordinary people could do about it.  
Irish  newspapers  devoted  little  coverage  to  the  acquisition  of  Tangier 
because of strict censorship but it would have been viewed as a further indication of 
107 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 13 June 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A).  
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Franco’s  alignment  with  the  Axis  against  the  one  remaining  liberal  democracy, 
Britain. In the Falangist press Manuel Aznar, a prominent journalist, wrote several 
articles  in  Arriba in  June advocating  an  immediate  action  against  Gibraltar.  He 
argued that Britain was weak and demoralised and that no better time existed to keep 
the momentum of Spain’s imperial ambitions alive. But an attack on Gibraltar would 
have been difficult. Since May the British had begun evacuating civilians from the 
area and had started digging into the Rock to use it as a fortress. On 3 July the Royal 
Navy  attacked  the  French  fleet  moored  at  Mers-el-Kébir.  It  showed  the  world 
Britain’s  military  capabilities  and  was  Churchill’s  definitive  rejection  of  Hitler’s 
peace offer.
Rumour  and  gossip  were  rife  throughout  Madrid  concerning  Franco’s 
intrigues with Hitler and Mussolini. Kerney sent a telegram estimating that ‘Spain’s 
entry into war appears to be imminent.’111 For the first time, Dublin began to see the 
true gravity concerning the implications of Kerney’s reports because if Spain entered 
the war it could potentially decide the fate of the Mediterranean theatre in favour of 
the Axis. The Diplomatic Corps in Madrid began to prepare for a swift evacuation 
because entry into the war would exacerbate the economic situation to such a degree 
that food supplies would become completely unobtainable. A senior official from 
Washington informed the Irish Minister that he was aware that ‘Spain, backed by 
Germany,  will  occupy  Portugal.  The  wives  of  American  diplomats  and  other 
American women here are being sent home.’112 Kerney became concerned that if 
Spain did enter the war the welfare of Irish citizens in the country could be placed in 
jeopardy if starvation threatened.113 If other missions decided to leave and the Irish 
Legation  remained  it  could  be  overwhelmed  with  requests  for  assistance.  The 
Assistant Secretary, Frederick Boland, advised him that these preliminary concerns 
of his were of little consequence because he was ordered to aid only Irish citizens in 
distress and no others.  
The  Department  operated  a  slimline  structure  vis-à-vis communications 
between Madrid and Dublin: reports were composed at a technical level by Kerney, 
111 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 4 July 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P12/4). 
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reviewed  at  administrative  level  by  Boland  or  Walshe  and  then  handed  to  the 
political head, de Valera, for a decision. Secrecy was maintained by this close knit 
structure  which  restricted  the  number  of  people  who  knew  about  confidential 
information. In addition, all communications were coded. This structure had worked 
well up until now but the extension of the war to the West significantly delayed 
communications  to  such  a  degree  that  events  were  outrunning  initial  data 
predictions.  Furthermore,  the  likelihood  of  interception  of  messages  by  either 
belligerent  side  now  appeared  more  probable.  Walshe’s  concerns  to  maintain 
communications  at  a  prompt  and efficient  level  combined  with  his  concerns  for 
secrecy, is highlighted by the increased use of the term ‘Estero’114 in more and more 
direct  communications  with  Kerney,  known  as  ‘Hibernia’.  Dublin  had  finally 
awoken from its periodic inactiveness concerning Franco’s autocratic command over 
the nation and what this implied for the people. Both de Valera and Walshe were 
now more concerned with events in Spain and its wider implications then at any 
other time since the war began. 
It seemed to the Irish Minister that the direction of foreign policy was now in 
the hands of Franco’s brother-in-law. On 27 August he commented: ‘Serrano Súñer 
is  still  the  power  behind  the  throne.’115 Another  Minister  in  the  Cabinet,  Rafael 
Sánchez  Mazas,  felt  the  full  weight  of  Súñer’s  power.  Mazas  was  one  of  the 
Falange’s ideological experts and Minister Without Portfolio but like many before 
him who had trod on Súñer’s toes, he was dismissed from office. Kerney noted that 
the ‘number of Generals, Ministers and functionaries dismissed at Súñer’s bidding 
grows steadily’.116 Súñer  was  winning acclamation  in  Germany and Italy  for  his 
endeavours to promote Fascism in Spain and an example of this collaboration with 
the Axis was shown in his contemptuous refusal to allow a prominent Irishman to 
pass through Spain. 
Seán Lester was a peer of Kerney’s who had risen through the ranks of the 
External Affairs since joining in 1923.117 Lester, a former League of Nations High 
114 ‘Estero’ meant the Department of External Affairs. 
115 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 27 Aug. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2A).
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Commissioner in the Free City of Danzig from 1934 to 1937, had earned the wrath 
of Hitler for his refusal to bow to Nazi provocation and for courageously voicing his 
disapproval  of  German  discrimination  against  Jews.  His  anti-appeasement  stance 
and  determination  to  uphold  the  League’s  mandate  in  Danzig  ran  contrary  to 
convention  at  the  time.  He  was  appointed  Secretary  General  of  the  League  of 
Nations, a position he held until 1946.118 Living in Geneva Switzerland, he continued 
to champion the cause of peace and democracy in defiance of Hitler’s supremacy 
over Europe. When Lester applied for a visa to enter Spain, Kerney learned that ‘by 
secret order’ it had been refused.119 Only Súñer could have issued such an order.120 
Keeping Lester a virtual prisoner in Geneva would have pleased the Germans and 
the regime’s treatment of Lester moved Kerney to write that the behaviour of the 
Spanish security agencies was in keeping ‘with the orientation of Spain’s foreign 
policy,  which  is  anti-League  of  Nations,  anti-English  and  anti-democratic’.121 
Kerney’s judgement is corroborated by Paul Preston.122
Unlike  his  diplomatic  counterpart  in  Ireland,  Ontiveros,  Kerney  was  not 
indisposed  to  meeting  people  of  poorer  circumstances.  It  was  through  their 
testimony that he could gauge the true reality of life for the vast majority of people. 
After one such conversation he recorded that the food situation was worse now, in 
September  1940,  then  after  the  Civil  War  had  ended:  ‘the  shortage  of  essential 
foodstuffs is acute; the position in this respect is much worse than in the first months 
after the Civil War’.123 The head of one family of eleven informed him that he could 
only  provide  his  family  with  ‘unseasoned  “pimientos”  [peppers],  tomatoes  and 
grapes’.124 Most people could not avail  of ration cards as in most cases the food 
stocks were not there. Kerney could provide for his family by making regular trips to 
Portugal for all clothing and food commodities. This privilege was not possible for 
the average citizen as the movement of people was restricted by a permit system. In 
General of the League of Nations. 
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another conversation, he spoke to the Papal Nuncio who informed him that ‘without 
much exaggeration, they are dying of hunger in Spain.’125 Kerney also learned that 
the regime needed ‘600,000 tons of wheat’ to bridge the gap until the next harvest, 
and  this  would  still  only  provide  for  the  people  living  at  a  subsistence  level.126 
Incredible as it may seem with hindsight, Franco now decided to enter into high-
level contacts with Hitler to forge ahead with his aspirations for a new empire. 
In early September Franco prepared an official delegation to be sent to Berlin 
for  high-level  talks  with  Hitler  and  Ribbentrop.  The  mission  was  composed  of 
prominent Falangists.127 Súñer headed the delegation and acted as Franco’s personal 
envoy and speaker on all official matters. His selection over the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs,  Juan Beigbeder,  highlighted  his  indispensable  importance  in  the  eyes  of 
Franco. For Germany, the essential topics of discussion centred on the acceleration 
of Spain’s repayments on its debts through mineral and metal exports essential for 
its war economy. On 10 September, as the delegation was preparing to depart and 
just  three days  before the Italian  invasion of Egypt,  Franco further  signalled  his 
confidence  in  Axis  victory  by  personally  authorising  the  Spanish  Embassy  in 
London to prepare detailed reports on the bombing of factories, harbours and other 
industrial and infrastructural sites in London, the range and degree of destruction, its 
effect  on  public  morale  and  military  confidence.  All  this  information  was 
subsequently handed to the German Ambassador  in Madrid.  At a time when the 
Britain was fighting for its own survival, the preservation of freedom and Western 
civilisation  in  the Battle  of Britain,  its  heroic  efforts  were being undermined by 
active Spanish assistance to the Axis. How many died as a result is unquantifiable 
but  Ribbentrop  commented  satisfactorily  on  the  reports  content:  ‘the  Foreign 
Minister  spoke  of  the  Duke  of  Alba’s  reports  from London,  which  the  Spanish 
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Government  had kindly made available  to  him through the  German  Embassy in 
Madrid.’128
On  16  September  the  first  discussions  took  place  and  revolved  around 
Spain’s military and economic needs. For any assault on Gibraltar the army needed 
long-range guns, mortars, mobile coastal guns and anti-aircraft guns which Germany 
found difficult to supply. Economically, Spain’s requirements of gas, grain, diesel, 
oil, kerosene could also not be supplied by Germany. The following day Súñer met 
Ribbentrop for the first time and outlined Franco’s imperial aspirations with the aid 
of a map. He argued that the Caudillo wanted living space in Morocco to exploit its 
economic  resources  and then  turned to  Portugal  which he  stated  ‘geographically 
speaking Portugal really had no right to exist’.129 The regime wanted to overthrow 
centuries of Portuguese independence and turn the tide of history back to the time of 
the Catholic Kings. He finished outlining his ‘territorial claims’ by also highlighting 
Spain’s historical ownership over southern regions of France.130 For Germany, these 
demands infringed on its territorial ambitions in Morocco especially concerning the 
port of Agadir, Mogador and its hinterland. The German Navy wanted to use the 
Moroccan coast to extend the fighting range of its U-boats. Furthermore, Franco’s 
demands infringed on Mussolini’s ambitions to obtain Nice, Corsica and the French 
Riviera  region  for  his  own  imperial  glory  as  well  as  the  close  collaborative 
relationship Hitler was trying to forge with Vichy France. 
On the question of Gibraltar, Súñer replied that the regime ‘would be ready 
for the war the moment the installation’ of the ‘long-bore guns’ at Gibraltar was 
completed.131 For the honour and prestige of the regime the Spanish Army must lead 
the assault against the Rock, he contended. These high-level talks served to outline 
the parameters of a possible wartime partnership and Súñer followed up on these 
discussions by visiting Mussolini in Rome. On 22 September Franco wrote to Hitler 
expressing his gratitude and reiterated his unflinching adhesion to the New Order: 
‘my unchangeable and sincere adherence to you personally, to the German people, 
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and to the cause for which you fight. I hope, in defence of this cause, to be able to 
renew the old bonds of comradeship between our armies.’132 This letter by Franco 
was followed by a note sent to Stohrer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 27 
September conveying Spain’s ‘solidarity’ with the Axis and its acceptance to join 
the Tripartite Pact – the ten-year military alliance signed that day by Germany, Italy 
and Japan.133 
That the most senior officials of the regime were prepared to meet Hitler and 
discuss the forceful acquisition of territory from other nations at a time when their 
own country was suffering appallingly ran completely at odds with the professional 
conduct of the Irish Government. Although Ireland was not an autocratic State like 
Spain, it did exercise a greater control over the nation at that time than at any other 
time since and held deep historical resentment towards Britain. When the German 
Minister,  Eduard  Hempel,  raised  the  issue  of  supporting  Ireland  with  captured 
British weapons should the island be invaded, de Valera remained non-committal. 
Even though the German offer was made in principle the Taoiseach still refused to 
impinge on neutrality by being seen to favour one belligerent over the other. On 
another  occasion  he  personally  intervened  in  relation  to  the  controversial  radio 
transmitter in the German Legation. Ribbentrop had declared the transmitter to be of 
‘decisive importance’ if hostilities broke out but de Valera knew that its presence 
could  be  used  to  relay  weather  forecasts  over  the  Irish  Sea  to  Berlin  and 
consequently, ordered the transmitter to be placed in a bank vault for the remainder 
of the war.134 
The world watched with eager anticipation to see what the outcome of these 
important  talks  would  be  for  Spain’s  future. On  11  October  Walshe,  using  the 
pseudonym ‘Estero’, telegrammed Kerney wanting to know ‘day to day’ probable 
course  of  action.135 The  Irish  Minister  decided  to  make  an  appointment  with 
Beigbeder for the 15 October. Kerney admired Beigbeder’s honesty and openness, in 
132  Ibid. p. 155, 22 Sept. 1940.  
133 Ibid., p. 200. Article three of the pact declared that the signatories to the pact would ‘assist one 
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134 Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945, series d, xi, the war years, September 1, 1940-
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what transpired to be one of his last interviews with him. Beigbeder still defined the 
regime’s position as neutral but admitted ‘Spain wants Gibraltar and Morocco’.136 
He advocated a return to a stricter practice of neutrality as the course now being 
pursued seemed difficult, given the fact that ‘Italy has not succeeded anywhere.’137 It 
should have been obvious  to  the  upper  echelons  in  the  regime that  if  Italy  was 
struggling to hold its own in the war, a much weaker and debilitated Spain could not 
hope to fare much better, yet as Denis Smyth has shown, there is a ‘substantial body 
of evidence to suggest that Franco was seriously considering entry into the war’ at 
this time.138 Beigbeder expressed the view that Germany had lost its chance to defeat 
Britain and unless the Spanish Army received sizeable armament supplies it could 
not enter the war of its own accord. In all of his declarations he confided that he had 
the support of fellow Anglophiles in the Cabinet, especially the Minister for Industry 
and Commerce, Luis Alarcón de la Lastra. Kerney summed up his own impressions 
to Walshe:
It is my personal view that ambitions in Africa will involve participation in 
war and attack on Gibraltar if opportune moment arrives. Suner [sic] favours 
war and big decisions would probably be imminent if he became Minister for 
Foreign Affairs  but at  the moment  Beigbeder  appears  more confident  of  
holding his appointment.139  
On 17 October both Beigbeder and Lastra were dismissed from office and replaced 
by prominent Falangists. The man Franco chose to replace Beigbeder was Súñer. 
The cuñadísimo now held the posts of Foreign Affairs, Interior and President of the 
Executive  Committee  of  the Falange.  He also controlled  through his  network of 
colleagues  the  press,  radio  and,  ironically,  the  tourist  office.  That  very  day  he 
delivered a long diatribe inside the Palacio de Santa Cruz, seat of the Ministry of 
Foreign  Affairs,  to  an  assembled  multitude.  His  forceful  and  bitter  attack  on 
136 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 16 Oct. 1940 (ibid.). 
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traditional  diplomacy  resounded  throughout  the  palace:  ‘I  have  no  respect  for 
“professionalism”’,  he declared.140 His  lack  of  esteem for  professional  diplomats 
centred on a belief he had forged which envisaged a new type of diplomat – one who 
would be enthused with the spirit of the Falange and represent the nation abroad as a 
prototype fascist official. He looked upon his appointment as a further acceptance by 
the regime of its closer commitment to the Axis. The Ministry should therefore be a 
window to the world where the international community could look in and see the 
spirit  and essence of Falangism: ‘the concepts,  the intentions,  the shouts and the 
ways  of our national  revolution  will  be known and wanted by the civil  servants 
here’.141 It was inevitable, he contended, that the Falange ‘will be from this moment 
an element of consideration in the diplomatic life of Spain.’142 Súñer’s speech laid 
down the gauntlet to the more traditional and conservative minded officials in the 
Ministry.  He would not tolerate “archaic” diplomatic practices. He would enforce 
the party’s authoritative principles on them. The speech concluded with a rallying 
cry: ‘yell the heroic shout…Up Spain!’143
Many in the Diplomatic Corps viewed Súñer’s appointment  with extreme 
unease. Kerney commented that the Falange now ‘controls position externally and 
internally’  with  Súñer  acting  as  the  lynchpin  holding  the  entire  State  structure 
together.144 The regime’s zealous support for the Axis was visibly displayed after the 
Chief of Police, the Count of Mayalde, extended an invitation to Heinrich Himmler 
to  be an official  guest  of the State.  Himmler  arrived on the 19 October  and the 
regime made sure that the capital was adorned with the Nazi swastika.145 Everywhere 
the  Gestapo  chief  went  he  was  warmly  received  with  a  raised  salute  and 
acclamations of support for Hitler. But despite this imposing atmosphere the Irish 
Minister  demonstrated his  skill  as  a professional  diplomat  by seeing through the 
façade and into the reality of the political situation. He advised Dublin that Franco 
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and Súñer would run into problems with Mussolini over Africa and that the army 
would not sit idly by for much longer and allow the Falange a free ride to direct the 
fortunes of the nation.146 
On 23 October 1940 Franco made one of his rare trips outside of Spain. His 
destination was the railway station of Hendaye,  just  north of the Franco-Spanish 
border.147 There he finally met his political hero, whose successes on the battlefield 
of Europe against the liberal democracies would inevitably, he believed, ensure the 
pre-eminence of Fascism and Spain’s great chance to join in the quest for imperial 
glory. Photographs and newsreels showed a beaming Caudillo warmly shaking the 
hand of Adolf Hitler – the man whose signed photograph stood proudly on his desk. 
Hitler  knew through reports  from the  German  Ambassador  von Stohrer  and  the 
Abwehr chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, that militarily and economically Spain was 
not ready for the war and so Spanish entry was not ‘an urgent priority’ for him.148 
Germany did not want to shoulder another weak ally and Franco’s non-belligerency 
was of greater assistance to the Axis than active participation in the war. Spain’s 
proposed empire also ran contrary to Hitler’s geopolitical strategy which hoped to 
accommodate Vichy France and Italy once victory had been achieved. It was Súñer 
who signed the secret protocol of Hendaye on behalf of Spain. In accordance with 
the Tripartite Pact, Spain agreed to ‘intervene in the present war of the Axis Powers 
against  England’  once  its  military  preparedness  was  sufficient  to  fulfil  this 
obligation.149 Germany agreed to help Spain economically and to recognise Spanish 
territorial claims over Gibraltar and North Africa, but only ‘in principle’ and after 
France and Italy were compensated.150 
 On 3 December Kerney met Súñer to discuss Spain’s position in the war. He 
could not have known about the precise content of the German-Spanish secret high-
level talks at Hendaye but he was observant enough to record that the previous day 
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an Abwehr agent named ‘Weidner’ had been in to see Súñer.151 He also noted that 
the  British  Ambassador  Sir  Samuel  Hoare  had  been  calling  on  the  Ministry 
repeatedly to ascertain  what Spain had committed to at  Hendaye.  It was clear to 
Kerney from the brief relaxation in the anti-British campaign in the press that Súñer 
feared an embargo on Spain and rumour had reached his attention that: ‘American 
loan sought as food shortages becomes more acute, conditional on Spain not joining 
Axis’.152 If the regime stayed out of the war it meant continued food supplies and 
survival; if it went into the war it meant economic and possibly political collapse for 
dreams of a bygone age of empire. 
At their first official meeting Kerney broached the topic of Spain’s official 
position in the war but was informed by Súñer that a wait-and-see policy was being 
adopted and he was disinclined to divulge any specific or classified information on 
this  occasion.  The  Irish  Minister  was  aware  of  Súñer’s  disdainful  and  rather 
idiosyncratic approach to normal diplomatic protocol and so changed the topic to 
Ulster  and  an  explanation  of  its  present  day  importance  to  Ireland.  Súñer  was 
pleasant and cordial at the meeting and enjoyed the religious affinity that existed 
between  both  nations.  Using  the  pretext  of  religion,  Kerney  then  shifted  the 
conversation to Ireland’s experience after its Civil War. He outlined Ireland’s path to 
reconciliation initiated by de Valera whose ‘subsequent efforts to reunite our divided 
forces’ had healed many deep wounds in the body politic.153 De Valera had adopted 
a ‘non-victimisation’ policy towards his political  opponents which had been ‘far-
sighted’ at the time, Kerney argued.154 This measure had stabilised the nation and 
now all grievances were aired and resolved within a national parliament and not by 
the use of force. The inference was clear: Spain should use the example of Ireland 
combined with its Christian faith to heal and bind the nation’s wounds. Súñer was 
touched by Kerney’s kindness but his mind was driven by a political ideology that 
overrode all other considerations including his nation’s urgent need for peace. Just 
two days later the German Ambassador sent a ‘Top Secret’ message to Berlin: 
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In reply to the request made by the Embassy in accordance with instructions, 
the Foreign Minister has now stated that the Spanish Government has agreed 
to the disposition of German tankers in remote bays along the Spanish coasts 
for refuelling German destroyers. The Foreign Minister strongly urged that 
the utmost discretion be observed in carrying out these operations.155
January-December  , 1941  
Throughout January and February 1941 the Spanish people lived on their nerves not 
knowing whether Franco would plunge the nation into another war, given as Denis 
Smyth has demonstrated, the dictator’s ‘inept statecraft.’156 The time was never more 
optimal for Germany to launch an attack against Gibraltar with Britain isolated and 
on the defensive. But despite these predictions Kerney still believed that the military 
would step into the picture to undermine both Franco and Súñer’s imperial plans. 
The economy had reached a perilous nadir and without Allied shipments of food, 
which the Axis could not supply, Kerney believed the nation would collapse. On 21 
January  he  informed  Walshe:  ‘Starvation  Spain’s  biggest  problem  and  gravest 
danger is accentuated by incompetent administration and corruption.’157 The Irish 
Minister followed up on this viewpoint by meeting senior officials in the regime. 
He reported on a conversation he had with the Falangist Minister Without 
Portfolio,  Pedro  Gamero  del  Castillo.  Castillo  was  also  Vice-President  of  the 
Falange Executive Committee and one of Súñer’s closest associates. In his opinion 
the rumours circulating everywhere concerning the ‘German desire to enter Spain 
and close the Straits of Gibraltar’  highlighted the renewal of Spain under Franco 
who had now made the nation the focus of the world’s attention.158 Castillo informed 
Kerney that ‘he expects the war to end this year’  with complete Axis triumph.159 
Despite Castillo’s senior position in the regime, if the military chose to intervene on 
155 Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945, series d, xi, the war years, September 1, 1940-
January 31, 1941 (London, 1961), p. 788, 5 Dec. 1940.  
156 Denis Smyth,  ‘Franco and the Allies in the Second World War’ in Sebastian Balfour & Paul 
Preston (eds), Spain and the great powers in the twentieth century (London, 1999), p. 204. 
157 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 21 Jan. 1941 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P12/4). 
158 Kerney to _____, 10 Feb. 1941 (ibid.). 
159 Ibid. 
133
the political  scene the Irish Minister  believed it  would sweep the Falange out of 
office. On 12 February Kerney went to the Ministry of War to speak with General 
Varela’s deputy. The military’s viewpoint was completely divergent to what senior 
officials in the Falange were saying. Kerney was informed that an attack even by 
German troops on Gibraltar would be ‘foolhardy’ under the present ‘conditions of 
food and transport’.160 He judged that deep tensions existed between the Falange and 
army and he foresaw an inevitable clash between both sides which could decide the 
future of Spain. 
At this time too the effects of malnutrition and poverty combined with the 
poor sanitary conditions that most people lived in lead to a spread of new diseases. 
State statistics, which were always manipulated, recorded that in the first quarter of 
1941 the provincial cities of the country recorded 898 deaths from typhoid, 471 from 
chicken  pox,  1,578  from  tuberculosis  and  8,375  from  influenza.161 A  purported 
carrier of some diseases was released prisoners who were never deloused once they 
had been let out of prison. Kerney was aware that typhus in Madrid was so difficult 
to control because at least a quarter of Madrid’s populace was ‘verminous.’162 These 
diseases were contagious and the authorities forbade any tramps from entering the 
metro, buses, trams and cinemas. A doctor told Kerney that the ‘daily average at the 
moment is 50’ of reported cases of typhoid in Madrid.163 This appalling catalogue of 
hunger and illness has been corroborated by Paul Preston.164
Starvation,  poverty,  unemployment, unsanitary  living  and  State  brutality 
forced many to try and escape this hopeless existence. One such man was a Catalan 
dissident named Federico Sabater Cid, who had tried twice to escape by crossing the 
Portuguese frontier.  He was caught on both occasions and was deported back to 
Spain for imprisonment. Desperate to escape the repression and grinding poverty he 
took the drastic decision to hide as a stowaway on the City of Dublin ship. He did 
not know much about Ireland except that it was a land where people lived freely. 
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When  the  vessel  arrived  into  Dublin  Port  he  was  immediately  detained  and 
transferred to Mountjoy Prison. There he remained in confinement until the prison 
chaplain decided to inform the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid, who 
might be able to help Cid. McQuaid became interested in the case and dispatched a 
personal secretary, Fr R. J. Glennon, to interview him. Glennon could speak some 
Spanish and could try to ascertain the reasoning behind Cid’s escapade. 
 The dissident liked to discuss politics and expressed his virulent hatred of 
Fascism. He wanted to dedicate his life to taking up ‘arms against what he describes 
as  the  “fascist  elements”  in  the world today’  and like  thousands of  other  exiled 
Republicans he was determined to extirpate all vestiges of it in Europe.165 His ‘chief 
anxiety’  was  deportation  back  to  Spain  as  he  felt  his  well-known  democratic 
tendencies had put him in the regime’s ‘black books’.166 Glennon did not doubt the 
veracity of Cid’s background and struggle against the regime but he believed the 
case did not warrant full ecclesiastical involvement. The case was handed over to the 
relevant political authorities but he advised External Affairs that because ‘His Grace 
is  interested  in  this  case’,  Archbishop  House  should  be  kept  informed  on  all 
developments.167 
The Department dispatched Captain Healy, a Spanish lecturer in U.C.C. who 
had  spent  some  time  in  Spain  before  the  war  working  on  behalf  of  the  Irish 
Manuscripts Commission, to interview Cid on its behalf. Healy spoke fluent Spanish 
and  worked  in  army  G.H.Q.  during  the  Second  World  War.  He  informed  the 
Department that Cid had written to Salvador de Madariaga, an exiled intellectual in 
Britain, and to the Mexican Consul in Ireland, Mexico being a nation that refused to 
have diplomatic relations with Francoist Spain, to highlight his case. Cid told Healy 
that ‘every day men and women are being shot for being democrats in Spain, and 
that if returned thither he will be shot too.’168  For the first time the Department had a 
perfect  opportunity  to  glean  vital  information  from  an  eyewitness  who  could 
corroborate Kerney’s reports. In addition, Cid could inform them on conditions in 
prison, the general perspective of the Spanish people towards Franco and the socio-
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economic conditions in the country. Instead the Department chose to concentrate its 
time on getting rid of him. 
It  had  been  agreed  that  the  Spanish  Minister  to  Ireland,  Juan  García 
Ontiveros, should not be informed about Cid, as Ontiveros’s prejudice against the 
Basque exiles had been flagged during his repeated efforts to have the Department 
deport them back to Spain. It was decided by Frederick Boland to consult the British 
Embassy to see would it be willing to assist its Irish colleagues. On 10 February 
1942 Boland wrote to the Permit Officer, C. S. Collinson, informing him of the Cid 
case and the Department’s official position: ‘the authorities concerned here are not 
inclined to send Cid back to Spain.’169 But neither were they inclined to keep him in 
Ireland. At no stage during his detention was Cid ever afforded proper sanctuary and 
treatment  as  a  refugee.  The  most  senior  ecclesiastical  authority  in  Dublin  had 
declined to offer Cid any form of assistance whilst the political authorities, despite 
Ireland’s membership of the League of Nations and the protection of human rights 
which that organisation had recognised under the 1933  Convention relating to the 
International  Statute  of  Refugees,  were  more  keen  to  keep  him locked  away  in 
prison  where  he  would  not  cause  a  diplomatic  incident.  In  the  end  Collinson 
responded to Boland that His Majesty’s Government would be delighted to grant a 
visa for Cid and so he was shipped to Britain. 
Throughout April and May Germany was victorious again on the battlefield, 
this time through its lightning campaigns in Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete. In North 
Africa  the  recently  arrived  Afrika  Korps  was  pushing  the  British  back  to  the 
Egyptian  frontier.  The  world watched with  awe as  Hitler’s  seemingly  invincible 
military  machine  continued  to  defeat  every  opponent  before  it.  Ironically,  with 
Fascism at its zenith, Franco made his first decisive move against his brother-in-law. 
On 5 May he appointed a military man, Colonel Valentín Galarza, to replace Súñer 
as  Minister  for  the  Interior.  Two of  Súñer’s  most  senior  collaborators,  Dionisio 
Ridruejo and Antonio Tovar, were dismissed from managing the State’s press and 
propaganda  services,  with  the  office  being  transferred  to  the  Vice-Secretariat  of 
169 Letter from Frederick Boland to C. S. Collinson, 10 Feb. 1942 (ibid.). 
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Popular  Education.170 Although  Franco  appointed  two  more  Falangists  to  the 
Cabinet, José Antonio Girón to Labour and Miguel Primo de Rivera to Agriculture, 
it was evident that Kerney’s repeated predictions that Franco would have to listen to 
the growing dissent from the military had been proved correct.  This was the first 
time that the Caudillo had stepped in to curtail Súñer’s power, but he still enjoyed 
Franco’s confidence and now appeared before the public to recruit “volunteers” to 
join in Hitler’s quest for living space in the East and the complete eradication of 
Communism from its birth cradle. For some time Hitler’s eyes had been focused 
ever eastward on the vast expanses of Russia and on 22 June 1941 he launched what 
he described to Mussolini as the ‘hardest decision of my life’: the invasion of the 
Soviet Union.171 
In his post-war biography Súñer wrote that neither ‘economically, militarily, 
nor politically, were we in a condition to engage in foreign war adventures.’172 But at 
that time he transformed his role into national recruitment officer for a division of 
Spanish “volunteers” to join Hitler’s crusade against the Soviet Union and rallied 
what he called ‘the armed Apostles of the faith of Christ’ to fight in the name of 
Spain and avenge the deaths  of their  fallen comrades  from the Civil  War.173 He 
blamed  all  the  nation’s  past  and present  woes  on  Russia  and used  the  fallen  to 
legitimise  the  regime’s  conduct.  For  Franco  active  participation  in  the  war  was 
justified because he claimed there were now two wars – one between the Axis and 
Allies of which Spain was a non-belligerent and another between the Axis and the 
Soviet  Union of which it  was a combatant.  On 17 July he delivered a speech in 
which he said that ‘the Allies have already lost’ the war.174 In all 47,000 men would 
fight in an infantry division and one aviation division as part of the Blue Division. 
The  division  was  placed  under  the  command  of  a  Falangist  general,  Muñoz 
Grandes.175 The acclaim of the public was ‘great and contagious’ for the adventure it 
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was claimed.176 Grandes’s men were incorporated into the  Wehrmacht  as the 250 
Infantry Division and swore an oath to Hitler. Deployed to the Leningrad sector they 
formed  part  of  the  frontline  that  surrounded,  shelled  and  starved  its  civilian 
population.  Their courageous valour on the battlefield in the service of the Third 
Reich  refuted  any later  claims  by apologist  historians  that  the  regime  adopted  a 
benevolent policy to the Nazis because it feared a German invasion from France.177 
The Irish Minister monitored the press commentary on the Eastern campaign 
throughout  the  summer  months  of  1941.  He believed  that  Franco looked  to  the 
Soviet Union as yet another great crusade against Communism which was bound to 
succeed.  But  on  22  September  he  informed  Dublin  that  any  enthusiasm for  the 
adventure was  on the wane because everyone knew that the Blue Division would 
soon  be  ‘campaigning  in  the  arctic  conditions  of  a  Russian  winter.’178 It  was 
Kerney’s view that the regime thought the war would be over by the time the Blue 
Division would be called up for active service. He observed the visible tiredness of 
the public from living with the threat of constant emergency and Súñer was still 
viewed as the ‘most unpopular man’ in Spain.179 For the ordinary people the Eastern 
campaign was a concerted attempt to deflect attention away from the ‘deplorable 
position at home’ and from the immense scarcities of goods: ‘Undernourishment is 
the rule, rather than the exception.’180 But the press did not concern itself with the 
socio-economic condition of Spain. It continued its line that ‘Germany’s adversaries 
are  the  real  aggressors’  and  attacked  the  Allied  cause  at  every  opportunity: 
‘everything that can be produced to their detriment [the Allies] and to that of the 
U.S.A. is given great prominence’, Kerney recorded.181 
It seemed to the supporters of the regime that the highpoint of Fascism was at 
hand  once  victory  in  Russia  was  secure.  A series  of  books  were  printed  which 
outlined  Spain’s  imperial  demands  now that  it  was  taking  an  active  part  in  the 
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fighting. P. Belleroche published a book ¿Cómo atacar el Peñón de Gibraltar? that 
detailed the best military strategy for attacking the British forces stationed there.182 
Another  publication,  Reivindicaciones  de  España by  José  María  de  Areilza  and 
Fernando  María  Castiella,  was  published  by  an  official  State  institution  –  the 
Institute of Political Studies. The book championed an expansionist programme for 
the  State  and  blamed  ‘Anglo-Saxon  imperialism’  for  Spain’s  loss  of  prestige 
internationally.183 It argued that history, demographical expansion, and geographic 
exigency  legitimised  Spanish  claims  over  Oran  and  French  Morocco.  It  further 
described Gibraltar as a national wound that had created an ‘inextinguishable source 
of hate against England.’184 It described the English Government as an ‘oligarchy of 
old politicians of the Masonic and financial clan’.185 Spanish seizure of Tangier was 
an ‘irrevocable decision of the Caudillo’.186 The regime also allowed non-Spanish 
writers  to  publish  anti-British  propaganda  which  was  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
authentic censorship policy enforced in Ireland. 
A publishing house by the name of “Blass” operated in Madrid and was used 
as a cover by the German Embassy to publish volumes of anti-British propaganda. 
The regime completely acquiesced in this scheme and did nothing to close it down. 
One  book  published  by  the  “Blass”  printing  house  outlined  British  ‘military 
weakness’  and asserted  the ‘certain  victory’  of  Germany in  the  war.187 With  the 
Channel Islands occupied, racial tension simmering in the Commonwealth nations of 
India  and  South  Africa  and  with  the  United  States  a  long  way  from  military 
preparedness,  it  prophesised  British  defeat  in  a  matter  of  months.  Another 
publication by “Blass” detailed a systematic policy of connivance within the British 
political  establishment  that  had orchestrated  incidents  in  neutral  countries  which 
‘inevitably forced’ Germany to come to the aid of Denmark and Norway.188 The 
book tried to inform the Spanish public that Germany respected neutrality and once 
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the Axis was triumphant it would ‘build above the ruins of destroyed neutrality a 
better and more solid edifice, in which all the people of Europe may live free and 
secure together.’189 
There is no written record of Kerney’s awareness of this publishing house 
and it would have been interesting to see what official position Dublin would have 
adopted had it been made aware of its existence, because it began to publish anti-
British  propaganda  that  touched  on  a  sensitive  topic  in  Anglo-Irish  relations  – 
Ulster.  A  vehemently  acerbic  tone  runs  through  one  such  publication  which 
denounced  British  partitioning  of  the  island  as  ‘one  of  the  most  absurd  frontier 
demarcations  in  European  history’.190 Ireland  only  demanded  its  rightful 
geographical  incorporation  whilst  Britain  used  the  partitioned  six  counties  for 
military purposes to wage war, it claimed. It outlined the historical importance of 
Ulster to the Irish people as the province which contained most of St Patrick’s relics, 
the seat of the Primate of All-Ireland and the ancient land of the noble Irish clans. 
The  Spanish reader  was  informed that  Britain  had abused  Irish cultural  heritage 
historically  and  was  now  renewing  a  new  campaign  to  suppress  the  Catholic 
community in Northern Ireland. This campaign was nothing short of a repetition of 
the ‘extermination’ policy which had failed to defeat the Irish during the War of 
Independence.191 The books clear message was that the Axis supported Ireland and 
its ‘inalienable right to possess a united island’.192
Other  facilities  that  the  regime  was  affording  Germany  were  constantly 
monitored by the Irish Minister. On 27 October he compiled a report on the steady 
supply of skilled and non-skilled workers being sent to the Third Reich, ostensibly 
due to shortages in German manpower brought on by the vicissitudes of conscription 
and war. In reality, he argued that the migration of thousands of workers alleviated 
the dead-weight unemployment problem in Spain. Contrary to post-war publications 
which claimed that these workers enjoyed better pay and allowances than if they had 
remained in Spain,193 Kerney knew that the policy had ‘been the object of much 
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hostile criticism’ among the working class.194 Many of these men would be forced to 
build Hitler’s Atlantic Wall to repulse an Allied landing on the continent. 
Diplomatically  too Franco and Súñer  were helping  the  Axis by officially 
recognizing its conquests. They recognised the Minister of Manchukuo – a Japanese 
aligned puppet State created following the bloody conquest of Manchuria. In Europe 
Franco recognised the new fascist satellite regimes in Croatia and Slovakia. Kerney 
informed Dublin that the Ministers of Poland, Holland, Norway and Greece whose 
nations  had  all  been  overrun  by  Germany  were  ‘never  invited  to  any  official 
ceremonies.’195 This was a tacit  recognition of their  permanent  incorporation into 
Hitler’s  empire.  The  Belgian  Embassy  too  was  left  in  a  ‘state  of  suspended 
animation’ with official accreditation being rebuffed.196 Súñer went so far as to expel 
some of these diplomats from Spain, but when he ordered the expulsion of the Polish 
Minister, Kerney personally went to him arguing that such a démarche would be 
viewed with deep  misgiving  by Ireland.  Súñer  backed down knowing the moral 
force that Ireland commanded owing to its fervent Catholicism.  
Clandestinely, rumours circulated throughout the capital of more benevolent 
assistance  to  Germany.  These  rumours  were  rather  factual  as  Franco  allowed 
German submarines to be provisioned in Spanish ports, German companies bought 
Spanish  trawlers  and  converted  them  into  supply  ships  for  U-boats  in  Spanish 
territorial  waters,  radio  stations  were  erected  in  Algeciras,  Barajas  Airport  and 
Tangier to monitor meteorological conditions and naval ships in Gibraltar  and to 
pass on information to U-boat wolf-packs which sunk British shipping vessels.197 
This  clandestine  assistance  was  known  at  the  time  by  the  British  through  its 
decoding facility in Bletchley Park which was reading all Spanish and German radio 
traffic. In Tangier the regime had allowed a German Consulate to operate freely and 
it quickly became the centre of a large espionage network in the region. All this was 
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in direct breach of the Hague Convention of 1907 which had outlined the rights and 
duties  of  neutral  powers.  Ironically,  it  was  in  Tangier,  Franco’s  only  territorial 
acquisition in the Second World War, that the full quixotic impracticalities of his 
foreign policy where exposed. Whilst German agents could roam around the port 
city free to carry out espionage activities, the inhabitants of the city had become 
completely destitute and impoverished as the regime could not provide them with 
enough food to survive. Only Allied shipments of food prevented famine there as 
well. 
On 2 December Kerney imparted his ‘personal reading of the situation’ and 
opined that so long as the Franco-Súñer-Falange combination lasts, their  ‘chosen 
course’  which  they  have  ‘constantly  and  consistently  pursued’,  would  not  be 
altered.198 They held a ‘firm belief’ that ‘Germany is invincible’ and that Spanish 
territorial  ambition  could only be ‘satisfied  with German cooperation’.199 Kerney 
also expressed the view that ‘a blockade of Spain will be fruitless’ as the regime had 
no concern for the welfare of its people.200 So long as Germany did not suffer ‘some 
big military defeat’ which could have ‘internal repercussions’, the continued support 
and assistance that the regime was affording Germany would continue into 1942.201 
His assessment of the situation was once again accurate as Franco reaffirmed non-
belligerency and not strict neutrality on 18 December. 
As 1941 drew to a close and the regime began a winter aid campaign for the 
Spanish soldiers on the Eastern Front, the Irish Minister learned of a rumour that 
was circulating that concerned Súñer. Súñer was married to Carmen Franco’s sister 
– Zita Polo and they had six children together. But the  cuñadísimo  had begun to 
have an extra-marital affair news of which reached the ears of Franco and his wife. 
Kerney informed Dublin that he heard from a reliable source that Súñer had been 
ordered to go to San Ginés church in Madrid and kneel before the statue of the Holy 
Virgin. There he pledged an oath of fidelity to his wife ‘at Franco’s request.’202 The 
Caudillo was asserting his power more and more over his brother-in-law. 
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January-August  , 1942  
At a speech before the female branch of the Falange,  Sección Femenina, the one 
time influential mandarin Antonio Tovar spoke of the urgent necessity to continue 
the quest for empire. But since Tovar’s dismissal from office the Caudillo had begun 
to assert his influence more and more on the political stage. He no longer relied as 
heavily as before on Súñer and he was now displaying a political cunning that was to 
define him. Kerney believed that a change in Spain’s position from non-belligerency 
to neutrality was ‘absolutely out of the question’ and ‘an absurd hope for those who 
entertained the idea.’203 This assessment was confirmed on 14 February when Franco 
delivered a bellicose speech in Seville promising to send two million men to Berlin 
if the “Asiatic hordes” threatened to destroy Western civilisation. He still believed in 
German victory but the fact  that  Hitler  had not won a decisive blow against  the 
Allies had caused him to be more cautious.  As a consequence he had looked to 
Portugal and its anglophile dictator Dr Oliveira Salazar to form a closer alignment 
that could transform the Iberian Peninsula into a bulwark to guarantee the safety of 
both nations in a long and protracted world war.204 With the United States and its 
limitless resources in men and manufacturing production still to be realised, Franco 
had decided to halt the quest for empire, for now. The Spanish people could begin to 
breathe easier. The Caudillo was now the prudent leader. He sought solidarity rather 
than discord with his neighbours.
The  Falange  too  was  becoming  less  vociferous.  Although  the  Secretary 
General of the Movement, José Luis de Arrese, was a diehard fascist, his loyalty to 
Franco  was  unwavering  and  the  party  had  begun  to  be  more  identified  by  its 
adhesion to Franco and Catholicism. Arrese detested Súñer and, like the generals, he 
began  to  plot  his  downfall.  With  the  overall  socio-political  situation  improving 
slightly, Franco found time to become a scriptwriter. Using the pseudonym Jaime de 
Andrade he wrote a novel that became a film: Raza. The protagonist, José Churruca, 
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was played  by Spain’s  most  prestigious  actor,  Alfredo Mayo.  The plot  mirrored 
Franco’s own childhood and military career. The film received much acclaim and 
won a prize for its artistic merit. Despite its wide publicity the Caudillo never wrote 
another film script again. 
On 6 February 1942 Kerney provided Dublin with a breakdown of the budget 
estimates  for the year.205 The Falange was to  have its  budget  increased from 14 
million pesetas to 141 million, military expenditure rose in all three branches with 
the army commanding a budget of 1,255 million pesetas, statistics substantiated by 
Christian Leitz in his research.206 In addition to this a sizeable sum of 452 million 
had been set  aside for action in Morocco.  By contrast,  funds allocated  to public 
works decreased by 3 million pesetas whilst Franco’s own office as Head of State 
received  an  11  million  increase  in  expenditure.  The  budget  reflected  Franco’s 
priorities. He had to appease the generals for if he lost their support both he and the 
Falange would be quickly toppled from power. Every peseta spent on the armed 
forces was one less spent on reconstruction and economic recovery and Kerney had 
learned that the British Ambassador had begun to use supplies from Gibraltar to feed 
British citizens. Of the 159 known Irish passport holders in Spain External Affairs 
did  not  deem it  necessary  to  increase  the  Legation’s  funds  to  provide  for  their 
welfare at this time.
On 23 February the Irish Minister had a conversation to discuss the general 
war situation with the German Ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer.207 Stohrer denied 
that the press was manipulated by German agents and that its overall tone was pro-
German.  He outlined Germany’s  continued supremacy over  the Allies.  Once the 
spring offensive began in the East it  would smash the Russians in the Caucasus 
region. The Kriegsmarine was also devastating British shipping in the Atlantic and 
sooner or later it ‘would bring England to her knees’.208 Kerney retorted that unless 
an actual invasion of the British mainland took place there would be no victory. He 
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had met the British and American Ambassadors earlier in the month to gain their 
assessment of the situation but overall he felt that they had failed to achieve their 
mission  in  Madrid,  which  was  to  curtail  Spain’s  alignment  with  the  Axis:  ‘the 
British and American representatives here have failed to improve relations’ with the 
regime, Kerney opined.209 
In March Kerney reported on a conversation he had with a doctor concerning 
the number of reported cases of malnutrition in the capital. The doctor informed him 
confidentially that in the previous month there had been ‘46 deaths in Madrid’ all 
caused by ‘starvation’.210 But the public and family relatives were not to be told this. 
He was ordered to certify the cause of death as ‘“avitaminosis”’.211 The doctor had 
no choice but to comply. If he refused he would be put in prison. The food situation 
in Spain was to deteriorate again in the summer when Kerney reported that the poor 
weather had ‘dashed the high hopes of promising crops and that the harvest will be 
below the average for wheat, vegetables, olives and grapes.’212 At no time did the 
Irish people endure anything comparable to what the people of Spain suffered in the 
first  years  of  the  Second  World  War.  But  Ireland  was  in  no  position  to  assist 
economically its historic friend and partner at that time. When the Spanish Minister 
in Dublin wrote to External Affairs requesting urgent exports of seed potato for the 
summer harvest, Frederick Boland informed him that Ireland’s domestic supply was 
‘barely adequate to enable us to meet home requirements’.213 
 August and September were to prove the most critical months of the war for 
the survival of the regime. Whilst  Súñer still  harked on about inevitable German 
victory,  Kerney believed that Franco had deferred entry into the war indefinitely 
because of ‘wheat and petrol’ shortages.214 He cited a report from the Commissioner 
General of Supplies which declared that the nation had ‘no wheat reserves and has 
now begun to use the 1942-3 crop.’215 Not even ration cards could be issued to the 
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general  populace  ‘owing  to  scarcity  of  paper.’216 Malaria  was  another  constant 
problem that the people had to contend with. The infectious disease was spreading 
due to the excessive summer heat and lack of quinine to combat it. But it was to be a 
religious  ceremony that  decidedly shaped the future course of the nation.  On 22 
August Kerney first recorded his knowledge of an incident that took place at a mass 
in Begoña, Bilbao. A contingent of Falangists threw a grenade on the Carlist crowd 
as they exited the church. The Irish Minister learned that ‘arrests were made and 
several  falangistas  are  said  to  have  been  since  shot’.217 In  attendance  was  the 
Minister for War, General Enríque Varela, who was lucky to escape with his life. 
The leading generals had finally had enough of the Falange and in September Franco 
would be forced to act decisively to prevent an all-out war between both factions.
Conversation w  ith a German  
On 24 August 1942, less than a week after the successful defeat of an Allied landing 
force in the port  of Dieppe,  Kerney personally compiled a report  that  day of an 
astonishing  face-to-face  meeting  he  had  with  a  German  in  an  open-air  café  in 
Madrid’s Retiro Park. The meeting had been arranged many months before through 
Helmut Clissmann. Helmut travelled from Germany to Madrid on several occasions 
to see Kerney and at one of these meetings he informed the Irish Minister that a 
senior and influential official who specialised in Irish matters would like to see him. 
Kerney had met officials in the British and Spanish secret service before, especially 
in  relation  to  the  Frank  Ryan  case,  and  only  a  month  previously  had  made  an 
appointment to see the American Ambassador in relation to anti-Irish propaganda 
disseminated  by an American  newspaper.  He did not  decline  any opportunity  to 
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defend his Government’s stance on neutrality even to the Allies, when he told the 
American Ambassador that:  ‘Ireland’s intention [is] to resist any violation of her 
territory even by the U.S.A.’218 The Irish Minister saw no reason why he should not 
accept the German invitation for a conversation, provided it took place in a discreet 
location to avoid any possibility of eavesdropping. To decline could be interpreted 
as an insult and meetings with such prominent officials always enhanced the prestige 
of his mission in Spain. 
The man he met that day was SS Standartenführer Edmund Veesenmayer. He 
was  recognised  as  one  of  the  rising  men  in  the  Nazi  regime.  A  year  before 
Veesenmayer had composed a memorandum for a landing of Frank Ryan, Helmut 
Clissmann and a radio operator by plane over Brandon Bay in Dingle Peninsula.219 
The  High Command  of  the  Wehrmacht and  Department  II  of  the  Abwehr  were 
involved in the planning process. The aim of Veesenmayer’s plan was to establish 
liaison  with the I.R.A.  and to  prepare  underground resistance  to  the Allies.  The 
operation was postponed by Ribbentrop but Hitler would come to admire and respect 
Veesenmayer’s  loyalty  to the Nazi State and when he ordered the occupation of 
Hungary on 19 March 1944, Veesenmayer was appointed Ambassador and worked 
with Adolf Eichmann in relation to the deportation of 450,000 Hungarian Jews who 
were eventually transported to the gas chambers of Auschwitz.220 
Kerney’s  five-page  report  was  headed  ‘Confidential’  and  for  Walshe’s 
attention  only.221 Kerney began by stating  that  Veesenmayer  had  come to  Spain 
under ‘an assumed name’ and he was mindful of the fact that ‘I was in the somewhat 
delicate  position of talking to a gentleman who, if  I  had looked under the table, 
might have been capable of disclosing something in the nature of a cloven hoof’.222 
Veesenmayer’s close association with the Nazi Party, ‘one of the original members’ 
he claimed, and with Ribbentrop, in particular,  highlighted the importance of the 
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German’s mission.223 Kerney believed he had come ‘with the deliberate purpose of 
making known Germany’s attitude in regard to Ireland.’224  
Veesenmayer began by outlining in detail the situation on the Eastern Front. 
Hitler’s summer offensive through the Ukraine and the Caucasus would drive a huge 
wedge in  Russia’s  southern front and open the way to the Caspian Sea ‘thereby 
depriving Russia of 30,000,000 tons of oil from Maikop, Grozny and Baku’.225 The 
control of Russia’s vast oil fields would have such a debilitating effect on the enemy 
that  Germany  would  ‘achieve  her  aims  in  Russian  probably  by  the  end  of  the 
year’.226 With Russia  eliminated and the vast  economic  resources of the Ukraine 
firmly in German hands, he argued that Hitler could wage war indefinitely against 
the  Allies.  He  did  not  believe  Hitler  would  launch  a  cross-Channel  invasion  of 
England because it would ‘occasion big losses’, but ‘he was absolutely convinced of 
German military victory’.227 He contended that the crucial  time for Ireland to re-
evaluate its position in the war was approaching. 
He outlined to  Kerney his  recent  uptake of  Irish history and study of  de 
Valera’s  speeches  which  ‘had  great  admiration  in  Germany’.228 He  declared 
emphatically to the Irish Minister that the Third Reich considered the north-eastern 
region of the island as completely ‘Irish’ and argued that the time was coming when 
Ireland had to show its hand before ‘final victory’ came and adopt a more ‘positive 
attitude’ in relation to its territorial and future ambitions.229 He said that de Valera 
could  rely  on  the  unstinting  support  of  Germany  to  help  realise  a  ‘territorially 
united’ Ireland that was ‘completely independent of England’.230 All de Valera had 
to do was come off the fence and join with the New Order in Europe.
Having listened to Veesenmayer’s argument Kerney responded by reiterating 
de Valera’s repeated public statements on neutrality: ‘the Taoiseach proved clearly 
that  Ireland would resist the violation of her neutrality by Americans,  English or 
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Germans’.231 Despite his age, he had no doubt that the Taoiseach would lead any 
armed resistance against any invader with the same readiness with which he had 
resisted British aggression a quarter of a century ago. Kerney further contended that 
de Valera would have examined all options at various stages before and during the 
war and concluded that for Ireland neutrality was the only conceivable  policy,  a 
policy supported by the majority of the people. The Irish Minister argued that for the 
Taoiseach to align the nation with either belligerent power in the hope of acquiring 
concessions of any kind courted potential disaster and reminded Veesenmayer that 
the unquantifiable strength of the United States could still be a major factor in the 
course of the war. He also mentioned incidents such as the sinking of Irish vessels 
belonging  to  ‘our  budding merchant  navy’,  ‘the  dropping of  parachutists’  which 
displayed a certain lack of respect for Irish sovereignty and the attempt to land Seán 
Russell  by  U-boat  to  contact  the  I.R.A.,  an  organisation  that  defied  the 
democratically  elected  Government  of  the State,  as  examples  of  a contemptuous 
attitude towards Ireland’s inviolable right to pursue neutrality.232 The inference was 
clear – Germany was no friend of neutral nations. 
Veesenmayer denied all knowledge of the Russell affair or of any attempts to 
organise  fifth-columnists  to  launch  a  covert  war  against  the  Allied  armies  in 
Northern Ireland. He was deliberately trying to deceive Kerney as Ribbentrop had 
entrusted  Veesenmayer  with  complete  handling  of  I.R.A.  matters  and  with  Seán 
Russell. The memorandum Veesenmayer wrote a year before proved that he not only 
knew  of  espionage  activities  but  was  personally  responsible  for  planning  and 
orchestrating at least one clandestine operation. He assured Kerney that Hitler had 
no expansionist intentions of violating Irish sovereignty neither for territorial gain 
nor for its usefulness as a springboard for an invasion of Britain. Speaking candidly 
he declared that they ‘“haven’t got the ships, even if we wanted to do so”’.233 This 
was another mistruth as the German High Command had drawn up plans in 1940 for 
the invasion of Ireland, known as Plan Green and the invasion of Northern Ireland, 
known as Plan Kathleen. 
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Kerney was not to know at the time how much this controversial meeting 
would impact later on his reputation but its importance was significant. At such a 
critical  stage  in  the  war,  Kerney’s  defence  of  neutrality  over  any  other  policy 
mirrored  de  Valera’s  skilful  handling  of  Irish  foreign  policy  vis-à-vis  the  two 
belligerent  sides.  He  had  reaffirmed  the  Taoiseach’s  official  position  which 
prioritised neutrality over adventurism with its promises of military assistance for 
the attainment of a unified island, a point supported by Dermot Keogh: ‘Kerney gave 
the Nazi no words of support or comfort.’234 Kerney’s report to Walshe is one of the 
best  examples  of  a  diplomat’s  defence  of  his  Government’s  position  during  the 
Second World War.235
234 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 169. 
235 In 1953 a distinguished historian in U.C.D., Professor Williams, used captured German documents 
accessed from his wartime involvement in British intelligence and subsequent work in the Foreign 
Office that discredited Kerney publicly. Williams published a series of articles in the Leader and the 
Irish Press which besmirched Kerney’s record as a professional diplomat and was nothing less than a 
scurrilous attack on his reputation. Kerney brought a libel case against Williams and the newspapers 
in which he was successful. 
150
Chapter 4
Kerney’s Diplomatic Mission to Spain, September 1942-May 1945
September-December, 1942
In his post-war memoirs Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador to Spain during 
the Second World War,  recorded that  Alfredo Kindelán had never forgotten ‘the 
Irish  origin  of  his  family.  His  ancestors,  like  many  others  in  Spain,  had  been 
amongst  “the  wild  geese”  from Ireland,  and  one  of  them had  been a  divisional 
general under the Marqués de la Romana when Napoleon had collected a Spanish 
contingent in Denmark for the invasion of Russia.’1 General Kindelán2 had fallen out 
of favour with Franco due to his antipathy towards Serrano Súñer and his pro-Allied 
inclinations. Despite this, Kindelán was held in great esteem by the army and he had 
become the  focal  point  for  transmitting  the  military’s  growing disquiet  with  the 
power and influence of both Súñer and the Falange. He came to see Franco after the 
Begoña  incident  to  demand  Súñer’s  immediate  dismissal  from all  his  offices,  a 
diminution  of  the  Falange’s  control  over  the  nation,  concrete  proposals  for  the 
reestablishment of the Monarchy and the implementation of a rigidly neutral foreign 
policy.  Kerney  learned  from  an  informant,  whose  ‘information  was  absolutely 
accurate,’ that Kindelán told Franco either Súñer goes or ‘he [Franco] would have to 
go himself’.3 
Pressure was also surfacing from within the Cabinet as the Minister for War, 
General Varela, had demanded the immediate execution of the Falangists involved 
in the Begoña incident.4 Other Ministers like the Minister for the Interior, Colonel 
Valentín Galarza, were known for their thorough anti-Falangism. Franco knew that 
his  own political  survival  was  at  stake and that  if  he did not  act  prudently  and 
decisively  a  military  coup d’état could  remove  him from office.  At  this  critical 
juncture  in  the  regime’s  lifetime,  Franco  turned  to  his  closest  advisor,  Captain 
1 Sir Samuel Hoare, Ambassador on special mission (London, 1946), p. 134. 
2 Kindelán was the former Commander of the Nationalist Air Force.  
3 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 15 Sept. 1942 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
4 Six had been arrested and tried by a military court. One was subsequently executed. 
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Carrero Blanco, for guidance. Like the Falange party boss Arrese and the military, 
he nurtured a seething hatred for Súñer. Franco had also to weigh up the important 
significance that a major Allied naval and air build-up in Gibraltar would have on 
the future direction of the war. If it was the preparation for an armada, where was it 
heading? If the armada’s landing target was North Africa, what implications would 
it have for Spanish imperial ambitions there, the conquered city of Tangiers and the 
130,000 troops he had stationed in Spanish Morocco? Would a successful landing 
alter  the  balance  of  forces  in the North African theatre  in  the Allies  favour  and 
embolden the Monarchist cause for the return of the pretender to the throne, Juan de 
Borbón, the Count of Barcelona?5
Both the Spanish people and the Diplomatic Corps were largely unaware of 
the internal  instability  then reigning through the regime and the extent  to  which 
Franco was vulnerable to possible replacement. On 3 September he ordered the press 
to announce without comment that his brother-in-law had been replaced in all his 
posts, the implication being that it was only a minor affair akin to a changing of the 
guard.  Súñer’s  enemies  were  numerous  but  perhaps  his  greatest  opponent  was 
Franco’s wife Carmen, who could not forgive him for dishonouring her sister. The 
birth of an illegitimate child and Franco’s paranoia with any possible threat to his 
position arising from Súñer’s accumulation of power had all but ended his political 
career.  From his  position  of  power  Súñer  had  solidified  the  regime  through  the 
arbitrary use of the security organs of the State. But his tenure in office had also 
occasioned manifest material hardship for the majority of the Spanish people. His 
imperial aspirations were never fully jettisoned despite the impoverished state of the 
nation and his support for the Axis had steered the country into troubled waters with 
the Allied powers. His removal was a welcome relief to the ordinary people who 
longed for a return to normalcy.  
As  Paul  Preston  has  shown,  Franco  displayed  ‘remarkable’  political 
astuteness  in  managing  the  gravest  political  crisis  to  his  leadership  since  his 
assumption of near-absolute power.6 He balanced Súñer’s departure by firstly taking 
over the former’s position as President of the Executive Committee of the Falange, 
5 Father of the present King of Spain, Juan Carlos. 
6 Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993), p. 470. 
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thereby accelerating Arrese’s policy of identifying the party more with Franco and 
the Catholic Church rather than with the Axis, and dismissed Valera and Galarza, 
replacing them respectively with two prominent Falangists, General Carlos Asensio 
Cabanillas and Blas Pérez González. This divide-and-conquer strategy was used to 
limit the influence of both the Falange and military factions in the regime. If both 
could have their authoritative positions curtailed by him at any time then they would 
never be strong enough to challenge his position – and with reduced power they 
would  inevitably  concentrate  their  energies  against  one  another.  This  infighting 
could only benefit Franco as he would remain aloof from their squabbles and only 
intercede when it best suited him and his continued longevity in office. In another 
important decision, Franco chose General Jordana to succeed his brother-in-law in 
Foreign Affairs. Contrary to Glyn Stone’s description of Jordana as marginally ‘less 
offensive’ to the Allies than Súñer, his appointment significantly altered the course 
of Spanish history in this period.7 The first sign in the direction in which Jordana 
was bringing Spain was noted in the diary of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Count Ciano: 
the submarine Giuliani, which is being repaired at San Sebastián, with many 
dead and wounded on board, has for all practical purposes been interned.  
When this happened under Serrano Súñer our submarines could come and go 
into Spanish ports as if they were public parks.8  
Less than a week after these tumultuous events, Kerney secured a personal meeting 
with  Jordana,  whose  eagerness  to  meet  the  Irish  Minister  contrasted  with  his 
predecessor’s  esoteric  approach  to  diplomacy.9 On entering  the  Ministry  Kerney 
noted  that  there  were  no  longer  uniformed  Falangistas around  the  building 
compulsorily saluting diplomats with a right arm salute. He was greeted hospitably 
by  Jordana  with  an  abrazo which  he  informed  Dublin  was  ‘an  arm around  the 
7 Glyn Stone, ‘The degree of British commitment to the restoration of democracy in Spain, 1939-
1946’ in Christian Leitz & David Dunthorn (eds), Spain in an international context, 1936-1959 (New 
York, 1999), p. 200. 
8 Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano’s Diary, 1937-1943 (London, 2002), p. 546, 8 Sept. 1942. 
9 Private meeting between Kerney and General Jordana, 10 Sept. 1942 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
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shoulder,  in  the  way customary  between Spaniards  who are  good friends’.10 He 
perceived the symbolic gesture to be an indication of Spanish perceptions of Ireland 
as one of its closest allies in the international arena. Both men discussed neutrality, 
with Jordana assuring Kerney confidentially that he would fight to pursue a more 
stringent  neutral  policy.  Kerney  reiterated  his  Government’s  adhesion  to 
‘unswerving neutrality’  and he was assured by Jordana that Spain would support 
Ireland  if  it  was  attacked  by  either  belligerent.11 As  a  result  of  this  amicable 
relationship  Ireland  would  feature  prominently  in  Jordana’s  later  attempts  to 
promote peace between the two belligerent sides. 
On 24 September  Arriba, the press organ of the Falange, finally broke its 
silence.  It  confidentially  asserted  that  Spain  could  not  survive  without  the  party 
orchestrating and guiding the present and future course of the nation:  ‘Her unity 
[Spain’s], forged in Falange and by Falange, can only have its roots in Falange…In 
it  resides,  with  vigilance,  the  control  of  the  present  and  the  foundation  of  the 
future.’12 The article went on to assert that the party was indissolubly linked with 
Franco; it was the national instrument of his will as the legitimate successor of the 
founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera: ‘There is no unity outside Franco; there is no 
political discipline outside Falange.’13 The inference was clear: if Franco as head of 
the party was removed from office, the nation would once again collapse into social 
anarchy with Communists,  Freemasons,  liberals,  Jews and Anarchists  once again 
dragging Spain into another dark abyss. The party was now inseparably linked with 
Franco and his patronage. He was the keystone holding the regime together.  The 
Begoña incident,  which precipitated the internal crisis,  had forced the Falange to 
turn inwardly to domestic affairs and away from external events.
On the same day that the Falange broke its silence the army also expressed 
its desire to put the Begoña incident aside through its periodical El Alcázar. Having 
smitten its principal opponents in the regime, the military now wanted to withdraw 
from the political scene and concentrate on internal unity for the good of the nation. 
Yet  the  army reasserted  its  conviction  that  should  any elements  in  the  country, 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Arriba, 24 Sept. 1942. 
13 Ibid. 
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including the Falange, try to challenge Spain’s political stability again, it was ready 
to step once more into the breach: ‘If, then, within the borders of the Motherland, 
resistance and obstacles should be encountered endeavouring to split the religious 
and political unity, we would resort to force.’14 In his characteristically dispassionate 
manner  Kerney confidently  informed  Dublin  that  Franco was  once  again  firmly 
ensconced in his position and that the Falange’s long aspirations for entering the war 
on the Axis side were all but derailed: ‘I would consider it certain that Spain would 
not come into the war of her own volition.’15 
On 21 September Kerney reported that another contingent of Blue Division 
troops had been dispatched to fight on the Eastern Front. Again in early October 
another  assigned  unit  was  deployed  for  active  frontline  action  in  the  Leningrad 
sector.16 The press began a hyper anti-Communist propaganda campaign to defend 
the participation of thousands of Spanish “volunteers” by portraying the war in the 
East  as a crusade to  extirpate  Communism from its  birth cradle.  The success of 
Operation Torch, the Anglo-American landings in North Africa as well as the defeat 
of  the  Afrika  Korps at  the  battle  of  El  Alamein,  had  not  diminished  Franco’s 
conviction that the Axis would win the war. As Paul Preston has argued, Franco’s 
belief in Axis victory ‘never entirely halted until the end of the war.’17 He perceived 
the Third Reich to be a military-technological powerhouse. This was confirmed by a 
telegram he sent to Hitler on 5 December that lauded Germany’s glorious enterprise 
of freeing Europe from the Bolshevik terror.
 Renewing his commitment to the active participation of the Blue Division 
and the Blue Squadron ran contrary to all international legislative conduct for neutral 
nations. Franco’s support for Hitler undermined Jordan’s efforts to extricate Spain 
from  possible  Allied  retribution.  But  Jordana  could  only  counsel  Franco.  The 
dictator  had  come  to  power  with  Hitler’s  support  and  he  had  watched  the 
Wehrmacht conquer territory from the Bay of Biscay to the banks of the Volga. His 
14 El Alcázar, 24 Sept. 1942. 
15 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 15 Sept. 1942 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
16 For a good account on the Blue Division see G. R. Kleinfeld & L. A. Tambs, ‘North to Russia: the 
Spanish Blue Division in World War Two’, in Military Affairs, xxxvii (1973), pp 8-13.
17 Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the myth of Hendaye, 1940’ in Contemporary European History, i 
(1992), pp 1-16. 
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unwavering  conviction  in  Allied  defeat  was  proclaimed  during  a  speech  at  the 
National  Council:  ‘the  thoughts  of  Spain  cannot  hark  back  to  the  nineteenth 
century…The liberal  world is  dying,  and with it  its  commercial  imperialism and 
financial  capitalism  with  its  millions  of  unemployed’.18 On  17  December  the 
Commander  of  the  Blue  Division,  General  Muñoz  Grandes,  returned  from  the 
Eastern Front and reported to Franco. The fact that the entire Eastern Front stretched 
nearly 2,000 miles and that the German 6th Army was now fighting house to house 
combat in Stalingrad in temperatures well below zero, still did not convince him that 
the war was turning slowly but inexorably against the Axis powers. On 28 December 
he authorised another contingent of over a thousand troops to leave for the boundless 
steppes of Russia.  
Plan D
Jordana’s  promise  to  Kerney  that  he  would  re-orientate  foreign  policy  towards 
stricter neutrality was further challenged by the Falangist members in the Cabinet 
who occupied important positions in the military, political and economic fabric of 
the State.19 His standing as a neutralist within the Cabinet was attested in the eyes of 
the Diplomatic Corps by his decision to travel to Lisbon on 18 December to hold 
high-level  talks  with  the  Portuguese  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Prime 
Minister, Dr Oliveira Salazar. Portuguese foreign policy had maintained a benign 
neutrality that favoured the Allies but Salazar had always desired, in tandem with 
this, a closer working relationship with Spain that would slowly accustom Franco to 
stricter neutrality. On 20 December the first soundings of a possible Bloque Ibérico 
began to be discussed. Spain had signed two treaties with Portugal during the war20 
and Jordana believed that a mutual alliance would safeguard the Iberian Peninsula 
from invasion, gravitate Spain towards the Allies, hinder the furtive provisioning of 
U-boats and other clandestine activities by senior Falangists in the regime and serve 
18 Speech  delivered  by  Francisco  Franco  at  the  National  Council,  8  Dec.  1942  (N.A.I.,  D.F.A., 
219/2B). 
19 José Luis  Arrese,  Secretary General  of  the  Movimiento,  Miguel  Primo de Rivera,  Minister for 
Agriculture, José Antonio Girón, Minister for Labour, Demetrio Carceller, Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, Blas Pérez González, Minister for the Interior, Carlos Asensio Cabanillas, Minister for 
War. All these Ministers were fervent Falangists in Franco’s Cabinet. 
20 17 Mar. 1939 – Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression; 29 July 1940 Additional Protocol. 
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as ‘an instrument  of peace and safeguard of the highest moral values.’21 For this 
proposal to be credible he had to win over Franco, a difficult  proposition at that 
time. 
Always conscious of his image and self-interest, Franco could only be won 
over to the ideals of the  Bloque Ibérico if it benefited him. Jordana argued that it 
could be used to propel Spain onto the international arena by playing the role of 
honest broker between the warring sides. Franco liked the idea of being perceived as 
an  international  statesman  and mediator.  It  could  enhance  his  standing  with  the 
Vatican and Catholic nations like Ireland by propagating an image of a pacifist. It 
could also assist the Axis during this difficult period for the New Order by possibly 
splitting  the western Allies from their  friendship with the Soviet  Union.  Jordana 
would have viewed the alliance with Portugal as an expression of neutrality and a 
means  of  guaranteeing  domestic  sovereignty  and  independence  during  the  war. 
Franco, however, saw none of this. On 6 January at the annual New Year dinner for 
the Diplomatic Corps, the Caudillo spoke at length with the British Ambassador Sir 
Samuel Hoare and outlined his theories on the future course of the war. His theory 
was that a stalemate akin to the First World War would ensue and that the West 
could not defeat Hitler but rather should join forces with him to stop the advancing 
Soviet  armies  from  enslaving  Europe.  For  Franco  the  time  was  ripe  for  an 
‘honourable peace’.22 
On 7 January Jordana called on the Irish Legation to have lunch with the 
Kerney family.23 Over  coffee  the  topic  of  discussion  revolved  around  Jordana’s 
recent  visit  to  Portugal.24 Kerney  was  intrigued  to  learn  about  the  possible 
establishment  of  a  bloc  of  neutral  like-minded  States  which  would  work  to 
implement peaceful reconciliation in the world based on the principles expounded 
by Pope Pius XII on 24 December 1939. Jordana informed him that this idea had 
been outlined in a memorandum he had presented to the Portuguese Ambassador on 
6 November,  entitled “Plan D”. Following on from this conversation Kerney met 
21 Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza,  Milicia y diplomacia: los diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936-
1944 (Burgos, 2002), p. 192. 
22 J. M. Doussinague, España tenía razón, 1939-1945 (Madrid, 1949), p. 144.   
23 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 7 Jan. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 205/120). 
24 L.K.P.A.   
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Doussinague on the 11 January to receive a copy of the memorandum.25 In his post-
war memoirs Doussinague recalled that the Irish Minister said at that meeting that he 
completely identified with the proposed intentions of Plan D and that as he knew the 
‘intimate thoughts’ of the Taoiseach, Ireland’s adhesion to such a neutral bloc of 
nations  was  all  but  assured.26 It  was  politically  expedient  for  the  Spanish  to 
encourage  Irish participation  in  Plan D as  Ireland’s  standing  in  the  international 
arena  as  a  Catholic  and  staunchly  neutral  nation  had  long  been  established. 
Furthermore, because direct air and sea links between both nations had been closed 
for some time owing to the war, it was hoped that Plan D offered a platform for both 
nations to reinvigorate and enhance closer bilateral relations. 
On  9  February,  shortly  before  the  Kerney  family  were  recalled  back  to 
Dublin  for  a  long-overdue  holiday,  Doussinague  compiled  a  report27 on  his 
interpretation of the third meeting he had with Kerney which took place over lunch 
in the Irish Legation that day.28 As a consequence of this meeting, he had formed the 
opinion  that  the  moment  had  come  to  give  ‘greater  consideration’  to  the 
implementation  of  Plan  D.29 He affirmed  that  Spain’s  intention  was to  seek  out 
‘closer  contact  with  the  countries  that  are  remaining  outside  of  the  conflict’ 
especially  with  those  that  shared  a  similar  ‘spiritual  and  religious’  formation  – 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and the Vatican.30 These countries could unite to form a bloc 
based on Christian ‘civilisation’ and justice that would cooperate to end the ‘violent 
waves of passion and hate’ that afflicted mankind.31 Doussinague hoped that Ireland 
and Spain would adopt a ‘similar international position’ that would champion the 
cause of peace, morality and ethics above materialism and belligerency.32 Plan D 
was  therefore  a  programme  to  be  implemented  prior  to  the  inevitable  ‘Peace 
Conference’  between the warring factions  where Ireland and Spain would act  as 
25 On  1  Apr.  1950  Kerney  wrote  a  letter  refuting  many  assertions  that  Doussinague  allegedly 
attributed to the Irish Minister in the book (L.K.P.A.). 
26 J. M. Doussinague, España tenía razón, 1939-1945 (Madrid, 1949), p. 151. 
27 File headed ‘Foreign Policy: Information of or about Ireland’ (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1375/E11). 
28 Private meeting between Kerney and J. M. Doussinague, 9 Feb. 1943 (L.K.P.A.). 
29 Report from J. M. Doussinague to General Jordana, 9 Feb. 1943 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1375/E11). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Ibid. 
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moral advisors to both sides.33 In another file he recorded his aspirations that Plan D 
would also ‘make Spain a great power’ and showcase the nation as the ‘number one 
Catholic  country’  in the world.34 He put great store on Kerney winning over his 
‘Chief’ to the idea. De Valera had other ideas for Plan D. 
The Taoiseach and the Department of External Affairs looked on Plan D with 
a considerable degree of scepticism. The Secretary of the Department expressed the 
view that: ‘while we are interested in it, we do not consider that our best interests 
would be served by involving ourselves in any commitments in the matter at the 
present juncture.’35 It seemed to Dublin to be a rather impractical plan as the Allies 
had already rejected any notion of a peaceful détente with the Axis at the Casablanca 
Conference,  during  which  they  had  formulated  their  insistence  on  unconditional 
surrender. This is confirmed by Dermot Keogh who argued that the plan, though 
tempting,  did  not  serve  Irish  national  interests  and  as  a  consequence  ‘was  not 
considered a viable foreign policy option.’36
Furthermore,  Hitler’s  desire  for  lebensraum  in  the  East  had  not  abated 
despite  suffering  a  crippling  defeat  at  Stalingrad.  It  seemed  equally 
incomprehensible that either side would be willing to listen to peaceful overtures 
from Franco,  given  the  insignificance  of  Spain.  For  Dublin  the  only  achievable 
outcome for  Plan  D was  the  formation  of  a  neutral  bloc  based  not  on  political 
affinities but rather humanitarian concerns to help the thousands of impoverished 
and displaced peoples whose lives had been dislocated by the war. Dublin passed on 
this  suggestion  to  the  Catholic  hierarchy  who  responded  favourably  to  a 
humanitarian rather than a politically orientated organisation. As Dermot Keogh has 
demonstrated,  despite  the public  face of solidarity  between Ireland’s  secular  and 
religious  leadership,  contact  between  both  was  limited.37 Plan  D is  therefore  of 
significant historical importance both for its uniqueness and in the context of Irish-
Spanish relations.
33 Ibid. 
34 J. M. Doussinague to General Jordana, 11 Jan. 1943 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1370/E7). 
35 Joseph Walshe to Kerney, 29 Jan. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 205/120). 
36 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 206. 
37  _____, The Vatican, the bishops and Irish politics, 1919-39 (New York, 1986). 
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At the  same  time  that  Jordana  and Doussinague  were sounding out  Irish 
opinion on Plan D, Joseph Walshe had received correspondence from the I.R.C.S. 
which outlined that organisation’s viewpoint that  Ireland could play a role in the 
‘Christian  work  of  relief’  throughout  Europe.38 Its  Chairman,  Conor  Alexander 
Maguire, was President of the High Court and a fervent supporter of the Spanish 
regime. From other channels the Department also received requests concerning the 
formation  of a Christian and humanitarian  organisation.  On 21 January the Irish 
High Commissioner to Britain, John Dulanty, had met with Bishop David Mathew 
and Sir Neill Malcolm, former British High Commissioner for Refugees Under the 
Protection of the League of Nations, and reported the outcome of that meeting to 
Walshe.  The  Irish  Women  Citizens  and  Local  Government  organisation  also 
contacted  the  Department  in  the  hope  that  Ireland  would  use  its  international 
standing as a devout Catholic nation to begin to help war refugees in Europe and if 
need be to work with other neutral nations to achieve this goal. 
One of the few admirable services that Franco rendered during the Second 
World War was his refusal to close the Spanish frontier with France. Economic and 
political considerations lay behind this decision but nonetheless it enabled countless 
numbers of Allied airmen who had been shot down over German occupied territory 
to  escape  over  the  Pyrenees  and  pass  through  Spain  en  route  to  Gibraltar.  In 
addition, the Nazi persecution of the Jews, which accelerated in the latter years of 
the conflict, forced thousands of Jews to use this escape route to prevent deportation 
to German concentration camps. One must not forget that the Francoist regime was 
openly  anti-Semitic.39 When  the  German  Army  overran  the  Greek  port  city  of 
Salonika, Franco did nothing to protect the Sephardic Jews living there.40 The city 
was the centre of Sephardic religious and cultural life and many of its inhabitants, 
who were  descendants  from the  Jews  that  had  been  expelled  from Spain  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  spoke a Judeo-Spanish language and still  identified  themselves 
with their Spanish heritage. The German persecution of the Sephardic Jews began 
with the obligatory wearing of the Star of David and eventually led to their forced 
38 Letter from the I.R.C.S. to Joseph Walshe, 20 Jan. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895). 
39 For a good account of Spain’s relationship towards the Jewish community see G. Á. Chillida,  El 
antisemitismo en España: la imagen del judío (Madrid, 2002). 
40 Doussinague was the Spanish Ambassador to Greece from 1940 to 1941. 
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deportation to concentration camps in the spring of 1943. Despite this failing, Franco 
must  be  acknowledged  for  indirectly  saving  thousands  of  Jews  from  the  gas 
chambers by keeping the frontier border with France open.
Once these Jews entered Spain they were confronted with the same problem 
as the Spanish people – lack of food. The nation could not shoulder the burden of 
more  mouths  to  feed  and  the  Jews  had  little  belongings  left  once  the  German 
authorities had seized their homes and goods. It was these Jewish refugees that the 
I.R.C.S.,  the  Catholic  hierarchy  in  Ireland  and  Britain  and  other  humanitarian 
organisations wanted Joseph Walshe to aid. On 12 February Dulanty contacted the 
Spanish Embassy in London but was informed that ‘there are no refugee children in 
Spain.’41  The Irish Counsellor in London, John Belton, knew this to be untrue as he 
was aware of ‘certain Spanish Doctors who kept drugs supplied for refugees and 
either gave them to their own private patients or sold them in the Black Market.’42 
The  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  informed  Walshe  that  by  their  estimates 
approximately  10,000  Jewish  refugees,  including  women  and  children,  were  in 
Spain in December 1942. Many were located in make-shift camps with no money 
and  hardly  any food  during  the  winter.  On  19  February  Belton  approached  the 
Spanish to verify or deny these figures but was informed that ‘to cross the Pyrenees 
by difficult  mountain  passes,  [was]  a  journey that  no  child  could  make.’43 That 
thousands of Republican children had done just that to escape Franco’s armies after 
Barcelona was captured was a fact not advanced by Belton to his counterpart on this 
occasion. 
As a result of these conversations and meetings the Spanish began to realise 
that Irish interest in Plan D was a purely humanitarian one. The Ambassador, the 
Duke of Alba,  wrote  to  Jordana on the 25 February to  make him aware of  this 
reality.44 He confided that it had been ‘absolutely impossible to discourage the Irish 
Government  from  its  intention,  without  offending  them.’45 He  outlined  a 
41 John Dulanty to Joseph Walshe, 12 Feb. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895). 
42 John Belton to _____, 18 Feb. 1943 (ibid.).  Belton would succeed Kerney as Irish Minister to 
Spain.
43 John Belton to Joseph Walshe, 19 Feb. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895). 
44 Duke of Alba to General Jordana, 25 Feb. 1943 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 1371/E9). 
45 Ibid. 
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conversation that had transpired between himself and John Dulanty during which the 
Irish  High Commissioner  had  said  that  both  Spain  and  Portugal,  owing to  their 
‘political  tradition  and  geographic  position’,  were  ideally  suited  to  forge  an 
international  centre  for  Christian  aid  that  would  help  the  ‘bereaved  civilian 
populations  of  the  continent’  in  the  reconstruction  of  Europe  under  the  guiding 
influence of the Catholic Church.46 Alba informed Jordana that all this was a direct 
result of the commanding influence that the ‘hierarchy’ exercised over all facets of 
Irish life and that the Church wanted to re-Christian Europe after the war through the 
guise of humanitarian work.47 Based on Alba’s report, Jordana realised that Ireland 
had no political desire to become part of Plan D unless it related to the formation of 
a neutral bloc of nations who worked for humanitarian relief. He therefore permitted 
the I.R.C.S. to organise such aid to help war refugees in Spain because ‘the initiative 
taken by the Irish Government is so generous in its intention and so expressive in its 
high ideal of Christian and Catholic collaboration’ that refusal to acquiesce would be 
unthinkable.48
It was the Catholic hierarchy in Britain who first sent goods and officials to 
Spain  to  prevent  a  calamitous  humanitarian  disaster.  The  Dominions  Office 
informed Dublin that it would allow an Irish ship to transport 1,000 tons of goods for 
humanitarian relief,  despite  British scruples on navicerts  for all  naval cargo,  and 
confidentially informed Belton that they would not attempt to claim any credit for 
the relief effort.49 On 25 February Walshe called on the Spanish Legation to put ‘a 
proper official footing’ to Ireland’s desire to ‘feed and clothe some of the thousands 
of  refugees  who  were  destitute  in  Spain.’50 The  Spanish  Minister,  Juan  García 
Ontiveros, promised to ‘give every help in his power’ to the enterprise.51 It seemed 
that  the  approximate  figure  of  10,000 refugees  given  previously  was  misplaced. 
Kerney  informed  Dublin  that  the  Spanish  authorities  did  not  classify  children 
separately but rather counted only adults.  In addition,  Hitler’s  takeover  of Vichy 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Jordana’s instructions to the Spanish Embassy, 25 Feb. 1943 (ibid.). 
49 Permission granted by the Dominions Office for the transport of relief aid on Irish ships, 24 Feb. 
1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895).  
50 Private meeting between Ontiveros and Joseph Walshe, 25 Feb. 1943 (ibid.). 
51 Ibid. 
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France after Operation Torch had precipitated a sudden influx of 4,000 war refugees 
who were interned in conditions of ‘great hardship and suffering’.52 The Spanish 
were, in Kerney’s estimation, ‘not organised to cope with this sudden inrush.’53 At 
this critical  time even Protestant ecclesiastical  leaders were prepared to put aside 
Franco’s hostile attitude to their faith in the hope that thousands of lives could be 
saved.  Reverend  G.  Allen  of  the  Presbytery  of  Letterkenny  contacted  the 
Department urging them to aid these Jews who had escaped persecution from the 
Nazis.54 De Valera preferred relief to asylum and at a Cabinet meeting held on 26 
March,  he  delegated  Frank  Aiken,  Minister  for  the  Co-ordination  of  Defensive 
Measures, with the responsibility of organising the supply of two cargo ships for 
Spain. 
In order to do this the Government needed the cooperation of the Irish public. 
Aiken used the  Irish Press to inform the public about the urgent need to supply 
foodstuffs and clothing to thousands of war refugees and prisoners of war in Spain.55 
It could have been an arduous undertaking to persuade a people to donate tons of 
supplies  given  the  debilitating  impact  that  the  war  had  had  so  far  on  domestic 
consumption and peoples’ living standards, but the Irish public responded positively 
to the request. No greater indication of the sincerity behind the historic friendship 
that defined Irish-Spanish relations can be better demonstrated than by the response 
of the Irish people to Spain’s predicament.  Two hundred tons of sugar, potatoes, 
peas,  powdered  milk  and blankets  were  donated  to  the  assigned depot  and  then 
shipped  for  the  relief  of  these  refugees  through  the  auspices  of  the  I.R.C.S. 
Ontiveros could not deny that the generosity of the people was something that would 
echo through the ages. His prophetic remarks could not have been more misplaced. 
The I.R.C.S. dispatched two delegates:  Colonel T.  McKinney,  Director of 
Army Medical Services in the Irish Army and senior member of the Central Council 
of the I.R.C.S., and Captain Joseph G. Healy, U.C.C. Spanish lecturer and former 
delegate of the Irish Manuscripts Commission in Spain. Both men flew from Foynes 
to Lisbon to await the arrival of the vessels for overland transport to the Spanish 
52 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 9 Feb. 1943 (ibid.). 
53 Ibid.
54 Letter from Rev. Allen to Joseph Walshe, 4 Mar. 1943 (ibid.). 
55 Irish Press, 30 Mar. 1943. 
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border.  No  news  was  forthcoming  for  some  time  except  a  report  issued  by  the 
Society’s  Chairman,  Conor  A.  Maguire,  which  stated  that  the  ‘mission  was 
successful, and that the Spanish Government and Spanish Red Cross had expressed 
their gratitude for the relief supplies of food that had been sent [to] them.’56 Maguire 
was either ill-informed or inclined to fantasy due to his pro-Francoist sympathies 
because the Secretary of the I.R.C.S., Martin MacNamara,  felt obliged to contact 
Joseph Walshe to seek his assistance on 27 October. Walshe wrote to Ontiveros on 
18 November 1943: 
Dear Minister, no communication has been received from the Spanish Red 
Cross by the Irish Red Cross Society or by the Irish Representative in Madrid 
concerning the disposal of the relief supplies sent to the Spanish Red Cross 
Society in the Spring of this year. It would be encouraging to know that this 
first  effort  at  collaboration  between  the  Irish  and  Spanish  Red  Cross  
Societies had been a success, and I shall be grateful; if you can let us have 
information as soon as possible.57
Ontiveros had known since the 7 August that there was a major problem with the 
relief  aid  organised  by  the  I.R.C.S.  but  he  chose  to  deliberately  withhold  this 
information in the hope that the news of the scandal would not surface in Dublin. On 
14 August  Jordana wrote  to  Ontiveros  that  if  Irish ears heard of  the calamity  it 
would  diminish  the  ‘prestige  and  noble  tradition  of  Spain’  in  the  eyes  of  the 
‘generous  donors’  who  had  so  willingly  contributed  to  the  effort.58 Even  after 
Walshe’s letter Ontiveros did nothing in his report to Madrid to convey Dublin’s 
concerns for the well-being of the refugees. It was left to Kerney to inform Dublin 
about  what  had transpired.  Since 15 June the relief  aid  had been held up at  the 
Spanish border because the custom authorities wanted to charge import duty on the 
goods.59 The problem was that the import duty amounted to the cost of the goods. On 
16 June Kerney had met a senior official in the S.R.C.S., the Count of Granja, to 
56 Report of the Chairman of the Irish Red Cross Society, 1943, p. 212. 
57 Letter from Joseph Walshe to Ontiveros, 18 Nov. 1943 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2149/E21). 
58 General Jordana to _____, 14 Aug. 1943 (ibid.). 
59 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 9 Aug. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895). 
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discuss  the  problem  and  see  would  the  authorities  be  willing  to  transfer  the 
ownership of the goods to his name.60 As a diplomat, Kerney would not have to pay 
import duty and the cargo could continue on its way to the camps of northern Spain. 
Bureaucratic  delays  between  the  customs  authorities,  the  Ministries  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  Finance  delayed  the  consignment  for  so  long  that  by  August  ‘the 
potatoes  had already rotted.’61 The S.R.C.S.  was  unable  to  pay the duty and the 
Falange’s  social  wing,  Auxilio  Social,  seized  the  consignment.  This  was  another 
major  blunder.  The  British  Passport  Control  Officer  in  Madrid,  Mr  Crofton, 
confidentially informed his Irish counterparts that ‘Germany had secured possession 
of  all  of  the  supplies’.62 Their  information  was  understood  to  come  from  a 
trustworthy and reliable source. 
The  whole  enterprise  was  a  rude awakening to  senior  officials  in  Dublin 
because  they  now  understood  the  depth  of  corruption  prevalent  in  the  regime, 
something Kerney had been repeatedly flagging for some time. The Falange had 
seized control of the aid so that individual members could sell it on the black market 
and make a handsome return.  The Secretary General  of the S.R.C.S., Dr Valero, 
privately scolded the behaviour of the Government which had made him ‘very much 
upset’ owing to the humanitarian need in the country and the sincerity of the Irish 
donation.63 But neither he nor his colleagues could express their indignation publicly 
as it ‘would land them in prison.’64 Valero wanted to bestow some award on Colonel 
McKinney,  Captain  Healy  or  ‘some  senior  ecclesiastic’  but  Kerney  objected.65 
Officially the Falange claimed that the consignment of peas had been given to the 
‘needy  populace’  of  Madrid  and  that  the  powdered  milk  was  distributed  to 
institutions  for  child  assistance.66 Walshe,  a  devout  Catholic,  and,  in  Dermot 
Keogh’s words ‘an enthusiast for Catholic Europe’,67 had hoped that this gesture by 
Ireland would foster a new progressive direction in Irish-Spanish relations based on 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 P. J. O’Byrne to the Department of External Affairs, 1 Oct. 1943 (ibid.). 
63 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 11 Feb. 1944 (ibid.). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 31 Dec. 1943 (ibid.). 
66 Kerney to _____, 15 Feb. 1944 (ibid.). 
67 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988), p. 23.
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Christian charity and humanitarian concerns, did not mince his words in a note to 
Kerney.  The  whole  scheme was ‘a  complete  failure’.68 The  Spanish  regime  was 
riddled with ‘incompetency’  at  every level  and those who needed the aid would 
suffer  the  most  as  a  consequence:  ‘it  appears  that  only  a  few pairs  of  blankets 
actually reached the refugees.’69 
With Ireland firmly opposed to a politically  orientated  neutral  bloc under 
Spanish hegemony, the regime decided to continue to disseminate peaceful overtures 
on  its  own.  On 9  May 1943,  at  Almería,  Franco  spoke before  cheering  crowds 
declaring that a stalemate in the struggle had come about in the war as neither ‘of the 
belligerents has the strength to destroy his opponent.’70 On 16 April General Jordana 
spoke before diplomatic  officials  in a speech designed to portray Franco’s peace 
initiatives as a process in keeping with history.71 Spain had spread the word of God 
in Columbus’s voyage of discovery,  and then, as now, Spain ‘feeds herself at the 
same  vital  spring  of  the  Catholic  Kings.’72 The  Francoist  State’s  ‘essence’  was 
equated  to  ‘the  Castile  of  Isabella,  and  that  Kingdom of  Aragon,  Catalonia  and 
Valencia of Ferdinand the Catholic.’73 Spain’s ‘dispassionate’ plea for a ‘just and 
fraternal  peace’  would not only save millions  of lives but  forestall  Communist’s 
insidious encroachment on European civilisation.74 For all Franco’s endeavours the 
Allies  dismissed  the  regime’s  mediation  role  on  the  grounds  that  only  the  total 
unconditional capitulation of all Axis forces would save European civilisation.
June-December, 1943
The British tip-off that  a large bulk of the Irish relief  aid had been given to the 
Germans should not have come as a shock given Kerney’s reports on the regime’s 
openly pro-Axis sentiments. A file entitled ‘Trade Statistics to the Axis and Allies’ 
located in the vaults of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as a firm 
68 Joseph Walshe to Kerney, 3 July 1944 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 243/895). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Speech delivered by Francisco Franco in Almería, 9 May 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
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72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
166
rebuke to apologist historians and an indicator of both the pro-Axis nature of the 
regime and the enormous difficulties that confronted Jordana.75 The discovery of this 
file challenges recent scholarly research, which relied too heavily on U.S. figures, 
which  claimed  that  in  1942 and  1943 the  Allies  were  pre-emptively  buying  up 
Spanish products to prevent their export to Germany.76 This in fact did not occur 
until  later  in  the  war.  Exports  of  food and drink  to  Germany  and Italy  totalled 
153,413 tons in 1943 whilst in comparison exports to the United States and Britain 
only  totalled  67,814  tons.  Of  even  greater  significance  were  exports  of  metal, 
minerals and manufactured goods to Germany and Italy in the same period which 
approximated to 10,962 tons to just twelve tons for the Allies.  One prized mineral 
was wolframite,77 a principal ore of tungsten and an important constituent in many 
industrial processes and machine tools, which was an essential commodity for the 
German  war  industry,  particularly  for  the  manufacturing  of  internal  bores  for 
artillery guns.78 Spain was one of  the  principal  suppliers  of this  material  and its 
continued export to Germany was another indispensable act of assistance it rendered. 
Throughout the course of the war the regime exported 62,770 tons of essential metal, 
mineral and manufactured materials to the Axis powers, and only 1,162 tons to the 
Allies.79 Due principally to the overwhelming pro-Fascist composition of the regime 
at the most senior and administrative levels of the State, it was a titanic struggle for 
Jordana to overcome these challenges on his aspirations for a neutral foreign policy. 
Although Spain  received  imports  of  food from the  Allied  powers,  it  was 
Argentina that supplied essential  wheat imports to keep the nation alive in 1943. 
What makes the above file so astonishing is that it  is documented proof that  the 
regime continued to export food out of the country in the knowledge that the food 
situation internally had not stabilised. As early as the 5 February Kerney attended a 
meeting with Doussinague during which the socio-economic state of the nation was 
75 File headed ‘Trade Statistics to the Axis and Allies’ (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3148/E8). 
76 See Leonard Carvana  & Hugh Rockoff,  ‘A wolfram in sheep’s clothing:  economic warfare in 
Spain, 1940-1944’ in Journal of Economic History, lxiii (2003), pp 100-26.
77 For a good account on this product see Christian Leitz, Economic relations between Nazi Germany 
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78 J. L. Parragon,  A concise guide to rocks and minerals (Bath, 2008), p. 89. Nickel and zinc were 
other exports sent to Germany.  
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discussed. Kerney could not have known the extent of food exports out of Spain but 
he was aware of its occurrence. Doussinague acknowledged that both ‘misery and 
starvation’  were  prevalent  conditions  everywhere.80 The  cities  in  particular  were 
suffering the most: ‘[conditions in] some of the suburbs of Madrid, and of other big 
cities,  were  extremely  bad’,  Doussinague  admitted.81 Their  poverty  was  further 
aggravated by the continued repression of the State against its own citizens. At the 
meeting Kerney did not disclose his knowledge of concentration camps like Miranda 
de Ebro, where women waited outside for weeks on end for news of their husbands’ 
fate,  but  Doussinague  did  contend  that  the  regime  was  trying  to  better  these 
problems  in  order  to  prevent  a  resurgence  from the  left.  His  actual  solution  to 
handling  leftist  sectors  in  society,  as  Head  of  the  Permanent  Inter-Ministerial 
Commission for the Sending of Workers to Germany, was to transport thousands of 
workers to Germany to help in the construction of Hitler’s Atlantic Wall. 
The departure of Súñer had done little to curtail the assistance that senior 
officials in the regime provided the Axis. It was not until years after the war that 
previously classified material  was published in the public domain that irrefutably 
confirmed the British Ambassador’s declaration in his post-war memoirs:  ‘By no 
stretch of the imagination could Spanish non-belligerency be regarded as genuine 
neutrality.’82 After the defeat of the Axis in North Africa the Allied High Command 
had decided to invade Europe from the south. The first objective was the capture of 
Sicily and defeat of all Axis air, naval and land units on the island, which would free 
up the entire Mediterranean for the inevitable invasion of mainland Italy.83 In order 
to  deceive  the  German  High  Command  a  section  of  British  Intelligence  that 
specialised in deception planning, B1A, had initiated a plan codenamed Operation 
Mincemeat.84 A  body  dressed  in  uniform  carrying  false  official  documents  was 
washed ashore off Huelva, Spain. The documents outlined the entire Allied naval 
plan for an invasion of Greece.  As expected the Spanish authorities immediately 
passed on all this information to the Germans who, after investigation, believed the 
80 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 8 Feb. 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
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documents to be authentic. This covert assistance to Germany could not have been 
done without Franco’s prior approval but it proved rather disadvantageous on this 
occasion, as the entire plan was a forgery which masked the real destination of the 
armada. In the end the Allied troops landed in Sicily with the deception operation 
saving countless lives by diverting large numbers of German divisions to Greece. 
Given  the  miniscule  size  of  the  Legation  in  Madrid,  the  restriction  of 
movement  caused by petrol  rationing  and censorship of  the press,  Kerney could 
never have been in a position to discover such damning facts about the regime. He 
had  to  operate  with  imperfect  knowledge  and  develop  contacts  within  the 
Diplomatic Corps that could help in his mission to observe and comment on Spanish 
neutrality  for  Irish  concerns.  One  theme  that  he  constantly  focused  on  was  the 
persecution  of  the  State  against  its  own  citizens.  In  four  separate  reports,  three 
entitled  ‘Death  Sentences’  and  one  entitled  ‘Executions’,  he  exposed,  through 
informants  and  confidential  contacts,  the  gruesome  and  sinister  scale  of  the 
retribution,  the  extent  to  which  it  turned  neighbour  against  neighbour,  and  the 
military’s role in the macabre process.
The first report compiled on 8 June concerned a group of people on trial for 
alleged Communist activities. Kerney’s informant was a devout Basque Catholic and 
ardent anti-Communist who was ‘pulling every string to save the life of his nephew, 
one of the condemned men.’85 The condemned man was on trial for his life on a 
charge of ‘having endeavoured to re-organise the communist party’.86 There was no 
shortage  of  witnesses  to  corroborate  the  charges  against  him.  Many  who  had 
supported Franco in the Spanish Civil War and who had lost relatives as a result, 
held  a  bitter  ‘vindictiveness’  towards  those  who  had  lost.87 Their  attitude  was 
‘unforgiving’  and  they  continuously  denounced  those  in  the  Basque  regions: 
especially ‘in places like Santander, Bilbao and towns of smaller size, life is made 
difficult if not impossible for any who were associated with the “red” side.’88 Kerney 
was aware of one such woman, who had lost her husband and son during the conflict 
and who was not sparing in her efforts ‘to see that sentences of death’ should be 
85 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 8 June 1943 (L.K.P.A.). 
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meted out by the military, whose courts carried out such sentences ‘with so much 
ease’.89 
In  Kerney’s  opinion,  all  this  killing  would  only  exacerbate  the  schisms 
within Spanish society and in particular between the upper classes and the working 
classes, yet the military believed it was defending the interests of the State. Not even 
the infrequent appeals of ecclesiastics could halt the persecution. On 17 June Kerney 
reported  that  there  were  ‘150  persons  awaiting  execution  in  one  Madrid  prison 
[Porlier] alone.’90 The Papal Nuncio, the Vatican’s representative to Spain, had tried 
to intercede with the Minister for War, General Cabanillas, and with Franco himself, 
on behalf of a ‘Basque nationalist’.91 His efforts were unsuccessful as the regime 
was determined to unmask all its enemies and solidify its position through the use of 
arbitrary  terror  that  was  unrestricted  by  law.  There  was  no  compunction  of 
conscience in arresting women and the Irish Minister was aware of several girls of 
‘high moral character’ who had been arrested for allegedly ‘ridiculing the head of 
the  State’  and  for  passing  on  ‘military  information  to  France’.92 They  faced  a 
mandatory thirty-year imprisonment sentence if found guilty by the court. 
On 23 September Kerney passed on information he received from an officer 
attached to a military court.93 The young officer imparted what it  was like to be 
present at an execution. His job was to sign the death sentence of the court and to be 
present at the execution site to ensure that the sentence was carried out. Normally 
the  condemned  were shot  in  batches  ‘usually  about  40’.94 The men  were ‘roped 
together,  wrist  to  wrist’  and  marched  towards  the  firing  squads  which  normally 
consisted  of  ten  or  twelve  soldiers.95 The  officer  stated  that  invariably  ‘a  man 
awaiting his turn to be shot often has a dead or dying neighbour pulling him down 
on  one  side.’96 These  reliable  reports  contradict  Julius  Ruiz’s  statement  that  a 
Government order of January 1940 marked a ‘turning point’ in the killings and from 
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then on executions were uncommon.97 Kerney’s reliable contacts reached into the 
upper  echelons  of  the  regime  to  ‘a  member  of  the  Government’.98 He informed 
Dublin  that  at  a  meeting  of  Ministers  it  was  proposed  to  commute  470  death 
sentences and to carry out ‘44 other death sentences’.99 At the highest levels of State 
the Cabinet knew and sanctioned executions. One must also bear in mind that in 
addition to the killings the regime was forcing thousands of Republican prisoners to 
work as  slaves  to  build  an  enormous  monument  in  Cuelgamoros  Valley outside 
Madrid for the Nationalist dead.100 This project had begun in 1940 and took over 
eighteen  years  to  complete.  Franco  personally  chose  the  site  which  from  an 
engineering perspective was most unsuitable. The whole topography of the land was 
composed of granite, yet the regime only supplied the prisoners with basic tools and 
primitive machinery.  The project  cost  a fortune at  a time when the nation could 
hardly  feed  itself.  Like  Hitler  and  Mussolini,  Franco  wanted  a  monument  of 
gargantuan proportions that would project his greatness and power in architectural 
form. Carved inside the granite hill was an ornate basilica and atop of the hill stood a 
500-foot cross. When it was completed the site became known as the Valley of the 
Fallen or  Valle de los Caídos; a more apt name for the fallen that had died in its 
construction. 
 That a democratic State like Ireland, which prided itself on a constitution 
that enshrined and recognised the rights and civil liberties of its people, continued to 
maintain diplomatic relations with a regime in the face of overwhelming evidence of 
genocide is in itself  an indictment  of its foreign policy.  Irish foreign policy was 
always regarded by de Valera to be an expression of sovereignty above all else and a 
reason why he held such a keen interest in promoting good international relations 
with neighbouring States. One can only surmise that these critical reports were being 
handed by Joseph Walshe to him. It would seem inconceivable that a senior civil 
servant would withhold such critical reports from his Minister. De Valera’s eyesight 
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was  quite  bad  by  this  stage  and  several  files  in  the  National  Archives  contain 
handwritten notes by other Secretaries of other Departments which state that they 
had read certain files out to him.101 If Walshe did not withhold these files from his 
Minister,  and  Dermot  Keogh  has  acknowledged  Walshe’s  ‘single-minded 
commitment to the service of the Irish State’,102 then how could de Valera not act or 
be moved to respond to them? Were these not crimes against humanity in which the 
victims had no legal counsel, no right to an appeal’s court or to be tried before a civil 
court? Did the Irish Government not have a moral conscience to know the difference 
between right and wrong? 
The reversal of fortunes for the Axis powers in the summer of 1943 led many 
in the Diplomatic Corps to believe that Franco’s supreme position was once again in 
the balance.  Internally  pressure was also mounting within certain  sections  of the 
regime for a return of the Monarchy. Kerney’s meticulous analysis of the situation as 
it stood on the ground ran contrary to most other diplomats’ perceptions: ‘I have 
carefully analysed all Franco’s speeches and studied his attitude, and I am convinced 
that he will not willingly abandon his position as Head of State until after the war, 
even if then.’103 His judgement was based partly on the increasingly apparent skill of 
the dictator – an astute politician – in balancing the divergent sectors of the regime, 
which was attested by his handling of the former Commander of the Blue Division, 
General Muñoz Grandes. Hitler had bestowed the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves on 
Muñoz  Grandes  for  his  command  of  the  Spanish  units  in  Russia  and  because 
privately  he  hoped  the  general  would  oust  Franco  in  a  bid  to  undermine  the 
increasingly neutralist soundings of the regime. Franco had recalled Grandes after 
the award ceremony and placed him in command of his personal household. In close 
contact with the Caudillo and away from his troops Grandes could be watched and 
manipulated to ensure his unswerving loyalty to Franco. 
Throughout 1943 Jordana had gradually repositioned Spain away from non-
belligerency  towards  respectable  neutrality.  He  was  finally  rewarded  for  all  his 
endeavours when Franco declared neutrality on 1 October. Other encouraging signs 
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that indicated Spain’s repositioning were reported by Kerney on 23 November. The 
Blue Division was being disbanded and returned home from active frontline combat: 
‘My colleagues here appear to be unanimous in their belief that the men are being 
brought back to Spain gradually in batches’.104 It had been a meeting held on 21 
August that had decidedly exposed Franco. That day the British Ambassador had 
travelled to Franco’s own version of Hitler’s “Berchtesgaden”, the Pazo de Meirás in 
Galicia. The Caudillo went there every summer to escape Madrid and reinvigorate 
himself with daily hunts in the surrounding forests. But on that day the tranquillity 
was broken by Hoare’s arrival and both Franco and Jordana had to listen to a two-
hour rebuke from the British Ambassador on the overwhelming pro-Axis sympathies 
of the regime. He castigated Franco on the behaviour of the Falange, the Spanish 
pretence to neutrality, the active participation of the Blue Division in fighting an ally 
of  His  Majesty’s  Government,  the  espionage  activities  of  hundreds  of  German 
agents  in  Spain and the continued existence  of  a  German Consulate  in  Tangier. 
Hoare was also angry at Franco over Plan D and the latter’s attempts to induce an 
atmosphere of peace between the warring factions which would have left Germany 
geo-strategically consolidated as the strongest continental power in Europe.  
That it took Jordana over a year to convince Franco that neutrality was in 
Spain’s best interest  is a testament  to the latter’s  belief  in the New Order which 
Christian  Leitz  has  argued,  ‘did  not  vanish’  until  near  the  war’s  end.105 This 
commitment to the Axis had resulted in abject  misery for the ordinary people of 
Spain whose lives were ones of indescribable toil and suffering. The dictator by his 
own actions had antagonised the Allies and supplies of fuel were all but running out 
as the winter of 1943 set in. Many of the annual events in the diplomatic calendar 
were poorly attended because there was not enough petrol for the diplomats to make 
it to the assigned event. In one incident Kerney had to get a lift from a colleague 
despite the Escorial being only an hour’s drive outside Madrid. Flights out of the 
country were grounded owing to lack of fuel. Even short-range flights with Iberia 
from Madrid to Lisbon were suspended. Ireland could do little to assist the ordinary 
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people in their  plight  and the outcome of the relief  effort  had left  a long-lasting 
impression on senior officials  in Dublin.  It  was becoming apparent  that  only the 
kindness of the Allies could secure an uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs, clothing 
and fuel for the domestic economy. The conditions sought by the Allies were that 
Spain  stay  out  of  the  war  and  stop  assisting  Germany.  Yet  incredibly  Franco 
continued  to  allow  German  agents  freedom  to  carry  out  unimpeded  espionage 
activities and to supply Hitler with ample stocks of wolframite. It was the ordinary 
people who would suffer as a consequence of their leader’s actions in 1944. Jordana 
knew this  and  recorded  in  his  diary  a  letter  he  wrote  to  Franco  requesting  the 
dismissal from office of the Falangist Cabinet Ministers. He confided that ‘my fight 
has been titanic’ to realign Spain away from the Axis.106
January-December, 1944
The Spanish Government published its budgetary estimates for 1944 in the Boletín  
Oficial  del  Estado.  When  compared  to  the  1941  budget,  these  estimates  were 
astounding  because  they  documented  the  figures  set  aside  for  the  military  and 
security organs of the State.107 The figures revealed the main priority of Franco – the 
entrenching of the regime in power rather than the urgent requirements for State-led 
investment in reconstruction, agricultural production or industrial output. The army 
alone was assigned 1,990 million pesetas for 1944, a ninety per cent increase from 
its 1941 budget. The Ministry of the Interior was allotted 1,164 million pesetas, an 
increase of thirty-three per cent on the 1941 budget. The vaguely defined ‘Action in 
106 Francisco Gómez-Jordana Souza, Milicia y diplomacia: los diarios del Conde de Jordana, 1936-
1944 (Burgos, 2002), p. 227. 
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Morocco’ submissions for the year amounted to 582 million pesetas, an increase of 
ninety per cent in just three years. As Head of State, Franco was to receive a fifty per 
cent increase for this office alone, irrespective of the other positions he held and 
emoluments he enjoyed. The Ministry of Agriculture was assigned just 86 million 
pesetas for the entire year yet the navy enjoyed a budget of 341 million pesetas. At a 
time when Spain was still impoverished and its people living at a subsistence level a 
further 432 million pesetas was allocated for the Ministry of Air. How could the 
nation recover economically if such sums were not being directed and channelled 
into recovery? It seemed to Kerney to be a gross neglect of responsibility yet for 
Franco  the  overriding  concern  was  power  retention  and  that  was  based  on  the 
support of the military and the security organs, not on the people. 
On  1  February  the  Allies  imposed  an  economic  blockade  on  Spain  for 
consistent  breaches  of  neutrality.  The  Falangist  organ  Arriba  responded  with 
incredulity to the embargo by arguing that Spain had always supported the Allied 
cause.108 The  leading  article  declared  that  despite  the  ethnological,  political, 
historical,  cultural and geographical links that united the country with Africa, the 
regime had abandoned any pretence to imperialist expansion there so that the desert 
war  would  not  escalate.  The  newspaper  argued that  Spanish  participation  in  the 
North African theatre would have led to countless American casualties. Franco had 
chosen  instead  to  maintain  neutrality  ‘inflexibly’  and  to  look  after  the  national 
interest of reconstruction first.109 The regime could clearly see that the overwhelming 
economic strength of the United States far exceeded anything Britain could muster 
and it hoped to drive a wedge between the two Allies by appealing to the United 
States rather than Britain to end the embargo. 
The  regime  initiated a  month-long  press  campaign  to  challenge  the 
legitimacy  of  the  embargo  and  to  defend  its  neutral  policy.  On  4  February  Ya 
reminded the Spanish people that Franco had promoted the ‘geographic and spiritual 
links’  with  Portugal  through the  signing  of  the  Bloque  Ibérico to  safeguard  the 
peninsula: ‘At all times Spanish diplomacy has put its effort, its maximum interest 
108 Arriba, 3 Feb. 1944. 
109 Ibid. 
175
and capability to the service of humanitarian ideals’.110 The cult of personality was 
resurrected to imply that Franco’s guiding hand had been ever present throughout 
the war. In El Español neutrality was claimed to have been realised through the ‘true 
fortitude  of  a  State’  that  was  ‘cemented’  in  union by Franco.111 This  newspaper 
argued that it was the nation’s ‘common luck’ to have such a peace-loving statesman 
as Franco at the helm navigating the ship of State through turbulent waters.112 That 
he could do this against the backdrop of a world war was truly a phenomenon, it 
contended.  The article  went  on to  state  that  the petrol  embargo was ‘a  coercive 
measure’  and  hoped that  the  United  States  would  appreciate  ‘the  nobility  of  its 
[Spain’s] attitude throughout the different phases of the present conflict’.113   
Even the monarchist daily A.B.C. toed the official line.114 Like Arriba it tried 
to blame the British for instigating the embargo in the hope of dividing the two 
western  Allies.  It  blamed  the  British  press  for  publishing  scurrilous  articles  that 
undermined Spain’s genuine efforts to promote neutrality. However, the newspaper 
did not provide examples of these damning articles, nor did it go into detail about 
why the Allies had decided politically to implement an embargo. Instead it relied on 
more  generic  terminology  that  claimed  that  it  had  all  come  as  a  ‘surprise’  to 
everyone that this drastic deterioration in relations had culminated in a blockade of 
petrol imports.115 On 15 February the newspaper again toed the official line in an 
article  entitled  ‘Neutrality  and Our Internal  Policy.’116 The article  reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of the State and its leader by contending that the majority of the ‘national 
will’ had supported Franco’s assumption of office from the first days of the rising 
and invoked the memory ‘of our dead’ to speak from the grave.117 Needless to say 
nothing concerning the repeated breaches by the regime of the Hague Convention on 
Neutral Powers was mentioned.
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Ireland too found itself blockaded by the Allies but that was as a direct result 
of the military concentration of force in the western theatre in preparation for the 
cross-Channel invasion of France. It had nothing to do with exports of industrial 
goods  to  Germany,  erection  of  Abwehr radio  transmission  stations  or  other 
clandestine assistance to German U-Boats because de Valera never carried out such 
acts. Spain, by contrast,  was still  sending wolframite by the ton to Germany and 
permitting agents to carry out espionage activities. Through his close contacts in the 
Allied  Embassies,  Kerney learned  that  Franco had  been  given  a  list  of  Gestapo 
agents  in  Spain,  alleged  to  be  responsible  for  sabotage,  and  requested  their 
expulsion. The Argentinean Ambassador informed his Irish colleague that whilst the 
official  figures for German residents in the country stood at 8,000, it  was in fact 
60,000.118 If even a portion of these individuals were engaged in espionage activities 
and were not being pursued by the Spanish authorities, it was ‘difficult to reconcile’ 
with Franco’s declaration of strict neutrality.119 Why also was the German Embassy 
in  Spain the largest  the Third Reich had abroad in comparison to  the minuscule 
Legation in Dublin? Why had Ireland arrested and interned for the duration of the 
war all Abwehr agents who had parachuted into the country or any I.R.A. members 
suspected of collusion with the  Abwehr to organise resistance cells  to the Allied 
presence in Northern Ireland? The answer is that the latter nation upheld a strict code 
of neutrality as expounded by its political leader whilst the former actively conspired 
to assist a belligerent with the tacit support of its political leader. It was for these 
reasons that the Allies had imposed an embargo on Spain. 
Like de Valera, Franco frequently met the Third Reich representative in the 
country in order to discuss critical matters of interest to both nations but, unlike de 
Valera, the Caudillo spent more time with Axis diplomats than Allied diplomats. On 
17  March  1944  he  spent  an  incredible  two  and  a  half  hours  with  the  German 
Ambassador,  Hans  Heinrich  Dieckhoff.120 Jordana  was  in  attendance  and  was 
informed by Dieckhoff that ever since the Allied conference in Teheran the Allies 
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had resolved  to  ‘destroy neutral  countries’.121 He argued that  Spain should align 
itself more with its historic ally Ireland because that nation had refused ‘to break 
with the Axis’.122 He raised the issue of the embargo as a clear indication of Allied 
contempt for Spanish integrity: ‘the most important thing is for Spain the triumph of 
Germany.’123 The implication of Dieckhoff’s remark was that the fascist composition 
of the Francoist State would not be tolerated by the Allies if Germany lost the war 
therefore it  was in Franco’s interests  to support Hitler.  To Jordana’s despair,  the 
Caudillo still refused to break with Hitler. 
On  1  April  Kerney  had  acquired  information  from  General  Tella  that 
revealed a break in relations between the pretender to the Spanish throne, Don Juan 
de Borbón and Franco.124 Tella was a former commander of the Foreign Legion in 
Melilla and had served in combat for eleven years alongside Franco in Africa. The 
letter was written on 14 February and recorded Don Juan’s ‘disconformity’ with the 
policies of the regime that were ruining the nation.125 He put on record his ‘lack of 
solidarity’ with the regime in a ‘clearly defined’ manner.126 For the ordinary people 
the pretender was the one ray of hope in their lives to unite the nation again and 
rebuild Spain on a sound socio-political basis. He dismissed Franco’s argument that 
he  could  not  resign  because  the  national  revolution  had  yet  to  be  realised.  He 
attacked the Falange for its assaults ‘with impunity on the monarchical institution 
and on the monarchists in official speeches and in the press obedient to the orders of 
the Ministry of the Interior.’127 He affirmed that the Monarchy was the ‘only lasting 
and practicable solution’ for the nation’s future.128
 On  that  same  day  he  received  this  letter  from  General  Tella,  Kerney 
commentated on the annual victory parade held each year through the main street of 
Madrid. The parade was not as impressive as in previous years because the Allied 
embargo  had  forced  the  army to  use  cavalry  rather  than  mechanised  units.  For 
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Kerney the whole event served merely to ‘remind the vanquished of their defeat’ and 
was  becoming  ‘less  and  less’  popular  each  year.129 Yet  it  was  in  the  regime’s 
interests  to  keep  alive  the  bitter  wounds  and  memories  of  that  conflict.  Chants 
calling for the recapture of Gibraltar resounded throughout the entire occasion in the 
presence of the British Ambassador. Jordana confided in his diary: ‘When will this 
nonsense end which  causes  so much harm without  any positive  result  except  to 
further  prejudice  ourselves?’130 In  contrast  to  Spain,  the  Irish Government  never 
once organised any anti-partition rally during the war and de Valera enjoyed cordial 
relations  with  the  British  representative  to  Ireland,  Sir  John Maffey.  One could 
acknowledge that Irish neutrality was favourable to the Allies as the cause for which 
they were fighting was beyond dispute, a view supported by Ronan Fanning.131
Jordana’s tireless struggle to promote neutrality was  beginning to affect his 
health.  Stressed,  working  long  hours,  constantly  receiving  complaints  from  the 
Allied Ambassadors and beginning to show signs of depression, he felt the burden of 
responsibility weighing heavily on his shoulders. Like de Valera, Jordana worked 
himself to the point of exhaustion in the interests of his nation and it told on his face 
as he aged beyond his years. His diary entry for 14 April noted how depressed he 
had become. Jordana’s health was not a concern to Franco who lived in opulence 
and  splendour  in  his  palace  of  El  Pardo.  On 21  April  Franco  and  Jordana  met 
Dieckhoff again who insisted that Germany was prepared to fight to the death for 
victory rather than reach any accommodation with the Allies. Everyone in the room 
knew that a massive armada was assembling in southern England on a scale never 
before  witnessed.  At  this  critical  time  Dieckhoff  requested  Franco  to  continue 
supplying  German  industry  with  tons  of  wolframite.  Franco  did  not  refuse  the 
request but did declare that ‘for us the moment to enter the war has passed’.132 It was 
a tacit acknowledgement that he had thought long and hard about it but had been 
held back because of the dire socio-economic condition of Spain. And so it had been 
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proven that not until the eleventh hour did Franco stop believing that the war had 
turned irrevocably against the Axis. For Jordana the declaration was like a bolt of 
lightning from the sky that justified all his efforts and endeavours to extricate Spain 
from its  ties  with  Germany.  When  the  Allied  armies  landed  on  the  beaches  of 
Normandy on 6 June Jordana was still at his desk ‘working with the same faith for 
Spain.’133 In less than two months he was dead. 
The implosion of Hitler’s thousand-year Reich forced Franco to focus on his 
survival by stressing his adhesion to strict neutrality.  Posters were printed by the 
Department of Propaganda for public dissemination stating that ‘Franco Maintains 
Spanish Peace’.134 The world was depicted in flames with a biblical winged demon 
astride  a  war  horse  and  armed  with  a  sword  reigning  death  and  destruction  on 
mankind.  By contrast,  Spain was portrayed as safe from the conflagration due to 
Franco’s prudence. The ordinary citizens could never have known how close their 
leader brought them to the brink of destruction and how their lives would continue to 
be affected in the post-war period as a direct consequence of his negligence. Posters 
like these reminded the people that if Franco was replaced by the pretender to the 
throne or ousted through a military coup the nation would once again collapse into 
anarchy. Using the example of Mussolini, the regime wanted the people to believe 
that  their  leader  worked  every  hour  of  every  day  in  the  service  of  the  State. 
Whatever message the regime wanted to disseminate to the ordinary people the fact 
remained that every German setback on the battlefield affected Spanish neutrality in 
much the same way as it affected Ireland in that the survival of both nations became 
predicated on Allied goodwill. Both nations knew that their wartime conduct would 
be  judged  analytically  and  with  probable  criticism  which  would  have  major 
repercussions for their  people in the post-war era.  Neither  felt  they had behaved 
dishonourably. 
During one of his frequent trips to Portugal to supply the Legation and his 
family with food, clothing and other essentials, the Irish Minister noted that when he 
travelled back into Spain by way of Badajoz he saw eighty citizens being detained 
133 Ibid., p. 293. 
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by the Guardia Civil for suspected Communist activities.135 Security concerns were 
so heightened that all of Spain’s borders were under constant supervision and for 
once the threat was a real one. The successful invasion of Normandy and Allied 
advances  in  northern France had accorded exiled Republicans  the opportunity to 
invade Spain in October. Although defeated, they remained a lasting problem for the 
regime  because  splinter  groups  using  guerrilla  tactics  operated  in  remote 
mountainous terrain from where they launched attacks against security forces until 
the early 1950s. The fact that the Republicans were able to enter Spain unopposed 
for so long proved that the regime never viewed any German invasion threat  as 
probable despite post-war propaganda claims to the contrary.  Otherwise, why did 
significant divisions deployed on the frontier with France not prevent this invasion 
force  from entering  Catalonia?  The  answer  is  that  the  army had  positioned  the 
majority  of  its  forces  along  the  borders  with  Gibraltar,  Morocco  and  Portugal 
throughout the war – which were all areas it had hoped to conquer.
Rumour  had  spread  that  these  ‘Reds’  had  marched  as  far  as  Huesca  in 
Aragon and Pamplona – the capital city of Navarre, and ‘in every village raided by 
them they killed the priest, the doctor and the Alcalde [Mayor].’136 It is not beyond 
probability that many of these rumours could have come from official channels in 
the hope of keeping alive the myth that Spain would be dragged again into anarchy 
if Franco was replaced as Head of State. Kerney was aware of underground leftist 
organisations  such  as  Junta  Suprema  de  Unión  Nacional  because  he  received 
propaganda  leaflets  from  them  which  detailed  forty  prisoners  it  claimed  were 
awaiting execution in Alcalá de Henares prison near Madrid.137 He informed Dublin 
that the reason they chose to contact him was that an appeal to a democratic nation 
which  valued  and  respected  human  rights  might  ‘save  the  lives  of  the  doomed 
men’.138 It did not but the fact that such a sizeable group of Republican fighters had 
infiltrated mainland Spain forced Franco to increase his  security precautions.  He 
bolstered his bodyguard detail to 800 men. Wherever he went so did they; sworn to 
protect him with their lives. Unfortunately for the daily life of ordinary people the 
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military  used  the  Red  fear  to  continue  cleansing  the  populace  of  undesirable 
elements.  On  Christmas  Eve  rumours  of  arrests  ranging  from  400-600  reached 
Kerney’s attention. 
In November  Franco  gave  an  extraordinary  interview  to  United  Press, 
described by Paul Preston as ‘disingenuous’,139 to defend his regime from the stigma 
of Axis collaboration in the hope of currying favour with right-wing public opinion 
in the United States. He argued during the well-staged interview that Spain had been 
neutral  from the beginning  of  the  war  and that,  unlike  Italy,  it  had  not  invaded 
France when that country was on its knees. He highlighted the Catholicism of the 
regime by outlining how it had followed the Vatican’s example by not associating 
with nations that did not uphold moral values and human rights. When asked about 
the Blue Division he responded that it had been formed spontaneously and without 
official sanction. Six days later at the annual commemorative mass for the founder 
of the Falange José Antonio Primo de Rivera the Caudillo acknowledged the party 
with an upraised right arm salute. He still could not completely detach himself from 
Fascism and as Kerney correctly predicted, he would not dissolve the Falange but 
rather keep the party in operation even if that meant it became the only officially 
sanctioned fascist party in Europe after the war: ‘[the] Falange is to be represented in 
future  as  a  peculiarly  Spanish organisation  of  purely  domestic  concern,  with  no 
external associations or ambitions, and therefore of no special interest for the outside 
world’.140  
Leopold   Kerney and Joseph Walshe 
Joseph Walshe’s ‘secretiveness’ ensured that External Affairs regulated information 
through  a  compartmentalised  system  whereby  only  a  select  few  were  privy  to 
important and often secret information.141 It is essential to examine the relationship 
that existed between Kerney and Walshe and how this relationship affected Irish 
efforts to promote closer bilateral relations with Spain. Walshe was the vital link 
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between the diplomats on the ground in foreign countries and the Minister, who was 
also the Taoiseach. It was through him that all information from below was handled 
and all decisions from above were passed on. But if there were problems at ground 
level where all information was acquired through meticulous analysis, observation 
and  evaluation  by  diplomats  than  this  could  have  devastating  consequences  for 
overall  policy formation  and decision-making at  senior  level.  There was nothing 
wrong  with  Kerney’s  performance  as  a  professional  diplomat  with  decades  of 
experience.  There  were,  however,  difficulties  between  himself  and  Walshe, 
described by Keogh as a ‘complex figure’.142 
Walshe  was  a  reclusive  and  at  times  rather  peculiar  civil  servant  whose 
‘administrative style was secretive in the extreme.’143 He had turned down a possible 
career in the Church but remained devoutly Catholic, ‘strongly anti-Communist and 
anti-left’ throughout his life.144 Like many of his generation his political outlook had 
been shaped by the Irish Civil War. He had remained loyal to the Irish Free State 
and when de Valera had come to power in 1932 he had quickly established a good 
working relationship with the man who had once been ostracised by the Catholic 
Church. Kerney, by contrast, was a convert to Catholicism. He was not theologically 
devout  and  his  decision  to  convert  was  based  primarily  on  professional 
considerations.  He was a committed Nationalist  like Walshe, but after the Treaty 
split  he  chose  to  side  with  de  Valera.  He  remained  in  the  service  of  the  ‘Irish 
Republic’ in France and accepted de Valera’s constitutional path to Republicanism 
once the latter had initiated it. Walshe was aware of Kerney’s conversion to the faith 
and his anti-Treaty stance.145 It often seemed to Kerney that these past incidents were 
held against  him throughout his career long after  they were relevant.  It  was also 
apparent that Walshe was suspicious of Kerney’s wife, Raymonde, because she was 
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French, and he feared that vital matters of national importance could reach the ears 
of the French Quai d’Orsay.
Throughout  his  career  Kerney  had  attached  considerable  importance  to 
promoting better  economic trade between Ireland and the continent.  On 17 April 
1939,  just  seven  days  after  he  had  presented  his  credentials  to  Franco,  Kerney 
commented on the unsatisfactory trade situation between both nations. He sought 
Dublin’s approval to travel to Bilbao to see the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
but by 9 June had received ‘no reply’.146 He decided to go ‘without authorisation’ 
and only received permission on 17 June two months after he had made the request 
and after the trip had been made.147 The outcome of this meeting was that Spain was 
anxious to conclude a trade deal with Ireland as soon as possible.  Kerney wired 
Dublin on 30 August for instructions and again on 2 September but received no 
reply.  On  23  September  he  requested  ‘permission  to  enter  on  preliminary 
negotiations’ but received no reply until 23 October with instructions only to begin 
asking ‘informally’ about the parameters of a trade agreement.148 On that same day 
he responded with trade analysis for the Department as well as draft proposals. Not 
until  4  March  1940  did  he  receive  any  further  instructions  to  begin  formal 
negotiations  on  a  trade  agreement  and  by  31  March  there  were  no  ‘further 
developments.’149
Most diplomatic missions followed a practice whereby its diplomats abroad 
would have the service of two secretaries, a commercial attaché, a military attaché 
and a cultural attaché, as well as several Consuls with sufficient funding to carry out 
a  widespread mission.  Kerney had none of these resources  available  yet  Walshe 
expected  him to  carry out  these  diverse functions  unaided,  a  view supported  by 
Dermot Keogh: ‘He [Walshe] had little empathy for the difficulties experienced by 
envoys abroad.’150 Like many of his contemporaries Kerney was proud of Ireland’s 
political achievements and its formation of an independent foreign policy. He was 
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patriotic and idealistic and one sees this throughout his reports, especially in relation 
to his endeavours to secure the release of Frank Ryan. In another example, he had 
worked for months to secure the repayment of debts owed to Irish companies until 
the Spanish authorities finally agreed to repay the debt even though it had arisen 
during the Spanish Republic’s time in office.151 He was willing to endure financial 
hardship and low pay despite having a young family because in his heart the needs 
of  the  State  came  first.  His  relationship  with  Walshe  who  was  frequently 
‘unreasonable’ and ‘dismissive’ eroded his idealism over time.152 
On 8 July 1940 a  young lady named Olive Byrne  wrote  to  Walshe after 
hearing from friends who had returned from the continent that there was a vacancy 
for  a  Clerical  Officer  in  the  Madrid  Legation.  She  cited  Mother  Aloysious  and 
Mother Consiglio from the Loreto Convent as references that could vouch for her 
character.153 Walshe replied on the 13 July that there was no vacancy even though 
her appointment would have been welcomed by Kerney in Madrid. When Kerney 
had been appointed to his position in 1935 he had been instructed by Walshe to 
source a local clerk-typist who had to be Irish born or of Irish descent. The employee 
chosen  was  Maisie  Donnelly  and  she  was  appointed  only  on  a  weekly  basis 
performing work beyond her job description without any official recognition. She 
remained on temporary contract throughout the war so that the State would not have 
to provide her with a pension. Walshe did allow Kerney the services of a Chargé 
d’Affaires ad interim, Patrick J. O’Byrne, during the war but only on a temporary 
basis and he was quickly dispatched back to Portugal. He was never replaced, with 
Kerney  and  Miss  Donnelly  again  carrying  out  the  entire  functions  of  Ireland’s 
mission in Spain. 
Throughout the war Franco had refused to recognise the diplomatic officials 
of  Belgium,  Denmark,  France,  Greece,  Poland,  Norway,  the  Netherlands  and 
Yugoslavia  thereby  recognising  the  Third  Reich’s  conquest  of  these  States  as 
permanent.  The regime also expelled some of these diplomats  from Spain at  the 
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request  of  the  German  Ambassador,  Kerney  informed  Walshe.  De  Valera  had 
publicly condemned the violation of neutral territories by the  Wehrmacht and the 
Vatican had condemned the invasion of Poland – a staunchly Catholic nation. On 2 
November 1940 Kerney informed Walshe that the regime had expelled the Belgian 
Ambassador  and all  his  staff  from Spain  and that  Arriba had  written  scurrilous 
articles  about  the  Belgian  Ambassador  that  were  ‘unworthy  of  [a]  civilised 
government’.154 He was present with the British and American Ambassador to see 
the Belgian Ambassador off as a token gesture of sympathy on behalf of Ireland. 
Walshe, instead of accepting Kerney’s version of events, argued that the press was 
probably right in the explanation given to justify the expulsion and that in future 
Kerney ought to be more careful for fear of causing any unnecessary incident: 
We cannot afford risk of even minor quarrels with Foreign Governments  
unless on matters directly concerning our own interests.155  
Had Walshe  not  read  the  Irish  Minister’s  reports  about  Arriba  and its  pro-Axis 
outlook?  The  Assistant  Secretary,  Frederick  Boland,  had  been  suspicious  of  the 
Spanish  Minister  to  Ireland  ever  since  his  appointment,  due  to  his  pro-fascist 
inclinations. In contrast, Walshe enjoyed cordial relations with Ontiveros despite the 
controversy the latter  had caused,  especially  in  relation  to  the  arrival  of  Basque 
exiles  to  Ireland  in  June  1940.  On  16  January  1941  Walshe  wrote  to  Kerney 
admonishing him for advising Irish citizens to get out of Spain due to widespread 
poverty in the country and the likelihood that Franco would join in the war on the 
Axis side. Kerney was perplexed that Walshe would believe such statements without 
consulting  him  first  to  verify  its  authenticity:  ‘Please  do  not  believe  any  false 
rumours spread by Spanish Legation. I have taken no such action. Request Spanish 
Minister to justify his attitude by giving details or else to apologize.’156 When no 
such  details  were  forthcoming  he  approached  the  Spanish  Under-Secretary  Juan 
Peche, who expressed his anger with Ontiveros for spreading false rumours. When 
154 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 2 Nov. 1940 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P12/4). 
155 Joseph Walshe to Kerney, 5 Nov. 1940 (ibid.). 
156 Kerney in response to Walshe’s note of 16 Jan. 1941 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 202/482). 
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Walshe heard of this he reproached Kerney for causing ‘mischief’ and ‘friction’ with 
Ireland’s friend.157 It seemed to Kerney that Walshe was completely inconsiderate 
and unsympathetic towards him. On 14 February he wrote a strongly worded note to 
Walshe stating that  ‘you left  me in  the dark’  and not once did he endeavour  to 
challenge the false charges made against him by Ontiveros which impinged on his 
professional reputation.158 
In 1942 a personal financial crisis occurred for Kerney when the Department 
of Finance decided to pay his salary directly to Madrid rather than Lisbon. This had 
a cataclysmic effect for him. In the free market of Lisbon the official exchange rate 
amounted to 120 pesetas to the pound but in Spain’s controlled economy the official 
exchange rate was 46 pesetas to the pound, which effectively cut his salary by more 
than half.159 He wrote to the Department desperately requesting them to immediately 
restore his payments to his account in Lisbon. Walshe did not seem too concerned 
with the issue despite the fact that Kerney and his family could not possibly subsist 
in  such conditions.  He requested to be relocated  and only the repeated threat  of 
resignation ultimately allowed a compromise to be reached whereby a part of his 
wages would be paid into his Lisbon account.
Many Irish families who had relatives abroad during the war were cut off 
from contact due to the exigencies of the war and the strict censorship on all postal 
and telegraphic communications  imposed by the Irish Government.  A file  in  the 
National Archives reveals that Walshe had requested Colonel Dan Bryan, Director 
of Army Military Intelligence,160 to monitor all of Kerney’s private mail, including 
his correspondence with family members in Ireland and France as well  as letters 
addressed to him. When Kerney dispatched his reports to Dublin they were placed in 
a  diplomatic  bag which was sealed for security reasons,  as a broken seal would 
indicate that the bag had been tampered with. Kerney began to notice an unusual 
delay in receiving letters from abroad which could not be accounted for as the Irish 
censorship authorities and other nations’ censorship authorities were not permitted to 
157 Joseph Walshe to Kerney (ibid.). 
158 Kerney to Joseph Walshe, 14 Feb. 1941 (ibid.). 
159 L.K.P.A.  
160 Also commonly referred to as G2. 
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handle the diplomatic bag. In a letter  to a friend it was clear that he knew what 
Walshe was doing. 
Kerney described Finance as ‘pig-headed’ for blocking his bank account and 
threatened to ‘resign my job here.’161 Jokingly he wrote: ‘However, please keep that 
to yourself, I am sure the censor who opens this letter, in the usual careful manner, 
will be equally discreet.’162 He forced Walshe to reveal his hand and on 13 June 
1942 the Secretary sent him a firm rebuke because Colonel Bryan had discovered 
that Kerney had been using the bag to pass on letters from Irish families to their 
loved ones abroad. In Walshe’s opinion the whole matter had caused ‘considerably 
embarrassment’ and was an inexcusable breach of protocol.163 He ordered Kerney to 
stop the practice immediately. Walshe feared that Mrs Kerney might also have been 
sending  confidential  information  to  the  French  which  would  jeopardise  Irish 
neutrality.  That  Kerney’s  superior  could  even  doubt  the  good  faith  of  his  own 
Minister showed how peculiar Walshe’s mindset could be. Mrs Kerney confided in a 
letter: ‘they think we talk about state secrets’.164 
In early 1943 Kerney was briefly recalled back to Dublin for consultation. 
He  had  not  been  home  for  some  time  and  had  hoped  that  the  controversy 
surrounding his pay would be addressed. In fact,  Walshe used the opportunity to 
make  de  Valera  aware  that  but  for  the  vigilance  of  Colonel  Bryan  and  the 
investigation he had authorised, Kerney’s misuse of the diplomatic bag would have 
continued.  De Valera rebuked Kerney and compared his behaviour to that  of the 
former Irish Minister to France, Art Ó Briain, who had also done the same thing. 
Kerney admired  de  Valera  and frequently  referred  to  him as  his  ‘Chief’  but  de 
Valera’s comparison of him to Ó Briain personally upset him. The summer of 1943 
was a hot and sunny time in Spain yet Kerney confided to a friend in a letter dated 
17 July how he wished he could escape it all: ‘oh for the cool rain and the green 
countryside of Ireland!’165 
161 Letter from Kerney to F. H. Litton, 10 June 1942 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P71). 
162 Ibid. 
163 Joseph Walshe to Kerney, 13 June 1942 (ibid.). 
164 Raymonde Kerney to Jean Kerney, 19 Dec. 1942 (ibid.).  
165 Letter from Kerney to a friend, 17 July 1943 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P71). 
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Whilst  Kerney’s  idealism  began  to  wane,  ensconced  in  Dublin  both  de 
Valera and Walshe directed Irish foreign policy with little or no appreciation for the 
challenges facing their diplomats abroad. Dermot Keogh has also acknowledged this 
‘serious professional flaw’.166 All overseas missions were underfunded, understaffed 
and their  employees  poorly paid.  Men like  Kerney were willing to endure these 
privations  and  work  industriously  throughout  their  careers  because  they  were 
patriotic and proud of Ireland’s achievements as an independent nation. Kerney’s 
disillusionment had set in because many of his most critical wartime reports were 
never acted upon by the Department, his relationship with Walshe had become more 
fractious over time and he had been far too long stationed away from home. He was 
not the only one who felt disillusioned. After the war the Department recalled all its 
overseas diplomats for a conference in Iveagh House on 11 September 1945. When 
de Valera was questioned about the outcome of the meeting in the Dáil by John A. 
Costello of Fine Gael he responded that the meeting had been arranged to air an 
‘exchange of views and suggestions’ and to coordinate a future strategy to promote 
‘Irish interests abroad.’167 De Valera did not impart just how strong the exchange of 
views had been.
A résumé was drawn up by several  of the overseas mission Heads which 
castigated  the  Department  for  failing  to  provide  adequate  staffing  and financing 
abroad.  The  situation  was  ‘so bad that  an  altogether  disproportionate  amount  of 
routine and clerical work is thrown upon the Head of the mission.’168 De Valera was 
present  at  this  meeting  and was informed  that  despite  his  wishes  to  disseminate 
information  on  Irish  culture  and  grievances  over  partition,  the  missions  had  no 
cultural attaché, were not provided with any books or translations of books in the 
language  of  the  resident  country  and  were  not  supplied  with  any  propaganda 
material.  Some  diplomats  argued  that  Ireland  was  further  away  from European 
integration now than in the past: ‘our [better] position in the 7th and 8th centuries 
when we were nearer to Europe, in spirit, than now.’169 As in his relationship with 
166 Dermot Keogh, ‘Profile of Joseph Walshe, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, 1922-46’, in 
Irish Studies in International Affairs, iii (1990), p. 75. 
167 Meeting of Irish diplomats in Iveagh House, 11 Sept. 1945 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P100). 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
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Kerney, Walshe displayed no sympathy to their plight and he wrote in the margins 
of the résumé his  own observations.  He believed that Kerney and his  colleagues 
should work harder despite the deficiencies and should always remember that they 
were charged with important  responsibilities  as ‘Apostles for this  country’.170 He 
endorsed a proposal to get Irish music and poetry aired abroad but he disagreed with 
the  suggestion  that  this  should  be  done  by  the  Department  using  short  wave 
transmitters that would beam the broadcasts to foreign countries. He preferred the 
diplomats to use their own contacts abroad to gain airtime on their resident nation’s 
national radio stations. 
It is difficult to gauge what contribution Kerney made to the résumé as it is 
unsigned but given his difficult relationship with Walshe, an experience shared by 
most of the other diplomats, it is highly likely that he would have been a vocal critic 
of  the  senior  echelons  of  the  Department.  All  the  diplomats  agreed  that  a  short 
thirty-minute  film  entitled  ‘A  Day  in  the  Life  of  Catholic  Ireland’  should  be 
produced which could prove immeasurably beneficial to display a visual image of 
Ireland overseas. The idea was that it could be shown in parish halls to hundreds of 
people but Walshe vetoed the idea by writing ‘obvious difficulty’ and ‘public funds’ 
in pen at the margin of the paragraph.171 It was not until Walshe was posted to the 
Vatican as Ambassador in May 1946 that the full scale of the gross deficiencies in 
Ireland’s efforts to promote the nation abroad was evident before his eyes. He had 
thought that hard work alone could overcome any obstacle. Now that he was in the 
frontline he began to think differently. De Valera knew that the Irish public would 
not tolerate large expense on overseas missions but neither would they have been 
happy to learn that their diplomats were surviving on a shoe-string. For men like 
Kerney idealism could only be stretched so far and public servants deserved better 
terms and conditions of employment to what they were then enduring. Historians 
often credit de Valera for his handling of Irish foreign policy but it was left to Seán 
MacBride to expand, develop and aid those who provided the real genesis of foreign 
policy – men like Leopold Kerney. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
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January-June  , 1945  
Throughout 1945 Franco and José Félix de Lequerica, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
fought a political rearguard action to try and ingratiate Spain with the Allies. They 
had severed relations with Japan but the totalitarian nature of the regime, its Axis 
origins and its unneutral conduct would be judged critically by the Allies after the 
war. Franco’s repression of his citizens was another crime that ran contrary to the 
cause of freedom and democracy that the Allies championed. On 29 January Kerney 
detailed how the regime had constructed a new prison on the outskirts of Madrid. Its 
inmates were being shot in its court-yard, nearly five years on from the end of the 
Spanish Civil War: ‘on Sunday 21st January there were 77 executions’.172 How could 
the Spanish Church stand idly by and not condemn this gross violation of human 
rights? Did the Spanish hierarchy alter  its attitude towards Franco given the new 
external reality facing Spain? Kerney did not cite many examples of the hierarchy’s 
perceptions of the regime but files located in Alcalá de Henares show that Franco 
and the Church were intricately bound together in their combined quest to mould the 
nation in the image of Caesar and Christ. 
Lequerica passed on all  ecclesiastical  publications by the hierarchy to the 
Spanish Minister in Dublin to help refute any allegations of improper conduct by the 
regime both internally and externally. On 14 April a pastoral letter from the Bishop 
of Barcelona expressed ‘gratitude to the Government and the Caudillo for help to 
rebuild churches and temples destroyed or damaged by the red revolution.’173 The 
Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain, Enríque Pla y Deniel, reaffirmed his 
adhesion  to  the  regime  on  15  May by publishing  his  own pastoral  letter  to  the 
people.  He argued that the Church had aligned itself  with Franco because of the 
‘bloody communist anarchy’ that was prevalent throughout Spain during the civil 
war and which still threatened the nation.174 He reminded the people that the Red 
terror  had  slaughtered  ‘thousands  of  [innocent]  victims’,  especially  ‘religious 
priests’.175 The  Reds  had  authorised  atrocities,  assassinations  and  destruction  of 
172 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 29 Jan. 1945 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 219/2B). 
173 Pastoral letter from the Bishop of Barcelona, 14 Apr. 1945 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11735). 
174 Pastoral letter from the Primate of Spain, 15 May 1945 (ibid.). 
175 Ibid. 
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Church property during its revolution. He justified the Church’s continued support 
of Franco based on the sacrifice of the Nationalist  dead. He argued that it was a 
legitimate struggle: ‘a Crusade of true character for God and Spain.’176 But did the 
Republican dead not fight for Spain also? He claimed that the Church recognised 
‘human rights’ but that the universal threat from ‘Communist anarchy’ often forced 
one  into  complex  allegiances.177 Pla  y  Deniel  believed  that  Franco  enjoyed  the 
support of ‘His Holy Roman Father’ and that also justified his continued support of 
the Government.178 He asked the nation to pray that the ‘Sacred Heart of Jesus and 
Pure Heart of Mary’ would shine on Franco and his nation.179 So long as the Vatican 
and the Spanish Church supported Franco there would be no question of Dublin 
changing its attitude towards the regime. Ontiveros made sure that  these pastoral 
letters were translated and handed to External Affairs. 
The  end  of  the  Second  World  War  and  the  increased  accessibility  of 
information as countries relaxed their control over censorship forced Madrid to fight 
vigorously to keep Ireland on its side. The British press published articles  which 
were distributed in Ireland that detailed the number of prisons and concentration 
camps inside Spain. Lequerica ordered Ontiveros to meet de Valera and Walshe to 
refute  these claims.  He declared  that  there  were only two such camps  in  which 
‘habitual delinquents’ resided who enjoyed paid work, opportunities to do ‘carpentry 
apprenticeships’ or build ‘cement blocks’.180 He contended that the regime respected 
its prisoners as any lawful nation would and even allowed these particular inmates to 
come and go as they pleased without fear of harassment. He asserted that there was 
not one case of ‘foreign death’ nor ‘natural sickness’ nor ‘any case of mistreatment’ 
because the regime cared for its prisoners so humanely.181 On 13 June Kerney in 
another report entitled ‘Executions’ irrefutably proved that Lequerica was not being 
truthful:
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 José Félix de Lequerica to Ontiveros, 21 May 1945 (ibid.). 
181 Ibid. 
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As I lay awake; in the early hours of Tuesday, 12 June I heard a volley of 
shots in the vicinity, followed by several “coup de grace”, and I presume that 
a batch of condemned prisoners was disposed of on that occasion.182 
182 Kerney to the Department of External Affairs, 13 June 1945 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
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Chapter 5
Spanish Diplomatic Reports from Ireland in the Post-War Period, 
1945-55
Changing of the Guard
Ontiveros’s recall back to Spain in the summer of 1945 heralded the beginning of a 
transformation in bilateral  relations in the immediate post-war period. During the 
Second World War both nations had succeeded in enhancing and strengthening close 
bilateral  political  relations  which  had  drawn  them  into  closer  alignment  and 
friendship due to shared experiences of neutrality,  Allied pressure, and economic 
isolation  since  1939.  The  Spanish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  José  Félix  de 
Lequerica,  knew that  General  Franco’s  close  association  with  the  defeated  Axis 
powers would result in enforced ostracism on Spain in the foreseeable future. Ireland 
had proven itself to be diplomatically, politically and religiously a trusted friend of 
the regime up to that point, and, as Ronan Mulvaney has argued, the country it had 
‘most in common’ with.1 However, given the fact that the Francoist economy was 
bankrupt and financially imploding due to the enormous costs of reconstruction, lack 
of foreign credit and weak domestic gold reserves, it was decided in the Palacio de 
Santa Cruz to explore the possibility of redirecting this cordial friendship towards 
tangible and sustainable economic cooperation. 
The man chosen to lead this new policy initiative could not have been more 
different to his predecessor. Tall,  cosmopolitan,  fluent in English with an Oxford 
accent, Luis Olivares y Bruguera – the Count of Artaza – arrived in Ireland on 18 
July 1945. He had served over twenty-six years in the diplomatic service and had 
held posts in the Vatican, Washington D.C., and Berlin. A native of Madrid, Artaza 
came from a noble family that could date its lineage back to seventeenth century 
Peruvian Governors. He immediately fell in love with Ireland when he asked his 
driver to chuffer him round the capital which he found held ‘enormous character and 
1 Ronan  Mulvaney,  ‘Ireland  and  the  “Spanish  question”,  1945-50’  in  Declan  Downey &  J.  C. 
MacLennan (eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), p. 231. 
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great attraction’.2 He quickly assimilated himself into the nation’s elite social circles 
and was often found playing tennis and accompanying Lord Oranmore of Galway on 
deer-stalking expeditions in the Dublin Mountains. His first interview to reporters 
stressed the primary concern of his mission: ‘to promote trade between this country 
and Spain on a larger scale.’3 
At the formal ceremony in St Patrick’s Hall, Dublin Castle, An Taoiseach, 
Éamon  de  Valera,  stressed  the  ‘long tradition  of  friendship  and mutual  respect’ 
between both nations.4 De Valera’s speech evoked the past and he emphasised the 
importance of closer political ties. His speech failed to address the urgent mutual 
necessity to raise the living standards of both nations through trade and economic 
cooperation. Artaza’s speech was an indication of the role he envisaged for himself 
and it seems his speech was meant more for the ears of the Tánaiste and Minister for 
Industry  and  Commerce  Seán  Lemass.  In  Lemass,  the  Spaniards  could  see  a 
visionary and possible driver of economic development. Artaza confidently hoped 
that through ‘fervour and zeal’  he could bring ‘ever-increasing prosperity’  to the 
both peoples.5 At the official dinner reception organised by de Valera on 23 August 
to welcome the new Minister, Artaza delivered a speech that was not well received 
by some officials in Britain. Sir R. Ross M.P. raised the matter of Artaza’s speech at 
a sitting of Westminster Parliament to Ernest Bevin, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
Ross  wanted  an  explanation  as  to  why  the  Spanish  diplomat  had  stressed  his 
accreditation  to  the whole of Ireland and not the territory known as Éire.  Bevin 
could not answer this point but was of the opinion that he felt the Spanish were well 
aware of the difference ‘that exists between Ireland and that part of the said country 
named “Éire”.’6 Neither Artaza nor Madrid felt  the urgency of responding to the 
complaint  but Artaza  certainly learned  from the incident  and trod very carefully 
regarding any future public speeches concerning contentious themes such as Anglo-
Irish relations. 
2 Irish Times, 24 Aug. 1945. 
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Spanish Embassy in London to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 Oct. 1945 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 
2154/E17). 
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Despite  this  minor  hiccup,  Artaza  assimilated  himself  well  into  his  new 
position and assiduously worked to  promote  a  very cordial  relationship  with the 
leading figures in Irish political life. When he formally visited the President, Seán T. 
O’Kelly, on 3 September 1945, he described the friendly reception accorded to him. 
The ceremony itself was ‘extremely simple’ and their discussion most amenable to 
promoting closer bilateral ties.7 The Minister particularly enjoyed his walk around 
the President’s residence in the Phoenix Park: ‘so well known and admired for its 
beauty.’8 Artaza spoke highly of Joseph Walshe with whom he was developing a 
most  cooperative  relationship.  In  one  report  the  Minister  cited  the  ‘friendly 
reception’ that was always accorded to him by Walshe, who also spoke to Artaza on 
any issue ‘with great frankness and in a most friendly manner’.9 It seemed that the 
Minister  was  extending  good contacts  which  had  been  initiated  by  Ontiveros  to 
further closer ties for the mutual benefit of both nations.
Artaza’s time in Ireland coincided with Spain’s exclusion from the U.N. The 
Spanish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  Alberto  Martín-Artajo,  sent  a  telegram  to 
Artaza denouncing the exclusion as a sulphurous attack on Spanish honour: ‘our 
conduct,  which  was  never  Nazi  nor  Fascist,  is  every  day  more  open  and 
progressive.’10 Artajo reaffirmed the regime’s preference for an ‘open arms’ rather 
than a ‘closed fists’ relationship with the Western powers and that the people were 
as one united behind the Head of State in perfect harmony: ‘Long live Spain and its 
authentic internal and external peace.’11 The policy makers in the Palacio de Santa 
Cruz need not have worried about possible repercussions in Ireland arising from the 
U.N.  vote.  Artaza  reported  that  public  expression  on  the  issue  was  more 
‘categorical’ than the press in its ‘opposition to any idea of intervention in the affairs 
of another country’. 12 The press on a whole ‘has not given much importance to the 
voting’.13 On 28 June The Standard outlined its position to its readers, asserting that 
the ‘Spanish issue is a religious issue’ and that the Soviet Union was deliberately 
7 Artaza to _____, 4 Sept. 1945 (ibid.). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 Dec. 1945 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 5465/E10). 
10 Telegram from Alberto Martín-Artajo to Artaza (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. 
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conniving to exclude staunchly Catholic  nations from membership.14 No mention 
was made of the stigma of Axis collaboration during the Second World War, which 
had been the principal basis for casting out Spain as a pariah State. 
By December  1946 Madrid  was  dispatching  copious  telegrams  to  Dublin 
refuting  any claims  of  past  association  or  collaboration  with the  Axis  side:  ‘our 
regime  has  nothing  to  do  with  totalitarian  systems  but  is  a  regime  that  respects 
fundamental  liberties  and human  life.’15 Artaza  had noted  with  pleasure  that  the 
press had consistently shown ‘unanimity’ of action by ‘censuring the speech of the 
Secretary General of the U.N.O. attacking Spain.’16 Ireland was not willing to accept 
U.N. condemnation of its historical friend and believed that Moscow’s perfidious 
machinations were the source of a smear campaign to discredit one of the world’s 
most Catholic nations. On 9 December Madrid sent yet another telegram, signed by 
Artajo, in which he outlined the ‘unanimity and enthusiasm without precedents’ that 
the people of Madrid had displayed  for  their  leader.17 Over  500,000  Madrileños  
packed into the Plaza de Oriente to express their adhesion, loyalty and admiration to 
General  Franco:  ‘one  cannot  remember  any  regime,  or  any  Monarchy,  or  any 
Republic that experienced such a similar demonstration of patriotic fervour by the 
people for their Caudillo and Government.’18 This manifestation of popular support 
was reiterated throughout the country and across ‘all social classes’.19 Within two 
days most Heads of Mission were preparing to leave Spain whilst Ireland appointed 
a new Minister to Madrid in defiance of international political opinion.20 An example 
of  general  Irish  perceptions  of  Spain  at  this  fundamental  period  in  Spain’s 
contemporary  history  survives  in  a  message  of  support  sent  to  Artajo  by  an 
14 The Standard, 28 June 1946. 
15 Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Artaza, 4 Dec. 1946 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738). 
16 Artaza to Alberto Martín-Artajo, 9 Nov. 1946 (ibid.). 
17 Alberto Martín-Artajo to Artaza, 9 Dec. 1946 (ibid.). 
18 Ibid. For a good account on the demonstration see Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993), p. 561. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. Despite the withdrawal of Ambassadors Embassies remained open. In the case of the United 
States, a Chargé d’Affaires carried out all its functions but the lowering of its status meant that no 
appointments  could  be  made with the  Minister.  Relations  were  therefore  conducted  between  the 
Embassy’s  Chargé  d’Affaires  or  First  Secretary  and  a  senior  official  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  When  the  Heads  of  Mission  returned  to  Madrid  relations  were  restored  to  normal  and 
Ambassadors arranged appointments directly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
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anonymous  Irish  citizen:  ‘May  God  defend  the  noble  Spanish  Nation  from  her 
unworthy enemies. Long Live Franco.’21 
Amidst  the  recall  of  the  Heads  of  Mission  and  the  implantation  of 
international  ostracism,  which  Florentino  Portero  has  argued  strengthened  rather 
than  weakened  the  regime,22 Madrid  scrambled  to  strengthen  and  reinforce  its 
relationship  with  Ireland.  Artaza  was  ordered  to  arrange  a  meeting  with  the 
Taoiseach. He met de Valera on the 18 December 1946 in Government Buildings. 
The  topic  of  discussion  was  the  ‘Spanish  Question’.23 De  Valera  opened  the 
discussion  by  expressing  his  considered  opinion,  based  on  a  lifetime  spent  in 
politics, that there were two types of demonstrations: one was spontaneous; the other 
orchestrated. Which one had it been in the Plaza de Oriente?24 For one hour Artaza 
had to persuade the Taoiseach that it was spontaneous and a demonstration of the 
will  of  the  people  as  an  expression  of  their  faith  in  General  Franco  and  his 
legitimacy.  De Valera asked for ‘clarification on different points’.25 Never before 
had he demonstrated such a cautious attitude in relation to Irish-Spanish relations 
and it seemed that he wanted absolute guarantees that the majority of the people 
supported Franco in the same manner as the Spanish Catholic hierarchy did. Artaza 
showed the Taoiseach reports and photographs of ordinary people from all sectors of 
society present at the demonstration. The Minister impressed de Valera with his line 
of argument and the conversation turned to how both nations could increase contacts 
across all spheres especially given the Taoiseach’s desire to break out of Ireland’s 
‘prolonged  isolation’.26 De  Valera  concluded  the  meeting  expressing  his 
commitment to increasing economic activity between both nations in order primarily 
to help Spain during this difficult period, Artaza reported. 
Throughout 1947  Irish perseverance in maintaining friendly relations with 
Spain  provided  the  essential  panacea  Madrid  needed  to  continue  a  diplomatic 
21 Message of support for the regime from an anonymous Irish citizen, 11 Dec. 1946 (ibid.). 
22 See Florentino Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestión española, 1945-50 (Madrid, 1989).
23 Private meeting between Artaza and Éamon de Valera at Government Buildings,  18 Dec. 1946 
(A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738). 
24 Paul Preston argues that it was all organised by the Falange. See Paul Preston,  Franco (London, 
1993), p. 561. 
25 Private meeting between Artaza and Éamon de Valera at Government Buildings,  18 Dec. 1946 
(A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738).  
26 Ibid. 
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mission  abroad  in  one  of  the  few  countries  in  which  it  had  an  accredited 
representative.  Artaza’s mission took on an ever-increasing degree of importance 
given  the  new  political  dynamics  affecting  Spanish  foreign  policy.  The  regime 
understood that its special relationship with Ireland had to be elevated by tangible 
successes across cultural, political and economic spheres in order to defy the U.N. 
resolution and to  demonstrate  to  the Spanish people that  if  a democratic,  peace-
loving and Catholic nation like Ireland was prepared to enhance links with Spain, 
than the U.N. condemnation was an injurious wrong. On 28 February 1947 General 
Moscardó, hero of the siege of Alcázar and a senior official in the regime, arrived in 
Dublin to be greeted by ‘great numbers of reporters and photographers’.27 His arrival 
coincided with a celebrated football game between both nations played on 2 March, 
at  which President O’Kelly and the Taoiseach were also in attendance.  The fans 
were delighted to welcome the Spanish team to Dublin and Artaza recorded that the 
‘expectation for the game’ was ‘enormous throughout Ireland’.28 The game was a 
great  success  with  the  home  side  emerging  the  winners  in  a  tightly  fought  3-2 
victory.  
Sporting  interaction  was  reciprocated  when  an  Irish  team  attended  the 
Burgos Horse Competition. But even in this sphere Ireland was stepping out of line 
with other nations. The International Equestrian Federation threatened to disqualify 
Ireland if  it  took part  in the Madrid jumping competition.  John Belton,  the Irish 
Minister in Madrid, was forced to write to José Sebastián Erice y O’Shea, Director 
General  of  Foreign  Policy,  in  relation  to  this  sporting  event.  As  the  Spanish 
competition  was  ‘not  being  recognised  as  official’  Ireland  with  ‘sincere  regret’ 
would have to decline future attendance.29 A penalty of ‘twelve months’ suspension 
would  ensue  if  it  did  not  adhere  to  the  International  Equestrian  Federation’s 
procedures which also would have disqualified Ireland from participating in its own 
R.D.S. show.30 The whole event displayed how far Ireland would go to walk the 
tightrope between international condemnation of Spain and maintaining the contact 
27 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 Feb. 1947 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11736). 
28 Ibid.   
29 Letter  from John Belton to José Sebastián Erice y O’Shea,  19 May 1947 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
3508/E22). 
30 Ibid. 
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at  all  cost.  Only  on  exceptional  occasions  such  as  this  was  it  forced  to  follow 
mainstream opinion. The Irish left it to the Spanish to couch the controversy in as 
benign a light as possible:
No announcement of the decision has yet been given to the press in Ireland 
and the Irish authorities are prepared to consider any suggestion which the 
Spanish authorities would desire as to the reasons for this change of plans of 
the Irish team.31  
On the political front Madrid informed Artaza that it had been receiving confidential 
reports from its Ambassador to Great Britain concerning a conversation he had had 
with the Irish High Commissioner John Dulanty. According to Dulanty, de Valera 
had wanted to pass on assurances that if Ireland was to become a member of the 
U.N. it would not interfere in the internal affairs of fellow member States. De Valera 
viewed such possible interference as ‘counter-productive’ and had stressed the case 
of  the Spanish Civil  War,  when foreign intervention  had prolonged the  war and 
embittered  the nature of the conflict.32 Irish membership  of  regional  associations 
provided a platform from which it could aid its ostracised friend. Following on from 
this  revelation,  Artaza  was  invited  twice  in  March  to  a  personal  interview with 
Frederick Boland concerning Ireland’s position vis-à-vis Spanish exclusion from the 
Universal  Postal  Congress  Union.  During  the  first  meeting  he  was  told 
‘confidentially’  that  Ireland  ‘had  approached  England’  with  the  intention  of 
addressing the ‘exclusion’ of Spain from the conference.33 The Irish delegates hoped 
that the Labour Government might be more amenable to persuasion on the Spanish 
issue. At the second meeting Artaza was informed that the Secretary considered it 
‘preferable’  to  raise  the Spanish question ‘collectively with other  nations’  at  the 
conference.34 These other nations included the Vatican and Argentina and Artaza 
was not hesitant in emphasising the risks Ireland was taking, given the nation’s ‘very 
31 Ibid. 
32 Telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Artaza, 15 Jan. 1947 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11736). 
33 Private meeting between Artaza and Frederick Boland at Iveagh House, 18 Mar. 1947 (ibid.). 
34 Private meeting between Artaza and ____ at Iveagh House, 31 Mar. 1947 (ibid.). 
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delicate’ position with the Western powers.35 Indeed as Ronan Mulvaney has shown, 
Ireland was jeopardising its future applications to the U.N. by such active support 
for  the  regime.36 On  10  April  he  reported  that  Ireland  was  ‘adopting  a  most 
favourable  Spanish attitude’  and that  it  wanted other  nations to vote for Spanish 
inclusion into the conference.37 The Western powers thought otherwise. 
It was during Artaza’s time as Minister that José Camiña surfaced again in 
the  reports  to  Madrid.38 Camiña  had  established  a  new  company,  ‘International 
Trading and Transport’. Artaza was aware that Camiña was not in agreement with 
the  ‘ideals  of  our  present  Spanish  regime’,  was  a  ‘Basque  supporter  [of 
independence]’ and ‘friend of Prieto’.39 He advised his superiors to inquire into the 
matter:  ‘he  ought  to  be  well  known  in  Madrid  and  it  will  be  easy  to  obtain 
information on his character...Camiña is known to Artajo. He was also known to 
Lequerica.’40 The file on Camiña had obviously been overlooked in Foreign Affairs. 
What interested Madrid about the Basque this time round was that he wrote a letter 
to Foreign Affairs outlining his revolutionary idea to lease an Irish port, preferably 
in Cork or Kerry, to Spain in return for a fixed sum. The Falange in particular, which 
was centrally involved in the management of the domestic economy, was very eager 
to promote such a scheme as it could be of immeasurable benefit to Spain. 
When Camiña first came to Ireland in July 1940 he noticed that the port of 
Cobh had little or no fishing vessels in sight. He began to study Irish dietary habits 
and visited restaurants to see what was served on average to guests. His findings 
revealed that by and large fish did not form a component of the national diet. In most 
restaurants the plates contained meat and Irish mothers had ‘little love’ for the art of 
cooking and preparing fish.41 This was slightly disingenuous as there was no proper 
refrigeration at that time but nonetheless his argument correctly identified the fact 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ronan  Mulvaney,  ‘Ireland  and  the  “Spanish  question”,  1945-50’  in  Declan  Downey & J.  C. 
MacLennan (eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), p. 236.
37 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Apr. 1947 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11736). 
38 Letter from José Camiña to _____, 31 Oct. 1947 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3216/E63). 
39 Artaza to _____, 8 Oct. 1947 (ibid.). Artaza had been monitoring Camiña’s activities prior to the 
latter’s letter to Madrid.  Indalecio Prieto was a prominent Socialist politician in the P.S.O.E. and 
former Minister for the Marine and Air during the Second Republic.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Second letter from José Camiña to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 7111/E37). 
The letter is undated but was probably written in the summer of 1948. 
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that an island people had ‘abandoned the sea and forgotten its richness’.42 Because 
his  research  was  being  undertaken  at  a  time  when  ‘it  was  impossible  to  get 
information  outside  of  Ireland’,  Camiña  had  arranged  through  a  Government 
Minister, P. J. Little, to see a senior official in the Department of Agriculture, Mr 
Rush.43 Rush was ‘pessimistic’ about Camiña’s port lease idea especially at such a 
dangerous time in the nation’s history.44  
In  these  letters  Camiña  explained  his  relationship  with  the  Professor  of 
Spanish  in  T.C.D.  and how both  men  had established  a  Society  of  the  Spanish 
Language. The Basque detailed a speech he gave on his impressions of Ireland and 
another in 1947 on ‘The Problem of Fish’ to seventy prominent businessmen, hoping 
for seed capital to invest in his idea. He clearly wanted Madrid to believe he was an 
expert on fishing. His idea impressed many but Madrid was reluctant to have any 
business dealings with a renegade dissident. In addition, the entire project, although 
potentially highly valuable for Spain was dependant on the support of the Irish to 
lease  a  national  port  which  seemed  extremely  unlikely.  Many  Irish  fishermen 
frequently contacted their  local  T.D.s to complain about Spanish fishermen,  who 
were frequently stranded and needed rescue or had been forced to come into port for 
hospitalisation or accommodation. They often lent these Spanish fishermen money, 
as  they  possessed  no  Irish  currency,  despite  the  latter  having  infringed  on  Irish 
territorial waters. At the Fine Gael annual convention held on 25 February 1950, a 
Deputy  Collins  vociferously  demanded  the  immediate  ban  on  all  Spanish  ships 
entering Bantry Bay and port. He expressed himself in such ‘violent terms’ that his 
motion had to be withdrawn.45 On 20 June 1952 Madrid was informed about the 
sinking of the María Rosa with the loss of six lives and on 21 July 1954 two Spanish 
trawlers, the  Don Juan and the  Don Quijote, were arrested by the naval corvette 
Maeve  for fishing in Irish waters. The subsequent trial was well publicised and an 
extension  of  Ireland’s  territorial  seas  was  contemplated.  In  the  end  the  Spanish 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. He met Rush in Feb. 1941 at a time when Ireland had no State shipping line let alone a deep-
seas fishing fleet. 
45 Report  from  the  Spanish  Embassy  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R  – 
7111/E37).  General  Richard  Mulcahy  contacted  the  Embassy  to  apologise  for  Deputy  Collins’s 
outburst. 
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promised not to enter Irish fishing lanes again and Camiña’s idea for a leased port 
was scuppered.  
Like  his  predecessor,  Artaza  had  frequently  voiced  his  displeasure  with 
articles  written  in the  Irish Times but  he could assure his  superiors  that  Spain’s 
image abroad was not  being sullied  due  to  the  constant  support  of  the  voice  of 
Catholic opinion, The Standard. The weekly had always been a staunch supporter of 
General Franco and in May 1946 its editor visited Spain. A.B.C. published a lengthy 
article  entitled  ‘It  Is  Absurd  to  Claim that  Spain  Represents  a  Threat.’46 Peadar 
O’Curry told the newspaper, that in this hour of universal condemnation, the regime 
could rely on Ireland to stand beside it in solidarity because from ‘the beginning of 
the Spanish Civil War, ninety-three per cent of the Irish people were on the side of 
Franco.’47 He argued that there was no rational basis for Spain’s ostracism from the 
international community and declared that the ‘Irish people know that a black legend 
has  always  hung  over  Spain’  which  was  fabricated  by  its  northern  enemies, 
especially  Britain.48 In  a  decade  in  power  Franco  had  managed  to  improve  ‘the 
quality  of  life  of  the  worker’  and  O’Curry  had  witnessed  himself  the  general 
‘healthy complexion’ of the people which belied the scurrilous years-old rumours of 
famine in the country and any possibility of a return to leftist policies.49 Ireland had 
only to look back in time to its own history,  when ‘countless Irishmen’ came to 
Spain to study and fight for their  faith,  he continued.50 Now that Spain was ‘the 
barrier  to  Communism’  Ireland  was  once  again  standing  by  and  supporting  its 
historical friend in defiance of the U.N. resolution.51 He reassured the newspaper and 
the nation that the Irish people felt ‘intimately an affection’ for them and a belief 
that  their  political  masters  represented ‘the sentiment’  of  the people.52 If  anyone 
doubted his views he challenged them to come to Spain where ‘one can speak and 
write on any foreign issue with complete liberty’.53
46 A.B.C., 17 May 1946. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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Artaza had always prioritised the development of closer economic links with 
Ireland as his principal objective and this was realised on 3 September 1947 with the 
signing of a commercial agreement. This proved to be the most celebrated moment 
in his mission,  coming so soon before his recall  back to Spain. After the formal 
signing had been concluded and photographs taken for the assembled media,  the 
Spanish Minister was invited by the Taoiseach to a private banquet in his honour. De 
Valera delivered a speech that conveyed the high esteem he held Artaza in.  The 
Taoiseach remarked that ‘after such a short time in Ireland’ and through his ‘fruitful 
labour’ Artaza had spearheaded the signing of a bilateral commercial agreement that 
was ‘the first stone’ in the foundations of a stronger economic connection between 
both nations.54 He concluded that Artaza’s achievements were ‘unequalled by any 
Irish or Spanish representative in the history of our relations.’55 After  the formal 
banquet both men retired to talk privately for over an hour. Dublin did not disguise 
its disappointment at losing such a talented and close friend. 
Artaza’s  replacement  was Alonso  Álvarez  de  Toledo  y  Mencos  –  the 
Marquess of  Miraflores.  A one-time close friend of  former  Minister  for Foreign 
Affairs General Jordana, Miraflores’s dispatch to Ireland was viewed by some as an 
unfortunate rotation. Whilst Ontiveros and Artaza had achieved their most enduring 
successes in the political and economic spheres respectively, Miraflores was to be 
most remembered for the cultural links he established between both nations. He was 
to be the longest serving Minister  in the post-war period and he lost  no time in 
arranging a prompt interview with de Valera. He met the Taoiseach at Government 
Buildings and was ushered into de Valera’s office by Frederick Boland. The meeting 
was ‘extremely simple, which is peculiar to Mr de Valera’, he reported to Madrid.56 
The Taoiseach dominated the discussion and expressed his ‘incomprehension’ and 
disproval of the ‘injustice’ reaped on Spain by the international community.57 Spain 
54 Signing of  the Irish-Spanish Commercial  Agreement,  3  Sept.  1947 (A.G.A.  (10)  3954/11736). 
Ireland agreed to supply Spain with seed potato and Spain agreed to supply Ireland with potash. The 
two commodities were to be set at a matching fixed quota and price. The commercial agreement was 
to run for three years. 
55 Ibid.
56 Letter from Miraflores to Alberto Martín-Artajo, 22 Oct. 1947 (F.N.F.F. 14286). 
57 Ibid. 
204
was  becoming  the  ‘victim’  in  post-war  rivalries,  he  opined.58 De  Valera  also 
expressed  his  fears  over  the  ‘critical  international  situation’  and  the  rise  of 
‘Communism in France and in the world generally.’59 The Taoiseach then moved the 
conversation  to  the  economic  sphere  hoping  that  Miraflores  would  build  on  the 
historic agreement negotiated by Artaza. The interview made a deep impression on 
the Spanish Minister and in all future reports which mentioned de Valera, Miraflores 
displayed a certain admiration for him. Be that as it may, his arrival coincided with a 
shift in domestic politics as the winds of change were gathering to end de Valera’s 
sixteen years in power.   
                         Spanish Perceptions of the First Inter-Party Government
A new party,  Clann na Poblachta,  had begun to make inroads into Fianna Fáil’s 
‘traditional  bastions’ of support,  the Minister  observed.60 The party had won by-
elections  in  Dublin  and  Tipperary.  Miraflores  found  the  party  leader,  Seán 
MacBride, to be a most curious individual as it seemed to him a ‘strange coincidence 
if one thinks in the case of Mr de Valera’s Spanish ancestry’ as to how both men had 
managed  to  scale  the  heights  of  political  power  in  an  ultra-homogenous  and 
monotonic country.61 But what worried Miraflores, and consequently Madrid, were 
the  suspicions  which  surrounded  MacBride’s  past.  The  Minister  had  obtained 
information  that  linked  MacBride  to  the  ‘Association  of  Friends  of  the  Soviet 
Union’.62 It was understood that he had been ‘very involved’ in its activities.63 For a 
regime  that  was  systemically  suspicious  and  paranoid  about  Communism, 
MacBride’s  ‘political  persuasion’  could  only  be  ‘leftist’.64 When  de  Valera  was 
ousted from power the following year,  Miraflores was horrified to see MacBride 
given the most important portfolio vis-à-vis Irish-Spanish relations. He was present 
at the Dáil session which announced MacBride’s nomination and he commented that 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 Oct. 1947 (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11736). 
61 Ibid. For a good account on his life see Elizabeth Keane, Seán MacBride: a life (Dublin, 2007).  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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amongst his group of confidants ‘nobody had hoped that Mr MacBride might be 
heading the foreign policy of the new Government.’65 He informed Madrid that he 
would normally be resolutely opposed to such a nomination but in the fairness of 
good  bilateral  relations  he  would  be  willing  to  ‘forget  the  past  incident’  of 
MacBride’s friendliness towards the Soviet Union: ‘I prefer to wait until my first 
interview before emitting more concrete judgement about the personality of the new 
Minister for External Affairs.’66 
 Miraflores  was  on  good  terms  with  many  of  the  Ministers  in  the  new 
Cabinet  and  he  was  pleased  to  see  that  the  Government  was  ‘manifestly 
conservative’.67 Madrid  was  also  investigating  the  new  Government  through  its 
Ambassador in Rome who reported on a communiqué by the Taoiseach, John A. 
Costello,  which  pledged  the  Government’s  ‘filial  loyalty  and  devotion’  to  the 
‘August Person, the Pope’.68 Miraflores had close contacts with the new Minister for 
Finance,  Patrick  McGilligan,  who  was  quickly  judged  by  him  to  be  doing  an 
exceptional job with the country’s economy: ‘the financial position of the country is 
healthy’.69 McGilligan was Miraflores’s closest friend and confidant in the Cabinet. 
Miraflores never lost his cautiousness in relation to MacBride. Both MacBride and 
Dr Noël Browne, Minister  for Health,  were perceived by him to be destabilising 
influences  on  the  Government.  The  former  possessed  ‘very  revolutionary  ideas’ 
whilst  the  latter  was  ‘inexperienced  and  far  too  young’  to  command  such  a 
portfolio.70 Costello felt the need to strengthen Ireland’s position against  possible 
Communist  infiltration by agreeing to MacBride’s  and Browne’s proposals  for a 
Welfare Plan. The idea was that a semi-welfare State could negate the attraction of 
Communism’s  ‘spurious  and  soul-crippling’  panacea  on  society.71 Miraflores 
thought the idea too ‘expensive’ and believed Ireland’s best defensive option against 
the Soviet Union was to align itself with NATO.72 The Taoiseach, however, outlined 
65 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 Feb. 1948 (ibid.). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2340/E6). 
68 Spanish Embassy in Rome to _____, 25 Feb. 1948 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3470/E16). 
69 Miraflores to _____ (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2340/E6). 
70 Ibid. 
71 Raidió Éireann, Speech delivered by John A. Costello to the Irish people, 17 Mar. 1950.   
72 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2340/E6). 
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his position on that contentious issue: ‘We have given proof of our will to cooperate 
with the free nations, but we cannot put our full strength behind them until we are 
fully free ourselves.’73 Miraflores never held a high opinion of Costello as a national 
leader. He found him to be very cold, unimaginative and a rather dull figure. On one 
occasion  he  ridiculed  a  speech  Costello  made  which  outlined  a  plan  to  hold  a 
plebiscite on partition, calling it a childish fantasy.
Ever since the Bretton Woods Conference held in July 1944,74 Spain had 
been excluded from almost every regional and international conference held by the 
community of nations. In the post-war period Ireland became involved in many of 
these despite having been refused admission into the U.N. on account of the repeated 
veto by the Soviet  Union.75 As Bernadette  Whelan has shown, in Europe and in 
North America, the Western powers moved to align Ireland into their orbit.76 Under 
the  Marshall  Plan  MacBride  negotiated  $146  million  for  Ireland  of  which  $18 
million was a grant primarily used for agricultural and afforestation projects. Spain 
was  barred  from  this  beneficial  fund  at  a  time  when  its  people  were  suffering 
frightful hardships. Miraflores reported with growing incredulity on how the First 
Inter-Party  Government  was  not  extending  its  benevolent  relationship  with  the 
United  States  by  joining  NATO.  The  U.S.  sent  Super-Fortress  bombers  to 
Collinstown Airport as well as naval destroyers to persuade Ireland to join in the 
defence of the West against the Soviet Union. Ireland’s strategic importance both in 
air and sea channels between both continents was a major attraction to the American 
administration. MacBride preferred to secure U.S. arms without committing to join 
NATO as article four of its charter guaranteed existing boundaries of member States. 
Contrary to Whelan’s assertion that the Marshall Plan assisted Irish expansion,77 in 
private  conversations  Miraflores  had  learned  that  Ireland was the  only one  of  a 
group of five nations which had asked for the ending of economic assistance because 
73 Raidió Éireann, Speech delivered by John A. Costello to the Irish people, 17 Mar. 1950. 
74 Bretton Woods – the first U.N. Monetary and Financial Conference held between 1-22 July 1944. 
Attended by forty-five States. Spain was excluded. The conference set up the International Monetary 
Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and a World Bank. 
75 This veto prohibited Ireland from joining the U.N. By Feb. 1952 the then Minister for External 
Affairs, Frank Aiken, had decided not to apply for membership again. 
76 Bernadette Whelan, Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57 (Dublin, 2000).
77 _____, ‘Integration or isolation? Ireland and the invitation to join the Marshall Plan’ in Michael 
Kennedy & Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000), p. 221. 
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it  did not want to attach itself  to the Mutual  Security Act:  ‘The other four have 
already reached an agreement with the U.S. She is the only one that persists in this 
intransigent attitude’, he informed his superiors.78 
But what really shocked and astounded Miraflores was a conversation he had 
with Costello. The Taoiseach expressed the view that the U.N. was ineffectual and 
could be infiltrated and manipulated to suit the purpose of the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern  satellites.  Costello  made  it  clear  to  Miraflores  that  he  also  disliked  the 
O.E.E.C. and the Council  of Europe because both were too regional and limited. 
This  revelation  challenges  Michael  Kennedy’s  view that  Ireland’s  foreign  policy 
outlook was expansionist  at  this  time.79 What  Costello  envisaged for Ireland and 
Spain was a new type of organisation, which Miraflores surmised: ‘In his judgement, 
it is necessary to create a new type of organisation, more exclusive and at the same 
time more broad in its objectives, in which nations at the margins of international 
affairs, like Spain, may be included’.80 In Miraflores’s opinion Ireland needed to join 
a military alliance not a peaceful alliance and he lambasted Costello’s assertion that 
the ‘historic European countries of Italy, Spain, Portugal…as well as Ireland, have 
no place in the United Nations.’81 The preposterousness of Costello’s judgment on 
international  affairs,  as  perceived  by  Miraflores,  reinforced  his  dislike  of  him. 
Miraflores reported that the nation and its people believed that they could live in 
perpetual  isolation  until  their  domestic  grievances  regarding  the  six  disputed 
counties could be resolved. This revelation confirms Gary Murphy’s description of 
Ireland’s international attitude as ‘parochial’.82 Such an ‘insular spirit’ could only 
prove damaging for such a small country, Miraflores argued.83 He believed that de 
Valera and a Fianna Fáil Government would not allow such an attitude permeate 
down through society. He had reported previously that ‘in so many conversations I 
78 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2689/E10). 
79 See Michael  Kennedy & Eunan O’Halpin,  Ireland and the Council  of  Europe: from isolation 
towards integration (Strasbourg, 2000).
80 Private  meeting between Miraflores  and John A.  Costello,  20 Mar.  1951 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
2689/E10). 
81 Speech  delivered  by John A.  Costello  to  the  Irish  people,  17 Mar.  1951 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
3508/E21). 
82 Gary Murphy, ‘“A wider perspective”: Ireland’s view of western Europe in the 1950s’ in Michael 
Kennedy & Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000), p. 251. 
83 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 Nov. 1951 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2689/E10). 
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had with Mr de Valera’ he was the only one to state that Ireland could not ‘remain 
on the margins of a new conflict.’84 
On 7  November  1950 MacBride  returned from Rome,  having  signed the 
Human Rights Convention on behalf of Ireland. This guaranteed secret ballots, free 
elections and freedom of speech. Article one of its charter  afforded everyone the 
‘right to life’.85 Article three stated that no one shall be ‘subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’86 Article four outlawed ‘forced or 
compulsory labour’.87 These constitutional guarantees were a major step forward for 
Irish  democracy.  Miraflores  opined  that  this  international  guarantee  could  help 
Ireland towards reconciliation with Protestants in the North by offering them legal 
guarantees to protect their civil liberties in a united country. In addition, Ireland’s 
membership  of  the  O.E.E.C.  had  facilitated  its  signing  of  the  agreement  and 
demonstrated the benefits that could accrue by involvement in international affairs. 
However, he was soon to report to Madrid that the Government’s association with 
anti-partitionists, who inundated the British representative,  Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, 
with  anti-English  propaganda  accusing  the  British  Government  of  facilitating 
‘pogroms,  murders  and  clearances’  of  people  in  the  Nationalist  community, 
undermined any reconciliation between the Republic and Northern Ireland.88 That 
members  of  the  Government  were  also  members  of  an  anti-partition  association 
seemed incredible to him, as their activities only reinforced partition. 
In November 1948 the Dáil approved the passing of the Republic of Ireland 
Bill,  which  separated  all  ties  between  Ireland  and  the  British  Crown  and 
Commonwealth.  The  Spanish  press  covered  the  Dáil  debates  on  the  bill  but  its 
coverage was more romantic in its description. De Valera was described not as the 
leader of the Opposition but as a military figure: ‘in the benches of the Opposition 
was the first Commander of the I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army) Éamon de Valera.’89 
The Irish Parliament itself was a most curious place altogether: ‘In the corridors of 
84 Miraflores to _____, 30 Oct. 1951 (ibid.). 
85 E. J. Osmañczyk, Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and general agreements (London, 1985), p. 
355.  
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Anti-partition pamphlet (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2344/E4). 
89 A.B.C., 18 Nov. 1948. 
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the Dáil one could find men dressed in the uniforms of the Irish Republican Army.’90 
This was a rather bizarre image of the Irish Parliament conjured up for the Spanish 
reading public. Miraflores was more sombre in his reports, especially at the public 
ceremony to commemorate the enactment of the Republic of Ireland Act by the First 
Inter-Party Government.  In his  opinion it  was a major  hindrance to Irish foreign 
policy  as  the  removal  of  any  legal  association  with  Great  Britain  was  bad  for 
relations between both States. He could not understand why Costello sanctioned the 
move as he believed that  Fine Gael was the party that  wanted ‘to remain in the 
Commonwealth’.91 Overall he detected a ‘lack of enthusiasm and popular fervour’ 
for  the  occasion.92 When  Fianna  Fáil  refused  to  attend  the  ceremony Miraflores 
noted that the Government had also failed to try and heal the wounds caused by the 
Irish Civil War as both sides harangued each other publicly.  
Despite the many failings of Irish foreign policy under the First Inter-Party 
Government, Miraflores could not deny that they had followed the line adopted by 
Fianna Fáil  in championing  the cause of  Spain.  At the European Reconstruction 
Assembly Ireland defended the reputation of the Francoist regime and later, in May 
1948,  at  a  Conference  on  Life  Security  at  Sea  in  London,  the  Irish  delegates 
protested  against  the  exclusion  of  Spain.93 By  August  Miraflores  was  hearing 
rumours  that  Ireland  would  be  seeking  a  ‘formation  of  a  neutral  Catholic  bloc’ 
should war break out between the West and East.94 On 11 May 1950 both nations 
signed a meteorological treaty to exchange information on the weather. September 
witnessed  the  departure  of  Frederick  Boland  as  Secretary  of  External  Affairs  to 
become Ambassador to Britain. Before he left he had authorised the raising of the 
Irish  Legation  in  Madrid  to  the  status  of  Embassy.  The  idea  was  Madrid’s  but 
Boland  was  an  enthusiastic  supporter.  Miraflores  organised  a  lunch  in  Boland’s 
honour to mark the elevation of the Irish representation in Spain and also to wish 
him the best in his new post. During their conversation Boland said that he hoped the 
90 Ibid. 
91 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 Apr. 1949 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2042/E5). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3115/E23). 
94 Ibid. 
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‘campaign’  against  Spain would end soon.95 For Miraflores,  the man had been a 
stalwart defendant of the regime: ‘a great friend of Spain and I am sure that from any 
post he occupies he will continue to maintain this stance.’96
Cultural Interaction
On 30 September 1948 the Spanish Minister purchased Ailesbury House97 as his 
new residence because Killowen had become by now too ‘insufficient, indecorous 
and damp’.98 In addition, the cost of renting the property no longer seemed a viable 
option. Miraflores began to acquire many artefacts and art works to furnish the new 
residence  and  elevate  its  status  from  a  former  coach-house  to  an  ‘excellent’ 
residency. He was often found outbidding other diplomats at auction for significant 
works of art. Within Ailesbury House, Miraflores and his Secretary, Adolfo Martín-
Gamero,  began  to  plan  and  orchestrate  meticulously  for  a  major  exhibition  of 
Spanish cultural work that would surpass all previous exhibitions in the capital. The 
aim of this exposition was to achieve maximum publicity.  Madrid approved their 
proposal and surprisingly also approved the enormous sums needed for the event 
which, they accepted, could be extremely costly.99 Miraflores was to demonstrate a 
twin  penchant  for  publicity  and  lavish  expenditure  which  was  unprecedented  in 
Irish-Spanish affairs. The success of the exhibition reinforced his conviction in this 
model. 
The  Spanish  folk  arts  and  crafts  exhibition  was  located  in  the  National 
Library and ran for a month. It was covered extensively by the Irish Press, with 
photographs  of  the  Minister  showing  the  President,  Taoiseach  and  members  of 
Government  around  its  exhibits.100 Advertisements  on  buses,  bill-boards  and  on 
Raidió Éireann had been used to launch the exhibition. The Catholic weekly,  The 
95 Private  conversation  between  Miraflores  and  Frederick  Boland  at  a  reception  in  the  Spanish 
Embassy, 25 Sept. 1950 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3115/E23). 
96 Ibid. 
97 In addition to the Legation, the Spanish had Consular representatives in Cork, Bantry, Limerick and 
Waterford. 
98 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11737). 
99 On three separate occasions Artaza had requested extra funding for such an exposition when he had 
been Minister. 
100 Irish Press, 15 Mar. 1949. 
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Standard,  claimed  that  nothing  ‘could be more  effective  to  correct  false  notions 
about the Spaniards created by accumulated propaganda than this exhibition.’101 This 
major cultural display of indigenous garments was the first time a cultural event on 
such an unprecedented scale had been launched by a Spanish diplomat in Ireland. 
The numbers who attended were truly astonishing and took Miraflores by surprise: 
‘some 60,000 visitors, a really extraordinary figure’.102 The Irish public had a keen 
interest in Spain and its culture and the number of visitors going to the country had 
begun to rise steadily. Even the Irish Times was remarkably pleasant in its coverage 
of this event and its general treatment of Spain despite its ‘traditional anti-Spanish 
attitude’.103 Miraflores informed his superiors that  it  had toned down its criticism 
after ‘an intervention by me to the editorial board’.104  
Many  Irish  figures  were  delighted  with  this  new  image  of  Spain  that 
counteracted all the malicious international criticism heaped on Spain. Politicians, 
senior  civil  servants,  judges,  lecturers  and ex-combatants  from the Irish Brigade 
visited the exhibition.105 Cultural figures such as the renowned Lavery family were 
invited  to attend.  Hilton Edwards and Michaél  MacLiammóir  were distinguished 
guests, personally invited by Miraflores. Both men had founded the Gate Theatre to 
counteract the ultra-Catholic and Republican Abbey Theatre run by Ernest Blythe. 
MacLiammóir himself was a renowned and talented actor. A pragmatist, Miraflores 
did not display any enmity toward both men even though the Francoist regime was 
stridently homophobic. On the contrary, the Spanish Minister was willing to turn a 
blind  eye  to  MacLiammóir’s  openly  homosexual  mannerisms  because  he  was  a 
useful  conduit  to  influence  and  enhance  bilateral  cultural  relations  and  public 
perceptions  of  Spain.  Unlike  his  predecessors,  Miraflores  did not  want  to  solely 
associate  with  the  elite  of  Irish  society,  who  had  all  originated  from the  same 
educational circles. His primary concern was to promote his nation’s interests, which 
meant  fostering  a  benign  image  of  Francoism  abroad  as  a  Catholic  and  anti-
101 The Standard, 15 Mar. 1949. 
102 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11737). 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 The exposition ran from 15 Mar. – 1 May. On 11 July 1949 Miraflores gave a luncheon at the 
Legation for the Taoiseach,  Seán MacBride,  Richard Mulcahy and Frederick Boland to officially 
thank them all for their assistance to him in organising the exposition. 
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Communist nation. Artists like MacLiammóir were therefore useful to him both to 
enliven an event with their presence and to encourage greater cultural interest in his 
country.  The event had proven to be an ‘excellent success’.106 Miraflores became 
convinced of the necessity of establishing a cultural centre in Ireland, something that 
Madrid  encouraged  in  all  its  overseas  missions.107 This  ambitious  plan  was 
postponed by his superiors but by May 1954 Miraflores was being allocated 25,000 
pesetas to promote cultural interaction.108 
Other  cultural  expositions  organised  by  Miraflores  proved  equally 
successful. In September 1953 the Minister and Gamero organised a wine tasting 
festival in Dublin which was covered by both the Irish and Spanish press.  A.B.C.  
carried the headline ‘Irish Newspapers Emphasise the Triumph of Spanish Wines 
Displayed and Tasted in Dublin.’109 The festival had been inaugurated the previous 
day and 14,345 people attended the three-day event.110 Spanish music was played 
and brochures distributed to every visitor. Miraflores stated to its correspondent that 
its purpose was that the Irish, ‘lovers of beer, may drink more wine.’111 He admitted 
that the public ‘possibly do not know the immense variety of our wines’ but given its 
‘superior alcoholic strength’,  compared to other wine competitors,  he hoped they 
would  enjoy  it.112 The  Ambassador  and  Gamero  had  requested  an  official  from 
Commerce,  Mariano Garrigues,  to  help with the display and organisation  of  the 
festival. The festival was a fantastic success but the coverage of the event from the 
Spanish correspondent was remarkably different to that emanating from the Irish 
press. Given the fact that Miraflores was endeavouring to promote both a cultural 
and economic awareness of Spanish wines, he was to discover the consequences of 
organising an event at which alcohol was to feature prominently and an all-expenses 
paid prize to a vineyard was on offer. 
106 In the breakdown of the 1949 budget for the Legation, Miraflores recorded that 70,000 people 
visited the exposition (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3115/E23). 
107 See J. L. N. Hernández, ‘The foreign policy administration of Franco’s Spain: from isolation to 
international  realignment,  1945-1957’  in  Christian  Leitz  &  David  Dunthorn  (eds),  Spain  in  an 
international context, 1936-1959 (New York, 1999), p. 289. 
108 Notification  from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  to  Miraflores  allocating  25,000  pesetas  to 
promote cultural events, 12 May 1954 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 5213/E12). 
109 A.B.C., 4 Sept. 1953. 
110 One of the prizes on offer was an all expenses paid holiday to Spain. 
111 A.B.C., 4 Sept. 1953. 
112 Ibid. 
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The day the festival opened the  Irish Times  covered the mêlée that was to 
ensue. The crowd was positively riotous after hearing a boring introductory speech 
by an Irish delegate. His Ulster accent was so indecipherable that most could not 
understand him and others thought he was speaking in Basque. When he finished the 
crowd were fixated on only one thing and looked with eager anticipation towards the 
tables full of wine: ‘wild horses would look like tame kittens in comparison to the 
Dublin populace invited to a free glass of sherry.’113 The reporter had to seek safety 
behind the ample frame of one of the guests when ‘the starting gun’ went off.114 
Despite  all  their  planning  neither  Miraflores,  Gamero  nor  Garrigues  could  have 
anticipated this particular  aspect of Irish-Spanish cultural  interaction.  The sudden 
onrush of people scrambling to grab a drink was described by the reporter like a 
metaphorical  corrida  except in this instance not even an experienced matador like 
Manolete could have tamed the wild beast that was the ‘thirsting mob’.115 Cheers of 
‘¡Olé!’  rang  out  as  the  Irish  drowned  the  alcohol  quicker  than  it  could  be  re-
poured.116  
The Irish public was keen to learn about Spain and Miraflores had persuaded 
Madrid to fund a Cultural Relations Branch Student Exchange Services. The project 
was designed to enable Spanish students to study English in Ireland for two months 
during  the  summer  and  stay  with  a  private  family.  A  Spanish  family  would 
reciprocate a following Irish student to study in Spain. Some prospective candidates 
wrote  to Miraflores hoping to take part  in  the scheme.  One Manuel  López Díaz 
stressed  his  ‘Catholic’  devotion  and  hoped  to  be  selected.117 Another  knew  the 
Ambassador  and wanted  to  have  a  residence  near  the  Embassy.118 One Donegal 
family wrote expressing their willingness to accommodate a foreign student: ‘Irish 
people  are  very  warm harted  [sic],  friendly:  our  food  is  good  and  plentiful.’119 
Unfortunately, the project was not successful in attracting Irish people to spend two 
113 Irish Times, 3 Sept. 1953. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Applicants’ records for the Cultural Relations Branch Student Exchange Services (A.M.A.E., leg. 
R – 3737/E62-159). 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
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months in Spain as part of the exchange. Many just wanted to go for two weeks to 
get a sun tan and others preferred to look for a pen friend. The largest amount of 
applicants  came  from young  bachelors.  One  Robert  Cotter  wrote  to  the  agency 
stating  that  he  would  ‘prefer  to  correspond  with  a  señorita.’120 P.  Bailie  from 
Newtownards wrote that his home ‘conditions are not quite suitable for keeping a 
Spanish student as there is no woman in the house to look after the cooking, etc.’121 
Daniel Brady, who was in St Patrick’s Training College, stated that he was looking 
for a lady ‘to see that she has a nice time.’122 All three were informed that it was a 
different  type  of  agency they  should apply to.  Religious  devotion  was a  certain 
attribute that attracted Spanish families to send their children to prospective Irish 
homes. Pat Lyons from Rialto declared that once a year ‘we organise a charity dance 
for our local church and up [sic] the present have given [£200] to the canon.’123 Irish 
ladies were more enthusiastic about a student exchange to learn Spanish. Kathleen 
Lynch wrote that she wanted to escape ‘the damp and cold of our Irish winter’ but 
some mothers were nervous about sending their children abroad despite the religious 
devotion of the Spanish people: ‘For a girl it is essential that an exchange should be 
checked up and recognised by an authority of standing.’124
In 1948 the Legation processed 323 visas and in 1949 this figure rose to 
970.125 There are many reasons for the increased number of tourists seeking visas to 
travel to Spain. Firstly, many religious sites were located there, such as Loyola and 
Santiago de Compostela, and large numbers of pilgrims and clergy desired to see 
them. Secondly,  many people held a romantic image of Spain as a warm, idyllic 
location  and  were  eager  to  visit.  Thirdly,  Miraflores’s  immensely  successful 
publicity events had highlighted the cultural aspects to Spanish life and awakened a 
yearning to see its native customs, cuisine, vineyards, bull-fighting and architecture. 
The Minister  had also worked tirelessly to promote university exchange contacts 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 In 1950 the number dropped to 679 visas. This may have been caused by the devaluation of the 
Irish pound in line with England’s currency devaluation which was officially announced on 19 Sept. 
1949. 
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between U.C.D. and Spanish universities  during the summertime and in  October 
1949 Wenceslao González Oliveros, Spain’s leading authority on education, came to 
Ireland to promote closer cultural exchanges and offer six scholarships for students 
to study in Dublin. By 1952 this number had increased to ten with £35 available to 
attend the summer school from 16-26 July in U.C.D.126 Madrid also sent many of its 
students  from the  diplomatic  school  to  learn  English  in  Ireland  which  provided 
another  conduit  to  closer  cultural  interaction.  During  the  course  of  Miraflores’s 
mission leading figures in Irish life were also to visit Spain in a personal capacity: 
Éamon  de  Valera,  General  Seán  MacEoin,127 Dr  Noël  Browne,128 Chief  Justice 
Conor Maguire,129 Dr Cornelius Lucey, Bishop of Cork, Michaél MacLiammóir and 
Hilton  Edwards.  In  October  1953  a  group  of  sixty-five  members  of  An  Garda 
Síochána visited Spain where they were received by General Franco, who expressed 
‘great  affection  and interest’  in  the island and described  how both nations  were 
united ‘through links of common faith.’130 He presented them with a signed portrait 
which was hung in Garda Headquarters.131 
It was during Miraflores’s time in Ireland that people began to view Spain as 
an  ideal  holiday destination.  Journalists  like  ‘Rex MacGall’132 wrote  informative 
articles about the “does” and “don’ts” whilst on vacation abroad. Bikinis were illegal 
and walking ‘bare-armed’ in cities was frowned upon.133 The most important advice 
to  any tourist  was to avoid discussing ‘politics’  and taking ‘their  womenfolk’.134 
126 D.E.A., Ireland, no. 126, 10 Mar. 1952. 
127 Minister for Defence in the Second Inter-Party Government (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3018/E44-45). 
128 Minister for Health in the First Inter-Party Government. 
129 Conor  Alexander  Maguire.  Born  in  Cong  Co.  Mayo  in  1889,  educated  at  Clongowes  Wood 
College and the National University of Ireland. He qualified as a solicitor in 1914 and transferred to 
the  Bar  in  1922.  He acted  as  a  judge  of  the  Provisional  Dáil  Courts  from 1920-1922 and  as  a 
Settlement Land Commissioner for Dáil Éireann. He was called to the Inner Bar in 1932 and was a 
Senator for the National University of Ireland from 1932-1936. He served as Attorney General in the 
first Fianna Fáil administration and was appointed a judge of the High Court in 1936 and President of 
the High  Court  in  December  1936 and became Chief  Justice  in  1946.  He was  Chairman of  the 
I.R.C.S.  from  1939-1946,  President  of  the  International  Celtic  Congress  1956  and  President  of 
Oireachtas na Gaeilge in 1962. He died in Dublin on 26 Sept. 1971. 
See html://www.courts.ie/supremecourt/sclibrary.html (02 Mar. 2011).  
130 A.B.C., 26 Jan. 1954. 
131 Neither the Garda Archives nor the Office of Public Works is aware of the present location of this 
portrait or the film recording. 
132 Pseudonym for Desmond Breathnach. 
133 Irish Times, 20 June 1953. 
134 Ibid. 
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Another  article  encouraged  Irish  tourists  to  travel  overland and enjoy the  travel 
experience  and  scenery  despite  the  awful  condition  of  Spanish  roads:  ‘it’s  not 
difficult  to  fit  a  new  spring  or  shock  absorber  when  you  get  back.’135 Any 
adventurous driver should use their horn ‘like the gallant trumpeter’, it opined.136 But 
the writer did warn about the grinding poverty throughout the country: 
It does not take long to get used to the cringing poverty, the beggars, and the 
many beret-heads who force unwanted services upon you for the meagre tins 
that are their sole income.137
The movement of tourists was not all one sided. Fógra Fáilte circulated its official 
journal ‘Ireland of the Welcomes’ to attract foreign visitors to these shores. External 
Affairs  in  its  weekly  bulletin  Ireland carried  photographs  and  illustrations  of  a 
mystical,  Celtic  island  with  unbounded  lakes,  forests  and  wildlife  awaiting 
discovery.  The  barren  wilderness  of  rugged  western  Ireland  was  a  common 
appearance in the publication to attract foreign visitors to the country as was the 
harking back to the island as a land of saints and scholars. The bulletin encouraged 
its  readers to pass it  on to friends and said it  ‘may be published freely,  with or 
without  acknowledgment.’138 Some  articles  were  published  in  Spanish  with 
illustrations depicting a Celtic lion and harp forming one body.139 
There  were,  as  we  have  seen,  many  upper  class  families  and  prominent 
officials in the regime who had a pro-Irish outlook because they could trace their 
ancestry back to the diaspora that had come to the country after the Flight of the 
Earls in 1607. Some of them looked upon Ireland as a possible holiday destination. 
Others came for a variety of reasons. Emilio Franco was the son of Nicolás Franco, 
Spanish Ambassador to Portugal and he came to Ireland to study English. Nicolás 
Franco  also  happened  to  be  the  dictator’s  brother.  These  senior  officials  in  the 
regime preferred to send their children to learn English in Ireland rather than Britain, 
135 Ibid., 26 Jan. 1954. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 D.E.A., Ireland, no. 113, 28 Apr. 1952. 
139 D.E.A., Ireland, no. 157, 13 Oct. 1952. 
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for fear that they may become intoxicated with materialism and liberalism. Ireland 
was  viewed  by  them as  an  idyllic  land,  green,  rugged,  hospitable  and  devoutly 
Catholic. Others arrived having stowed away in ships to seek ‘a better life’ in a free 
country.140   
As a result of Ireland’s steadfast support for the regime, more articles began 
to appear in the Spanish press promoting the island as a possible tourist destination. 
A series of articles appeared in A.B.C. entitled ‘Letters from Ireland.’141 The articles 
contrasted Ireland with its neighbour: ‘Everything that in London is red, is in Dublin 
green.’142 The capital was a wonderfully quaint city divided in two by ‘the beautiful 
Liffey’.143 The city’s Georgian architecture was the finest in the British Isles and a 
marvel to behold: ‘Merrion Square […is…] the most beautiful that I have seen in all 
of  Britannia.’144 Other  articles  generally  appeared  during  the  St  Patrick’s  Day 
celebrations.  One  article  displayed  the  city’s  promenades  with  a  photograph  of 
O’Connell  Street:  ‘the  pride  and  heart  of  Ireland.’145 The  headline  read  ‘Ireland 
Ought to be Better Known Throughout Spain.’146 The reporter conjured up images of 
an island full of wilderness and unbounded beauty which created a sense of mystery 
and curiosity  for  the  reader.  Its  ‘misty valleys  and plains’  were unspoilt  and its 
ancient culture spanned the ages linking this island to St Patrick and the Romans.147 
For  the  ‘majority  of  Spaniards,  Ireland  is  synonymous  with  a  happy and heroic 
people’, he argued.148 The reporter went on to describe the political landscape of the 
nation which could be understood by many of the diaspora in Spain because of ‘the 
great number of Irish that occupied elevated posts in Spanish social life’ over the 
years.149 
140 Note  recording  the  arrival  of  three  stowaways  in  Ireland,  7  Oct.  1954  (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R  – 
3040/E3). 
141 A.B.C., 13 June 1951. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 17 Mar. 1954. The writer,  Juan Patricio O’Reilly,  was extremely sympathetic  to Ireland 
probably due to his Irish ancestry. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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For the benefit of the Spanish reader, Northern Ireland was classified as a 
disputed region between the Republic and Britain and consequently was ‘still to be 
free’.150 Its natural home is within the Irish nation but for the moment it  remains 
unfortunately ‘under the imperialist  English flag’.151 The whole disputed territory 
was likened to ‘a sort of Irish Gibraltar.’152 Bilaterally Ireland and Spain had always 
had ‘cordial relations’ and in the darkest hour of universal condemnation the land of 
saints and scholars had shown itself to be ‘one of the few countries that disobeyed 
the blockade of Spain initiated by the United Nations.’153 The Irish knew what it was 
like to be ‘wickedly subdued’ by foreign powers.154 Time and again at regional level 
in  the Council  of Europe the Irish delegates  raised their  voices  ‘energetically  to 
affirm the sovereignty of Spain’.155 For any Spanish visitor who wished to travel to 
Ireland they could be assured that they would be travelling to one of the most loyal 
and friendly nations that would welcome them with open arms.
Miraflores  had  demonstrated  previously  his  willingness  to  expend  vast 
amounts of money in order to further his mission by gaining enormous publicity 
both in the press and with the wider public. Time and again he wrote to Madrid 
requesting  more  sums  of  money.  He  repeatedly  praised  his  Secretary,  Adolfo 
Martín-Gamero, in his dispatches and both men formulated an ambitious plan that 
they hoped would achieve superb propaganda for Spain. Their proposal was to send 
a  naval  ship  to  Ireland  both  to  demonstrate  Spanish  military  capabilities  to  the 
Western  powers  and  to  delight  the  general  Irish  public  with  the  sight  of  naval 
officers  in  uniform  parading  up  the  capital’s  main  streets.  Never  before  had  a 
diplomatic mission in Ireland gone to such lengths to promote such a visible display 
of friendly relations. Madrid approved the idea and Miraflores and Gamero worked 
in  earnest  to  prepare  what  would  become  the  best  party  ‘in  the  annals  of  this 
country’s social life’.156  
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.
156 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738). 
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‘Gun Salute As Spanish Ship Berths’157 was the headline of the Irish Times 
on reporting the arrival of the training vessel Juan Sebastián Elcano into Alexandra 
Basin Dublin on 4 July 1950. There it was welcomed by all leading political figures 
as well as senior religious and judicial personnel, amongst who were Archbishop 
McQuaid and Chief Justice Maguire.158 The Spanish press also covered the arrival of 
the ship to Ireland saying it had received a ‘green Irish welcome’.159 The vessel fired 
a salvo of twenty-one guns on arrival, which was returned by Dún Laoghaire coastal 
battery.  Miraflores met the crew from a police boat and saluted the 500-year-old 
Castilian naval flag that flew at high mast. Planning for the arrival of the Elcano had 
begun as early as 3 February 1950, with Cork as the original berthing destination.160 
For  publicity  purposes  Miraflores  preferred  Dublin  Port  and  on  3  May  at  a 
conference organised in External Affairs, it was agreed that Dublin would be the 
port of call. On 5 July the crew played a public concert in St Stephen’s Green. Their 
naval uniforms greatly impressed the Dublin public who overwhelmingly ‘received 
the Spanish sailors with great affection and enthusiasm.’161 
The following day, 6 July, Miraflores organised a reception at the Legation 
with a guard of honour from the ship assembled to greet the more than 600 guests of 
the Diplomatic Corps, Government, civil service, judiciary and cultural elite on their 
arrival.  The Minister  was relieved when the weather suddenly ‘helped us’ in the 
mid-afternoon as ‘a splendid sun shone’ over the Legation’s lawn for the garden 
party.162 For Miraflores, it was a propitious omen as the ‘radiant’ light put an end to 
possible fears of ‘typical Irish rain and grey sky’ dampening the occasion.163 The 
banquet  was  exquisite  with  no  expense  spared.  The  Minister  acknowledged  that 
External  Affairs  had  ‘done  more  than  in  similar  cases  previously  with  other 
country’s naval vessels’.164 He toasted his distinguished guests by stating that the 
arrival  of the  Elcano  marked a watershed in bilateral  relations because it  visibly 
157 Irish Times, 5 Sept. 1950. 
158 Built in 1927, the training vessel displaced 3,420 tons and could reach a top speed of 9.5 knots. 
159 A.B.C., 13 July 1950. 
160 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.G.A. (10) 3954/11738). 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
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solidified  their  shared  ‘Catholic  faith  and  fight  against  Communism’  and 
demonstrated  to  the  world  that  both  nations  spoke  as  one  on  the  international 
stage.165 The Taoiseach spoke of the Spanish Armada and how this was not the first 
time a Spanish vessel had sought refuge in Irish waters. Miraflores found Costello to 
be his usual ‘cold and very inexpressive’ self.166 The Commander of the  Elcano, 
Álvaro  Urzaiz  y  de  Silva,  believed  both  nations  were  marching  ‘shoulder  to 
shoulder’ and would soon join with the Western world in defending the values they 
both shared.167 The guests in attendance represented the elite pillars of society and all 
remarked to Miraflores that the festival was the best seen in Ireland ‘in so many 
years’.168 They all raised their glasses for a toast in honour of General Franco. 
The crew of the ship enjoyed their time in Ireland and visited Boyne Valley 
and later played a game of football in Phoenix Park against the Irish Army. A dinner 
was organised in McKee Barracks by Chief of Staff Major General Liam Archer and 
General  Hugo  MacNeill  –  Officer  Commanding  Eastern  Command.  The 
Commander  of  the  Irish  Naval  Service  wrote  to  Commander  Urzaiz  that  ‘the 
youngest Catholic navy’ hoped that it could reciprocate the Spanish gesture and the 
initiative that they had shown in expressing such ‘enthusiasm to fight for the ideals 
which we have in common.’169 Miraflores later awarded Lieutenant Commander C. 
B. O’Connor a Cruz de Mérito Naval for his work as liaison-officer to the Elcano.170 
When it was time for the crew to depart, after hearing mass in Westland Row, they 
played the Irish anthem whilst the Army band played theirs. A column appeared in 
External  Affairs official  publication which described the collective feeling of the 
nation towards the crew of the Elcano: 
And so, after a gay and colourful visit the ship left Dublin on Saturday last 
while Dubliners already missed the bright uniforms from their streets and  
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listened to the salute  of guns which recalled the days  when the Spanish  
Armada found refuge on the rocky west coast of Ireland.171 
Miraflores  further  intensified  closer  relations  by  frequently  hosting  dinners  and 
receptions in the Embassy. Invited guests were enthralled to be scaling the heights of 
the social scene whilst for Miraflores the benefits of their company,  all of whom 
commanded  senior  positions  across  the  spectrum  of  Irish  society,  could  prove 
important  for  both  access  and  information  into  political,  judicial  and  cultural 
spheres. Michael Scott, the leading architect in Ireland, was a frequent invitee to all 
cultural events organised by Miraflores and Gamero. The Spanish gave Scott free 
architectural magazines and information about outdoor ceramic tiles. The Minister 
described Scott as a ‘good friend of Spain’.172 In time this personal contact proved 
enormously advantageous for when Scott was awarded the contract to design and 
build C.I.E.’s central bus station opposite the Customs House, Spanish companies 
won many of the public tenders for the project, most notably, the supply of ceramic 
tiles for the elaborate façade of the building. 
He  frequently  bestowed  prestigious  gifts  on  leading  political  figures. 
President O’Kelly received the Gran Cruz de Carlos III on 20 November 1950. The 
event gave Miraflores much exposure in the newspapers. President O’Kelly’s wife, 
Phyllis, had also received a gift earlier for which she wrote a letter to Miraflores in 
Spanish.  The  present  was  ‘beautiful’  and  she  felt  extremely  ‘honoured’  by  the 
gesture on behalf of his Government and ‘the great Caudillo’.173 Friendly gestures 
like  these  assisted  Miraflores  to  gain  easy access  to  senior  influential  people  in 
politics. In fact, O’Kelly and Miraflores had a very close friendship all along as the 
President on one occasion had lunch in the Spanish residency. No other diplomatic 
representative was accorded this honour. Regretfully Miraflores could not publicise 
the event as it had to be kept secret from the press and confined to the knowledge of 
a select few for fear of causing offence and showing favouritism to one nation over 
others. 
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Miraflores understood that by awarding gifts to people for their efforts on 
your behalf, they would be more malleable and useful. Chief Justice Conor Maguire 
had always shown himself to be a trusted friend of the regime. He was a frequent 
attendee at all the Embassy’s receptions and his prominent position in the judicial 
system would have facilitated good contacts in the legal profession and access to 
important people and information which could aid Miraflores. On 5 October 1952 he 
returned from an official visit to Spain during which time he met the Minister for 
Justice.  Maguire professed his delight at the competence of the regime’s judicial 
process to all and sundry and Miraflores decided to award him the Gran Cruz de San 
Raimundo de Peñafort  for which there was ‘no precedents’ for an Irish citizen.174 
Maguire  was  presented  with  the  medal  at  an  official  ceremony which  displayed 
‘proof  of  the  intimate  friendship’  between  the  two  nations.175 The  Government, 
senior officials in External Affairs and the press were all there to witness the historic 
occasion.  
History  was  invoked  by  both  nations  to  stress  their  unifying  links  and 
commemorations  which  marked  the  involvement  of  Irishmen  in  the  service  of 
Spanish Armies in Flanders were a focal point for remembrance.  On 10 October 
1949 Gamero dispatched a report on a commemoration he had attended in Cavan for 
the tercentenary of the death of General Eugenio O’Neill.176 The President, leading 
figures in the Government and many Nationalists had been present to remember the 
historic links between both nations. Gamero noted that the occasion was used to 
reinforce Ireland’s present-day commitment to stand beside Spain, a stance it was 
‘proud of for not having followed the absurd policy of isolation’ imposed on its 
friend and partner.177 The recent Spanish Civil War was another historic legacy about 
which Miraflores had stressed the ready sacrifice of Irishmen to defend Catholicism 
in his homeland through their tenacious martial courage. Ex-combatants from that 
conflict were occasionally invited to receptions, speeches, or masses organised by 
him. However, with the passage of time the Irish Brigade, which could have been 
used  more  to  strengthen  cultural  ties,  was  often  ignored  by  successive  Spanish 
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diplomats.  The death of  O’Duffy on 30 November  1944 and Commander  Pat J. 
Dalton,  the Brigade’s  second-in-command,  on 18 February 1956, highlighted the 
gradual  disappearance  of  the  Irish  Brigade  in  public  discourse.  Neglected  and 
forgotten, men who had fought to defeat Communism and demonstrate their affinity 
with Spain, found themselves apparently not wanted. They had to fight a prolonged 
campaign  just  to  get  a  combat  medal  from  Madrid  in  recognition  for  services 
rendered during the war.178 One former soldier, Michael Kenny, wrote a letter for 
Foreign Affairs, in relation to war wounds he had sustained whilst fighting during 
the conflict.179 An artillery shell had damaged his head and he had suffered severe 
physical discomfort as a result of that injury which precluded him from employment. 
He was forty-seven, had two children and was seeking some form of compensation. 
The Irish Embassy in Madrid personally handed in his original certificate as proof of 
his service. The certificate was signed by General O’Duffy and General Franco. It 
displayed the four provinces of Ireland, the national symbol of the harp in a Celtic 
borderline and the flags of both countries. Despite his requests for ‘personal and 
sentimental reasons’ to have it returned to him after they had finished their inquiries, 
it never was and still lies in an archive file, forgotten with the passage of time.180 
Defending Spanish Honour
As with Ontiveros and Artaza, Miraflores became embroiled in some controversies 
with newspapers during his mission. One source of constant irritation was the Irish 
Times, which had attacked the Francoist regime from the latter’s inception. Anyone 
associated  with  this  newspaper  was  immediately  castigated  as  an  enemy  of  the 
Francoist  State  in  Miraflores’s  eyes.  In  one  incident  he  had  received  a  visa 
application  from  a  man  named  Dudley  Henry  Walsh.  Walsh  was  a  cousin  of 
Professor  Starkie,  who  had  always  displayed  great  affection  for  Spain  and  the 
regime.  Walsh  wanted  to  go  and  see  the  country  in  a  personal  capacity  but 
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Miraflores held up his visa application after he had been tipped off that Walsh was 
going to be writing for the Irish Times shortly. Miraflores had often quarrelled with 
the newspaper over its political commentary which was always full of ‘aggressive 
hostility…from this Protestant daily on Spain.’181  
The broadsheet  repeatedly vilified  the benign perception of the regime in 
Ireland and had supported the case for excluding Spain from the Marshall Plan.182 
Shortly  after  arriving  in  Ireland,  Miraflores  had  had  to  contact  its  editor  ‘in  a 
practical and discreet manner’ to voice his displeasure at ‘injurious falsities’ in its 
reports.183 The newspaper’s constant  criticism of the Francoist  State  was a major 
preoccupation for him. Whenever it could the  Irish Times  frequently attacked the 
regime for its perceived religious discrimination against Protestants. To Miraflores 
the  Irish Times  was ‘once again’ fomenting trouble.184 The article claimed that no 
Protestant church could put up posters, ‘publicise its services’ or express its faith 
‘freely’.185 In many regions of Spain loved ones could not hold ‘religious service in 
honour of their dead.’186 State discrimination from childhood to adulthood against 
Protestants was endemic and the regime itself was ‘the most hated in the history of 
Spain’.187 
 The  uniqueness  of  Irish-Spanish  relations,  which  had  maintained 
cooperative  relations  in  the  face  of  international  condemnation  of  the  Francoist 
State, added another dimension to Miraflores’s mission. Behind the scenes he had 
been engaged in skilful diplomacy which was tactfully forging a strong relationship 
with the American diplomatic mission here. He had learnt confidentially from the 
American Minister, who was an ‘intimate friend of [President] Truman’,  that  the 
United  States  would  soon ‘resume normal  relations  and economic  assistance’  to 
Spain.188 This was a major coup for Miraflores and he revelled in informing Madrid 
of this propitious news. However, the importance of the matter necessitated secrecy 
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for as long as possible. This did not stop the Irish Times discovering the revelation 
of  a  possible  rapprochement  between  the  United  States  and Spain.  It  carried  an 
article that condemned any possible détente with Franco because ‘Spain today is a 
police State, just as it was when General Franco first took office.’189 If the American 
administration wanted to realign itself with Spain in its Cold War confrontation with 
the Soviet Union than the whole affair was ‘a matter of expediency’ and not based 
on any ‘question of political principle’, as Boris Liedtke has also demonstrated.190 It 
would be regretful if the international community pulled Spain out from its enforced 
isolation because the regime was still a totalitarian one that suppressed freedom of 
expression: ‘the jails are still full of republican prisoners.’191 
Since his arrival Miraflores had enjoyed major publicity successes and had 
established useful contacts within the small diplomatic body. This effort had allowed 
him not only bolster stronger cultural, political and economic relations with his host 
nation,  but  also to  help  break Spain  out  of  its  enforced  ostracism.  However,  by 
August 1950 the Minister had become aware of a controversy that would soon rise to 
the surface of public debate: the gathering of the 29th Inter-Parliamentary Assembly 
Union in Dublin. Miraflores had called on Iveagh House but was amazed that no one 
there  was  aware  about  the  gathering  of  dissident  Republican  and  Communist 
elements in Dublin: ‘this Government is oblivious to the Assembly’, he reported.192 
This controversy, coming not long after the  Elcano  success, which was one of the 
greatest propaganda successes achieved by any Spanish diplomat abroad in the post-
war period, irritated the Minister considerably. Madrid pressured Miraflores not to 
allow his recent successes to be overshadowed by this polemical event and he was 
ordered to:
pressure the Government  with regard to the Inter-Parliamentary Union by  
eliminating the presence of Red representatives; in all cases the Government 
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of  Ireland  ought  to  prohibit  this  activity  including  speeches  in  that  
assembly.193
Miraflores responded to Madrid’s order by sending a letter to the President of the 
conference, Mr Boissier, requesting a guarantee that Spanish Republicans would be 
prevented from making inflammatory speeches against the Francoist State. The Irish 
Times reported  the  opening  of  the  29th Conference  of  the  Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly Union. In attendance were members of the exiled Spanish Government, 
amongst whom were Dr Juan Negrín and Álvarez del Vayo.194 Negrín declined to be 
interviewed but Vayo openly told the press he hoped for ‘a democratic election in 
Spain’ and when that time comes ‘the Republican Party will take its place in the 
Parliament.’195 They were received in Leinster House on 7 September but Miraflores 
had obtained assurances that ‘the Spanish Republican flag would not be flown’ nor 
would  any  member  of  the  Irish  Government  or  the  President  officially  receive 
them.196 
He then sent a note to the Minister for Finance Patrick McGilligan, ‘a great 
friend  of  mine’,  who  assured  Miraflores  that  the  arrival  of  these  prominent 
Republican politicians would not precipitate a public swing towards those who were 
defeated  in the Spanish Civil  War.197 On the contrary,  McGilligan informed him 
‘confidentially’ that it would strengthen the public’s resolve to stand behind General 
Franco ‘because of the reaction it  will  produce from the decidedly hostile  broad 
body of public opinion to Red representatives’ in Dublin.198 McGilligan was not the 
only senior politician within the Cabinet to help Miraflores. Other ‘Deputies who I 
am friends with’ assured him that they were working covertly to rally ‘religious and 
civil  associations’  in  protest  at  the  presence  of  ‘Red  Spaniards’  in  Dublin.199 
Miraflores was inundated with letters from Dáil Deputies across the political divide 
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as well as the Speaker of the House, Frank Fahy, who were all ‘preparing today to 
organise a demonstration’ against the conference, he informed Madrid.200 
On  10  September  thousands  of  pamphlets  were  distributed  by  a  nascent 
‘Committee of Protest of Dublin Citizens’. This group gathered on Abbey Street to 
protest against the ‘Christ-haters’ arriving into the capital.201 Using amplifiers and 
microphones they sung hymns,  recited the rosary,  distributed leaflets and tried to 
block members going into the Abbey Theatre.202 Miraflores claimed that thousands 
had turned out to support  his cause but this was disputed by the Irish Times.  In 
another article the writer ‘Quidnunc’203 excoriated the Francoist regime and those in 
Ireland who supported it.204 One of the delegates to the conference was Manuel de 
Irujo, the former Minister for Justice who had released Serrano Súñer and Esteban 
Bilbao from prison. Irujo was a Basque and the article detailed the repression the 
Basque  people  had  suffered  under  Franco.  ‘Quidnunc’  argued  that  de  Valera 
deserved to be tainted with the Marxist brush as much as Irujo who, during his time 
in  the  capital,  attended  church  every  morning.  But  Miraflores  was  not  overly 
concerned  with  challenging  the  Irish  Times on  this  occasion  because  the  whole 
controversy had ‘provoked a violent reaction in the press and in the streets’ to the 
presence of Red delegates in Dublin, he gleefully informed Madrid.205 The second 
polemical controversy that confronted Miraflores during his mission was reported to 
Madrid on 20 March 1954. The issue concerned a fifteen-minute radio broadcast on 
Raidió Éireann.206 For the first time, a distinguished and renowned academic was 
prepared to voice his disproval of the regime. Up until now, no member of the Irish 
intelligentsia had endeavoured to expose the repressive nature of the Francoist State. 
With  the  exception  of  the Irish  Times,  all  journalistic,  scholastic  and  academic 
circles had followed mainstream political, religious and popular opinion by adopting 
200 Ibid. 
201 Letter from several religious societies to the President of Ireland, Seán T. O’Kelly, 10 Sept. 1950 
(N.A.I., Pres. P4548).   
202 Irish Times, 11 Sept. 1950. 
203 Pseudonym for Patrick Campbell.  
204 Irish Times, 13 Sept. 1950. 
205 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3115/E23). 
206 Raidió Éireann, Broadcast by Professor Basil Chubb, 27 Feb. 1954. Chubb was a Professor of 
Political  Science in T.C.D.  and he had a weekly fifteen-minute slot  on radio that  covered world 
affairs.  
228
a pro-Francoist attitude since the military uprising on 17 July 1936. This accepted 
attitude had managed, ironically,  to square an obvious circle. How could a nation 
like Ireland, that cherished values such as democracy and Catholic morality, accept 
so  warmly  a  regime  that  was  overtly  tyrannical  and  had  abused  human  rights 
repeatedly? The argument used time and again to defend this viewpoint was that any 
attempt to alter or interfere in the internal affairs of another nation would cause more 
misery for  the Spanish people.  When Professor  Basil  Chubb of  T.C.D. gave his 
lecture on the radio, the most accessible mass media system at that time, he was also 
challenging Irish foreign policy. 
His talk, entitled ‘Spain’s “New Look” Foreign Policy’,  was described by 
Miraflores as ‘tendentious and unpleasant’.207 Chubb attacked Franco addressing him 
time and again as a ‘dictator’.208 The regime’s rapprochement with the United States 
in  August  1953  was  based  entirely  on  American  ‘cold  logic’  and  not  on  the 
propaganda emanating from Madrid that presented itself as a bulwark against the 
advance of Communism in Europe, Chubb argued.209 He attacked Franco’s conduct 
during the Second World War, when the Caudillo had ‘supported the Axis with all 
aid short of outright participation.’210 The dictator’s post-war behaviour was nothing 
short of ‘emotional’ and ‘increasingly irrational’.211 Far from possessing prudence 
Franco was likened by Chubb to an unbalanced leader who was leading his poverty-
stricken country closer toward an abyss. The academic stressed the point on air to 
the Irish people that Franco had no popular support and had never held anything like 
free elections.  His continuance in office was based solely on ‘the support  of the 
greatest  forces  in  Spain,  the  Church  and  the  army’.212 The  opening  of  Spain  to 
foreign direct investment would certainly see a huge rise in inflation which could 
only impact negatively on the great mass of Spanish society, he declared, and would 
‘bring greater hardship for the poor, who are very poor in Spain.’213 
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When  Miraflores  first  heard  of  Chubb’s  talk  he  immediately  sought  a 
meeting at Iveagh House with Frank Aiken but was informed that due to St Patrick’s 
Day  celebrations,  both  the  Minister  and  Secretary  were  away  in  London.  He 
therefore  met  the  Assistant  Secretary  and  subjected  him  to  ‘my  most  energetic 
protest’ over the controversy.214 The Ambassador could not understand how a ‘semi-
official organ of the State’ could have allowed such a flagrantly abusive speech to be 
aired to the nation.215 In particular, the severe criticism by Professor Chubb of the 
‘politics and behaviour of the Head of State’ could not but undermine the cordial 
relationship  established  so  laboriously  by  both  nations,  he  argued.216 He  further 
added  that  although  the  regime  was  ‘unfortunately  accustomed’  to  such 
inflammatory propaganda from Great Britain, the Irish Times and ‘some individuals 
in  Trinity  College’,  he  was  perplexed  and  dismayed  that  a  friendly  national 
broadcast station could have been used to so unfairly besmirch his country.217 Raidió 
Éireann  was  officially  under  the  auspices  of  Posts  and  Telegraphs,  which  was 
headed  by  Minister  Erskine  Childers.  Miraflores  informed  Madrid  that  he  had 
contemplated protesting to Childers’s office as well but declined to do so because 
Childers ‘is a Protestant and quite supportive of Trinity College’.218 He therefore 
dismissed this channel of complaint as it would not be understood by a non-Catholic. 
Miraflores believed that Chubb’s speech was an attempt to counter a widely 
covered talk the Ambassador had organised at the Mansion House.219 In a speech 
entitled ‘The New Spain’,  Dr Halliday Sutherland,  a renowned British expert  on 
international affairs, had defended General Franco, whom he believed had always 
shown himself  to be anti-Communist,  so much so he argued that the absence of 
Spain from NATO was akin to opening a ‘gateway’ for Communist infiltration into 
Europe and Africa.220 He believed that  Britain’s  stance towards Franco since the 
Second  World  War  was  ‘illogical,  irrational  and  insular.’221 Franco  had  the 
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confidence of the Arab world222 and Britain’s prejudiced attitude was an indictment 
on the Western powers defence strategy. On 14 October Miraflores gave a talk at a 
conference  in  the  Gresham  Hotel  for  which  ‘I  have  received  endless  cards  of 
congratulations’.223 The Standard repeatedly defended the peculiarities of Francoism 
to the Irish public: ‘totalitarianism practised in Spain is very distinct’  from other 
systems. 224 The nation was in fact an ‘organic democracy’.225 Public representation 
was channelled fairly through the Falange which had achieved ‘many triumphs’ in 
bringing  people  into  socially  beneficial  work.226 The  ‘resurgence’  of  Spain  in 
international  affairs  could  only  be  judged  as  an  event  of  significant  ‘worldly 
interest,’ the newspaper declared.227 
Miraflores  warmly  welcomed  articles  which  championed  the  cause  of 
Francoism and in the wake of the Chubb speech the  Irish Catholic came out  to 
defend staunchly General Franco, asking the Director of Raidió Éireann, Maurice 
Gorham,  to  consider  his  position  after  allowing  ‘such  a  talk’  on  ‘our  national 
radio.’228 The whole controversy reinforced certain  fundamental  opinions held by 
Miraflores and his predecessors: that Trinity College was a bastion of Protestantism 
and dissident opinion and a centre of covert anti-Spanish propaganda which must be 
constantly monitored; that a principal prerogative of a Spanish diplomat to Ireland 
must be to vigorously combat malicious propaganda emanating from Great Britain 
and the Irish Times; and that any viewpoints which attacked the regime were not 
expressions of popular opinion or expressions of democratic free speech, but rather 
mutterings by minorities who could be discredited as being either Jewish, Masons, 
Communists, Republican-extremists or Protestants.  
These two controversies mirrored each other in that they highlighted Irish 
perceptions of Spain that were deeply imbedded in the national conscience. Of all 
the nations that had maintained a diplomatic presence in Spain during the years of 
enforced  ostracism,  Ireland  was  the  principal  democratic  nation  that  supported 
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General  Franco.  The  rest,  such  as  Portugal  and  Argentina,  were  all  ruled  by 
dictators. Both the Fianna Fáil Government and the Coalition Governments stood 
shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Francoist  Spain  and  refused  to  accommodate  any 
reconciliatory  approach  to  anti-Francoists.  Liam Cosgrave,  Minister  for  External 
Affairs in the Second Inter-Party Government and future Taoiseach, explained why 
this was so when he took charge of Irish foreign policy in 1954. Franco ‘had his 
limitations’  but  ‘his  successes  out-weighed’  his  limitations.229 He had ‘prevented 
Spain  going  Communist’  and  although  Franco  may  not  have  been  ‘perfect’,  he 
‘stood for the correct ideas and had the support of his people’.230 He had maintained 
‘law and order’ which is the ‘first duty of any Government worth their name’.231 
There was no other alternative to Franco as this was not reflective ‘on the reality of 
the  situation  in  Spain.’232 The  Republicans  and  other  anti-Francoist  political 
groupings were ‘anti-Catholic’ and ‘left-wing’; two aberrations in Irish eyes.233 It is 
therefore not surprising that any criticism of Franco was so vehemently opposed by 
the broad mass of public opinion in Ireland. Irish perceptions of Spain in the post-
war  period  as  demonstrated  through  public  and  political  reactions  to  the  29th 
Conference and the Chubb speech must be viewed in this context.
Given the fact  that  religion was a prominent  factor and dynamic between 
both nations it is rather surprising that ecclesiastical interactions were an infrequent 
theme in post-war diplomatic reports, as Dermot Keogh has confirmed.234 In one file 
dedicated to ecclesiastical issues Miraflores recorded his cordial  relationship with 
Archbishop  McQuaid.  He  frequently  met  McQuaid  for  lunch  at  which  they 
discussed issues such as the Irish College in Salamanca.235 Miraflores judged the 
Archbishop of Dublin to be ‘always a great friend of our country’.236 The same could 
not  be said about  the most  senior  official  in  the Catholic  hierarchy,  Archbishop 
D’Alton of Armagh and Primate  of All-Ireland.  D’Alton’s  attitude to  Spain ‘has 
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always  been  a  cautious  one’  and  ‘we  cannot  consider  him  as  an  unconditional 
friend’, he advised.237 Miraflores believed that D’Alton should be invited on a trip to 
the country to  help change his  opinion.  He was present at  most  of the religious 
ceremonies organised by the Catholic hierarchy during its calendar year. One annual 
commemorative  mass  in  particular  honoured  St  Francis  Xavier  -  the  Spanish 
missionary  who  had  co-founded  the  Jesuit  society  which  had  achieved  notably 
success in Ireland,  especially  in the educational  sphere.  Both countries  did work 
together in 1948 to champion the Vatican’s desire for an internationalisation of the 
holy sites and in the 1950 holy year, both tried to out do each other in their outward 
display of filial loyalty to Rome. 
The closure of the Irish College in Salamanca in 1954 likewise received little 
commentary from Miraflores.238 However, its closure did encourage the Spanish to 
maintain ecclesiastical links with St Patrick’s College, Maynooth by offering annual 
scholarships  to  Irish  students  to  study  ecclesiastical  and  secular  sciences  in  the 
University of Salamanca. In that same year the Catholic organisation Opus Dei set 
up its first residence in Nullamore House, Milltown. McQuaid blessed the residence 
at its official opening on 18 November. The Taoiseach John A. Costello and leader 
of the Opposition Éamon de Valera were also there. Richard Mulcahy, Minister for 
Education and nominal leader of Fine Gael, was appointed Director of Nullamore. 
The involvement of such prominent  figures with the organisation highlighted the 
strong  religious  bonds  between  both  nations.  In  time  Opus  Dei  expanded  its 
presence and opened up other residences and colleges that were part-staffed by new 
members to the organisation.239 
Ulster
The issue of Ulster was of considerable importance in Irish-Spanish relations given 
the fact that they both shared territorial grievances with Britain. The reunification of 
237 Miraflores to _____ after D’Alton’s elevation to Cardinal on 12 Jan. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 
3470/E16). 
238 After  some initial  disagreement  the  Spanish  Government  agreed  to  pay  2,000,000  pesetas  or 
£18,000 for the former Irish College building in Salamanca. See Irish Times, 24 Feb. 1954. 
239 See Irish Times, 15 Aug. 1955. 
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the island was the principal political objective of every party inside Dáil Éireann and 
Irish sensibilities on this issue were well understood by the Spanish Ambassador: 
‘the keystone of Irish foreign policy revolves around the solution to the problem of 
partition’,240 an observation supported by Ronan Mulvaney.241 On several occasions 
Miraflores  recorded  the  inflammable  consequences  to  friendly  States  if  they 
impinged on these sensibilities.  On 8 January 1951 Minister  for External Affairs 
Seán  MacBride  threatened  to  ‘boycott  Dutch  products  in  Ireland’  if  the  Dutch 
authorities allowed a contingent of their pilots to be trained on airbases in Northern 
Ireland.242 The  bases  were  located  in  Derry  which  MacBride  said  was  forcibly 
‘occupied  by  the  British  Army’.243 Protests  were  organised  outside  the  Dutch 
Embassy  and  anti-partitionists  vowed  to  ransack  all  Dutch  businesses,  the 
Netherlands-Irish  Institute  and  K.L.M.  offices  at  home  and abroad.244 Miraflores 
recorded  that  ‘a  small  bomb exploded  in  the  Chancery  of  the  British  Embassy’ 
during the height of the controversy.245 The arrival in September 1952 of Portuguese 
frigates and one submarine to Derry, a mainly Nationalist enclave, was received with 
a firm and vituperative riposte by the Irish Government and press. In January 1954 a 
diplomatic clash broke out between Ireland and Australia over a dispute involving 
presentation  of  credentials.246 The  Australians  were  reluctant  to  accredit  their 
Ambassador to the President of Ireland under the Republic of Ireland Act as this 
infringed, in their opinion, on English sovereignty over Northern Ireland. 
The  Spanish  sometimes  afforded  the  Irish  the  opportunity  to  raise  the 
contentious  issue of partition on air.  On one occasion Eoin MacWhite,  who was 
studying in Madrid,247 was allowed on St Patrick’s Day to make an impassioned 
speech on Spanish national radio concerning ‘the present problems and demands of 
his country.’248 The Spanish were sympathetic to the cause of a united Ireland and 
240 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 Jan. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3107/E11).
241 Ronan  Mulvaney,  ‘Ireland  and  the  “Spanish  question”,  1945-50’  in  Declan  Downey & J.  C. 
MacLennan (eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), p. 249.  
242 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Jan. 1951 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2689/E10). 
243 Ibid. 
244 K.L.M. – Dutch national airline company. 
245 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Jan. 1951 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2689/E10). 
246 Evening Herald, 14 Jan. 1954. 
247 See chapter seven.
248 A.B.C., 19 Mar. 1947. 
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never  impinged  on  Irish  sensibilities.  The  Netherlands  and  Portugal  sent  their 
military units  to  Derry because they were members  of  NATO. Spain  was not  a 
member of that military alliance and therefore could privately assure its friend that it 
would never act in a similar manner if it was a member of NATO. When the Dutch 
authorities  sent  their  aircrew  to  Derry,  A.B.C.  carried  an  article  entitled  ‘Dutch 
Military Air Force Will Carry Out Exercises Over Irish Territory’ and claimed that 
Derry  was  ‘temporarily  occupied  by  Britain.’249 The  article  stressed  Ireland’s 
‘profoundly Catholic and anti-Communist’ nature to its readers.250 Madrid was aware 
that the Irish Constitution claimed sovereignty of the six counties and so navigated 
this polemical issue by styling its representative as head of the ‘Spanish Embassy in 
Ireland’. This was geographically correct and conveniently bypassed any political 
problems between Dublin, Belfast and London. 
Not  until  the  1980s,  long  after  Irish  claims  of  sovereignty  over  the  six 
counties had become dormant, did Madrid approve the opening of a Consulate in 
Northern Ireland. It did have a Consulate in Glasgow in the post-war period which 
was headed by Luis de Torres-Quevedo. Like Miraflores, he monitored events in 
Northern  Ireland  and  copiously  read  Nationalist  and  Unionist  newspapers  on 
domestic affairs in the province and issues concerning Spain. He believed that the 
Nationalist  journalists who wrote for the  Irish Weekly were ‘more favourable’ in 
their attitude towards Francoist Spain than their Unionist counterparts.251 Quevedo’s 
reports mirrored Miraflores’s in their perceptions of Northern Ireland’s Government: 
gerrymandering and civil rights discrimination were ‘an undeniable fact.’252 Foreign 
Affairs  was itself  well-informed on Irish territorial  claims over Northern Ireland. 
The Irish staff in Madrid frequently sent propaganda posters and pamphlets to the 
Ministry that depicted the flagrant violation of Ireland’s territorial integrity. In one 
example, Britain was depicted as a monster swallowing up the Nationalist people.253 
That  particular  pamphlet  had  been  published  at  the  All-Party  Anti-Partition 
249 Ibid., 3 Feb. 1951. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Luis de Torres-Quevedo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 Mar. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 
2992/E4). 
252 Luis de Torres-Quevedo to _____, 27 Feb. 1951 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2689/E10). 
253 Irish propaganda material (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2344/E4). 
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Conference in the Mansion House which had been attended and endorsed by all the 
political parties and their leaders in the Dáil. Another propaganda publication sent to 
the Ministry asserted that partition was an international  issue and asked if  Spain 
would allow Catalonia the choice of not co-existing within the body politic?254
For politicians across the political divide in post-war Ireland, partition was 
the last hurdle to be overcome to achieve the fundamental goal of Republicanism – a 
united island.  De Valera spoke constantly on this  issue and after  he was elected 
Taoiseach  again  in  1951 he  reaffirmed  partition  as  the  principal  concern  of  his 
Government.  On  St  Patrick’s  Day  1952  he  described  partition  as  an  artificial 
aberration with no natural lineation nor ‘historical, economic, cultural, linguistic or 
racial basis’ and he prayed to God that ‘it all may speedily be brought to an end.’255 
For de Valera,  partition was the greatest impediment to national progress and all 
members to the Fianna Fáil party swore an oath to work towards its removal. He 
foresaw a federal solution to the problem whereby the powers vested in Westminster 
would  be  transferred  to  Dublin  and  Stormont  could  still  enjoy  some  degree  of 
autonomy.  This  viewpoint  had  been  shared  by  Seán  MacBride  of  Clann  na 
Poblachta,  but  he  insisted  on  a  timeframe  for  the  eventual  dissolution  of  the 
Northern Parliament. 
Initially Miraflores was quite sympathetic towards Irish claims over the six 
counties, which he believed naturally belonged to the Irish people. He highlighted 
the case of Korea which was also the result  of an incomplete peace.  In time his 
opinion  altered,  above  all  because  he  did  not  admire  Seán  MacBride.  When 
MacBride was Minister for External Affairs he raised the issue of partition at every 
opportunity.  As outsiders looking in,  it  appeared to the Spanish that  MacBride’s 
frequent excursions abroad were mere ‘propaganda trips’ that had induced ‘nothing 
new’ except ever-increasing boredom amongst foreign dignitaries at conferences.256 
His speeches were also criticised by the Irish Times: ‘Partition has become, in fact, a 
254 D.E.A., Ireland, no. 38, 12 June 1950. 
255 Speech delivered by Éamon de Valera to the Irish people, 17 Mar.  1952 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
3508/E21). 
256 Luis  de Torres-Quevedo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  3 May 1951 (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R – 
2689/E10). 
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Strasbourg joke.’257 But for MacBride this contentious issue was a national struggle 
and would not cease until Britain’s continued interference in Irish affairs had ended. 
Throughout 1953  the  issue  of  partition  formed  a  large  component  of 
Miraflores’s  reports  as  the  issue  was  advancing  considerably.  That  year  Vice-
President Richard Nixon, aware of his Irish roots and seeking electoral support in the 
United  States,  stated  ‘You  can  record  me  as  against  the  partition  of  Ireland 
completely’ and said he was in favour of ending it through economic pressure on 
Great Britain.258 Paul O’Dwyer of the ‘American League for a United Ireland’ and 
Democrat  John  MacCormack  of  Massachusetts  were  bringing  a  motion  before 
Congress  on  the  subject.  The  new  American  Ambassador,  William  Taft,  was 
reported  to  be  pro-Irish  and in  favour  of  reunification  but  Miraflores’s  contacts 
within the American Embassy differed from mainstream perceptions. Through his 
contacts ‘with very distinguished members of the North American Embassy’ he had 
learnt correctly quite early on that the resolution of the problem would have to be 
‘resolved  exclusively  between  England  and  Ireland’.259 Miraflores  had  always 
disliked  the  close  association  of  prominent  politicians  with  anti-partition 
organisations and he cynically remarked that these organisations only appeared at 
the weekend to coincide with countrywide parish collections and thus raise more 
money for anti-partition propaganda. One of its publications displayed the Murray 
family home in Gortineddan County Fermanagh.  The article  described how their 
house was ‘partitioned’ by British ‘manipulation’.260 One side of their house was in 
the Republic and the other in Northern Ireland. Even the family dog was divided in 
the  photograph  as  the  ‘dog  is  half-in  half-out’  of  both  countries.261 The 
‘dismemberment’, dislocation of the economy and retardation of national progress 
was all attributed to British machinations.262
The importance of all this for Spain was that Madrid had begun to detect an 
ever-increasing  hyper-sensitivity  on  this  supreme  aspiration  which  threatened  to 
257  Irish Times, 27 Feb. 1953. 
258 Richard Nixon to the Irish News Agency, 25 May 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3508/E21). 
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undermine the future development of its friend on the international stage. When de 
Valera became Taoiseach again in 1951 he restricted the rapid advances made by 
MacBride in expanding Ireland’s diplomatic representation abroad. Miraflores noted 
that ‘the Governments that have ruled the destiny of Ireland in the last twenty years 
adopted a defined and unique posture of subordinating all  external  affairs  to the 
resolution of the problem of partition, which impedes the nation’s entrance into any 
bloc  which  figures  Great  Britain.’263 By  June  of  1954  Ireland  had  only  seven 
Embassies  and  eight  Legations  abroad,  a  fact  that  further  challenges  Michael 
Kennedy’s view that Irish foreign policy was expansionist at this time.264 For the 
Spanish Ambassador this was a deliberate policy of ‘isolation adopted by Ireland’ in 
response to the polemics of partition.265 If Ireland was pursuing a policy of isolation 
from  international  affairs  it  seemed  utterly  incredible  to  Miraflores  because  his 
nation would have loved to have been involved in all the regional organisations that 
Ireland was represented in. Spain’s diplomatic officials were endeavouring to do all 
they could to reinstate their nation within the international community. 
Time and again Miraflores commented with disbelief on Ireland’s ‘error of 
posture’  in  preferring  an  ‘isolationist  attitude’  to  international  integration.266 The 
nation seemed oblivious to international affairs and more concerned with internal 
matters, an attitude that he described as ‘provincialism’.267 This insular complex was 
diverging  Irish  policy  away from its  fortunate  position  in  being  at  the  heart  of 
European policy making at the Council  of Europe and O.E.E.C., he opined.  This 
‘stubbornness’ over the lost territory was becoming a bore to the Spanish also who 
much preferred to hear Irish attempts to promote the inclusion of Spain in regional 
and international organisations from which they could align themselves together and 
speak as one voice for the mutual benefit of both nations.268 
Despite  their  best  intentions,  the  displeasing  ramifications  of  stepping  on 
Irish toes over Ulster  also affected Spain.  On 29 December 1952 Jesús Pardo, a 
263 Miraflores to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 1954 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3050/E11). 
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correspondent for El Pueblo in London, published an article that was viewed by the 
Irish as ‘English propaganda hostile to the unity of Ireland.’269 The Irish Embassy 
raised the issue with Foreign Affairs refuting many of Pardo’s claims. Firstly, Ulster 
consisted of nine counties with three in the Republic and six ‘cut off and occupied 
by the English in the same way as Gibraltar is cut off and occupied by them.’270 
Although  the  British  like  to  ‘insinuate’  that  the  division  was  natural,  it  was 
‘completely artificial.’271 Secondly,  Pardo’s assertion that  ‘Ulster  is  composed of 
predominantly  Protestant  counties’  was  a  total  distortion  of  facts  to  the  Spanish 
reading public and they wanted the Ministry to know that ‘if Sr Pardo desires to 
write about Ireland he would consult with the Irish Embassy in London’ first and so 
prevent ‘dissemination of anti-Irish propaganda’ in El Pueblo.272 This incident marks 
one of the infrequent occasions the Spanish authorities had to apologise over the 
polemical issue of Ulster. 
19 December 1951 Irish-Spanish Trade Agreement
In accordance with the Irish Constitution every ‘international agreement to which 
the State becomes a party shall be laid before Dáil Éireann.’273 On 19 December 
1951 an Irish delegation in Madrid signed on behalf of the country the ‘Irish-Spanish 
Trade Pact.’274 The new agreement gave an undertaking by Ireland to afford Spain 
‘trade liberalisation as she gives to the member states of [the] O.E.E.C.’275 At a time 
when Spain was still in the doldrums of universal disapproval, Ireland was happy to 
increase  trade  with  the  Francoist  State.  However,  on  this  occasion  economic 
necessity overrode political  altruism.  The beginnings of this landmark agreement 
had taken place months before when an official in External Affairs, William Fay, 
had approached the Embassy’s Secretary and Commercial Attaché, Adolfo Martín-
269 Verbal  note  from the  Irish  Embassy  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R  – 
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Gamero, to discuss the possibility of a reconfiguration in bilateral trade. Gamero was 
told that  the 3 September  1947 agreement  had proven ‘very disadvantageous for 
Irish interests’.276 The Secretary passed on the notes of his discussion with Fay to the 
Director General of Foreign Policy, José Núñez Iglesias.277 Iglesias could not deny 
the  seriousness  of  the  matter  as  Madrid  had  known  for  some  time  that  a 
reconfiguration  of  bilateral  trade  had  to  happen  soon:  ‘the  Spanish  attitude  has 
always been to delay whenever possible the signing of a new agreement’.278 
An analysis of the official statistics in Madrid’s possession showed just how 
unbalanced the trade figures were. In 1950 exports to Ireland totalled £1,879,461 
and imports from Ireland totalled £409,468.279 This left a balance of payments deficit 
of  £1,469,993  in  1950  in  Spain’s  favour  which  could  only  be  bridged  by  cash 
payment. This trade relationship was extremely beneficial to the Spanish economy 
because it lacked foreign cash to help bolster its gold reserves which could then be 
used to purchase goods in the dollar area.280 Even Spanish tomato exports, valued at 
£587,440, were surpassing total Irish exports.281 By early 1951 Ireland was exporting 
£243,338 worth of goods and receiving imports valued at £985,630.282 This complete 
‘disequilibrium’  did  not  factor  into  account  an  estimated  £100,000  of  tourist 
spending by Irish visitors to the country that year.283 The Spanish had always wanted 
Irish agricultural produce but the vast majority of this went to the British market. 
The remaining commodities Ireland was offering were not wanted by the Spanish 
because they could be got cheaper and of better quality on the open market or could 
be made by themselves. Desperate to continue what in hindsight was an obviously 
failing self-sufficiency policy, Ireland managed to persuade its friend to agree to a 
new agreement that would see Spain purchase Irish beer, scrap metal, second-hand 
cars, spark plugs, soft toys, musical instruments, radio components and even tennis 
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racquets. In return Spain would continue to export fruit, wine, textiles, pyrites and 
potash. 
The eagerness of the Irish for ‘a happy conclusion as soon as possible’ did 
not stop them from delaying sending a delegation to Madrid until October.284 The 
Irish  thought  that  the  summer  heat  in  Madrid  was  not  conducive  to  good 
negotiations. They originally suggested San Sebastián as a nice coastal location for 
the negotiations but Madrid informed them that the capital was where the delegation 
should come in October. On 8 October a substantial Irish delegation arrived in Spain 
led  by  External  Affairs.  The  Irish  Ambassador,  Leo  McCauley,  headed  the 
mission.285 The visiting delegation was looking for a three-year agreement and was 
willing, owing to what it styled as ‘our traditionally friendly relations’, to extend 
free importable licence, better known as liberalisation of trade, to Spain.286 Ireland 
normally only afforded this generous practice to members of the O.E.E.C. In return 
it would present the Spanish with a list of goods at fixed quotas that it wanted Spain 
to purchase. This was not the kind of agreement that suited Spain, which by now 
was beginning to move towards a less controlled economy than Ireland.  
The Spanish delegation was headed by Jaime Argüelles, Under-Secretary of 
Economics  Section  in  Foreign  Affairs.  The  Irish  delegation  outnumbered  its 
counterpart  by two to  one.  A successful  and  ‘comprehensive’  conclusion  to  the 
negotiations  was  an  imperative  for  ‘future  trading  relations’  if  Ireland  was  to 
reconfigure  its  balance  of  payments.287 By  the  time  that  the  negotiations  had 
commenced the trade statistics for that year revealed that Spanish exports totalled 
£1,280,000  compared  to  just  £327,000  imports.  Reluctantly  Argüelles  agreed  to 
facilitate the purchase of more manufactured items from the Irish. He also agreed to 
an annual quota of £200,000 for eggs, £50,000 for horses, £100,000 for beer and 10-
15,000 tons of seed potato.  In addition to the normal  goods purchased,  the Irish 
would  commit  to  at  least  50,000  tons  of  pyrites  annually.  The  agreement  was 
heralded by the Irish as a major success but in time it proved illusory. A subordinate 
to  Jaime  Argüelles,  José  Miguel  Ruiz  Morales,  wrote  to  him  about  a  chance 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid.
287 Ibid. 
241
encounter he had had with Leo McCauley. He subjected Morales publicly to a ‘fiery 
rebuke’.288 The  ‘unpleasant’  scene  was  caused  by  the  Ministry  of  Commerce 
delaying ‘import licences for Irish products.’289 Morales admitted that McCauley’s 
complaint was ‘fair’.290 
From  January  to  October  1953  the  deleterious  cost  to  Ireland  of  the 
December 1951 agreement had become ominously apparent. The Spanish were not 
committing to purchases of poor manufactured goods which they did not want and 
had never  wanted.  From January to  October  1953 Ireland exported goods to  the 
value of £79,544 to Spain and £90,883 to the Canary Islands. By comparison Spain 
exported goods to the value of £1,321,764 and the Canary Islands £649,275 worth of 
goods  to  Ireland.291 That  the  Canary  Islands  could  out-trade  an  entire  national 
economic  unit  was  a  decisive  indictment  of  the  failed  policy  of  economic  self-
sufficiency based  on  a  protected  rural-industrialisation  structure  which  had  been 
initiated  and  championed  by  de  Valera  for  nearly  three  decades.  In  1955  the 
Secretary of the Embassy, Charles Whelan, wrote to Carlos Prieto in the Economic 
Section of Foreign Affairs still complaining about the disadvantageous position that 
Ireland was in. He cited figures from January to July of that year which indicated 
that combined imports totalled £1,111,933 whilst in the same period Ireland only 
exported £264,509.292 A relationship of nearly five to one was ‘very unbalanced’ and 
he hoped that Spain would honour its commitments ‘in the deed as well as in the 
spirit.’293 Whelan  believed  that  Ireland  was  offering  them  ‘goods  which  Spain 
requires’ and that Prieto, being ‘a frank realist’ and ‘in the fashion of good friends’, 
would see to it that this disappointing state of affairs might be resolved.294 After all 
Ireland was Spain’s ‘best friend’, he declared.295 
In the end it was not until October 1966 that Ireland finally achieved parity 
with  Spain  in  its  trade  relations  when the  then  Minister  for  Agriculture  Charles 
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Haughey made an official visit to Madrid. On this occasion, unlike in October 1951, 
Haughey insisted that  the Spanish Minister  for Foreign Affairs  be present at  the 
negotiation table. Haughey achieved trading parity by giving the Spanish what they 
had always wanted – agricultural exports by the ton. 
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Chapter 6
Irish Diplomatic Reports from Spain in the Post-War Period, 
1945-55
Kerney Departs  the Scene  
One  of  Kerney’s  last  official  engagements  took  place  on  23  June  1946  at  an 
international football match between both nations that was covered extensively by 
Radio Nacional, the first radiophonic event in the history of Irish-Spanish relations.1 
The press coverage of the game detailed the ‘overflowing enthusiasm’ for Franco 
resonating throughout  the stadium.2 Sustained applause,  chants and cries  for him 
delayed kick-off for some time. Pictures from the Kerney private archive show the 
Caudillo,  Carmen Franco and the most  senior officials  in the regime standing to 
attention,  whilst  over  60,000 fans  acknowledged the Spanish team with  a  raised 
right-arm salute.3 Internationally  shunned,  the  regime  did  not  shy  from publicly 
displaying Fascist paraphernalia – ‘Franco, Franco, Franco’ adorned the stadium and 
the imperial eagle was still emblazoned on the national flag. Franco loved football 
and during the 1950s Real Madrid became identified as his team; it was showcased 
to the world. F.C. Barcelona, by contrast,  was shunned for its Catalan identity,  a 
policy in  keeping with  the general  suppression of  the  region.  With  the  tricolour 
behind him, Kerney spoke of Ireland’s desire to share with Spain ‘peace, prosperity, 
well-being  of  our  people,  territorial  integrity  and  conservation  of  our  national 
independence.’4 Toasts extolling both nations were exchanged – ‘Viva España! Viva 
Irlanda!’ – and after Carmen Franco was presented with an obligatory bouquet of 
flowers, the game kicked off.5
1 International football game between Ireland and Spain, 23 June 1946 (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 6/3). 
2 A.B.C., 25 June 1946. 
3 General Muñoz Grandes, Alberto Martín-Artajo, Blas Pérez González, General Moscardó. 
4 Speech delivered by Kerney at the Ireland-Spain football game, 23 June 1946 (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 
6/3). 
5 Ibid. 
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The Madrid dailies expected their national side to defeat Ireland easily: ‘the 
atmosphere  was  one  of  confidence  and  optimism’.6 Their  confidence  was  not 
misplaced as the war had severely handicapped the development of Irish football and 
neither Kerney nor the Football Association of Ireland expected their side to achieve 
much that day.7 But try as the Spanish team might  they could not overcome the 
‘magnificent physical form of the Irish’ which pushed them off the ball and stifled 
any attacking move.8 They were rewarded for their dogged resistance with a shock 
goal that ultimately won them the game. The A.B.C. correspondent recorded that the 
fans greeted the goal with ‘sporting grace’ and ‘cordially applauded for some time 
with enthusiasm’.9 
When the game was over the newspaper blamed the pitch, the referee for 
allowing the Irish to put in heavy tackles, and the fact that the visitors were ‘very 
lucky’  in its attempt to account for the shock defeat.10 Franco could not hide his 
displeasure but neither could Kerney hide his delight. A staunch democrat, Kerney 
privately despised Franco for uprooting a progressive democratic State and turning it 
into  a  violent,  regressive  dictatorship.  Back  in  the  confines  of  the  Legation  he 
arranged a rare lavish dinner in honour of the national team and as he toasted their 
success he smiled to himself knowing that at least for one day fate had not favoured 
Franco. 
6 A.B.C., 25 June 1946. 
7 The last game between both nations was on 26 Apr. 1931 in Barcelona that ended in a 1-1 draw. 
Friendly internationals became a common occurrence in the post-war period: 2 Mar. 1947 Dublin 3-2 
to Ireland, 30 May 1948 Barcelona 2-1 to Spain, 12 June 1949 Dublin 4-1 to Spain, 1 June 1952 
Madrid 6-0 to Spain, 27 Nov. 1955 Dublin 2-2 draw. 
8 A.B.C., 25 June 1946. 
9 Ibid. 
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John Belton
As Kerney’s time as Minister came to an end,11 Madrid was eager to know who 
would succeed him for the ‘senior diplomatic post’ and in a private conversation 
held on 25 October Frederick Boland,12 disclosed to the Spanish Minister, the Count 
of Artaza, the two likely candidates: Seán Murphy and John Belton.13 Artaza opined 
that the latter would be the most likely candidate owing to his ‘capable, intelligent 
and industrious’ character.14 His prediction proved accurate and Belton brought his 
own dynamic style to the post.15  He enjoyed a more cordial relationship with his 
superior  Boland,  a marked contrast  to Kerney’s  relationship with Walshe.  In his 
reports to Boland he addressed the Secretary as “Dear Fred” and Boland referred to 
him as “Dear Johnnie”. A new energy seemed to be injected into Ireland’s mission 
in Spain.
However, two significant weaknesses in Irish foreign policy in this period 
were  lamentably  apparent.  Owing  to  the  Department’s  small  budget  and  staff 
numbers,  there  were  few  diplomats  with  fluency  in  a  second  language.  All  of 
Kerney’s successors arrived in Spain not being able to speak the language.16 Unlike 
its Spanish counterpart, the Department did not have a diplomatic school or operate 
programmes abroad whereby trainees could learn a second language as part of their 
training for a diplomatic career. Men like Belton learnt to struggle on and learn the 
language in time but the fiscal weakness of the State always meant that their initial 
desire to hit the ground running was inhibited by factors outside their control. The 
other  apparent  weakness  related  to  Kerney’s  previous  complaints  about  the 
Department’s failure to provide adequate finance and staffing for the Legation. 
11 He was approaching statutory retirement age [11 Dec. 1946].   
12 Frederick Boland succeeded Joseph Walshe as Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. 
13 Private  meeting  between  Artaza  and  Frederick  Boland,  25  Oct.  1946  (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R  – 
2302/E15). 
14 Ibid. 
15 John Aloysius Belton: born in Longford 6 Nov. 1903. Educated at Blackrock College and U.C.D. 
Practised law at  Midland Circuit Court 1926-29, appointed Third Secretary of the Department of 
External Affairs in 1929, First Secretary in the Paris Legation 1934, Head of Section Department of 
External  Affairs 1937, Counsellor in the Office of the then High Commissioner in London 1941, 
appointed Chargé d’Affaires in Stockholm 1946. 
16 John Belton, Leo McCauley, Dr Michael Rynne. 
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Neither de Valera as Minister nor Boland as Secretary were responsible for 
the poor funding allocated to missions abroad. The Irish public  for one tended to 
view foreign policy, especially overseas missions, as expensive luxuries rather than 
valuable  assets  and  as  a  consequence  few  politicians  publicly  championed 
investment  in diplomacy.  This viewpoint was upheld vigorously by the two men 
most influential in running the nation’s finances: Frank Aiken, Minister for Finance, 
and  James  McElligott,  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Finance.  Both  men  were 
conservative-minded and believed in balanced budgets with less State involvement 
in the economy. This accounted for the small budget assigned to External Affairs; 
but  of  greater  concern  for  Irish  diplomats  was  the  insistence  by  Finance  in 
overseeing every additional expense that arose. Time and again small requests for 
part-time typists or for additional literature to stock the Legation in Madrid were 
turned down by Finance. Contrary to Michael Kennedy’s assertion that Irish foreign 
policy was broad-minded in the post-war period, it was, in fact, restricted as a direct 
consequence of this interference by Finance.17 At a time when Ireland could have 
played a more significant role in Spain, owing to the recall of the Heads of Mission, 
it was undermined by certain harsh realities and some harsh perceptions. 
Dublin was always eager to learn from and emulate the Vatican, in particular 
regarding its attitude towards Franco. The Department contrasted Belton’s reports 
with those from Joseph Walshe to help formulate Ireland’s future relationship with 
the Franco regime. In a secret report Walshe declared that the Vatican was becoming 
‘very tired’ of Spanish affairs but could not ‘interfere’ in the internal matters of the 
country.18 He outlined that Franco’s insistence on the direct appointment of bishops 
was the main bone of contention between both States. In regard to the succession 
question, Walshe opined that the Pope ‘does not believe that monarchy is a remedy 
for our modern evils.’19 He hoped that a ‘democratic constitutional Republic’ would 
emerge to provide stability which was ‘the supreme need of the Church.’20 Walshe 
provocatively  warned  Boland  not  to  pass  on  his  observations  to  Belton.21 His 
17 See Michael Kennedy & Joseph Skelly, Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000). 
18 Joseph Walshe to Frederick Boland, 22 Mar. 1948 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P122). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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observations on the Vatican attitude to Franco were rather strange as the dictator had 
waged a Civil War to destroy a Republic and he held a widely known visceral hatred 
of democracy. What is interesting from this secret report is that it confirmed later 
observations  made  by  Belton  which  showed  that  the  Church  in  Spain  was  not 
supportive of Don Juan and preferred to maintain the status quo with Franco. This 
attitude was forged after Franco had permitted the reestablishment of the Tribunal of 
the Rota22 and awarded the Papal Nuncio the Gran Cruz de Isabel la Católica. The 
dictator thus soothed relations with the Holy See over the appointment of bishops. 
The Vatican would continue to support the regime because, in reality,  there were 
little prospects for any substantial constitutional change in Spain. 
One of the dominant themes in Belton’s reports was the succession question. 
Franco had no intention of resigning but understood that so long as he had no male 
heir the regime needed a successor should he die unexpectedly. The most respected 
successor  would  be  a  member  of  the  royal  family  and  Franco  knew  that  both 
internationally as well  as domestically the restoration of the Monarchy would be 
perceived as the preferable option.  The Falange organ  Arriba supported the rival 
Carlist royal line led by Don Jaime, despite the proposed candidate being ‘deaf and 
dumb’.23 The  principal  daily  A.B.C.  supported  the  main  candidate,  Don Juan de 
Borbón. A war of words took place between the Falange and the Monarchists in the 
nation’s newspapers. Belton opined that there was ‘widespread belief’ that if Don 
Juan succeeded Franco then history would repeat itself and another civil war would 
break out.24 Through his contacts with ‘high army officers and prominent civilians’ 
he learned that there were many dissenting voices against Don Juan’s candidature.25 
This  seems  an  odd  observation  as  most  of  the  generals  in  the  regime  privately 
supported Don Juan, despite his public criticism of Franco. Arriba again stressed its 
preference for Don Jaime, which Belton saw as a covert way of Franco declaring his 
opposition to Don Juan’s candidature.26 The Falangist organ juxtaposed an image of 
22 Tribunal of the Rota: an ecclesiastical court that adjudicates on issues pertaining to the Church, in 
particular, cases involving nullity of marriage.  
23 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 23 Apr. 1947 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
24 Belton to _____, 23 Apr. 1947 (ibid.). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Arriba, 1 May 1947. 
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the War of Independence with Franco’s rally on 9 December 1946.27 It argued that 
unlike Carlos IV, who had abandoned the country to the French in 1808, Franco 
would not abandon the Spanish people in the teeth of universal opprobrium. More 
importantly, the real hidden meaning was that Don Juan’s father, Alfonso XIII, had 
abandoned Spain in 1931 which allowed the Second Republic to come into being. 
Could the Spanish people trust the son not to do the same? 
A.B.C.  responded  by  reminding  the  public  that  Spain  had  enjoyed  ‘ten 
centuries of Monarchy’ and to this institution did the nation owe ‘unequalled glories’ 
and ‘an Empire which has had no equal before or since.’28 It refuted the contention 
of  Arriba  that the Borbón line was decadent and supportive of Freemasonry. That 
Franco allowed  A.B.C.  to openly oppose him was a  rare  thing but  he was more 
concerned with trying to win the hearts and minds of the people. He travelled to 
Valencia in May and at a speech he invoked military parlance to declare his resolve 
to not abdicate from power: ‘if I were not absolutely certain of being able to bring 
you to a safe port I would do, with military sincerity what I advised that General to 
do – leave the field free and go away!’29 There was never any danger of a return of 
the Monarchy unless he sanctioned it.30 Franco had the support of the army,  the 
security organs and the hierarchy behind him and the three branches of the State, the 
legislative, judicial and executive, were all under his control. 
On  7  June  1947  the  Cortes,  Spain’s  Parliament,  passed  the  Law  of 
Succession.  Belton  informed  Dublin  that  despite  a  dissenting  voice  shouting  ‘“I 
protest”’  the  vote  was  ‘by  acclamation’.31 The  President  of  the  Cortes,  Esteban 
Bilbao, declared ‘If the Monarchy must come, it must come with Franco or not at 
all.’32 Spain was now officially a Monarchy but with no king. Franco would reign as 
a pseudo-regent and decide his heir at a time of his choosing.33 The regime hoped 
that  the  law  would  project  an  image  of  progress,  order  and  unity  and,  in  an 
27 Ibid., 2 May 1947. 
28 A.B.C., 4 May 1947. 
29 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 16 May 1947 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
30 See David Gilmour,  The transformation of Spain: from Franco to the constitutional Monarchy 
(London, 1985), pp 51-3. 
31 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 7 June 1947 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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extraordinary decision, a referendum was called for the public to endorse the law as 
an expression of organic democracy. The Church fervently endorsed the referendum 
and reminded the public of the Nationalist dead in the Civil War to ensure that the 
present generation would enjoy the fruits of their sacrifices. The Primate of Spain 
issued a pastoral letter calling on the public to come out and vote but it  was the 
Bishop of Madrid-Alcalá who was most vocal in his views:
the martyrdom of so many thousands who suffered death for religion, so  
many thousands who died for God and Spain…“For God and Spain” was  
the sacred cry which roused good Spaniards in the epic days of our Crusade. 
The same cry should move all before the call of the ballot box…knowing  
that you will have to answer before God for your vote!34
Initially Belton reported the latent corruption of the democratic process. Intimidating 
slogans on walls said that anyone who did not vote was abandoning their religion. 
Those who did not vote were fined or lost their ration cards. A threat to cut pay was 
another  fear  tactic  that  particularly  frightened public  servants  because its  size  in 
Spain was possibly greater ‘than anywhere else,’ Belton observed.35  He learned that 
the voting slips were ‘given to the electors beforehand’ and filled in at their home.36 
When they  arrived  at  the  polling  station  to  ‘verify  their  identity’  the  paper  was 
handed to the supervisor and placed into the ballot box.37 When the vote was tallied 
over ninety-two per cent of the populace had affirmed their  support  for the law. 
Franco used the anniversary of the rising to challenge the violent press and radio 
campaign from abroad that vilified Spain. He declared that the exiled Republican 
Government no longer carried the voice of the working class. The referendum had 
shown their allegiance to him: ‘Spanish workers gave these people their answer’, he 
proclaimed.38
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Speech delivered by Francisco Franco, 18 July 1947 (ibid.). 
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On  22  August  Belton  met  Artajo  to  discuss  the  transparency  of  the 
referendum  and  was  informed  that  everything  was  ‘entirely  aboveboard’  which 
Belton, despite his earlier report to the contrary, now informed Boland was ‘a fact.’39 
Artajo acknowledged that they could have fixed the figures but Franco wanted a free 
election  and privately  stated  his  intention  to  resign  if  it  was  not  enthusiastically 
supported. Despite the absurdity of this statement it was undeniable that Franco’s 
position  was  more  secure  at  that  time  than  ever  before.40 International  isolation 
entrenched  the  regime  by  focusing  all  its  intentions  inwards  and  Franco  had 
prospered as a result. This view is shared by Florentino Portero who has shown how 
the international condemnation ‘did not weaken’ the regime.41 Belton enquired about 
the  next  steps  to  be taken  ‘towards  a  democratic  form of  government’.42 Artajo 
replied  that  ‘for  Mr de Valera’s  information’  he was working on establishing  ‘a 
second party’ in the Cortes and holding ‘limited municipal elections.’43 The meeting 
concluded with Artajo referring to one of Aesop’s fables to describe the evolution of 
the regime: 
I suppose you think we are travelling very slowly. Undoubtedly we are only 
travelling at the speed of a tortoise, but a tortoise is the best judge of the  
speed that suits himself.44 
The regime used sympathetic foreign newspapers and ecclesiastical publications to 
publicise itself abroad but despite projecting an image of an evolving State that was 
allowing greater  freedom of expression,  the very restricted  nature of these press 
interviews belied any claims of greater transparency.  Franco used the referendum 
success  to  attack  the U.N. as an ineffectual  organisation  for  allowing the Soviet 
Union to  have a commanding presence in it  but his  prejudices were not  long in 
39 Belton to Frederick Boland, 22 Aug. 1947 (ibid.). 
40 For a good account on Spanish isolation in the post-war period see Florentino Portero,  Franco 
aislado: la cuestión española, 1945-50 (Madrid, 1989).
41 See Florentino Portero, ‘Spain, Britain and the Cold War’ in Sebastian Balfour & Paul Preston 
(eds), Spain and the great powers in the twentieth century (London, 1999), p. 219.
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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remaining  silent.  He argued that  social  reconciliation  was not  an official  policy: 
‘Those who think our crusade was merely an episode are greatly mistaken.’45 Belton 
confirmed  that  any  dissidents  or  opponents  of  the  regime  enjoyed  no  legal 
guarantees. People could be detained and held without trial indefinitely by military 
courts, not civil courts, and there was no provision for habeas corpus. Often those 
detained  were  accused  of  being  Communists,  Anarchists  or  Freemasons  and 
associated with terrorist activities but Belton knew that many were of a moderate 
political persuasion and were protesting that Franco had never been elected to office 
and no general election since his assumption of power had been called. 
Were Ireland and the Vatican unusual in adopting a pragmatic rather than an 
ethical outlook towards Franco? Did the Spanish hierarchy endeavour to disentangle 
itself from its compliant support of this repressive regime? Over ten years on from 
the start  of  the Civil  War,  Belton reported that  the Bishop of Madrid was ‘well 
known to  be  a  strong supporter  of  the  regime  and is  actually  a  member  of  the 
Committee  of  the  Falange.’46 In  addition,  the  Church  continued  to  interfere  in 
politics. When a group of Monarchists who supported Don Juan arrived at mass at 
Medinaceli church the doors of the temple ‘were locked.’47 After twenty minutes, a 
priest emerged to inform them that the church had been ordered to be closed on ‘the 
instructions of the Government and with the approval of the Bishop of Madrid.’48 
Undeterred the group knelt on the street and said the rosary. Monarchists could not 
be tarnished with the same brush as left-wing political agitators but the regime and 
the  Church  were  equally  trenchant  in  adopting  an  uncompromising  attitude  to 
supporters of Don Juan. Although he was the most acceptable successor to govern 
the nation, his earlier opposition to Franco had irked the dictator and unsettled the 
Catholic hierarchy. 
One of Belton’s last  reports  concerned an issue of particular  relevance to 
Ireland. Whilst Spain had been languishing at the extreme end of isolation, Ireland 
had managed to position itself into several regional organisations49 and acquired aid 
from the Marshall Plan, but disputes with Britain over Ulster had conditioned Irish 
45 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 7 Nov. 1947 (ibid.). 
46 Belton to _____, 27 Feb. 1948 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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responses to joining NATO and thus enjoying greater collaboration with the United 
States. Indeed as Ronan Mulvaney has shown, Irish foreign policy was centred on 
the grievance of partition.50 Ireland understood its special  relationship with Spain 
was also partly based on a shared grievance over territorial disputes with Britain and 
anything that revolved around Spanish inclusion in any international organisation 
was keenly watched by Dublin in the hope that both nations would act collectively. 
On 28 August Belton dispatched a significant report  that  moved Boland to write 
‘Minister  I  think you  will  be interested  in  this.’51 Belton  had met  the  American 
Chargé d’Affaires, Paul Culbertson, who declared that the United States would not 
change its position towards Franco so long as ‘the political set-up’ remained.52 He 
passed on details  of  a  meeting  he had  with Franco and Artajo during which  he 
demanded  greater  strides  be  taken  towards  democratic  reform,  allowing  for 
municipal elections, freedom of political prisoners, and habeas corpus. In return for 
this he guaranteed ‘substantial American financial assistance’.53 The Spanish were 
aware through their Minister in Ireland that Irish entrenchment over partition was 
excluding the nation from a beneficial political and financial relationship with the 
United States – which refused to pressure Britain over Ulster. Learning from this, 
the  regime  never  sought  a  sympathetic  American  ear  over  Gibraltar  but  instead 
worked assiduously to forge a cooperative relationship with the United States.
The heightening  East-West  divide  in  the Cold War,  as Boris  Liedtke  has 
shown, accentuated by the Berlin Blockade, focused U.S. military attention on Spain 
as a possible ally in the Mediterranean region.54 Franco’s proven track record against 
Communism was now becoming an asset. Belton told Culbertson that there was little 
stopping ‘the Soviet  Army reaching the Pyrenees  inside a very short  time’.55 He 
believed Spain could be transformed into a military bulwark where NATO could 
49 See Michael  Kennedy & Eunan O’Halpin,  Ireland and the Council  of  Europe: from isolation 
towards integration (Strasbourg, 2000).
50 Ronan  Mulvaney,  ‘Ireland  and  the  “Spanish  question”,  1945-50’  in  Declan  Downey & J.  C. 
MacLennan (eds), Spanish-Irish relations through the ages (Dublin, 2008), p. 249. 
51 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 28 Aug. 1948 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
52 Belton to _____, 28 Aug. 1948 (ibid.). 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Boris Liedtke,  Embracing a dictatorship: U.S.  relations with Spain, 1945-53  (Basingstoke, 
1998). 
55 Belton to the Department of External Affairs, 28 Aug. 1948 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9).
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project its power. Confidentially,  Belton was informed that a softening in attitude 
was discernible in the American administration and that Spain would be allowed into 
some scientific and cultural conferences under the auspices of the U.N. Less than a 
week after this meeting Franco announced that municipal elections would soon be 
held. Despite Ireland’s raised profile in Madrid, its stoic support for the regime at 
regional  level  and Belton’s argument  to Culbertson that  Spain could be a useful 
military and strategic ally for NATO, Franco and Artajo were moved by realpolitik. 
Political ties with Ireland were useful to a point but ultimately they proved transitory 
and ephemeral. The regime knew that the power, influence and financial strength of 
the United States could achieve more tangible and beneficial results for the nation. 
Although  Ireland  and  Spain  were  to  remain  adrift  from  the  progress  and 
advancement  of  the  Western  world  throughout  the  coming  decade,  it  was  the 
Spanish that realised before the Irish that the world was changing and that they could 
no longer  remain  isolated  and distanced from events.  Not  until  the  departure  of 
Éamon de Valera  as Taoiseach  in  1959 and the handing of  power over  to  Seán 
Lemass,  would  Ireland  begin  the  process  of  becoming  a  modern  industrialised 
society with an active role in international affairs. This confirms the ‘parochial’56 
view of Irish foreign policy in the post-war period rather than the purported activist 
one.57
In  Belton’s  last  hurrah as  Minister  he detailed  the  special  liaison  he had 
established with the Count of Albiz – an Irish descendant and member of Don Juan’s 
inner council  who was responsible for drafting the written correspondence of the 
pretender with Franco. This special relationship accorded Dublin a unique insight 
into the intricacies surrounding the succession question and the ground-work made 
in arranging the historic meeting between both men on Franco’s yacht Azor off the 
coast of San Sebastián. On 29 August 1948  Ya  published an account of Franco’s 
meeting with Don Juan during which the Caudillo addressed the pretender as ‘Your 
Highness’.58 Whatever  about  the  coverage  displayed  for  the  public  Belton  was, 
56 Gary Murphy, ‘“A wider perspective”: Ireland’s view of western Europe in the 1950s’ in Michael 
Kennedy & Joseph Skelly (eds), Irish foreign policy, 1919-66 (Dublin, 2000), p. 251. 
57 Michael Kennedy & Eunan O’Halpin, Ireland and the Council of Europe: from isolation towards  
integration (Strasbourg, 2000).
58 Ya, 29 Aug. 1948. 
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through  conversations  with  his  contacts,  in  no  doubt  that  Franco  would  never 
abdicate from power voluntarily. In this, his final prediction, he was proven correct.
The Vicissitudes of  Cultural Interaction  
Perhaps surprisingly, archaeology was to prove one of the closest areas of contact 
between both nations in the post-war period. A pioneering figure in the promotion of 
this interaction was a young student named Eóin MacWhite, son of the Irish Minister 
to  Italy,  Michael  MacWhite.  On 6 October  1944 Eóin  was awarded a  travelling 
scholarship from U.C.D. for his first-class M.A. thesis entitled ‘Some Aspects of the 
Irish Late Bronze Age, based on a Study of the Hoards of the Period.’59 Initially, 
MacWhite was unsure where to go while abroad. Encouraged by his father, Eóin 
soon settled on the idea of travelling to Spain to study Iberian prehistory and enjoy 
‘bullfights and the sun’.60 On 14 February 1945 Michael MacWhite wrote a report 
that showed that he did not consider Spain a dangerous place to send his son despite 
opining  that  significant  ‘political  change’  would  soon  restore  the  Monarchy  to 
power.61 He had met  the heir  presumptive  and believed Don Juan would restore 
harmony to the nation. In early October Eóin left for Spain and was advised that if 
he wanted to pursue a successful academic career he needed to ‘impress people’ by 
gaining publicity for his studies.62 
Like many Irish people at that time, Eóin had an idealistic image of what 
Spain was like but the reality proved rather difficult when he found the language, 
culture and food to be distant and alien. Money was also difficult and his father was 
concerned that because ‘things are not very agreeable for you’ he would become 
dispirited  and  homesick.63 Eóin’s  letters  became  more  sombre  with  his  father 
warning him that if ‘you write in the same tone to other people you will not be likely 
to  have  many  friends.’64 Unable  to  return  home,  Eóin  was  forced  by  his 
59 Title of Eóin MacWhite’s M.A. thesis (U.C.D.A., Michael MacWhite Private Papers, P194/707). 
60 Letter from Eóin to his parents, 16 Dec. 1944 (ibid.). 
61 Michael MacWhite to the Department of External Affairs, 14 Feb. 1945 (ibid.). 
62 Letter from Michael MacWhite to Eóin, 4 Nov. 1945 (ibid.). 
63 Letter from Michael MacWhite to _____, 28 Dec. 1945 (ibid.). 
64 Ibid. 
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circumstances to concentrate on his studies to make the time pass quicker but some 
of the advice his father imparted was not quite reassuring. He reminded Eóin that in 
the  excavation  area where  he  was working,  the Sierra  Morena,  the most  paying 
occupation of the people for centuries ‘was the capture of foreigners for ransom.’65 
Eóin’s  doctoral  thesis  was  supervised  by  Professor  Julio  Martínez  Santa 
Olalla of the University of Madrid. On 14 October 1945 Arriba carried the headline 
‘The Illustrious Archaeologist MacWhite in Spain’ and declared that ‘this is the first 
time that in the field of prehistory, primitive history and archaeology that a foreign 
university student has arrived here to specialise under the supervision of a Spanish 
Professor.’66 On 16 October  Alerto Santander  published an article on Eóin with a 
picture of him and some background information about his scholarship from U.C.D. 
After his return to Ireland, Eóin repeatedly promoted his time in Spain to help forge 
a career in academia. He used reference letters from Professor Olalla and reminded 
prospective universities of his radio broadcasts that he had given on national radio 
that  highlighted  the  similarities  between  Irish-Spanish  archaeology.  He  did  not 
disclose  the  fact  that  many  of  these  broadcasts  were  devoted  to  anti-partition 
propaganda nor how difficult his study abroad had proven.67 
The closure of the Irish College in Salamanca had transferred the initiative 
on  cultural  cooperation  from the  religious  authorities  to  the  universities.  Eóin’s 
research abroad for U.C.D. was pivotal  in bringing Irish and Spanish universities 
into  closer  contact  and  precipitated  the  development  of  student  exchange 
programmes  and academic  interaction  between both countries.68 On 3 November 
1947 the Secretary of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, Anthony Lucas, 
wrote  to  Belton  opining  that  although  there  was  a  ‘deplorable  lack  of  contact’ 
between  both  nations  in  the  field  of  archaeology,  more  academic  and  literary 
exchanges should be encouraged by the State.69 On 28 March 1949 Professor Olalla, 
Eóin’s  former  supervisor  and  Spain’s  leading  authority  on  archaeological 
65 Ibid. 
66 Arriba, 14 Oct. 1945. 
67 A.B.C., 19 Mar. 1947. 
68 Eóin MacWhite emulated his father by joining the diplomatic service. He was tragically killed in a 
car crash in 1972. 
69 Anthony Lucas to Belton, 3 Nov. 1947 (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 3/1). 
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excavation, was invited to the Society’s 100th anniversary celebration. By September 
1953  Professor  Seán  Ó  Ríordáin  of  U.C.D.’s  Department  of  Archaeology  was 
working  alongside  Professor  Olalla  at  the  First  International  Course  of  Field 
Archaeology in Granada. In April 1954 Ó Ríordáin and Professor Joseph Raftery of 
the  National  Museum  were  again  working  alongside  Olalla  in  Santander  on 
archaeological  excavations.  However,  in  the  customary  Irish  way,  there  was  a 
humorous element  to the official  visit.  Ó Ríordáin had written to the Embassy’s 
Secretary,  Charles  Whelan,  to  arrange  accommodation  for  him:  ‘I  don’t  want  a 
swank hotel nor room with bath if something normally decent can be got – after all 
I’ll be out all day.’70
The first holder of the Professorship of Spanish in T.C.D., Walter Starkie, 
and Joseph G. Healy,  of U.C.C., were the two most significant Hispanists in the 
immediate  post-war  period.  Starkie’s  published  works  and  involvement  in  the 
British Institute in Madrid and the University of Madrid earned him international 
acclaim. His support for the regime was used extensively to combat the despised 
image  of  enforced  ostracism.  Healy’s  preliminary  work  as  part  of  the  Irish 
Manuscripts  Commission  in  Simancas  had  involved  microfilming  documents 
pertaining to the Irish diaspora there. The promotion of Spanish departments in both 
T.C.D.  and  U.C.C.  must  be  accredited  to  these  two  men.  It  took  U.C.D.  some 
considerable  time  to  mark  its  own  path  in  the  promotion  of  bilateral  relations. 
Summer exchange programmes for students were one method employed but it was 
through the detailed categorisation and documentation of the Irish diaspora abroad 
that U.C.D. made its mark.71 The man it chose to undertake this task was a brilliant 
linguist  whose academic  career  was  intricately  linked with  Spain,  where  he had 
undertaken his doctoral  thesis. In time his work was to eclipse all  previous joint 
academic projects between both nations. His name was Patrick McBride.72 
De Valera’s  command over Irish foreign policy and his  own Spanishness 
ensured that diplomats abroad actively sought out members of the diaspora to help 
70 Note to Charles Whelan from Seán Ó Ríordáin (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 2/3A). 
71 By 1952 there were Spanish societies in all of the main universities (N.A.I., D.F.A., 3/1). 
72 In  1935 McBride published an article on General  Luis de Lacy and his service in the Spanish 
Army. He also contributed to various journals to promote a greater appreciation of the Irish diaspora. 
See A.B.C., 17 Mar. 1959. 
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promote Ireland in the host countries. From the time of the Flight of the Earls in 
1607  and  the  establishment  of  colleges  in  Spain,  the  diaspora  had  played  a 
significant role in the political and administrative life of Spain.73 Under Franco, their 
descendants likewise held key positions within the regime. Initially Joseph Walshe 
seemed to reject de Valera’s instructions. A proposal by one Marquess of Ciadoncha 
to sponsor a publication that listed all Spanish-Irish descendants in the country was 
turned  down  on  financial  grounds.74 When  some  descendants  like  Pedro 
O’Callaghan, a descendant of the Clare-born military Captain Cornelio O’Callaghan 
who had commanded the Ultonia (Ulster) Regiment in the Spanish Army, wrote to 
the  Irish  Legation  requesting  information  on  his  genealogy,  Walshe  informed 
Kerney that unless money was paid in advance the State would not undertake the 
genealogical  study even though the  sums  involved  were  miniscule.  O’Callaghan 
duly paid the fee and the Genealogical Office in Dublin traced his ancestry for him. 
In 1950, at the tercentenary anniversary of the siege of Clonmel, where Hugh 
Dubh O’Neill had inflicted significant casualties on the besieging New Model Army 
led by Oliver Cromwell, the national significance of cultural links with Spain was 
highlighted  through  requests  from  locals  to  External  Affairs  to  track  down 
descendants there who might travel to Clonmel for the historic celebration. Dublin 
informed Leo McCauley about the occasion and he wrote to the diaspora. The extent 
of the diaspora in Spain was significant and he contacted the most prominent figures 
who were linked with the regime as well as the diaspora that made up a sizeable 
contingent of the aristocratic class. Many of these people were proud of their “Wild 
Geese” ancestors and desired to maintain contact with the branch of their families in 
Ireland.  Other  Irish  surnames  that  were  frequently  encountered  were  O’Connor, 
O’Dogherty  and  O’Farrill.  There  was  no  doubting  the  meritorious  careers  and 
achievements many members of these families had accomplished over the centuries 
but some form of clarification and documentation of lineage had to be undertaken 
not  only  as  evidence  of  genuine  ancestry  but  also  given  the  emotive  history 
involved.  Both  countries  had  stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  throughout  turbulent 
73 For a good account see Declan Downey & J. C. MacLennan,  Spanish-Irish relations through the 
ages (Dublin, 2008). 
74 Ciadoncha went ahead and published the book (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 2/4/1).
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moments  in  history  and  they  needed  to  intensify  that  historic  bond  in  order  to 
overcome their present external difficulties. 
Throughout the early part of 1954 Patrick McBride was in Spain collating 
data on the diaspora that would be published as a book. In conjunction with this he 
had been campaigning  for years  for funds to establish a centre  for Irish-Spanish 
studies. On 3 July he wrote to McCauley explaining how the ‘appalling arrears and 
endless negotiations about setting up and staffing a new department of “Hispano-
Irish” Studies’ in U.C.D. was delaying progress in the promotion of closer bilateral 
relations.75 Eventually U.C.D. consented to the establishment  of a Department  of 
Historical Investigation which McBride headed in conjunction with his other post as 
Head of the Department of Spanish and Italian. The staff recorded the innumerable 
cases of Irish descendants in the Spanish military, political and administrative elite 
who for centuries distinguished themselves in their professional careers. By staffing 
the department with some Spanish scholars McBride gave the research project an air 
of permanency. His assistant was Micheline Kerney Walsh, the daughter of Leopold 
Kerney, who went on to become McBride’s Deputy Director. In 1956 the success of 
McBride’s work was recognised when General Kindelán and the Duke of Tetuán, 
Leopoldo O’Donnell, travelled to Ireland to be awarded honorary doctorates by the 
Chancellor of the N.U.I., Éamon de Valera. 
It  was  not  just  for  political  and  diplomatic  reasons  that  de  Valera  had 
consented  to  allow  public  funds  to  be  used  to  promote  closer  cultural  relations 
through familial links. A personal obsession with tracing his paternal ancestry lay at 
the heart of this policy. He had never known his father and throughout his lifetime 
he repeatedly ordered investigations to be undertaken to ascertain his identity.  At 
first he believed he was related to the famous diplomat and author Juan Valera and 
Kerney was directed to contact his grandson Enríque Valera to investigate the matter 
in January 1936. On 5 February de Valera’s Secretary Kathleen O’Connell passed 
on hiss gratitude for Kerney’s lengthy efforts: ‘He asks me to express his thanks for 
the pains you are taking in the matter. He would like to have the whole thing cleared 
75 Patrick McBride to Leo McCauley, 3 July 1954 (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 2/4/1). 
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up.’76 Kerney dispatched two reports on 18 February 1936 but the issue was again 
raised on 4 April 1940 when the Taoiseach instructed Joseph Walshe to ‘go into the 
matter personally immediately.’77 Since his father was not the renowned diplomat 
Juan Valera, then de Valera became convinced he was a descendant of Leonor de 
Valera, an aide to Saint Teresa of Ávila. It seemed inconceivable to him that his 
ancestors  were  anything  but  renowned figures  despite  all  the  available  evidence 
pointing to a humble father who originated from Andalucía.
One of the most bizarre interactions that occurred between both nations in 
the post-war period centred on a mercurial academic named Dr Wenceslao González 
Oliveros.78 A Professor of Law at the Complutense University of Madrid, Oliveros 
was an influential official in the regime. After the fall of Barcelona in January 1939, 
he had been appointed Civil Governor by Serrano Súñer to suppress any lingering 
opposition. He was also charged with the suppression of the Catalan language and its 
culture. During the Second World War he was appointed President of the National 
Tribunal of Political Responsibilities that was responsible for the arrest, fining and 
imprisonment  of thousands of suspected opponents and dissidents of the regime. 
Simultaneously, he was Vice-President of the National Tribunal for the Repression 
of Freemasonry and Communism that Súñer and Franco had established to ‘cleanse’ 
the nation of all  undesirable and dangerous elements.  After the war he had been 
appointed President  of the Council  of National  Education and had continued the 
process of inculcating the regime’s doctrines, ideas and attitudes through teaching. 
On 30 September 1949 Oliveros was granted permission to travel to Ireland 
on a scientific mission to see U.C.D. and its President, Michael Tierney.  Richard 
Mulcahy, Minister for Education in the First Inter-Party Government, had been in 
correspondence with his Spanish colleague, José Ibáñez Martín,79 and had approved 
the trip despite Oliveros’s acquired reputation. Dublin welcomed the arrival of such 
a  prominent  and influential  official  on a mission  aimed at  enhancing  the ‘fertile 
76 Kathleen  O’Connell  to  Kerney,  5  Feb.  1936  (U.C.D.A.,  Éamon  de  Valera  Private  Papers, 
P150/224).  
77 Ibid., 4 Apr. 1940. 
78 For a good account on Oliveros see Paul Preston, The Spanish Civil War: reaction, revolution and 
revenge (London, 2006), p. 311. 
79 Minister for National Education. 
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intensification of the cultural relations between our beloved Universities’.80 Mulcahy 
hoped  it  would  pave  the  way  for  a  momentous  change  in  bilateral  cultural 
interaction. Oliveros was deeply moved by the warm reception he was accorded by 
the Government and Michael Tierney.  The characteristics of Irish society that he 
witnessed and that were upheld by its political and educational authorities found a 
mirror image in Spain – a conservative, nationalistic, insular and rural society. 
He met the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid, and admired the 
latter’s  efforts  to  insert  the  Church  into  every  facet  of  public  life.  McQuaid’s 
preference  for  a  more  orthodox  and  interventionist  Church  was  respected  by 
Oliveros  and he wrote  a  report  on his  mission findings to Franco.  The  Caudillo 
approved  the  report’s  recommendations  to  make  Ireland  a  centre  of  study  and 
cultural exchange for Spanish students abroad. T.C.D. aside, the Spanish believed 
that Ireland was the ideal location for their youth to study English and to experience 
a different cultural environment that was also safe from the evils of Communism, 
Freemasonry and materialism. However, the Spanish Minister in Dublin, Miraflores, 
was not  happy to  see an outsider  come into his  exclusive  field  of  expertise  and 
overshadow his mission. He worked to undermine Oliveros’s credibility for his own 
purposes. 
On 9 December 1949 Leo McCauley met Oliveros to try and ascertain what 
perceptions he had derived from his trip. Oliveros assured McCauley that he spoke 
with  the  full  approval  of  his  Government,  which  wanted  to  propose  the 
establishment of three hostels, two for men and one for women, for Spanish students 
studying  in  Ireland.  Oliveros  was  aware  that  U.C.D.’s  principal  residence  was 
located  on Earlsfort  Terrace,  but he recommended situating the proposed hostels 
around  Belfield  House.  U.C.D.  had  acquired  this  property  in  1934  and  had 
purchased some of the adjoining land surrounding it. He knew that the university 
was struggling to accommodate its growing number of students and that a move to 
Belfield  offered significant  scope for large-scale construction of buildings in that 
area. Incredibly, without prior consultation with the Irish authorities, Franco had also 
agreed to the proposed architectural design of the hostels: ‘It was intended that the 
80 U.C.D. and Complutense University of Madrid (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 1/7/1). 
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façades  of  these  hostels  would  be  reproductions  of  famous  buildings  in  the 
Universities of Salamanca, Valladolid and Alcalá [de Henares]’.81 In addition, the 
stonework for the façades was to be crafted by Spanish sculptors using the same 
stone quarries as those used for the original façades. Once shipped to Ireland they 
would  then  be  assembled  by  Irish  workers  ‘under  the  supervision  of  Spanish 
technicians’.82 The entire project was to be completed in two years. 
McCauley was genuinely shocked that the entire project had been examined 
by Franco. He now knew the enormous influence Oliveros commanded but doubted 
whether  the  Irish  Trade  Unions  would  ever  allow their  members  to  work under 
foreign supervision and could foresee only conflict  between the workers and the 
Spanish technicians. Still,  he welcomed the idea that only those students of ‘well 
mannered’ disposition and from ‘good social class’ would be selected for admission 
to  the hostels.83 Oliveros  assured McCauley that  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
would  officially  recognise  the  hostels  and  that  the  probability  of  establishing  a 
diplomatic  school  abroad for  trainee  diplomats  was  another  consideration  of  his 
Government. 
On 11 February 1950 McCauley was requested by his superiors in Dublin to 
arrange another meeting with Oliveros that would outline specific details behind his 
proposal.  Oliveros  stated  that  the  President  of  U.C.D.  would  exercise  ‘complete 
disciplinary authority’ over the hostels and had the right to ‘refuse admission’ to any 
students  coming  to  the  university.84 Dublin  believed  that  the  likelihood  of  any 
internal infiltration of Communists into the educational system was improbable but 
it  still  wanted concrete  assurances that  Spanish students coming into the country 
were  vetted  to  prevent  subversive  elements  undermining  impressionable  native 
students. Oliveros assuaged these concerns by declaring that the protection of ‘Irish 
students from contamination’ was an overriding concern of his Government and that 
the  authorities  could  guarantee  that  all  their  students  were  of  sound  moral  and 
religious  character.85 Therefore,  there  was  no  need  to  fear  ‘an  attempt  to  send 
81 Private meeting between McCauley and Wenceslao González Oliveros, 9 Dec. 1949 (ibid.).
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Private meeting between McCauley and Wenceslao González Oliveros, 11 Feb. 1950 (ibid.). 
85 Ibid. 
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Communists to Ireland’ as his Government had repeatedly displayed its resolve to 
unmask  and  punish  all  social  undesirables.86 Oliveros  himself  had  built  his 
reputation on this specific issue. 
The two men did not meet again until the 18 March, with Oliveros proposing 
another  idea  that  would  see  both  nations  working  closer  together  to  promote 
increased cultural interaction. 1950 was a holy year and both nations had been in 
competition  to  outdo  one  another  to  display  their  filial  loyalty  to  the  Vatican. 
Oliveros envisaged chartering a shipping vessel, the Ciudad de Sevilla, and use it to 
pick up Irish pilgrims and transport them to the religious sites of northern Spain – 
Loyola and Santiago de Compostela. From there they would then re-embark for their 
onward journey to Rome and on the return journey pick up Spanish students who 
wanted to study in Ireland. The ship was equipped with an altar and the services of a 
chaplain.  It  had  ample  accommodation  for  families  and a  sizeable  restaurant  on 
board. There is no doubt that there were economic and cultural benefits to the idea 
but McCauley dismissed it on the grounds that the lengthy time at sea made the 
proposal  unfeasible  because  both  nations  placed  restrictions  on  the  amount  of 
currency a citizen could take out of the country. 
External Affairs wrote to McCauley on 20 April requesting specific student 
numbers  from Oliveros  as only the Jesuit  hostel  in  Hatch Street  was capable  of 
accommodating the increased numbers of students then attending U.C.D. Oliveros 
said he envisaged a preliminary group of 100 students visiting for study during the 
summer period. Michael Tierney was enthusiastic ‘about roping the group into his 
summer school’ as the university had been receiving small numbers of Spaniards for 
its summer courses for some time.87 Miraflores had been inspirational in organising 
this  small  interaction  and behind  the  scenes  he  plotted  to  undermine  Oliveros’s 
credibility.  Miraflores  disliked  being  upstaged  by  an  outsider  and  dispatched 
Gamero to Iveagh House, seat of the Department, to inform confidentially senior 
officials there that ‘Oliveros is regarded as a highly impractical person – brilliant at 
conceiving elaborate plans but quite incapable of recognising or dealing with any 
86 Ibid. 
87 Department of External Affairs to McCauley, 20 Apr. 1950 (ibid.). 
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difficulties.’88 Dublin was becoming increasingly ‘alarmed’ that Oliveros could think 
that in just two years U.C.D. could move its centre of operations to Belfield and 
build the necessary infrastructure in such a short timeline.89 Just where the financing 
for such an ambitious scheme was to come from had yet to be clarified. 
It was not until another year that McCauley met Oliveros again to discuss the 
parameters of the project.90 On the Spanish side, Oliveros said that the Universities 
of Madrid, Salamanca and Valladolid would have a State representative overseeing 
everything from their end. He proposed himself for this lucrative post. Each of the 
hostels would have a Director and be answerable to the President of U.C.D., who 
would  have  the  final  say  over  any issue,  especially  if  subversive  ‘undesirables’ 
infiltrated the campus disguised as upstanding Spanish students.91 After discussions 
with  the  Minister  for  Agriculture  he  could  confirm that  the  Minister  wished  to 
establish ‘an experimental farm or garden of say 30,000 sq. meters’ on the grounds 
of the hostels for scientific purposes and for growing food to feed the students.92 
Oliveros  proposed  that  the  hostels  should  be  allowed  import  wine  freely  but 
McCauley disliked this suggestion in case it encouraged excessive drinking on the 
campus. Oliveros promised to accelerate the architectural plans for the project and 
claimed that despite the lapse in time, the foundations for the hostels could be in 
place by the spring of 1952.
Although swayed by Miraflores’s arguments, Dublin still held onto the hope 
that  the  project  could  be  brought  to  fruition  because  Oliveros,  despite  his 
‘eccentricities’, was an ‘extremely influential’ individual who made things happen.93 
One of the major flaws in Irish policy in Spain was a lack of influential contacts in 
the upper echelons of the regime. In Oliveros, Dublin knew it had stumbled on a 
fortuitous opportunity:  the most senior official  in charge of education policy was 
interested in Ireland and he had easy access to the highest levels of the State both 
within  the  Cabinet,  including  Franco.  For  this  reason,  Dublin  continued  to  give 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Private  meeting  between  McCauley  and  Wenceslao  González  Oliveros,  4  May  1951  (N.A.I., 
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serious consideration to the project. McCauley was informed that another meeting 
should be arranged that would provide them with ‘tangible proof’ that the building 
plans and designs for the project were near completion.94 On 11 July 1951 he met 
Oliveros,  who  was  as  ‘enthusiastic  as  ever’.95 He  told  the  Ambassador  that  an 
architect by the name of Valcarcel had drawn out the proposed designs and that a 
copy was  with  Foreign  Affairs.  In  addition,  the  Minister  for  Education,  Joaquín 
Ruiz-Giménez, who was a close associate of his, was ‘definitely decided’ on the idea 
and that building work should commence quickly.96 He stated that so long as the 
project could be kept ‘out of politics’,  its completion would mark a watershed in 
Irish-Spanish cultural relations.97 
In 1952, with no sign of any advancement in the proposals, Michael Tierney 
wrote to the Legation’s Secretary to advise her that Belfield would probably become 
the  chosen  site  for  the  expansion  of  the  university  in  the  foreseeable  future,  as 
Oliveros had predicted it would. But the project had long since foundered despite the 
anxious  desire  of  Ireland’s  political,  diplomatic  and  educational  elite  to  see  it 
brought  to  completion.  Whether  the  N.U.I.’s  Governing  Body  could  ever  have 
permitted such a visible and ostentatious display of Spanish architectural form on 
Irish property is contentious because of the omnipotent presence of John Charles 
McQuaid. Despite all his calculations, Oliveros had not accounted for the attitude of 
the Archbishop. At this time McQuaid was involved in an extensive church-building 
programme.  He  oversaw  the  development  of  a  unique  Hiberno-Romanesque 
architectural design for his churches and it is unlikely that he would have approved 
of  sixteenth  century  Spanish  plateresque  architecture,  with  its  lavish  motifs  and 
intricate fusion of Gothic, Moorish and Renaissance décor, on the proposed site for 
the expansion of U.C.D. He had long aspired to raise the reputation and prestige of 
U.C.D. to that of its Protestant equivalent, T.C.D., but such a striking representation 
of Spanish architecture on Irish soil would have been unlikely to have met with his 
approval.98 As influential as Oliveros was in his country, McQuaid was considerably 
more  powerful  in  his  own.  Yet  it  was  to  prove  ironic  that  when the  university 
94 Private meeting between McCauley and Wenceslao González Oliveros, 11 July 1951 (ibid.). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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transferred to Belfield in the 1960s it chose a rather Communistic architectural form 
to define its campus: but by that time attitudes had changed and McQuaid’s power 
was on the wane. 
Seán Lemass
Throughout  his  long political  career  Seán Lemass  had always  believed,  as  Tom 
Garvin  has  argued,  that  his  greatest  achievement  was  the  establishment  of  Aer 
Lingus  in  1936.99 He had  a  keen  interest  in  aviation  and under  his  auspices  as 
Minister for Industry and Commerce Shannon Airport was expanded in the post-war 
period to  enable  Ireland to  become a transport  hub between North America  and 
Europe. Although originally a firm believer in self-sufficiency,  the Second World 
War had forged in Lemass the conviction, strongly held, that Ireland had to open up 
its economy in order to attract foreign direct investment and develop trade relations 
with other nations. In 1946 he could not envisage just how long de Valera was to 
remain in power nor how other Governments would severely curtail the expansion of 
his aviation programme, but in March of that year, at a civil aviation conference, he 
resolved to project Ireland abroad as an ideal location for tourism and business. Aer 
Lingus was the means to achieve this goal. 
On 20 February 1947 the Spanish Minister to Ireland, the Count of Artaza, 
met Frederick Boland and urged him to ‘accelerate’ the establishment of direct air 
links between both nations on Ireland’s part.100 It was in Spain’s interest to develop 
closer  bilateral  economic  ties  supported  by  direct  air  routes.  The  international 
football game held the previous year had proven that an air agreement was feasible, 
since Aer Lingus had flown the football  team directly to Spain using its  Dakota 
planes.  Madrid  declared  its  eagerness  to  ‘unite  ourselves  with  the  great  hub  of 
intercontinental air communications which is Shannon Airport’ because it knew that 
Lemass was positioning Ireland to be in the centre of the economic route between 
98 For a good account of the life and times of Archbishop McQuaid see John Cooney, John Charles 
McQuaid: ruler of Catholic Ireland (Dublin, 1999). 
99 See Tom Garvin, Judging Lemass (Dublin, 2009). 
100 Private  meeting  between  Artaza  and  Frederick  Boland,  20  Feb.  1947  (A.M.A.E.,  leg.  R  – 
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North America and Britain, thereby guaranteeing closer access to the dollar trading 
area.101 Incredibly, Dublin soon voiced its concerns over the economic viability of 
the project that it now deemed unlikely to prove a paying proposition. 
By the 1950s Madrid knew, through its eyes and ears in Dublin, Miraflores, 
how stagnant  the Irish economy had become.  An Bord Fáilte  Éireann,  the State 
agency responsible for promoting tourism, had an inherent aversion to promoting 
tourism in  Spain  after  a  difficult  experience  with  the  Spanish authorities.  David 
O’Neill,  designer of the ‘Ireland Now’ advertisement,  had portrayed Ireland as a 
modern country using the backdrop of Collinstown terminal building.102 Yet efforts 
to  expand  the  publishing  material  inside  Spain  were  restricted  by  the  Spanish 
Currency  Control  Commission,  which  regulated  foreign  exchange.  Moreover, 
warnings  that  State  censorship  was vigorously enforced  on  ‘anything  that  might 
offend against the rigidly Catholic outlook of the authorities’ had disinclined Bord 
Fáilte from promoting tourism in Spain.103 This could have had extreme implications 
for  bilateral  trade  relations  as  well  as for  the economy.  Ireland had escaped the 
destructive  impact  of  the  war  and  should  have  used  this  cumulative  economic 
advantage to attract more tourists and foreign currency into the country.
In  1953  External  Affairs  passed  on  trade  statistics  to  Bord  Fáilte  which 
showed  that  in  1950  456,968  tourists  had  visited  Spain,  of  whom  33,688  had 
travelled by air, 33,636 by sea and 389,644 by road.104 As expected, Bord Fáilte used 
these figures to jettison any direct  air  links with Spain. On 22 May 1953 M. K. 
O’Doherty,  General  Manager  of  Bord  Fáilte  Éireann,  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of 
Industry and Commerce, John Leydon, and advised that direct air links would be ‘so 
limited  that  the  cost  of  promoting  and  increasing  that  traffic  would  be 
disproportionate to the cost of promoting additional traffic’.105 In addition, whatever 
might be said about ‘the merits of promoting Spanish/Irish tourism, from the points 
of view of history, culture and religion, the prospects of success in the immediate 
101 Ibid., 3 May 1946. 
102 Irish Tourist Board pamphlet (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 4/4). 
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future are regarded as hazardous and extremely doubtful.’106 O’Doherty’s judgement 
was  symptomatic  of  the  pervading  pessimism and short-sightedness  that  dogged 
Ireland in the 1950s. A fear of financial risk and entrepreneurship in a manifestly 
conservative society was stifling the economic development of the nation. Lemass 
disregarded  O’Doherty’s  viewpoint  and  the  implementation  of  direct  air  routes 
between both nations was accelerated. 
On 19 May 1955 the Irish Times  carried the heading ‘New Air Link With 
Spain’ to mark the epoch-making event.107 Travelling on the non-stop 1,000 mile 
journey between  Dublin  and Mutados  Airport,  in  Barcelona,  on  the  Aer  Lingus 
Vickers Viscount plane was William Norton, Tánaiste and Minister for Industry and 
Commerce,  Patrick  Lynch,  Chairman  of  Aer  Lingus,  Seán  Nunan,  Secretary  of 
External  Affairs,  Leon  Ó  Broin,  Secretary  of  Posts  and  Telegraphs  and  M.  K. 
O’Doherty.  The  Irish  Ambassador  in  Madrid,  Dr  Michael  Rynne,  greeted  the 
distinguished dignitaries as they disembarked from the plane. In time a return ticket 
was to cost £47.18; this gave passengers the option of flying directly to Barcelona or 
stopping off at Lourdes. After his advice had been dismissed it would have been 
interesting to gauge just what O’Doherty was thinking on that historic day. He had 
lost out to a visionary who had gambled that although in the short term Aer Lingus 
would have to absorb financial losses, in the long-term a direct air link with Spain 
would transform bilateral cultural and economic relations forever.
Leo  McCauley  
Belton’s  successor  as  Minister108 was  to  prove  the  most  ineffectual  diplomatic 
representative of either country in the post-war period. Across all spheres – political, 
economic and cultural – it became apparent over time that McCauley was unsuitable 
106 Ibid. 
107 Irish Times, 19 May 1955. 
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for such a prominent post abroad, especially given the raised profile of Ireland’s 
mission  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Heads  of  Mission  and  the  elevation  of  the 
Legation  to an Embassy.  McCauley’s  poor performance was also not in  keeping 
with the high standards of reporting and political analysis that Dermot Keogh has 
described as a feature of diplomats in External Affairs.109 This was best highlighted 
through  a  strange  cultural  correspondence  that  began  on  28  March  1947  whilst 
Belton was still Minister.110 The parish priest of Lorca, Bartolome López, wrote to 
the Legation requesting a relic of St Patrick for his church.111 The only known relic 
was  in  the  Irish  College  Rome  and  Dublin  raised  the  matter  with  Archbishop 
McQuaid. Unfortunately McQuaid forgot about the matter and it took another two 
years before López got word of his initial request. By then McQuaid had obtained a 
relic of the saint and López decided to hold a ceremony on St Patrick’s Day 1951 to 
mark the occasion. 
López asked McCauley to attend but he declined because Professor Starkie 
had  been  invited  to  the  ceremony.  As a  consequence,  Ireland was  not  officially 
represented at a major ecclesiastical and civil ceremony that honoured her.112 The 
Spanish went ahead with the ceremony with the Bishop of Cartagena blessing the 
relic and a parade in the main square playing the Irish anthem. López later requested 
McCauley  to  attend  the  ceremony  in  1952  and  he  asked  for  an  Irish  flag  to 
commemorate  the  occasion.  A  flag  was  ordered  by  the  Irish  President.  It  cost 
External Affairs £4.10.0 and after it had received ‘the sanction of the Minister for 
Finance’ was dispatched to Spain.113 
McCauley did not attend this ceremony either despite acknowledging that the 
‘occasion  is  an  opportunity  for  publicity  which  we  could  never  engineer  for 
ourselves’.114 Instead  he  sent  the  Embassy’s  Secretary,  Robert  McDonagh,  to 
represent Ireland and give a ‘healthy counter-blast’ to Starkie’s popularity.115 Dublin 
109 See Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988). 
110 Letter from Bartolome López to Belton, 28 Mar. 1947 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 338/179). 
111 Lorca is  a city in the southern province of Murcia.  The church of St Patrick was built  in the 
sixteenth century and had contained a relic of the patron saint of Ireland until it disappeared during 
the Civil War.  
112 McCauley to the Department of External Affairs, 19 Apr. 1951 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 338/179). 
113 Ibid., 10 Mar. 1952. 
114 McCauley to the Department of External Affairs, 28 Jan. 1952 (ibid.). 
115 Ibid. 
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informed McCauley that McDonagh’s wife could accompany him but would not be 
covered for travel expenses. On 17 April McDonagh compiled a report on his visit to 
Lorca.  Over  6,000  people  had  attended  the  ceremony  with  traditional  Murcian 
dancing on display. Father López, ‘almost in tears’, spoke before the people: ‘he told 
the  crowd that  he  had  hoped for  11  years  to  see  a  representative  of  Ireland  in 
Lorca.’116 McDonagh’s speech reminded those present that the resting place of St 
Patrick was in a ‘part of Ireland which was now suffering foreign occupation’.117 
This  sniping  political  reference  was  also  meant  for  the  ears  of  Starkie  and 
McDonagh privately let his opinions of the academic be known to López. The priest 
had hoped that the Irish State would commission a wooden statute of the saint to be 
placed inside the church but this was turned down on financial grounds. 
At no time did McCauley show anything approaching even a remote interest 
in cultivating Lorca as a focal point for cultural links between both nations despite 
being paid to do so. With the effective closure of the religious college in Salamanca 
it was even more important to promote cultural interaction outside the environs of 
Madrid. McDonagh had seen for himself how the affinity of the people and clergy 
for  Ireland  had  awakened  a  vibrant  interest  in  closer  cultural  cooperation  but 
McCauley’s inertia soon dissipated this spirit. For him the only notable matter of 
interest  was  to  reclaim  expenses  on  behalf  of  McDonagh’s  wife.  Dublin  was 
becoming increasingly aware of McCauley’s lacklustre approach to cultural affairs 
after a request by Conor Cruise O’Brien for plans on an Irish Week in Spain was met 
with the response: ‘time is not yet ripe for holding an Irish Week in Madrid’ let 
alone the establishment of a ‘Spanish-Irish Society.’118 These failings did not escape 
the attention of senior officials in the Department, in particular Dr Michael Rynne, 
who used them to indicate McCauley’s unsuitability to continue on as Ambassador.
 On 27 July 1953, the day an armistice was signed in the Korean War, the 
beginning of the most  celebrated episode of McCauley’s mission to Spain began 
when he received a hand-written letter from the Taoiseach announcing his intention 
to visit Spain in early September, as part of a wider pilgrimage in Europe. One could 
116 Robert McDonagh to the Department of External Affairs, 17 Apr. 1952 (ibid.). 
117 Robert McDonagh to _____, 17 Apr. 1952 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 338/179). 
118 McCauley to Conor Cruise O’Brien, 27 Sept. 1951 (N.A.I., D.F.A., I.C. 3/3). 
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argue that he had planned this trip since early May 1939 when, during a private 
conversation with Juan García Ontiveros he had expressed his  desire to visit  the 
religious  sites  of  northern  Spain.  Important  political  exigencies  had  delayed  the 
planned trip until now. He wanted the trip to be ‘as quiet as possible’119 and External 
Affairs contacted McCauley directing him to find suitable accommodation for the 
travelling party: ‘As you know he [de Valera] dislikes large hotels of the expensive 
“flashy” kind’.120
On 3 August McCauley wrote to Dr de Valera that the Spanish were still 
unaware about the arrival of so distinguished a guest to their country: ‘I have not yet 
mentioned to anyone here that the Taoiseach is coming to Spain.’121 He believed that 
the  Taoiseach’s  visit  would  be  ‘a  great  event  in  the  eyes’  of  the  regime  and 
counselled that the party would need to ‘determine to what lengths they [the regime] 
will be allowed to go in their wish to make him welcome.’122 He offered to collect 
the party in Lourdes if the Irish Ambassador to France, Cornelius (Con) Cremin, did 
not  feel  that  ‘I  was trespassing on his  territory’.123 De Valera  wanted to  see the 
religious sites of Loyola124 but did not want to stay in a large city nearby like San 
Sebastián. McCauley recommended the small coastal town of Zaraúz and a quaint 
hotel  named  Hostería  del  Mar that  had  been  converted  from a  villa.  Its  owner, 
General Luis Kirkpatrick y O’Donnell, was of Irish descent and a prominent figure 
in the regime. No one had referenced Kirkpatrick and his role as Vice-President of 
the National Tribunal of Political Responsibilities. If Kerney’s confidential wartime 
reports  had  been  referenced,  de  Valera  might  very  well  have  remembered  this 
disturbing fact. 
McCauley remarked that  the hotel  was in keeping with the party’s  frugal 
requirements: ‘The Taoiseach and you will have to model yourselves on jackknives 
119 Letter from Éamon de Valera to McCauley, 27 July 1953 (N.A.I., D.F.A., P.C. 5/5/3). 
120 Ibid. The full party consisted of the Taoiseach and his wife Sinéad, their son and daughter-in-law 
Dr Éamon de Valera and Sally de Valera, as well as Fr Thomas O’Doherty – Sally’s brother. 
121 McCauley to Dr de Valera, 3 Aug. 1953 (U.C.D.A., Éamon de Valera Private Papers, P150/3044). 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid.  For  a  good  account  on  Con Cremin  see  Niall  Keogh,  Con  Cremin:  Ireland’s  wartime 
diplomat (Dublin, 2006). 
124 Birthplace of St Ignatius Loyola – founder of the Society of Jesus. 
271
to  get  into  the  baths.’125 Sleep  should  be  comfortable  as  the  hotel’s  location 
guaranteed that ‘your slumbers should not be disturbed by the pounding of the Bay 
of Biscay but only by songful Basques returning home late at night.’126 In fact the 
Guardia Civil had to be ordered to guard the hotel to clear groups of drunken night-
time stragglers away after they had caused repeated ruckuses outside. Prior to the 
group’s departure Dr de Valera had to arrange connecting return flights via London 
to  the  continent.  On  25  August  Aer  Lingus  Traffic  Manager  Oliver  Hone 
confidentially informed him that the airline was willing to ‘arrange to delay in our 
Starflight ex-London which will make the connection a little bit easier.’127 Such an 
authorisation would cause a ‘delay in departure up to thirty minutes’.128 Hone even 
declared  his  willingness  to  look  into  ‘the  question  of  operating  our  Starflight 
altogether from London Airport which would make the matter easier still, but I will 
not know whether this can be done for a day or two.’129 It was important for both 
parties to keep this correspondence as confidential as possible. If other passengers 
on that connecting flight, rival political parties or the press had found out about this 
servile compliance by Aer Lingus, it would have landed de Valera and the airline in 
hot water. 
On 26 August Miraflores had met the Taoiseach that day to discuss his trip to 
Spain. The Spanish Ambassador, on behalf of his Government, extended an official 
invitation for a private lunch with the Minister and General Franco.130 The Taoiseach 
replied that he regretted to decline the invitation because of the private nature of the 
trip but he responded enthusiastically to the suggestion that Artajo might accompany 
the group to Loyola. News of de Valera’s impending trip was leaked to Diario del  
Vasco which carried an article on him to its readers.131 On 6 September he set foot on 
Spanish soil for the first time; he had returned to the land of his father – a man he 
never  knew.  The  press  were  eager  for  an  interview  with  the  most  prominent 
125 McCauley  to  Dr  de  Valera,  19  Aug.  1953  (U.C.D.A.,  Éamon  de  Valera  Private  Papers, 
P150/3044). 
126 Ibid. 
127 Oliver Hone to Dr de Valera, 25 Aug. 1953 (ibid.). 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Private meeting between Miraflores and Éamon de Valera,  26 Aug. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg.  R – 
3018/E48). 
131 Diario del Vasco, 4 Sept. 1953. 
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politician in twentieth century Ireland and a man whose reputation as a statesman 
was internationally respected. Prearranged answers were prepared by McCauley for 
Informaciones and Gaceta del Norte. In response to a question about the purpose of 
his trip, the reply given was ‘Pilgrimage’.132 When asked what stood out the most 
McCauley  wrote  ‘No.  of  happy  children,  beautifully  cared  for.’133 Although  the 
Taoiseach wanted as little publicity as possible, it was in the regime’s interest to 
promote his visit. Franco respected de Valera’s Republicanism because it had built a 
model Catholic and law-abiding State in contrast to his perceptions of the Spanish 
Republic.  Ireland’s democratic  composition  and close friendship with the regime 
was a useful propaganda tool to discredit the U.N. and its enforced ostracism on 
Spain. 
‘De  Valera:  Prototype  of  Catholic  Spirit  and  Fortitude’  was  the  leading 
headline of Ya.134 Its reporter, Jesús Barranquero Orrego, described the statesman as 
the ‘symbol of the hope of a people’; his role in the forging of an independent Irish 
State in the long and protracted struggle against British oppression was constantly 
invoked in the media.135 Indeed, the common perception of de Valera in the Spanish 
press was of a romantic warrior-like statesman. The best coverage of his visit was 
displayed in Foco magazine.136 Pictures of the Taoiseach show him at the beach and 
walking in the streets of Zaraúz greeting Basque children. The article stressed the 
role that his father must have played in imbuing ‘a Conquistador soul’ in de Valera 
through his inherited Spanish characteristics that had shaped the ‘national hero’ he 
had  become.137 The  Taoiseach  must  have  admired,  like  all  Irish  people  did,  the 
religious devotion of the Basques. Through wartime files and the arrival of Basques 
exiles to Ireland in the summer of 1940 de Valera was acutely aware that the regime 
had systematically persecuted these people for their different cultural identity. On 10 
September a secret note was smuggled to him from a group calling itself the ‘Basque 
132 McCauley’s hand notes in preparation for the press interview (N.A.I., D.F.A., P.C. 5/5/3). 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ya, 9 Sept. 1953. 
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136 Foco magazine, no. 76, 19 Sept. 1953. 
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Patriots  of  Zaraúz’.138 The  note  was  headed  with  the  word  ‘Euskadi’139 and  the 
authors invoked the ‘martyr nation of Ireland’ and its ‘distinguished Prime Minister’ 
as  their  acclaimed  inspiration  to  fight  until  death  for  ‘the  independence  of  our 
beloved Basque nation’.140 They pledged their lives to defeat the Francoist ‘tyranny’ 
through the  example  given  by the  ‘forger  of  Irish independence’.141 The  note  is 
important because it gives continuation to his chequered record with the Basques. 
On the one hand de Valera had shown compassion in 1940 by granting asylum to a 
group of refugees and, in defiance of the express wishes of the Spanish Minister in 
Dublin, the Basques had not been forcibly deported. However, in spite of the fact 
that  there  was  little  he  could  do  for  the  Basque  people  in  mainland  Spain,  his 
Government continuously turned a blind eye to their suffering even though he had 
always supported the principle of self-determination. He was mindful never to raise 
the question of Basque self-determination with the Spanish authorities.
Before leaving the country, de Valera sent a telegram to Artajo in Spanish142 
that  conveyed his  ‘deep appreciation’  for the kindness bestowed on him and for 
accompanying him to Loyola.143 He expressed his delight with his first visit to this 
‘beautiful country’ and hoped to return once again.144 As suddenly as the party had 
arrived they were soon ready to depart for Portugal on 10 September. A local tourist 
and travel magazine, Zaraúz Playa de Moda, contacted McCauley and requested an 
Irish translation for a feature article that it  wanted to do on the Taoiseach’s trip. 
Throughout  his  political  life  de Valera  had given primacy to  the restoration  and 
promotion of the Irish language. It was a fundamental tenet of Fianna Fáil’s party 
manifesto and in the 1937 constitution Irish was declared to be the ‘first official 
language’  of  the  State.145 Joseph  Walshe  had  always  followed  his  Minister’s 
138 Note from a group called the ‘Basque Patriots of Zaraúz’ to Éamon de Valera (U.C.D.A., Éamon 
de Valera Private Papers, P150/3044). 
139 For  a  good  outline  on  Franco’s  repression  of  the  Basques  in  the  post-war  period  see  Paddy 
Woodworth, ‘Why do they kill? The Basque conflict in Spain’ in World Policy Journal, xviii (2001), 
pp 1-12.
140 Note from a group called the ‘Basque Patriots of Zaraúz’ to Éamon de Valera (U.C.D.A., Éamon 
de Valera Private Papers, P150/3044). 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid.   
143 Telegram from Éamon de Valera to Alberto Martín-Artajo (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3018/E48). 
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145 Article eight, section one of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland. 
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instructions  to  try  and  raise  the  uniqueness  of  the  language  abroad.  McCauley 
acknowledged that the request was ‘breaking new ground to have an article in Irish 
printed in Spain.’146 When the initial request had been submitted by the magazine on 
19 October, the editors had informed McCauley that it had to be ready by the start of 
April.  Not  until  25  March 1954,  barely in  time  for  the  print  deadline  and after 
several reminders had been sent to McCauley by the editors, was the Irish translated 
copy forwarded from Dublin. This incident was indicative of a lax approach to joint 
projects. Time and again it  seemed that Irish foreign policy was moved more by 
political  considerations  then  by  economic  or  cultural  ones.  It  was  generally  the 
Spanish who showed the initiative to promote a project and the Irish who turned 
down cooperation, usually on financial grounds. Despite his acquired reputation for 
skilfully handling foreign policy during the war, de Valera must shoulder the blame 
for failing to bring a more dynamic element and drive to Irish-Spanish relations in 
the post-war period. 
De Valera was not the only famous visitor to Spain during McCauley’s time 
there. Dr Lucey, Bishop of Cork, visited Santiago de Compostela and Loyola whilst 
Seán  MacEoin,  Minister  for  Defence,  held  a  personal  meeting  with  Franco.147 
Momentous  changes  were  happening  in  Spain  at  that  time.  Franco  signed  a 
Concordat with the Vatican that restored harmony between both Church and State 
whilst the U.S. began the construction of several  military bases and installations, 
which  Ángel  Viñas  argues,  surrendered  considerable  sovereignty  to  an  external 
power.148 These events were not being monitored with due diligence by McCauley. 
Dublin had to send specific instructions to him to report on the precise attitude of 
Franco to ‘the U.S.A., the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Spain’s position in an 
East-West conflict, and British policy towards Spain.’149 The Secretary of External 
Affairs,  Seán  Nunan,  stated:  ‘we  get  few  –  if  any  –  “political”  reports  from 
Madrid.’150 This viewpoint was shared by the Assistant Secretary and Legal Advisor, 
146 Note from McCauley to the Department of External Affairs (N.A.I., D.F.A., P.C. 5/5/3). 
147 A  photograph  in  this  collection  shows  MacEoin  in  a  private  meeting  with  General  Franco 
(U.C.D.A., Seán MacEoin Private Papers, P151/2014). 
148 See Ángel Viñas,  Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda económica,  
recortes de soberanía (Barcelona, 1981).
149 Department of External Affairs to McCauley, 20 May 1953 (N.A.I., D.F.A., 313/9). 
150 Ibid. 
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Dr Michael  Rynne,  who judged most  of McCauley’s  reports  to be ‘of  academic 
rather than practical interest’.151 His performance in a bilateral trade agreement that 
was supposed to redress Ireland’s balance of payments deficit was poor. Equally, his 
record  in  promoting  closer  cultural  interaction  was  below  par.  If  Finance  was 
unwilling to extend greater financial and human resources to Ireland’s mission in 
Spain,  then  at  the  very  least  External  Affairs  had  to  counterbalance  these 
deficiencies with competent and skilled personnel on the ground who would act as 
Ireland’s eyes and ears there. McCauley did not meet these requirements and as a 
consequence, he was replaced by Dr Rynne.152 
Towards Membership of the United Nations
For both nations the path towards admission into the U.N. was overshadowed by 
their conduct during the Second World War. Ireland’s process began on 2 August 
1946 when its application for membership was submitted but subsequently vetoed 
by the Soviet Union because, as Joseph Skelly has shown, it  ‘feared that Ireland 
would  back  the  West’.153 The  Spanish  Minister  in  Dublin,  the  Count  of  Artaza, 
compiled  an  important  report  to  Madrid  following  on  from  this  exclusion  that 
ultimately  enshrined  everything  about  Ireland’s  relationship  with  the  U.N.  He 
declared: 
Ireland  was,  like  ourselves,  neutral  in  the  past  conflict  and  one  of  the  
objections that has been made against applying for admission has been that to 
enter the organisation, Ireland might some day see itself forced against its  
will to take unfriendly measures against Spain, a course the majority of this 
country considered against the historical tradition and good relations which 
both countries maintain.154 
151 Ibid. 
152 On 7 Mar. 1955 the Irish Independent stated that McCauley had been awarded the Gran Cruz de 
Isabel la Católica by Franco. 
153 Joseph Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: a 
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154 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2662/E12-21). 
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This forecast was proved correct when on 30 July 1947 Ireland was again debarred 
from membership by a Soviet veto not only due to its staunch Catholicism and pro-
Americanism but because it ‘did not help the Allies to lay the foundations of the 
organisation which she is now trying to enter’ and that it had always maintained a 
friendly attitude ‘with Franco Spain.’155 This last point was critical and formed the 
basis upon which Irish policy makers refused to pursue with eagerness membership 
of the U.N. – the world’s most important international organisation. Neither Éamon 
de Valera nor John A. Costello wanted the U.N. to interfere in the internal affairs of 
another  nation and this  principle  was always cited,  in addition to the controlling 
influence of the Soviet  Union, as a weakness of the U.N. that  Ireland could not 
support. Consequently, the promotion of Ireland abroad was centred within regional 
organisations, like the O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe. The consequence of this 
policy decision was that the nation was to join its historic friend on the periphery of 
world affairs and staunchly support Spain, thus ‘jeopardising’ Ireland’s applications 
to join the U.N., as Ronan Mulvaney has confirmed.156
In  the  post-war  period  the  Francoist  regime  sponsored the  publication  of 
innumerable books which endeavoured to extricate Spain from the international taint 
of  Axis  collaboration.157 One  apologist,  Eduardo  Comín  Colomer,  published  an 
account of Franco’s ‘chivalrous’ conduct during the war that repudiated all charges 
made against the regime by the Allies.158 He argued that the propaganda campaign 
aimed at  the regime was financed by ‘the reserves from the Bank of Spain’ that 
Republican  exiles  had  stolen.159 However,  on  24  April  1945  Freda  Kirchwey, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Friends of the Spanish Republic, had 
published  a  damaging  memorandum  for  submission  at  the  United  Nations 
Conference  in  San  Francisco  that  detailed  the  unneutral  conduct  of  the  Franco 
regime during the Second World War.160 The memorandum requested delegates to 
155 Veto by the Soviet Union, 30 July 1947 (N.A.I., D.T., S13750). 
156 Ronan  Mulvaney,  ‘Ireland  and  the  “Spanish  question”,  1945-50’  in  Declan  Downey & J.  C. 
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‘bar the admission of Franco Spain’ because the regime had been an ‘active ally of 
the Axis partners’ throughout the war and had permitted ‘ports to be utilised as Nazi 
submarine  bases’.161 In  addition  to  citing  the  ‘accelerated’  flow of  essential  raw 
materials  destined  for  use  in  Germany’s  war  economy  after  the  capitulation  of 
France,  the  memorandum  outlined  the  systematic  persecution  that  had  been 
orchestrated at the highest levels of the State against its own citizens: ‘By 1943 more 
than a million people were in concentration camps, prisons, and labour battalions, 
subjected to the brutal measures of repression.’162 The members of the organisation 
requested that the U.N. should endeavour to ostracise this totalitarian dictatorship 
and in  its  place  facilitate  ‘the efforts  of  Spanish  Republican  elements  to  form a 
democratic government; and to reserve a place in the Security Organisation for such 
a Republican Government when formed.’163 
Franco had kept Lequerica as Minister  for Foreign Affairs after  Jordana’s 
death because with the defeat of the Axis powers Franco knew that both Lequerica 
and the Falange were entirely dependent on him for their  own survival and thus 
would obey him unquestionably.  Franco had deliberately chosen not to appoint a 
more pro-Allied Minister because the Allies would have inevitably focused on, and 
encouraged, such an appointee to form the nucleus of an internal opposition force to 
oust  the  Caudillo from power  and pave  the  way for  a  return  of  the  Monarchy. 
Lequerica had ordered all senior officials in the Ministry and diplomats abroad to 
combat vigorously the growing swell of inflammatory propaganda emanating from 
anti-Francoist  sources such as the Mexican Government  and Spanish Republican 
exiles. He countered the accusations that the regime was tyrannical by asserting that 
such accusations ran contrary to ‘the peace and prosperity of Spain in these last few 
years’ which was ‘one of the most extraordinary phenomenons’ of that time.164 He 
contended that the Cortes represented ‘authentic Spanish opinion’ were the ‘thought 
and feeling of the country’ was articulated.165
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For all his endeavours, Lequerica failed to stop the U.N. from condemning 
the  regime.  On 2 August  1945 during  the  Potsdam Conference,  President  Harry 
Truman of the United States, Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union and Clement 
Atlee, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, issued a joint declaration that rejected 
Spanish admission to the U.N.: 
having been established with the support of the Axis powers, in view of its 
origins, nature, behaviour and close association with the aggressor States,  
[Spain] does not possess the necessary qualities to justify admission.166
Franco’s decision to replace Lequerica with Alberto Martín-Artajo was to prove a 
significant  development  in  Irish-Spanish  relations  as  he  looked  to  the  historic 
friendship to help Spain break out of its enforced isolation. Moreover, as Florentino 
Portero  has  shown,  Artajo’s  appointment  would have been viewed positively by 
Catholic  countries  because  of  the  ‘new look’  and  focus  on  Catholicism  that  he 
promoted.167 On 25 August Artajo refuted the Potsdam declaration by claiming that 
the ‘movement of liberation of 1936 was an authentic national uprising with moral 
and  historical  justification’.168 The  Francoist  State  was  ‘open,  flexible  and 
evolutionary’  and  understood  the  needs  of  the  nation  better  than  any  external 
authority.169 Every month he dispatched telegrams to Artaza, to refute vigorously the 
‘innumerable  calumnies’  that  were  festering  universal  opprobrium  against  the 
regime: ‘Spain today continues to be strong and secure in itself and believes with 
certainty that in its own hands lies its future.’170 Such statements were deliberately 
designed to meet with de Valera’s long-held belief in the inalienable right of every 
country to  self-determination.  Artajo encouraged leading  Irish Hispanists  to give 
public  speeches  attacking  the  international  perception  of  the  regime.  Professor 
166 Declaration at Potsdam, 2 Aug. 1945 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3877/E3). 
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Walter Starkie spoke at the University of Compostela on 28 November and declared 
that Spain was ‘a real force and will be once again’.171
Artajo was aware that Ireland’s proximity to Britain meant that imports of 
British publications and anti-fascist statements by the press and Labour Government 
had to be challenged in order to maintain close bilateral relations with Ireland. As 
the regime became more identified with its adherence to Catholicism rather than to 
Fascism  it  wanted  to  be  associated  with  other  Catholic  nations.  Ireland  meant 
something vital to the regime – respectability. Time and again the historic links were 
evoked to argue that if a democratic, friendly, neutral and religious State like Ireland 
maintained relations with Spain then the international condemnation of the regime 
was baseless.
 The  years  1945-50  could  rightly  be  called  the  wilderness  years  for  the 
Francoist regime. Condemned by the U.N. and ostracised to the point of obscurity, 
the regime was limited in how it could effectively channel its resistance to enforced 
isolation. One means was through State-controlled media with the press lambasting 
the  U.N.  relentlessly  whilst  on  Radio  Nacional,  programs  such  as  ‘Gibraltar: 
comentarios de un español’ disseminated vitriolic propaganda at the West and the 
Soviet  Union.  But  who  was  listening  to  the  regime?  Neither  the  West  nor  the 
Vatican was moved to help Spain or interfere in its domestic affairs. Ireland was one 
of  the  few  nations  that  stretched  out  an  altruistic  hand.172 At  the  Emergency 
Economic Committee for Europe, the biggest conference held since the war, and the 
Conference of European Economic Cooperation, the nations of Europe denied Spain 
a  voice  on  the  international  stage.  The  Sunday  Independent  stated  that  it  was 
‘unthinkable’ to plan greater regional cooperation without Spain.173 In April 1947 at 
the International Convention of Telecommunications in Washington D.C. Spain was 
again excluded from attending. It was left to Ireland to speak on behalf of Spain and 
‘adopt an attitude…in favour of the assistance of Spain’.174 At the International Civil 
Aviation  Provisional  Organisation  in  Montreal,  that  Spain  was  debarred  from 
171 Speech delivered by Professor  Walter Starkie at  the University of  Compostela,  28 Nov. 1945 
(ibid.). 
172 Argentina and Portugal maintained full relations with Spain.
173 Sunday Independent, 13 July 1947. 
174 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 Apr. 1947 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 2662/E12-21). 
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attending, External Affairs was requested to ‘issue instructions’ to its delegates ‘in 
order  to prevent  the “Spanish Question” being raised’.175 Ireland adopted a  most 
‘loyal position’ in defence of its friend.176  
Inside  the  Palacio  de  Santa  Cruz,  Artajo  and  José  Sebastián  de  Erice  y 
O’Shea177 worked  to  break  this  international  stranglehold  through  aligning  the 
regime with a broad coalition of supporters, a difficult task in the immediate post-
war  period.  On  14  December  1950  at  a  speech  before  the  Cortes,  Artajo 
acknowledged,  to  sustained  applause,  that  to  ‘Catholic  Ireland’  did  Spain  owe 
everything up to that point.178 Both nations were ‘tied’ together through destiny and 
Ireland’s  decision  to  ignore  the  ‘international  blockade’  and  stand  by  its  friend 
would  forever  be  remembered  through  the  annals  of  history.179 Ireland  had  also 
proven useful for harnessing the support of the broad Irish-American community in 
the United States which looked with sympathy on Spain’s isolation. Although it was 
ultimately  the  broader  East-West  conflict  that  pulled  Spain  back  into  the 
international  scene,  as  Boris  Liedtke  has  demonstrated,180 the regime did flex its 
muscles and show considerable political  clout by singlehandedly forging a broad 
coalition of nations to help attain membership of the U.N. 
The  regime  took  advantage  of  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  and  France’s 
deteriorating image and declining presence in the Maghreb to win over the Arab 
grouping in the U.N. The rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser and pan-Arabism in Egypt 
proved beneficial. On 18 December 1953 at a secret meeting held in Cairo between 
the Spanish Ambassador, the Marquess of Santa Cruz, and a large ‘African-Asiatic 
group’,  Spain was assured of the ‘votes of the Arab countries.’181 Why were the 
Arabs sympathetic to the regime knowing Franco’s previous imperial machinations 
towards North Africa, his control of Spanish Morocco and Spain’s past inglorious 
treatment of the Moors? Firstly, like Ireland, Egypt and the Maghreb could identify 
175 Ibid. 
176 Artaza to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 May 1947 (ibid.). 
177 Director General of Foreign Policy. 
178 ‘La política internacional de España en 1945-1950. Discurso del Ministro de Negocios Extranjeros 
ante las Cortes españolas,’ B.N., 14 Dec. 1950. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Boris Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship: U.S. relations with Spain, 1945-53 (Basingstoke, 1998).  
181 Santa Cruz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 Dec. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 5006/E134). 
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with Spain because foreign powers occupied part of its territory. The Egyptians, in 
particular, detested foreign occupation of the Suez Canal as much as Franco wanted 
to drive the British out of Gibraltar. In addition, the regime had never recognised the 
State of Israel which was seen as a good gesture to the Arabs and because it was far 
more  civil  in  its  treatment  of  natives  and  did  not  ‘pursue  imperialist  ends  in 
Morocco’, unlike the French.182
On 3 January 1953  Madrid published a  letter  from Costa  Rica,  Ecuador, 
Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Paraguay. The letter was a 
collective invitation to join ancillary bodies of the U.N. that were not subject to a 
veto.  Spain  had  used  its  cultural,  linguistic  and  historical  links  with  its  former 
colonies to rescue it from its current impasse and with the support of this group it 
was permitted to join the U.N. Educational,  Scientific  and Cultural  Organisation, 
Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Health Organisation. On the 16 
January Artajo issued a bulletin describing the gesture as an ‘eloquent testimony of 
the affection and solidarity of the brother countries’  for the mother  country.183 It 
highlighted,  he  argued,  the  ‘moral  authority’  and  ‘spiritual  influence’  that  Spain 
commanded over Central and South America.184 It was the Dominican Republic’s 
dictator, Dr Trujillo, who proved the most influential supporter of the regime in the 
group. He unashamedly declared both himself and Franco to be the great statesmen 
of the world who had never ceded an inch ‘to Communists and leftist forces’.185 
On 25 January 1955 the U.N. permitted  the regime to  have a  Permanent 
Observer to the organisation.186 With the West behind Spain it seemed that only the 
Soviet  veto  blocked Spanish  and  Irish  full  membership  to  the  U.N.  But  for  the 
regime the ‘assassins of José Calvo Sotelo’ and those who had ‘divided Spain’ were 
still placing obstacles in its path.187 Félix Gordon Ordás, President of the Council of 
the  Spanish  Government  in  Exile,  wrote  a  memorandum  to  the  U.N.  Secretary 
182 Ibid. 
183 Bulletin issued by Alberto Martín-Artajo, 16 Jan. 1953 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3179/E50). 
184 Ibid.
185 Publication entitled: ‘For the Admission of Spain into the U.N.’ (Ciudad Trujillo, 1954).  
186 Ibid. 
187 José Calvo Sotelo was a right-wing politician who had been assassinated a week before the rising 
broke out in July 1936. This incident crystallised for the right the complete collapse of law and order 
in the Second Republic (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 4506/E77). 
282
General,  Dag  Hammarskjöld,  asking  him  to  rescind  this  appointment.  On  5 
November Madrid sent a telegram to Erice to vigorously ‘counteract the action’ of 
Ordás.188 In the corridors of power the emerging nations of the world, India and 
China, had begun to pressure the Soviets to accept some form of package deal that 
would allow Spanish and Irish membership in return for the admission of several 
countries in the Communist bloc. Their influential assistance persuaded Russia to 
end its ten year blockade with both nations and a package deal was agreed upon on 
15 December 1955.189 
For Spain acceptance meant that it could now legitimately claim to belong to 
the  free world and vowed to  continue  the  fight  against  the  ‘Machiavellism’  and 
‘diabolical  game  of  the  Kremlin’.190 On  the  17  December  Artajo  dispatched  a 
telegram  to  Liam  Cosgrave,  Minister  for  External  Affairs,  which  expressed  his 
‘great satisfaction’ over Ireland’s admission into the international club.191 He hoped 
both  nations  would work to  maintain  their  ‘close  collaboration’  from within the 
organisation.192 But the Irish seemed more concerned with the financial implications 
of membership than with the possibilities that membership could offer it.193 The U.N. 
had designated $46,278,000 for its budgetary requirements for 1956. Each member 
was to pay a quota with Spain likely to pay over $500,000. As both nations had been 
admitted in December 1955 they were both liable to pay a third of the yearly quota 
for 1955. This particularly irked the Irish but there was nothing they could do about 
it.  Payment  was  obligatory.  With  the  backing  of  the  West,  Central  and  South 
America, the Arab group and Catholic nations, Spain now commanded a formidable 
presence in the U.N. Always pragmatic  the regime was not prepared to wait  for 
Ireland and was determined to carve out its place on the international field. On the 
same  day  that  Artajo  had  telegrammed  Cosgrave,  Madrid  informed  Dag 
Hammarskjöld  that  José  Félix  de  Lequerica  had  been  chosen  by  the  Spanish 
188 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to José Sebastián de Erice y O’Shea, 5 Nov. 1955 (ibid.). 
189 Along with Ireland and Spain, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Austria, Jordan, Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, 
Libya,  Nepal  were  the  other  non-Communist  nations  allowed full  membership  of  the  U.N.  This 
brought to seventy-six the total number of nations in the U.N.G.A. 
190 Communiqué issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 3877/E2). 
191 Telegram from Alberto Martín-Artajo to Liam Cosgrave, 17 Dec. 1955 (ibid.).  
192 Ibid. 
193 Irish note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 Dec. 1955 (A.M.A.E., leg. R – 4278/E18). 
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Government to become its Permanent Representative to the organisation. The man 
who had once derided Churchill as a drunken gangster to French Senators and who 
had plotted France’s downfall as Hitler’s panzers raced westwards in May 1940, was 
now acceptable to the international community. Franco had an international stage to 
portray  himself  as  the  sagacious  statesman.  He  could  rightly  conclude  that 
everything was atado, y bien atado.194 
194 A favourite saying of Franco’s.  It  literally translates into English as ‘tied down and well tied 
down’. He used this expression often and especially when something was going well. 
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Conclusion
Proverbs 18:2                                  
Proverbs 18:24 aptly define Irish-Spanish relations from 1939-55: ‘There is a friend 
that sticketh closer than a brother.’ This relationship between Dublin and Madrid 
was more than just a study in bilateral interaction; it is a definition of friendship. 
Few, if any, of the leading participants in the development and progression of that 
close  and  historic  friendship  survive  to  this  day.  The  cited  opinions  of  Liam 
Cosgrave,  former  Minister  for  External  Affairs  and  Taoiseach,  on  the  rationale 
behind the links provide an explanation as to why that friendship was so valued and 
upheld at the time. His opinions are also an aid to historians for they corroborate the 
documental  evidence  found  in  the  archives.  After  the  harrowing  and  traumatic 
experience of the Spanish Civil War, both nations extended their hands to each other 
in the hope that a normalisation in bilateral relations could be quickly resumed. The 
Irish State not only embraced with goodwill this expectation but worked tirelessly to 
assist its partner throughout the Second World War and into the politically-charged 
atmosphere of the post-war years.  This relationship was always  based on mutual 
cooperation and became a genuine friendship during the years 1939-55 because of 
the shared experiences of territorial disputes, neutrality, post-war isolation, religion 
and tradition. 
In light of the findings of the thesis it is necessary to reflect, firstly, how we 
assess Irish foreign policy throughout this period, beginning with the Second World 
War. Dermot Keogh1 and Ronan Fanning2 are correct  in their assertion that Irish 
foreign policy was primarily an instrument to assert the nation’s sovereignty on the 
international stage. This research validates and expands on their findings. Neutrality 
was the visible expression of a nation pursuing its own national agenda and interests 
before  moral  considerations  in  the  international  fight  between  Fascism  and 
democracy.  Indeed,  as  Ontiveros’s  reports  demonstrate,  the  inflexibility  of  this 
policy led de Valera to offer on behalf of Ireland, official condolence on the death of 
1 Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 (Dublin, 1988).
2 Ronan Fanning, ‘Irish neutrality – an historical review’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, i 
(1982), pp 27-38.
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Adolf  Hitler,  with  little  regard  for  either  Hitler’s  warmongering,  the  crimes 
perpetrated by Germany or the ramifications this would have on Ireland’s relations 
with the Allies.  Secondly,  it  is  commonly assumed that  because of  the manifest 
importance of religion in Irish society at that time, it had a significant and perhaps 
overbearing  impact  on  the  direction  of  the  country’s  foreign  policy.  This  thesis 
shows that despite a strong public reverence for Catholicism and sense of pride in 
Ireland’s  international  standing  as  a  Catholic  State,  External  Affairs,  although 
mindful to whatever line the Vatican took on a particular issue, did not determine its 
foreign  policy because of  religious  considerations.  This  conclusion  also supports 
Dermot Keogh’s findings in relation to church-State relations within Ireland.3
 Thirdly,  one of the strongest  re-evaluations  that  have emerged from this 
research is the disproportionate attention historians, biographers and scholars have 
focused, hitherto, on the policymakers who directed foreign policy and not on those 
who formed the genesis  of  that  policy – the  diplomats  on the  ground.  Ireland’s 
diplomats  worked tirelessly to promote their  nation’s interests  and to further and 
enhance the cordial relationship with Spain. No diplomat has emerged stronger from 
this  examination  then Leopold  Kerney.  As we have seen,  Kerney performed his 
duties admirably. He was Dublin’s eyes and ears on the ground monitoring events 
and initiating contacts that formed the basis of Ireland’s relationship with Spain. Yet 
his mission was severely inhibited by de Valera’s and Walshe’s obliviousness to the 
Legation’s staffing or financing shortfalls, the overburdening responsibilities placed 
on his shoulders and the other innumerable difficulties he encountered as a result of 
Dublin’s inefficiency. His willingness to persevere in the face of these problems is a 
testament to his professionalism. His defence of Irish neutrality,  as shown in the 
Veesenmayer meeting, represents one of best defences of Irish neutrality during the 
Second World War and comprehensively refutes Donal Ó Drisceoil’s aspersions on 
his character.4  
On  the  Spanish  side,  the  discovery  of  Ontiveros’s  wartime  reports  has 
broadened our understanding of life in neutral Ireland for the majority of people who 
lived through those years of isolation. Their lives were directly conditioned by the 
3 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, the bishops and Irish politics, 1919-39 (New York, 1986). 
4 Donal Ó Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland, 1939-1945: neutrality, politics and society (Cork, 1996).
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neutral  policy  pursued  by  their  political  leaders.  Our  knowledge  of  censorship, 
rationing and the changing public mood has all  been enhanced as a result  of his 
observations.  As  an  outsider  looking  in  Ontiveros’s  wartime  dispatches  are  an 
invaluable addition to the historical narrative of this period. His reports corroborate 
Tom Garvin’s investigations5 and James Deeny’s findings on the poor standards of 
living  and  unsanitary  conditions  endured  by  thousands  of  Dublin’s  poor.6 The 
reports provide a window into the elevated lifestyles enjoyed by the small elite of the 
capital for whom life in “de Valera’s Ireland” was not so bad. More importantly, 
Ontiveros’s  contacts  with  influential  conservative  and  right-wing  elements 
illuminate the support that General Franco enjoyed in Irish society,  in a way that 
significantly builds on Fearghal McGarry’s work in this area from 1936-9.7 These 
supporters were prepared to use national broadsheets, such as the Irish Independent  
and  The Standard, as well as religious and political commemorations to assist the 
Spanish  Minister  in  presenting  this  violent  dictatorship  in  as  benign  a  light  as 
possible to the general masses. Ireland’s backwardness in education and illiteracy, 
its  stringent  censorship  policy  and  lack  of  foreign  correspondents  to  report 
accurately  on  what  was  really  happening  in  Spain  at  this  time,  also  helped  the 
Spanish Minister’s propaganda campaign.  
Partly as a result of personal tragedy in his own life, Ontiveros became a 
fervent  supporter  of  Fascism.  In  keeping  with  diplomatic  practice  at  the  time, 
Madrid dispatched a diplomat  of  extreme right-wing tendencies  to  represent  and 
promote the new Spanish State abroad. Throughout his time in Ireland, and despite 
operating a mission with completely inadequate resources, Ontiveros hunted with 
zeal dissidents and opponents of the Francoist dictatorship. The exhaustive efforts he 
employed in his pursuit of the Basque refugees highlights the regime’s paranoia and 
fear that  these elements might  one day return to oust  it  from power. His reports 
confirm the anti-Semitism, suspicion of Freemasonry and mistrust of Republicanism 
– in an Irish context this was represented in the I.R.A. – that present us with a clearer 
picture behind the mindset of Spanish diplomacy at that time. Yet in spite of his 
5 Tom Garvin, Preventing the future: why was Ireland so poor for so long? (Dublin, 2005).
6 See James Deeney, To cure and to care: memoirs of a Chief Medical Officer (Dublin, 1989).
7 Fearghal McGarry, Irish politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999). 
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flaws the Minister  succeeded in  his  mission.  Bilateral  political  relations  between 
Dublin and Madrid were restored, enhanced and strengthened not just because of a 
shared experience of neutrality and the pressure exerted on both countries by the 
belligerent powers, but because of the groundwork done by Ontiveros to promote 
cordial relations.   
 As a  direct  result  of  neutrality  both  countries  were spared  the  appalling 
consequences  of  the  war  yet  the  conflict  still  conditioned  the  actions  of  their 
Governments. It has been shown in this research that although Ireland practised a 
much  stricter  form of  neutrality,  it  did  ultimately pursue  a  more  friendly policy 
towards the Allies, a conclusion supported by Henry Patterson.8 Spain by contrast 
repeatedly  violated  international  legislation  and  pursued  a  pro-Axis  orientated 
foreign  policy.  The  furtive  provisioning  of  submarines,  a  pro-German  press,  the 
unhindered activities of espionage agents inside the country and the construction of 
Abwehr radio transmitters around Gibraltar were all flagrant breaches of the Hague 
Convention  on  Neutral  Powers  that  defined  the  rights  and  responsibilities  of  a 
neutral country. Whilst this has been documented in recent years,9 Kerney’s reports 
confirm beyond doubt the pro-Axis sympathies and support rendered for that cause 
and categorically refutes post-war memoirs that presented a false picture of Spanish 
neutrality  during  the  war.10 His  analysis  of  the  press,  the  dispatch  of  the  Blue 
Division,  the  Falange  and the  imperial  aspirations  of  the  regime  as  well  as  his 
monitoring of the political situation through his contacts at Government level and 
within  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  validate  Manuel  Ros  Agudo’s  investigations  on 
Spain’s ‘unneutral’ neutrality.11 
Kerney’s dispatches comprehensively prove that Franco was far from being 
the sensible statesmen during the war that apologist historians portray him as.12 The 
8 Henry Patterson, Ireland since 1939: the persistence of conflict (Dublin, 2006). 
9 See Javier Tusell, Franco, España y la II Guerra Mundial: entre el Eje y la neutralidad (Madrid, 
1995).
10 J. M. Doussinague, España tenía razón, 1939-1945 (Madrid, 1949), Ramón Serrano Súñer,  Entre 
Hendaya y Gibraltar (Madrid, 1947).  
11 M. R. Agudo, La gran tentación: Franco, el imperio colonial y los planes de intervención  en  la  
Segunda Guerra Mundial (Barcelona, 2008).
12 See Brian Crozier, Franco: a biographical history (London, 1967), Sancho González, Diez años de 
historia difícil: índice de la neutralidad de España (Madrid, 1959), M. M. Labarra, El desafío rojo a 
España (Madrid, 1968). 
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Irish diplomat’s  reports  further  challenge  recent  scholarly findings.  Denis  Smyth 
argued that Britain’s pragmatic policy towards the regime, particularly from 1940-1 
when Britain’s own strategic situation was perilous, helped in keeping Spain neutral. 
Kerney’s reading of the situation as events unfolded proved that this is too simplistic 
a conclusion. The Irish Minister believed that Britain’s policy towards Spain was a 
failure  because  it  did  not  stop  the  large  scale  assistance  that  the  regime  was 
rendering to the Axis. Smyth in his analysis failed to give enough consideration to 
the importance Germany exercised over Spanish foreign policy. As Paul Preston has 
shown,13 Spain was only of minor importance in Hitler’s broad geopolitical outlook 
and Franco’s meeting with Hitler at Hendaye in October 1940 confirmed, in Hitler’s 
mind,  that  Spanish  neutrality  was  of  greater  benefit  to  Germany  than  active 
participation in the war. Kerney said himself that the failure of the Italians to mount 
a  successful  campaign  anywhere  in  the  war  was  a  clear  indication  that  a  much 
weaker  Spain  would  be  of  little  or  no  assistance  to  the  Axis.  Germany’s 
unwillingness  to have Spain involved in the war,  rather  than Britain’s  pragmatic 
diplomacy, kept Spain out of the conflict.  
 Recent scholarly research, especially important to Spanish historians,  has 
centred on the investigation of post-Civil War executions committed by the regime. 
As we have seen, estimates vary from 10,000 to 50,000 to in excess of 150,000. 
Without further examination this will remain a disputed field. Although Kerney was 
hampered  in  his  movements  because  of  petrol  rationing  and  the  refusal  of  the 
Department  of  Finance  to  sanction  any  additional  expense  without  prior 
consultation, he was aware throughout his time in the capital that the killings were 
still ongoing. Julius Ruiz has claimed that a Government order from January 1940 
marked a decisive turning point in the repression and from then on lengthy prison 
sentences  rather  than executions  became the norm.14 In fact,  as  Kerney’s  reports 
highlight, this is a misconception. The military still commanded a decisive role in 
the macabre process and it, rather than the judicial branch of the State, continued to 
arrest and execute opponents, not just throughout 1943 and 1944 but even after the 
13 Paul Preston, ‘Franco and Hitler: the myth of Hendaye, 1940’ in Contemporary European History, i 
(1992), pp 1-16.
14 Julius Ruiz, Franco’s justice: repression in Madrid after the Spanish Civil War (Oxford, 2005).  
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Second World War had ended. In his last report on executions in June 1945 Kerney 
details  another  batch  of  prisoners  that  were  executed  close  to  the  Legation.  If 
frequent killings like these were happening in the capital then it is probable that they 
were also occurring throughout the country. 
The Frank Ryan case was the most controversial  and contentious issue in 
Irish-Spanish relations during this period. Although the life of Frank Ryan has been 
documented,15 little has been known about Spanish perceptions of him or why he 
was kept for so long in prison. As a result of original material unearthed from the 
Spanish  archives,  a  much  broader  picture  has  emerged  that  helps  in  our 
understanding of this polemical issue. Despite the tireless efforts Leopold Kerney 
made on behalf of Ryan and his Government, we now know that the Spanish, and 
Franco in particular, had no intention of releasing Ryan. Ontiveros was made well 
aware by both de Valera and Joseph Walshe in his first meeting with them in May 
1939 that  the Irish Government,  a  Catholic  nation that  had enjoyed centuries  of 
friendship with Spain,  looked on his  continued arrest  as a  blight  on the historic 
relationship.  But  neither  Ontiveros,  nor  Franco  for  that  matter,  were  moved  by 
religious compassion. The files reveal not only clandestine infiltration by Catholic 
elements of pro-Frank Ryan meetings but also clerical condemnation of Ryan that 
certainly influenced Spanish perceptions  of him.  As Paul Preston16 and Christian 
Leitz17 have  shown,  both  Franco  and  his  brother-in-law,  Ramón  Serrano  Súñer, 
repeatedly supported the Axis cause through clandestine assistance. The transfer of 
Ryan to the Abwehr corroborates these findings.     
In  the  post-war  period  both  countries  were  inhibited  from  gaining 
membership to the U.N. and as a consequence were left to languish on the periphery 
of international affairs. As this thesis has revealed, both were excluded for different 
reasons yet as a result of the examination of the diplomatic files a re-evaluation  on 
our  perceptions  of  Ireland’s  and  Spain’s  place  in  the  post-war  period  is  now 
15 See Seán Cronin,  Frank Ryan: the search for the Republic (Dublin, 1980),  Fearghal  McGarry, 
Frank Ryan  (Dublin, 2010) and Robert  Stradling,  The Irish and the Spanish Civil  War,  1936-39  
(Manchester, 1999). 
16 Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993).  
17 Christian  Leitz, Economic  relations  between  Nazi  Germany  and  Franco’s  Spain,  1936-1945  
(Oxford, 1996). 
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necessary.  Contrary to Joseph Skelly’s view18 that de Valera and External Affairs 
desired a more active role for Ireland abroad, the continued partition of the country, 
the fear that the U.N. would interfere in the internal affairs of another State and his 
preoccupation  with  preserving  his  romanticised  vision  for  Ireland,  hindered  the 
nation’s  evolution  on  the  international  stage.  This  was  borne  out  repeatedly  in 
private  conversations  with  Artaza.  Michael  Kennedy’s  assertion  that  External 
Affairs  became  more  expansionist  during  the  1950s  is  likewise  called  into 
question.19 Although Seán MacBride  increased  the number  of  overseas  missions, 
which were then subsequently reduced when de Valera returned to power, he too 
centred Irish foreign policy in the post-war years on the thorny issue of partition. As 
Miraflores’s reports illustrate, the Irish subordinated their national and international 
development  to  this  parochial  issue.  The  Spanish  watched  on  with  growing 
incredulity as Ireland failed to extract positive dividends from its membership of the 
O.E.E.C. and Council of Europe. Ireland’s distancing from the United States, first by 
discontinuing  the  Marshall  Plan  and  second,  by  refusing  to  join  NATO,  further 
isolated the country. 
For the policymakers  in the Palacio  de Santa Cruz,  the challenges  facing 
Spain in the immediate post-war years were extremely sombre. However, in spite of 
this, Spanish foreign policy was driven and focused primarily towards breaking the 
country out of its enforced ostracism. The appointment of Alberto Martin-Artajo, as 
Florentio  Portero has demonstrated,20 gave the regime a veneer  of respectability. 
This  new look symbolised  its  desire  to  be identified  as  a Catholic  rather  than a 
fascist State. Although Boris Liedtke has correctly argued that the broader East-West 
conflict,21 rather than any shrewd diplomacy on the part of Franco, was the decisive 
factor in its rapprochement with the West, the diplomatic files reveal that Spanish 
foreign policy on its own merits helped its rehabilitation back into the international 
fold. Miraflores’s successful relationship with the U.S. Ambassador in Ireland and 
18 Joseph Skelly, ‘Ireland, the Department of External Affairs, and the United Nations, 1946-55: a 
new look’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, vii (1996), pp 63-80.
19 Michael Kennedy & Eunan O’Halpin, Ireland and the Council of Europe: from isolation towards  
integration (Strasbourg, 2000).
20 Florentino Portero, Franco aislado: la cuestión española, 1945-50 (Madrid, 1989). 
21 Boris Liedtke, Embracing a dictatorship: U.S. relations with Spain, 1945-53 (Basingstoke, 1998). 
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the arrival of the Elcano ship to Dublin were evidence of this broad strategy aimed 
at showing the West that Spain, unlike Ireland, was prepared to become an active 
participant and defensive bulwark against Communism in Europe.
A trait common to both countries that has become evident as a consequence 
of  this  investigation  concerns  the  overarching  presence  and  influence  of  their 
political  leaders.  De  Valera,  a  national  hero  to  many  and  lifelong  supporter  of 
democracy,  could never  be categorised in  the same context  as Franco,  but some 
interesting  new insights  have now emerged that  shows similarities  between both 
men. During the Second World War, both commanded a tighter reign on power than 
at  any  other  time  in  their  respective  careers.  Both  were  devoutly  religious  and 
conservative  yet  were  determined  not  to  allow  the  church  interfere  in  political 
affairs. They also came to believe that they were the physical embodiment of the 
nation they represented and genuinely thought that  the vision they held for their 
countries was the correct one. As Tim Pat Coogan22 and Ángel Viñas23 have shown, 
the idea that Ireland and Spain could insulate themselves from the outside world and 
pursue a policy of self-sufficiency or autarky, in defiance of the forces that came to 
be known as globalisation,  has left  a lasting indictment  on their  leadership.  This 
thesis extends that criticism to their handling of foreign affairs and confirms Denis 
Smyth’s judgement that Franco was an inept statesman.24 Although de Valera has 
been praised for his skilful handling of foreign policy,25 as we have seen throughout 
the  thesis  this  is  now  called  into  question  in  light  of  his  failings  as  both  an 
administrator and policymaker.  
Perhaps  the  greatest  irony  to  emerge  from  the  examination  of  this 
relationship is how ephemeral it  was. Both sides looked and praised the unifying 
links that united this historic friendship – their shared experiences of history, their 
shared  grievance  over  territorial  disputes  with  Britain,  their  conservatism  and 
religious devotion. Historiography on Irish-Spanish relations has, likewise, correctly 
22 Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: long fellow, long shadow (London, 1993).
23 Ángel  Viñas,  Guerra,  dinero,  dictadura: ayuda fascista  y  autarquía en  la  España de Franco  
(Barcelona, 1984).  
24 Denis Smyth, ‘Franco and the Allies in the Second World War’ in Sebastian Balfour and Paul 
Preston (eds), Spain and the great powers in the twentieth century (London, 1999), pp 185-209. 
25 Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev (Dublin, 2007). 
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identified these attributes as the defining characteristics of that relationship.26 It was 
during the years investigated for this research that those links were at their tautest, 
having been strengthened by the shared experience of neutrality, post-war isolation 
and  joint  membership  to  the  U.N.  However,  the  most  revealing  aspect  to  this 
relationship that has now emerged is that once both countries joined the U.N., the 
summit  of international diplomacy,  those unifying links slackened. Both societies 
and Governments, reluctantly, began to see that the antediluvian vision they sought 
to  uphold was no longer  viable.  In  a  Spanish context,  the research validates  the 
theory  of  ‘first’  and  ‘second’  Francoism  as  autarky  gave  way  to  economic 
liberalisation and the 1960s ‘Spanish miracle’.27 It is also ironic, that the Francoist 
dictatorship evolved quicker than democratic Ireland and embraced this change. Yet 
as the observations of Ontiveros, Artaza and Miraflores have all shown, the coming 
man that  they had all  singled out since 1944 to succeed de Valera as Taoiseach 
would emerge  in  1959 to  transform Ireland and place  it  on a  path of  economic 
development and international participation.  From then on economics became the 
defining attribute of the bilateral relationship. 
 
26 Declan  Downey & J. C. MacLennan,  Spanish-Irish relations through the ages  (Dublin,  2008), 
Fearghal McGarry, Irish  politics and the Spanish Civil War (Cork, 1999).
27 Ángel  Viñas,  Guerra,  dinero,  dictadura:  ayuda fascista  y  autarquía en la  España de  Franco  
(Barcelona, 1984).   
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